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1
Introduction
“Tout le monde ayant à manger, la paix peut régner dans les ménages et les familles, le clan ou
la tribu” (Ngongo Mbédé (2003 : 30) “La médiation traditionnelle des conflits par les femmes
au Cameroun”)
The people of the small village Davagang in the Far North of Cameroon can catch fish all year
round due to a deep spot in the Logomatya River situated within the village territory.
Unfortunately, people in neighbouring Padmangay have no such wealth and are jealous of the
high incomes generated from fish during ‘fish-scarce’ periods. When demanding access to this
spot and negotiating their rights does not bring them the desired opportunities, Padmangay’s
inhabitants start claiming what has not been given. The dry period of the year does not offer other
income generating possibilities, so their demands become increasingly intense. They threaten
and even molest Davagang’s women and children on their way to market or school. In the end
they just start catching ‘their’ fish. “What is a village boundary, anyway? The river flows…”  But
Davagang does not accept the interference in its rights, its territory. As Cameroonian villagers,
they call in the police for protection. However, Padmangay’s men do not seem to be impressed
by these representatives of authority. They use guns to safeguard their catch, wound a policeman,
hide successfully against reprisals and consider that the use of violence has helped them to the
scarce resources. Davagang’s people, on the other hand, decide that the police are no use and that
they have to defend their property themselves (own observations, Febr. 2000).
Is it indeed, as the women of Cameroon tell us, food shortages that are a threat to peace, is it
the limited access possibilities to the natural resource fish, or is there something else that
engenders violence along the Logomatya? Whatever it may be, the scarcity of natural
resources certainly plays a role1. It is this role in violent conflict that is the focus of the research
field of Environmental Security (ES). The environment has been both a cause of, and a means
1 See also Dietz (1996).
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in, war since time immemorial, but it has only been since the 1970s onwards that politicians
(e.g. Anwar Sadat in 19792) and security scientists recognised the importance of natural
resources as a factor in the outbreak of violent conflicts. They reluctantly had to acknowledge
that this factor was being chronically overlooked as a cause of conflict. Indeed, if not given
specific attention, the environment will not automatically feature in the analyses (Noorduyn
and De Groot 1999). Moreover, disregarding one of the myriad ‘start-up conditions’3 of a con-
flict prevents people “understanding the likely consequences of any cause [because that] may
depend on understanding its relation to other causes” (Waltz 1959, in Porto 2002: 17). In such
instances, reasons for conflict development may not become clear and an escalation of conflict
cannot be prevented. 
With a view to exploring the role of the newly discovered ecological factor, a host of publi-
cations appeared in the Eighties and Nineties of the last century which described cases in which
environmental degradation or the scarcity of natural resources played a role in the outbreak of
violence4. Nevertheless, to the present day, scholars from the security science field call the
“‘ecological variable’ an underestimated factor [in violent conflicts] among commonly cited
[ones]” (Porto 2002: 2)5. Nevertheless, the roles of renewable and non-renewable resources in
both inter-state wars and intra-state conflicts were examined and a variety of projects focussed
on the environment-conflict nexus. 
Among the most renown is the Environmental Conflict Project (ENCOP) of Bächler and
Spillman in Switzerland6. The Swiss researchers focussed on renewable resources and found
that ‘environmental discrimination’ (uneven distribution of resources between richer and poor-
er or more and less powerful actors) and “bad state performance outside the federal district or
national capital areas” (Bächler 1999: xvi) are important factors in the causal chain. Based on
the analysis of more than forty case studies worldwide, they concluded that environmental
roots of conflict are mostly found in “domestic arenas” (id) and not in interstate wars. They
speak of different problem syndromes (like ethno-political or interregional) in which the envi-
ronment plays different roles. “There are different pathways of present violent conflicts and
wars that could be traced to the environmental roots of the conflict genesis” (Bächler 1999:
xv). The environment plays a role in violent conflict causation, they say, if and when more than
one of five key factors are present. Those factors are: total dependency on the degraded
resources, scarcity of regulatory mechanisms and poor state performance, using environmen-
tal discrimination to pursue (other) group interests, opportunities for ally-formation (often
dependant on strong leaders) and a context of an existing (historic) conflict structure. Whatever
the role of natural resource scarcity may be in the conflict, “the threshold of violence depends
on socio-political factors and not on the degree of environmental degradation as such” (Bächler
1999: xviii).
Two other important projects in the ES-field, with profound political influence in North
2
2 “Egypt”, he said, “would not hesitate to start a war against the up-stream Nile-countries to ascertain the water
supply” (Kakönen 1992a: 5).3 See Sandole (1999).
4 For an overview see Noorduyn and De Groot (1999: 24) and Halle et al (2002).
5 See also Halle et al (2002: i): “A full appreciation of the implications of Environment and Security for devel-
opment co-operation would require a more complete and systematic attempt to examine these issues in a
development country context and from a development country perspective.”
6 See the three-volume ENCOP report of Bächler & Spillmann and Bächler et al published in 1996.
America, are those of the Environmental Conflict and Security Project (ECSP) of the Woodrow
Wilson Institute in the United States7 and the Environmental Change and Acute Conflict Project
(ECACP) of Toronto University in Canada. The second one was headed by Homer-Dixon who,
as long ago as in 1991, published a first article on the relationship of environmental scarcity and
violent conflict. Further research on sixteen case studies only confirmed the early findings. In
1999, the total of the theory of the project, as it had been developed over the years, was com-
piled into one book8. Interstate conflicts over non-renewable resources are not very likely, the
conclusions stated, but the inescapable effects of scarcity of renewable natural resources is
something to worry about. According to Homer-Dixon, such scarcities, springing from deple-
tion of these resources, but also from population growth and an uneven distribution of
resources, cause certain societal effects. These are, first, a decrease in agricultural production
and economic productivity in general, specifically affecting those who depend directly on nat-
ural resources. Secondly, migration and increase of societal segmentation can be expected.
Without ‘ingenuity’ (a certain amount of inventiveness and the combination of inventiveness
with drive and the possibility to implement that inventiveness) to counter these effects and mit-
igate their consequences the effects will cause State breakdown and subsequent violence. This,
therefore, shows a clear relationship with environmental scarcity. However, it is claimed to be
even stronger because a lack of ingenuity may easily be caused by the scarcity itself.
A last project that has to be mentioned is the initiative of the Oslo-based International Peace
Research Institute (PRIO) of Nils Petter Gleditsch9. This focuses not only on environmental
scarcity per se, but takes circumstantial factors, especially the presence of democracy or other
regime types, into consideration. The different characteristics of democracies both prevent the
depletion of natural resources and the outbreak of possible violence resulting from such deple-
tion. In accordance with the ‘ingenuity’ paradigm of Homer-Dixon it is stated that innovation,
substitution and price mechanisms can overcome resource scarcity10.
Although a straightforward link between scarcity and violence has been claimed, the most
obvious link in all the case studies seemed to be the one between abundance-in-scarcity and
violent conflict. This means that generally the natural resource scarcity itself only appeared to
lead to violence when a pocket of abundance of that same resource was present11. It is not
7 This project was headed by Geoffrey Dabelko. See the Environmental Conflict and Security Project Reports
from 1995 onwards (ECSP (1995, 1996) or, for example, Dabelko (1997)).
8 See Homer-Dixon (1999).
9 See, for example, Gleditsch (1997).
10 Because PRIO studied the role of natural resources in general the ‘resource curse’ model is also described
and analysed. See Gleditsch (2003) for the three possible types of influence of resource abundance on vio-
lent conflict
11 People do not fight for ‘nothing’. Nevertheless, pure resource scarcity may be a strong factor in the “rising
tensions in social relations […] thus paving the way for evermore overt expressions of disharmony and vio-
lence”, as André and Platteau (1998) have proved for Rwanda. See also Bigagaza et al (2002).
12 See, for example, Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Collier (1999), Porto (2002), De Soysa (2002), Gleditsch
(2003), Hoeffler and Reynal-Queral (2003). 
13 See e.g. Oketch and Polzer (2002: 88) that it is “false to make a categorical distinction between the eco-
nomic and political”, and that “greed [is not ] the only relevant factor in civil war”. See also Ballentine and
Sherman (2003a: 6): “conceptualising explanations of armed conflict in terms of greed or grievance has
imposed unnecessarily limiting dichotomy on what is, in reality, a highly diverse, complex set of incentive
and opportunity structures that vary across time and location.”
3
‘grievance or greed’ as is now often stated12, but mostly a combination of the two13, possibly
with an emphasis on one of them14. Apart from the collection of example cases featuring both
violence and environmental scarcity, the aim of the projects was to clarify the causal chain and
to discover general patterns. 
It is in this tradition that the current research is placed. In contrast to several critics, this
study does not reject the ES field as such. Yet, the study is no repetition of the work done so
far. On the contrary, this study tries to address the flaws15 that inevitably face such a relative-
ly new science field as Environmental Security. By that, it tries to improve both conceptual and
methodological weaknesses and the analytical profundity. 
1.1 Insecurities and conflict
The most important consideration to be made when performing research in the ES-field is that
natural resource scarcity is never an isolated phenomenon. It is the complex of insecurities and
the interaction of the different types of insecurity, be it social, political, economic or human,
that also makes natural resource insecurity important. It is possible to incorporate all the dif-
ferent (in)securities under one big heading, and then say that people’s actions are pre-eminent-
ly shaped by (the lack of) social security16. That concept will then cover “the sum of all regu-
lations and practices within a society which aim to guarantee the individual or group not only
physical survival, but also general protection against unforeseen risks which would entail the
deterioration of their situation, the consequences of which can not be borne by the individual
or group without external assistance” (Schmidt 1991, in Van den Berg 1997: 9). In such a grand
category “social security presupposes […] the availability of material resources (land, money,
crops, labour)”, and “social resources (social relationships, rights, laws, status and power) [that
guarantee that] the material resources can be transformed into social security provisions” (Von
Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann 1994: 22). 
In this concept, all types of scarcities in the different sub-domains of security are part of
‘social insecurity’, which is the reverse of what is defined by Schmidt (1991). This also applies
to environmental scarcity. Because scarcity in one or more of the basic domains is inherent to
human life (Mohamed Salih 2003), most people and societies have exercised a broad diversi-
ty of responses to it in one or more of these domains, of which violence is but one. One of the
more frequently used investments to reach a more secure position is the assertion of rights
which makes conflict apparent.  
The men from Padmangy certainly did ascertain their rights to the environment, in this
case the deep river spot and the abundant fish there. However, they did not choose violence
right away. Before they felt a grievance over the unequal distribution of access rights, the con-
flict had been hidden, latent, in the sense that although they of course realised the potential of
4
14 And always in combination with other factors: “a key issue of contention [between scholars] has been the
relative explanatory weight of economic factors vis à vis the role played by other political, cultural, and
strategic factors…” (Ballentine and Sherman (2003a: 5)). I will come to that in the next chapter.
15 I will address most of the shortcomings of current ES studies in chapter 2 (on theoretical notions) and
chapter 3 (on methodology).
16 See e.g. Mazzucato and Niemeijer (2000) who stress the importance of social security arrangements to
overcome or prevent environmental degradation.
the deep fish spot, they did not experience it as unjust, because they had their own possibili-
ties in the flooding period, when fish can be found everywhere17. Only in the dry season, when
Davagang caught fish and Padmangay was denied access, did feelings of dismay start to grow,
especially when their general insecurity increased. Soon after that, Padmanagay’s inhabitants
reacted, in what scholars call ‘the phase of requirement’ (Griffiths et al 1996), by demanding
their rights, thereby making the conflict manifest (Chandrasekharan 1997). Only because “..it
[was] not possible to withdraw such a demand within the normal relationship between the par-
ties, and the party with the grievance still want[ed] his ‘right’ …” (Griffiths 1996: 699), did
the conflict escalate.
Indeed, the different stages described here show that conflict is a very broad concept, incor-
porating everything from almost invisible discords of interest or meaning to high-intensity
contention with violent expressions. Thus, to prevent conceptual confusion it is important to
discriminate between conflict and violence that is only part of conflict18. Moreover, confusing
the two concepts makes researchers and managers forget that a conflict is sometimes desirable.
Without conflict, societies would drift in a state of inertia. “Conflict is the seedbed that nour-
ishes social change”, say Rubin et al (1994: 7). Van der Merwe (1993: 263) also states that “...
social upheaval […] contains the seeds of regeneration and growth”. In conflicts the demand
for new institutions in a changing world becomes apparent19. However, although “[c]onflict in
its peaceful forms has engendered much positive change within human society. […], we are
concerned about […] the destruction wrought by violent conflict – the lost lives, the maimed
and traumatised survivors, the economic devastation and the crippled hopes …” (Rupesinghe
1995: viii). Thus, a society needs a certain degree of conflict, but not too much, and not too
intense. “[P]ositive functions of conflict are [often] swamped by the harmful consequences that
derive from the use of heavy contentious tactics.”(Rubin et al 1994: 8-9)20. So, it is this switch
from positive into escalated conflict that needs our attention.
Following the described notions of insecurities, scarcities and conflict, ES appears to be
part of the study of social insecurity and the reactions and investments of actors to counter that.
The type and intensity of actors’ strategies and tactics differ in relation to the type and stage of
their insecurity and, subsequently, the phase of the conflict in which they find themselves. It
is an ‘ES–in–context’ that systematically studies this ‘insecurity complex’. 
In turn, the actions and the factual (physical and social) results thereof influence which
stage of conflict will come next. Safeguarding the resource via a clear assertion of rights by
way of purchase (an economic investment) may cause a diversion away from the next, more
17 Besides being latent, a conflict can also be potential. In this case at the moment the boundaries were set, but
nobody realised that this would lead to unequal fishing possibilities between the two villages, an attentive
observer could have seen that it would lead to inequalities and could have denominated the situation as
“potentially conflictuous”. ‘Latent’ means: involved persons see the problem but they do not (yet) feel a
grievance, nor do they express it.
18 In ES publications this is regularly forgotten. See, for example, the publications of Homer-Dixon and Bächler
themselves and the critic of Peluso and Watts (2001a).
19 See also Laurent and Mathieu (1994); Chauveau et Mathieu (1996).
20 Hoeffler and Reynal-Queral (2003: 22): violent conflicts such as civil wars, although perhaps started to
improve a country’s (or a party’s) possibilities, always turn out to be “development in reverse”. An econom-
ic (and social) revival after a war always has to start at less than zero, and appears to be a very difficult under-
taking. It seems as if this has met with success only after WW II in Europe and only then with substantial
outside help to overcome the ruins of war.
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escalated, conflict stage. As Rupesinghe (1995a: 51) said about the ‘requirement phase’: “if
addressed at this stage the conflict may not escalate”. But what does ‘addressed’ mean? At dif-
ferent phases, different actions can be chosen, both by the direct actors and by the managing
institutions, that all aim to improve the present insecurity. Each action can be the start of the
continuation of, or the diversion away from, the conflict. However, security for one may mean
insecurity for another.
In addition, it has to be stressed that conflicts need not show a linear pattern in the devel-
opment of the different phases. ES in its context of different, mutually influencing insecurities
has to be aware of the possibility of back and forward jumping or spiralling conflicts. For
example, installing “negative peace” (that is, not addressing the structural causes of conflict
(Sandole 1993a: 280-281)) out of necessity in a very acute and violent phase can mean that the
conflict will develop anew. The phases can then show a circular pattern. Moreover, in season-
ally occurring conflicts, temporary solutions can cause the discord to flare up each year, with
the risk of a more escalated temporary end-situation each time: a spiral to violence. Of course,
the stage of grievance, the very low-level insecurity situation (perhaps even only existent in
the mind of the actor), occurs very often, but the human race, being a social race (Clark 1993),
has learned (or got it in his genes)21 to handle these grievances peacefully most of the time. The
social security arrangements of most societies include management and prevention institutions
to resolve conflicts, from whichever domain they may spring, in an early phase.
Besides actions, causes can also differ per stage. There is, or can be, a difference between the
factors that cause the conflict to develop in an early phase and the factors that cause people to
resort to violence at a later phase. Different insecurities may be perceived differently when the
conflict phase has changed. “.. Escalation of a conflict does not simply involve greater size or
intensity, but may add a new dimension” (Van der Merwe 1993: 269). Starting from differences
in objectives (Van de Goor et al 1996:1), “in opinions regarding values, interests, aims, or rela-
tions ..” (Miall in Van de Goor et al 1996: 1) between “at least two individuals or groups” (Van
de Goor et al 1996: 1), conflicts arrive, when these differences are incompatible; when, out of
those differences, “actors are pursuing incompatible goals” (Rupesinghe 1995: 73). It is, of
course, not the difference as such that causes conflict. Nor is it each difference that leads to
incompatibility. The use of a natural resource in two different ways that exclude each other can
obviously lead to competeting interests and give rise to initial conflict phases. Whether or not
the escalation into violence of this conflict is also due to the resource scarcity remains to be
studied. At that moment a careful ES approach will again have to involve the other possible
insecurities and scarcities. Simply stating a one-dimensional cascade from environmental
scarcity to violence, as Homer-Dixon (1999) did, risks overlooking inherent complexities and
causational turns. 
1.2 Land as a natural resource
The natural resource land can be expected to show more of the complexities that need to be
clarified in the ES studies than any other natural resource would show. Of course land is first
6
21 De Waal (1998: 236) states that, “... it is possible that conflicts between human beings are inevitable and that
aggression has such a long evolutionary history, that you may expect excellent control-mechanisms”.
and foremost the basis for agricultural and pastoral production and a place to live. Land is indis-
pensable for very basic life needs. Although, in Latin America, the dependence of the poor on
land is decreasing (Zoomers 2001) and the question that has to be posed in relation to that con-
tinent is whether land and natural resources are important for livelihoods (Appendini 2001: 27),
in rural Africa “land and the biological resources the land supports are principal livelihood
assets” (Toulmin and Quan 2000a: 422). There, it is an “insurance against uncertain employment
[or] a pension fund for old age” (Platteau 1996: 50). Additionally, land, as a production factor
and especially when commoditised, can become a source of wealth. On the other hand, “land
[…] is a stake and a resource within social and political competitions” (Le Meur 2002: 135).
People use land to “gain control over others” (Juul 2002: 204) and over other resources (such
as water wells). Apart from all-pervasive natural resources such as air, other natural resources
are positioned in land. Although perhaps not officially, ownership and managerial rights to land
also give de-facto rights (possibilities) to determine access to other resources that can only be
reached via the piece of land in question. Land forms the basis for power23 and power forms the
basis for land. For example, chiefs have rights of sovereignty that are connected with “politi-
cal control over their territory and over their subjects” (Fisiy 1995: 6). 
A third characteristic of land is its function as a bearer of meaning which is different for
different pieces of land and for different cultures. Land has a role as a source for social iden-
tity. The alienation of land means cultures risk losing their roots. Indeed, “[the value of land]
is embedded in the social structure and history of a particular community […] and it has a
significant symbolic component” (Platteau 1996: 50); the alienation of land is more than the
loss of livelihood security. It easily violates “deep-seated social norms [upon which] bitter
resentments and acute tensions are aroused which may lead to opportunistic acts and, in the
worst cases, even erupt into open violence” (id: 56). Local individuals and groups may react
strongly when scarcity rises and when they risk the alienation of land to outsiders. Thus, it
may be expected that, if the phenomena being looked for in this research really do exist, they
will show up explicitly when studying land.
In addition, because of the combination of the three properties, “power, wealth and mean-
ing” (Shipton and Goheen 1992) but especially that related to power, higher level institutions
quickly interfere in land issues. Indeed, the State’s sovereignty is ascribed to its territory, to its
land, more than to its trees or rivers or wells. Even when State policy covers the other types of
natural resources, it is connected to their being placed in the land. 
Land therefore seems the most appropriate choice for a focus of attention when consider-
ing that a study into the causal pattern of environmental scarcity to violence needs compara-
ble cases and, at the same time, when considering that comparison is only possible when the
amount of variables is not too overwhelming. Indeed, this last can be achieved by restricting
the amount of natural resources studied. Conflicts over water or fish, as in the Logomatya case,
can only be part of this ‘land-choice’ when the connected discords are approached as conflicts
over territory.
22 See also Quan (2000: 32).
23 For example Platteau (1996: 52) stated that “… to a significant extent, demand for land arises from non-eco-
nomic motives such as social prestige and political power.”
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1.3 Summary
In short, violence (frequency and seriousness) over scarce natural resources has become an
issue for social as well as political scientists and practitioners. Testing the presence of the
assumed relationship and understanding the causal relationship between the two variables is
necessary to broaden the scientific understanding of society. Focussing on the natural resource
land, clarity is sought on whether or not this understanding can aid (or prevent) the formula-
tion of specific policy measures. Why do people under more or less the same circumstances
choose for different strategies when confronted with growing insecurity? Why do the farmers
that are busy clearing parts of the grazing area of Kila in North Cameroon raise their sticks
against a cattle-owner that shows me the boundaries of the same pasture and yell that they
would rather “kill you and your white lackey-woman” than give up their fields here? When,
how and why do people invest in the assertion of their rights to land, particularly when the sit-
uation seems to be on the brink of violence? When and why do they choose violence to ascer-
tain their rights to land? What is the direct and what the underlying cause of the extreme anger
and the subsequent willingness of the younger men of Dzambou (North Cameroon) to organ-
ise armed protest against the prohibition of access and use of fields in a nearby pasture area? 
This research studies three different cases of conflict over land at the local level in the
Extreme North of Cameroon from 2001 to 2004, using different sociological, geographical and
anthropological methods.
After this Introduction, chapter two will investigate some theoretical notions related to the
Environmental Security field. Both the concept of Environment as well as the concept of
Security will be dealt with to shed clarity on how these two terms are looked at in this study.
Subsequently, I will outline the reason and necessity to come up with a kind of model to struc-
ture research in the Environmental Scarcity and Security field. Then, I will construct such a
model and in the process I will discuss the concepts and ‘sub-models’ to be used. Thus, at the
end of chapter 2, the flow-diagram “Violence-or-Escape” (VoE), which is to be used as a guid-
ing model in the rest of the study, will have acquired form.
Methodology and methods used in the study are the subject of the third chapter. The focus
is on the choice of theoretical background, the research sites, the way to perform the studies in
the chosen villages and some problems encountered during the fieldwork .
In the fourth chapter, the general geographical background of the study will be described.
First, some very brief information on Cameroon as a country is given. Then, I will focus on
the Far North Province, where the three case studies were performed.
The next three chapters (5 – 7) are dedicated to the full description and partial analysis of
the three cases, thereby following the VoE-model and using the concepts described in the the-
oretical chapter. By doing so, two purposes can be met. First, because of the strict use of pro-
tocols implemented in the diagram, the cases can be easily compared. Second, the usefulness
of the model to guide Environmental Scarcity and Security research can be tested. 
Chapter eight actually deals with these two goals. Again following the VoE diagram, the
three cases are analysed and compared, so generalisations about the causal pathway from
Environmental Scarcity to Violence can be formulated. This is followed by a presentation and
examination of old and new criticism of the original Environmental Security notions. The doc-
ument ends with a short section dedicated to the usefulness of the model itself.
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The causal cascade: dwindling resources, violence and
escapes
2.1 Aim of this chapter
As stated in the Introduction, the nexus of natural resources that play a role in violent conflict
causation or as conflict object (when abundance-in-scarcity is at stake) is the subject of this
thesis. For the purpose of the research, three different areas which seem to foster some griev-
ances, but which have not developed full-scale violent conflicts (yet) have been studied. The
aim was to make a comparison between the three full causal stories of conflicts. This chapter
intends to come up with a framework to systematise the research field of ‘environmental secu-
rity’1 (ES) and thereby clarify the discussion between academics (and politicians) who see or
do not see a link between environmental scarcity and violence.
Within the ‘environmental security’ field as well, different scholars of the same and differ-
ent disciplines have seriously conflicting opinions and not only use different concepts and def-
initions, different assumptions and different theories, but also study different scale levels.
These different approaches must be integrated in order to reach a more fruitful debate and open
up the possibility of reaching a more productive outcome. This integration takes place in the
framework.
After a short discussion of the usefulness of the ES field, despite all the critics, I will explain
the necessity of the proposed framework. Only then will I start to build up that framework. 
1 For an explanation of this research field see the Introduction.
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2.2 Objections to ES science 
2.2.1 To the whole science field
Since the start of the research projects into a causal relation between environmental scarcity
and violence, several scholars have reacted with scepticism. Some of them have even totally
rejected Environmental Security as a science field. In general the critics have recognised three
categories of flaws in ES that basically all come down to an excessively restricted view of the
science field.
To the astonishment of many scholars, the ES field uses specific and fairly narrow defini-
tions of the terms ‘Environment’ and ‘Security’. In fact, it is this limitation that spurs most of
the criticisms. Why is ‘environment’ only seen as the natural resources that support the (eco-
nomic) subsistence of people (or states)? What about nature in its own (intrinsic) right? And
why are other resources, such as air, not incorporated? Violating the health of humans and
nature2 by environmental pollution in favour of economic gains, especially threatens the secu-
rity of the poor3. 
On the other hand, limiting the concept of security to ‘physical attacks against humans or
material property’ unsettled social scientists. After the broadening of the term ‘security’ in the
Eighties and Nineties - from the denotation of ‘safeguarding national values against external
threats by military or allied means’ (Levy 1995) to ‘safeguarding also local and global values,
among which economic and ecological ones and human rights, against threats in general by
not only military means’4 - one would expect the subject of a new science field, which emerged
in the same period and using this term in its name, to have the same scope. 
Critics expect ES to study the connection between ‘human’ or ‘social’ (in)security and envi-
ronmental degradation. Thus, ES should focus on securing a sane and supporting environment
so as to safeguard the human lives and livelihoods that depend on it. However, doing so would
mean that ES does the same as has already been done by Environmentalists or Sustainability
researchers and politicians.
The irritation felt concerning the contradiction between the ‘all-involving’ name and the
narrowness of the factual research subject as defined in its terms made opponents criticise 1)
the origin of the science field, 2) the starting-point and end of the chosen ‘causal story’5 and
3) the blindness for several important connections within that ‘causal story’. Together, critics
say, these three weaknesses will lead to neo-Malthusian pessimism. This “fear for the poor”
(Peluso and Watts 2001a: 11) will in turn cause the development of repressive policies to ‘save
the world from violent reactions to scarcities’, thereby “not leav[ing] any room for local nego-
tiations, adaptations and innovations”, and “den[ying] any role for agency in the non-violent
resolution of local conflicts of interest” (Hussein et al 1999: 414). 
However, the critics’ worries concerning “violence by states against their own people”
10
2 See for example Rajan (2001).
3 The excessively narrow definition of ‘violence’ therefore excludes this ‘violence of pollution’. Peluso and
Watts (2001a: 23): “… it implies a narrow interpretation of violence (for example it excludes the violence of
cancer alley in Louisiana )…” (a lane with an exceptionally high percentage of cancer, most probably due to
pollution, RN).
4 See for instance Noorduyn and De Groot (1999: 26-27), Halle et al (2002), Gleick (1993) or Opschoor
(1996).
5 This is a term used by Noorduyn and De Groot (1999:36): see below for an explanation.
(Peluso and Watts 2001a: 30) and their apprehension of the narrowness of the notion of secu-
rity, have engendered (or are perhaps based on) groundless accusations of instigation and the
adoption of the subject by the military to safeguard their position after the end of the Cold War.
In addition, this fear of the critics themselves caused them to regard ES as being founded on
“the emergence of “new” forms of violence […] such as Islamic terrorism or ethnic cleansing”
(Peluso and Watts 2001a:11). By doing so they overlook the fact that, as they themselves (id:
10) rightfully state, ES had already started to play a role in the 1970s, when both geopolitical
conditions did not seem so apparent or did not even exist. In addition, the second accusation
contradicts the first: do the military need the environment as a funding issue, when “the war
on terrorism” already furnishes them with endless funds? On the contrary, it was a politically
inspired recognition of the lack of awareness of one of the causes of violence and the fear of
too many military actions as a possible result that inspired pre-ES scientists to draw attention
to the subject.
As the diverse projects mentioned in the introduction have shown, a connection between
violence and environmental scarcity does exist. Thus, focussing on this connection and leav-
ing out broader ones, is a legitimate choice of scholars. As Noorduyn and De Groot (1999: 36)
have explained, both “scientific and daily-life stories display relatively arbitrary cut-off points
in spite of the fact that in the real world causal chains neither have a true beginning nor an
end”. A good scientist cannot cover the whole of reality. The demand of the critics to start not
at the point that environmental scarcity exists, but to include the (political economic) causes
of environmental scarcity as well, is equally arbitrary. Because many scientific disciplines
focus on that subject, I consider the choice of the starting point of ES as a logical limitation.
The same applies to the choice not to extend the ES research beyond the point of violence. Of
course mediation and peace-building are important factors and phenomena, both for scholars
and for politicians, but they need not per se to be included in ES, as an after-violence device. 
Yet, not giving specific attention to phenomena that are present before the beginning or after
the end of the chosen causal chain, that exist alongside the causal chain or that are the reverse
of the causal chain, does not mean that ES denies their existence. Naming ‘structural scarcity’6
or ‘environmental discrimination’7 as key sources for environmental scarcity is an explicit ref-
erence to the political economic causes of this scarcity and, thus, fore-lying causal chains. In
my opinion, it is also an implicit way to call for the halting of this kind of discrimination.
Nevertheless, other academic (sub)fields have to cover (or already cover) this and the rest of
the wide range of connections in detail. The results of all these different endeavours may be
integrated later on, if necessary. Indeed, to show the positioning of ES in a wider context, sev-
eral ES publications8 start to describe which sorts of linkages between environment and vio-
lence they will not take into further consideration. 
An obvious link in addition to that of ‘scarcity leads to violence’ is the reverse one: violence
and war can cause scarcity and degradation of natural resources. Violence or wars destroy
6 Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994, 1999).
7 Bächler et al (1996), Bächler (1999).
8 See Gleditsch (1998), IUCN (1998) or Noorduyn and De Groot (1999) for an overview.
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water wells, agricultural lands, or forests, whether deliberately9 or as collateral damage10. In sit-
uations of violent threats, refugees tend to flight to marginal or as yet uninhabited areas, such
as nature parks. The pressure thus augmented can degrade the already fragile lands or disturb
the natural equilibrium11. An example of the over-use of certain areas as a result of the flight
from dangerous areas, prone to violence, is the southward movement of cattle nomads in Chad
due to the civil violence (De Bruijn and Van Dijk 2003). But, being part of the sustainable
development paradigm, the relationship between incoming refugees and the subsequent degra-
dation of the environment has already been addressed outside the ES boundaries by environ-
mental and (some) economic scientists. However, ES focuses on the effects of the resulting
scarcity of natural resources (such as water or land) on the peace process or a new eruption of
violence.
Yet, it is not only scarcity of resources that plays a role in violent conflicts. The opposite is
also true. Since the end of the 1990s, scholars have claimed that the abundance of minerals, oil
and even valuable crops such as (e.g.) coca-plants, is a far more important objective to fight
for. Statistical analyses have demonstrated a far greater risk for civil war of resource abun-
dance than of resource scarcity
12
. In general, distinguishing between mineral resources and
renewable resources is important. “‘The honey pot’ of abundant mineral resources is a major
determinant of civil conflict” (de Soysa 2002: 28), but for renewables “conflict is likelier when
countries have a moderate level […] per capita but [it] diminishes with abundance” (De Soysa
2002: 17). However, some of these authors used primary commodity exports as a measure of
resource availability, although this might as well be considered as a measure for resource
dependence and scarcity. It does not say anything about potential resource availability and
whether or not these exports are on the brink of disappearing because of resource supply deple-
tion. Even those researchers who considered the real stock of natural resources13 based their
calculations on data at country level and did not look at regional (or lower level) differences
in natural resource endowments, let alone boundary-surpassing inequalities14. The civil wars in
both Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo are not restricted to within these
countries’ boundaries. 
As has already been mentioned in the introduction, absolute scarcity is no reason to fight.
It is a reason to go away. It explains the link between moderate levels of renewable resource
availability and violence. This can be seen, for example, in the study of Witsenburg and Adano
(2003 and, Adano and Witsenburg 2004) in the Marsabit district of Kenya where, in drought
years, water wells are not the object of conflicts because the majority of cattle-keepers move
to the south in search of pastures. In addition, the remaining people are too poor and do not
want to take excessive risks to safeguard their water access. Violence, “like any other form of
organized social activity, requires financial and other resources …” (Ballentine and Sherman
(2003a: 1). When the possible gain is too low, a cost-benefit calculation of the use of violence
12
9 An often mentioned example is the use of Agent Orange in the Vietnam War, but the biblical acts of pollut-
ing the enemies drinking water sources also serve as examples.
10 For example, bombing Serbia in 1999 destroyed the sewage system of Belgrade and caused the spill-over of
waste water into the Danube.
11 See for example Dudley et al (2002).
12 See e.g. Auty (2001), Collier (2000), Collier and Hoeffler (2002), De Soysa (2002).
13 E.g. De Soysa (2002).
14 See for example Cater (2003).
that includes the risks will turn out negative. Thus, the resource that will be fought for has to
have (monetary) value. The abundant (but ‘free’) resource ‘air’, for example, has never been
fought for. The value derives from the fact that the resource is precious on the (global) market
and thus generally scarce and, secondly, that it can be looted. This means that it is locally abun-
dant and provides an “easily [to be] captured stream of revenue” (De Soysa 2002: 8). These
three conditions can be met more easily by non-renewable resources. The last two factors
explain the positive relationship between civil war and the primary commodity export-factor.
Although ES does not deny the strong relationship between resource abundance and violent
conflicts, it does question the specific role of the abundance. After all, statistical analysis does
not reflect the direction of the cause-effect chain. Nor does it distinguish between abundance
as a start-up factor or as a continuation factor15. “The larger the conflict, the more likely it is
that it has evolved through many stages and the more likely it is that the factors that sustain it
are different from those that provide the initial trigger” (Ballentine and Sherman 2003a: 8). In
reality the underlying cause of an ongoing conflict may well be a (relative) scarcity of
resources, started at a very local level. Indeed, Cater (2003: 19) warns that several wars in
Africa have a high “complexity and intractability” and that related (UN) “policy making [is]
influenced by potentially misleading assumptions […] particularly excessive reliance on a par-
adigm of economic predation.” A “modified ‘political economy’ approach may more accu-
rately reflect the realities of contemporary armed conflicts”, Cater says (2003: 19-20). This is
exactly what ‘improved ES’ (see below) will do.
Another link, described by Peluso and Watts (2001a) as an important but forgotten one in
the nexus between environment and conflict, is the amelioration or restoration of the environ-
ment. However, contrary to what these critics state, this phenomenon falls directly in the ES
body of research. It is nothing else than the struggle between two user groups over a certain
scarce resource (mostly land) based on differences in interest and form of use. The establish-
ment of a nature park or reserve to conserve an endangered species or to safeguard the poten-
tial environmental support systems pits the State16 against local herders or farmers who suffer
from scarcity of land and have no alternative regions in which to perform their subsistence
activities17. Although some ES scholars look too narrowly at the State’s role18, the phenomenon
of the State as one of the contending parties in a conflict is incorporated in the body to be stud-
ied by ES.
Because ES confines itself to direct violence, all sorts of structural violence that indirectly
engenders overwhelming poverty and bodily harm are not clearly incorporated. Structural vio-
lence against human beings because of the extraction of natural resources by rich end users
without any account being taken of the well-being of the local inhabitants19, for example, or
15 See Sandole (1999) about differences between start-up and continuation causes. See also Guàqueta’s  (2003)
description of how armed groups in the Colombian conflict transformed into “formidable money-making
machines” (id: 93), tapping resource wealth during the conflict which was started on the basis of grievances
concerning the low economic performance and unequal distribution of benefits.
16 Secondary actors in State policies to install nature parks are often international NGOs (e.g. IUCN).
17 See for example Bauer (2003), Balmford et al (2001), Loth (2004), Lewis (1996), Shyamsundar (1996).
18 The notion of the State as one of the parties in an environmental conflict escaped, for example, Homer-Dixon
(e.g. 1999) who describes the State only at the end of his overall schema as a victim of escalating social effects
of environmental scarcity.
19 For example the worldwide unequal distribution that engenders poverty and subsequent high morbidity and
mortality rates.
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structural violence caused by budget division in favour of the violence and defence industry, are
connections between the two concepts that are not directly covered.  However, by studying the
causal pattern from environmental scarcity to violence and by examining all the factors that
influence actors’ steps and possibilities, ES cannot avoid involving these political economic
subjects20. That this should be done more systematically, while “preventing too simplistic con-
clusions”, as Hartman (2001) now observes, is something I will come to in the next section.
In short, the critics who repudiate the whole ES science field do so because they think that
the boundaries thereof are set too narrow. They do not disclaim the existence of a link between
environmental scarcity and violent conflict. Yet, they judge the exercises of ES as being too
limited to generate unambiguous results. Their last category of criticisms contains all the
aspects which lie within the causal story studied by ES but which have not been studied. As
Dietz (1996: 23) already said: “interpersonal strive and competition can be turned to produc-
tive co-operation, and collective solutions to difficulties can be found, even in desperate
resource situations.” Claiming an unambiguous relationship between scarcity and violence via
the ruin of management institutions, without any eye for the constant re-definition of such
institutions and for other routes that may be chosen by actors, indeed risks leading to ‘danger-
ous’ top-down policies. 
Like the critics, I think it is necessary, both for a general scientific understanding and as an
aid for policy measures, to improve the knowledge about the discussed link. The connections
between environmental scarcity and violence deserve special attention to help explain when
and why violent outcomes have to be feared. Therefore, partly in order to overcome “simplis-
tic linkages between ‘increased environmental scarcity’, ‘decreased economic activity’ and
‘migration’ that purportedly ‘weaken states’ and ‘cause ‘conflicts and violence’ (Peluso and
Watts 2001a: 5), my study tries to improve the concepts, methods and therefore results of
research in the ES field.
2.2.2 Countering flaws within the science field
Although most of the weaknesses of ES mentioned so far are going to be described and
responded to in following sections, I will briefly enumerate some of them here. 
Up to now too much emphasis has been given to the supra-local, even national or supra-
national level in the search for causal links between environmental scarcity and violence21.
Systems, not actors and agents, have been the focus of attention. To clarify people’s strategies,
the local and (small) regional levels as well as empirical studies in these local and regional set-
tings should be focused on.
In addition, a greater insight into the relationship between scarcity of natural resources and
violence will be gained if circumstances of environmental scarcity without violence are stud-
ied22. As yet, attention has almost exclusively been paid to cases that show, at first sight, both
violent conflicts and environmental scarcity. However, in most cases of environmental prob-
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As has already been stated with regard to Bächler’s “environmental discrimination” (Bächler 1999), and
Homer-Dixon’s (1999) “structural scarcity”.
21 The level of the State is also used to measure the importance of resource scarcity versus resource abundance
in civil war causation. Regional differences between regions within States, that is the abundance-in-scarcity
paradigm, are ignored.
22 This point is also made by some critics of the whole ES science, for example Levy (1995).
lems people do not react with violence. Equally interesting to study for clarifying causal pat-
terns between scarcity and violence are the situations in which clear-cut violence does not (at
first glimpse) coincide with environmental problems. Violence as such is the result of “very
complex interactions, and seldom mono-causal” (Van de Goor et al 1996:1). 
However, the absence of violence may also be part of a complex situation in which both
violence and non-violence are chosen as a strategy to overcome the insecurity raised from the
environment. What Homer-Dixon (1999) traverses with two steps (from environmental scarci-
ty to social effects to violence) in local realities appears to comprise a myriad of different
strategies and tactics which are different for different actors at different moments in time and
which are influenced by insecurities in other domains than the environmental one. 
Such highly complex situations have to be studied with the help of the insights into and the-
ories of all different science fields that already cover (parts of) the phenomena involved.
2.3 Complexity and models
2.3.1 Multy-disciplinarity
Human-Environment Interaction
To study such situations that can be classified as (potential) resource scarcity conflict situa-
tions, different theories and concepts from disciplines and sub-disciplines are used that study
the interaction between individual human beings as well as their groups and societies with
their surrounding environment (being local, regional or even global) and the problematic
aspects thereof. In accordance with the New Ecology ideas that characteristics of ecosystems
are no self-preserving properties but only by-products of individual plant and animal strategies
(Cahen 1988), ecological branches of several social sciences23 as well as the Dutch Environmen-
tal Science
24
regard human beings as agents in an environment built by the natural surround-
ings, the socio-cultural and the legal-political fabric, as well as the economic reality25. “The
variability of natural resources over time and people’s varying and often flexible responses to
23 Such as Human Ecology (eg. Levine 1975), Cultural Ecology (e.g. MacC Netting 1977), Ecological
Anthropology (e.g. McCay and Vayda 1993 or Milton 1996) and Political Environmental Geography (e.g.
Dietz 1996).
24 Dutch Environmental Science developed in the Netherlands in the early 1970s as a discipline that combined
the insights of both social and natural sciences and formed an interdisciplinary body of knowledge to study the
interrelationships between humans and their environment, with emphasis on potential and actual problems
within this relation, with the aim to find ways to solve these problems (e.g. Udo de Haes (1991); Bouwer and
Copius Peereboom (1993)).
25 At the beginning of the 19th century ecological principles, such as Darwin’s theory of ‘survival of the fittest’,
that triggered the idea of competition as the driving force behind all actions of living organisms, inspired sev-
eral scientific (and non-scientific) domains. From then on, ecological branches of several social science disci-
plines sprouted (and evolved) from this stem, wherein human beings are finally thought of as not being inde-
pendent from their (natural) environment. As man was seen as a biological species, interrelations of human
beings were studied analogue with plant and animal interrelations. To this end the social sciences used meth-
ods and theories from the biological sciences, with the inevitable result of (from time to time) “unsophisticat-
ed adoption of biological concepts” and “bad analogies” (Young 1983: 96). Very soon the social and the moral
order of human society were seen to be missing in the analysis. Headland (1986: 61) wondered “how [...] cul-
ture articulates human populations with their environment” and Steward (1955 in Young 1983: 63) wanted to
“understand [...] the effect of environment upon culture.” (continued on next page)
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it” (Dietz 1996: 34) make this environment a highly dynamic one.
To this should be added the influence of people’s images of the surrounding reality on their
actions. “Man’s behaviour is structured by a set of habits, norms and values which reflects the
perceptions or rationalisations of the surrounding world in the particular society or social
group to which he belongs.” (Platteau 1996: 55). “While there is an objective reality, our per-
ceptions of that reality are mediated by social processes. Biophysical reality shapes social per-
ceptions about itself through individuals reflexively changing or accepting their perceptions
contingent to their direct or indirect experiences with reality” (Burke 2001: 467). Dialectically,
the behaviour, that is the actions, of people which result from worldviews and direct percep-
tions, influences the shaping of that physical reality. 
Yet, the perceptions (although influenced by former generations’ stories) cannot be but
short-time based. They do not account for the fact that “the causal relationships within envi-
ronmental systems are sometimes best represented by sharply non-linear mathematical func-
tions” (Homer-Dixon 1999: 37); that “[i]ndeed, some environmental systems are chaotic” (id.:
38). For everyday human life, the knowledge of ecologists that “to describe complex, interde-
pendent systems of organisms [...] metaphors of anarchy, flux, and constant turmoil are […]
apt” (Homer-Dixon 1999: 39) are not workable. 
Thus, in order to tackle this mixture of influences that shape people’s roles and positions in
and with their environment, several theories about mutual human-environment determination,
more specifically those that regard the use of land and the expansion of the use thereof, are
(sometimes implicitly) integrated into the framework and will therefore be discussed shortly.
Meanwhile, the (perhaps simplifying) perceptions of actors (between other things, the inter-
pretation of the state of their natural resources) are considered to be decisive in the shaping of
their strategies and actions.
Human-Human Interactions
In a study that tries to explain the reasons of the outbreak of violence between people or the
absence thereof, theories and concepts from the fields of social sciences and humanities have
to be incorporated that describe or explain human interactions as such. Not only the problem-
atic relationships of people with their environment, but also the problems that arise there from
in the strictly social domain (or vice versa) is the subject of the study. Within Sociology (as
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Although the ‘ecological social scientists’ themselves have formulated critiques on their over-reaction to see
all human beings and action as wholly ‘natural’ and (thus) their unrestricted adoption of ecological notions,
such critiques can be extended still, especially since ecologists have developed totally new insights into
ecosystems and aggregate communities therein instead of (only) competition as a driving force. Although the
use of concepts, like ‘niche’ or ‘predation’, may sometimes be very useful, it has to be stressed that the focus
of the different ecological social sciences on “individual as well as population responses to environmental
forces and stresses” (Orlove 1980: 251) is too narrowly restricted to a one way relationship between people
and their environment. In addition, phrases like “the mechanisms by which the system is sustained and main-
tains its equilibrium” (Van Driel 2001: 26) indicates a systems approach – with its box-like concepts - , that is
too confined in situations where there are no boundaries, and certainly not those drawn on a very limited scale,
whether in time or in space. Last but not least: contemporary ecological insights deny the existence of total
balanced ecosystems. Especially the Sahel and Sahel-Sudan zone are currently seen as non-equilibrium envi-
ronments. These three issues are already stressed by Leach, Mearnes and Scoones (1999: 232): “We need to
ask, for instance, which social actors see what components of variable and dynamic ecologies as resources at
different times? […]  How does natural resource use by different social actors transform different components
of the environment?”
‘Conflict studies’), Anthropology, and Political Science (‘Peace studies’), to name but a few,
sub-disciplines focus specifically on discords between people. There are many theories about
the development of revolutions26 that offer ideas and concepts, of a socio-cultural and struc-
tural-political kind, which are helpful for an analysis of growing discontent and rising tenden-
cies to violence. In addition, although revolution against authorities as such is not the focus of
this study, during the course of the study the overthrow of governments or (particularly) other
authorities may, nonetheless, appear to be a factor.
More important are the theories and case studies dealing with conflict and conflict resolu-
tion on an inter-personal or inter-group level27. Of these, the theories on individual behaviour
and goal seeking (e.g. rational choice theory), which are based on social identity (whether or
not ethnicity driven), relative deprivation and frustration, psychologically formed stereotypes
and world views (whether or not based on cultural patterns), and group conflict patterns and
resource mobilisation methods occupy a prominent place in the description of conflict theories.
2.3.2 Why a model
Basing a study on such an overwhelming number of different theories and disciplines could
lead to the main issues becoming lost in a plethora of complexities. We need to “find a lan-
guage that makes interdisciplinary discourse possible” (Brox 1990: 227). Therefore, as has
been stated, I will develop an integrating framework based on the perception that a concise the-
ory, that incorporates all these different notions, is necessary in order to acquire a view of real-
ity. However, it has to be emphasised that it can only be “a kind of ‘window’ on reality” (Brox
1990: 229), “that provides us with a particular view of the phenomena we are trying to under-
stand” (Kenneth Pike in Headland 1986: 65). Broadly speaking, there are two types of theo-
ries. First, ‘simple’, ‘straightforward’ models to explain certain phenomena (such as Rational
Choice Theory or the Geographical Location Theory of Von Thünen (see below)), and, second,
‘encompassing’ models to order the world. 
The first are used to discern the “A” from the “non-A” in a certain situation, i.e. not to prove
the ‘realness’ or truth of A, but to test the relevance of the “A - non-A” divide. For example,
the Rational Choice Theory says that people act according to rational cost-benefit considera-
tions. Of course the non-A, that is behaviour that is not based in rational calculations, does
exist. However, it can be useful to initiate a search for an explanation of people’s actions in the
rational domain. This is especially so when the limitations, such as the existence of non-A, are
recognised. Here the warning of Ostrom (1990: 183-184) springs to mind that several criticised
models are not so much wrong, but only applicable under special circumstances, namely
“[w]hen conditions in the world approximated the conditions assumed in the models…” She
also states that “these are special models that utilise extreme assumptions rather than general
theories.”
The second type of model tries to describe a whole complex of phenomena, all mutually
related as well as related to other complexes. In short, it describes a non-limited system of the
real world. At the same time, though, such a “description is necessarily a selection out of the
real world” (Segers 1977: 57). It is always possible to use another cut-out of the world, anoth-
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26 De Toqueville (1835), Marx  (1887), Gurr (1993), Huntington (1996), Mohamed Salih (1999).
27 For example those of Burton (1993), Rubin et al (1994) or Sandole and Van der  Merwe (1993).
28 See, e.g., Van den Hombergh (2004).
er angle from which to view reality. For each such window or ‘frame’28 one should keep in
mind the things that are neglected by this view. According to Headland (1986), Pike has
already argued that the same phenomena can be viewed through two or more different win-
dows (or theories), showing different aspects of a pattern. It is in this tradition of description
of an entire, complex part of reality that I will build my model to enable a better understand-
ing of the relationship between resource scarcity and violence or non-violence at local level:
the model as “a paradigmatic structure that helps to order the material” (Rapaport 1985)29. The
proposed model will be descriptive in the sense that it seeks to give “all” possible reactions
and influences that drive an actor’s conducts in the pathway to violence (or, for that matter, the
avoidance of violence). And because, “‘[a] theory must be simpler than reality if it is to be
helpful,
[i]t attempts to strip away from attention those items which are not important to the observer at the
moment. In this way it helps obtain answers to particular questions on a narrow front by simplifying the
task of investigation … A scientific theory is good only if it leaves out wisely those materials which are
relevant to other questions but not to those immediately being answered’” (Pike 1982: 5-6 in Headland
1986: 65).
Thus, for my model, the word “all” must be interpreted with some reservation: only the impor-
tant “all” will be included and these will be categorised in order to reach the aimed simplici-
ty. The other restriction is that the model describes only a selection of the world by limiting
its scope to the local or regional level and by not surpassing the moment of violence outbreak.
In such an ‘encompassing’ model the simpler “A – non-A” models, the actor level and actor-
in-interaction-models, can be used to analyse the different ordering steps. Assuming that vio-
lent encounters can occur between two individuals or between clusters of individuals or even
very big groups, the framework proposed here starts at the individual level and works with the
individual actor models as they exist in the social sciences (e.g. De Groot 1992). Personal
livelihood strategies formed by ‘rational’ use, overuse and shifts of and between the divers
capitals, as described by Bebbington (1999)30, will be the focus of my attention. Within the
flow-diagram I try to discern the different steps that actors can make based on their livelihood
decisions, the influences that lead to a specific step and the consequences of different steps,
following especially the chain that may lead to violence. Other scholars have to focus in more
detail on the peaceful pathways of co-existence that, together with the competitive ones,
always form a complex mixture of livelihood strategies in the real world. In compliance with
Bebbington, who emphasises the importance of access to different “capital assets”, I wish to
point out the fact that ‘whole’ frameworks “must capture both the dynamics of conflict […],
and those of cooperation ...” (Bebbington 1999: 2023). However, it has to be stressed that
every researcher always chooses ‘his own part of the total story of reality’ (Noorduyn and De
Groot 1999: 36). Of course a cascade that describes only the path up to violence does not imply
total ruin without recovery, as some critics suggest Homer-Dixon (1999) said by ending his
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29 Thus, here the frame focuses on scarcity of natural resources in the story-line towards violence. Another pos-
sible frame may be the role of ethnicity or religion in the story-line towards violence. Nevertheless, as will be
explained further in the sections about the influencing factors, the chosen frame does not mean that these other
phenomena do not play a role in my model.
30 Produced (being separated by Henkemans (2001), and DFID (Appendini 2001: 26) into physical and finan-
cial), social, natural, human and cultural capital (see the next sections about escapes and influencing factors).
model after the breakdown of states and governments31. ‘No condition is permanent’ (Berry
1993) as has been noticed already by the pioneers of sociology (Simmel 1955, Coser 1967)
and their followers (Parsons 1994, Boulding 1993). Moreover, sometimes conflict and even
violence seems to be necessary to alter a status quo that hinders development32. Then the break-
down forms the dawn of a better situation.
Like the ‘encompassing’ model of Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994, 1999)33 by which it is
inspired, my window on reality only deals with the Cascade from scarcity to violence, albeit
with all its in and outgoing influences and possibilities, and the flows (called ‘escapes’) to non-
cascade-following actions. Structurally including (co)-causes and ‘escapes’ helps to counter
the missing views from the Homer-Dixon model. 
Next to that, there is one aspect of the Homer-Dixon model that, according to me, makes the
analysis somewhat rough. Yet, it cannot be enhanced by simply adding to that model. As “a
good analytical model makes you see one aspect of a complex problem in great clarity, [and]
you always risk that it makes other important details of the same phenomenon disappear from
your view” (Brox 1990: 232), I have chosen to change the perspective of my model a bit from
the systems-level to the perspective of the individual actor. Mostly, in my research, this is a
human person, but it can be a group. Yet, because local communities are diverse and divided
entities, perspectives of individuals within the group are always of importance. Von Benda
Beckman et al (1992: 3) already stated that “there is no such thing as the community as a
whole”. People have different positions dependent on different situations. For example, men
and women as well as adults and children have different roles, capacities and stakes. “There are
differences in access to resources, in power, in technical skills between ethnic groups, between
age groups and between individuals” (Van Est and Noorduyn 2000: 54-55). Within the hearth-
hold family, the extended family, the village or towards the outside world (e.g. as a member of
a political party or an employee of a certain enterprise) persons have different bearings in dif-
ferent groups. A group only serves as such under specific circumstances. Under other circum-
stances or from another perspective the group boundaries have to be demarcated differently34. 
The value of a ‘window’ or ‘frame’ is that it can help to look at certain situations. My model
will help, while following one causal chain backwards, to explain an already existing violent
conflict or, by going forward, to predict probabilities of certain strategies, one of them violence.
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31 Van Houweling (2000: pers. comment), Witsenburg and Adano (2003).
32 Laurent and Mathieu 1994; Van der Merwe 1993 (263): “Such social upheaval also contains the seeds of regen-
eration and growth”. Gluckman (1982) even describes the positive social ordering principles of conflicts with-
in and between family (ies).
33 Homer-Dixon 1999: 134, figure 1: Starting from three types of rising scarcity he unfolds a flow chart of causal
steps leading to three types of violence. One of his main points is that only ingenuity (page 109: “by ingenu-
ity I mean ideas applied to solve practical, technical and social problems”) can give an escape, but, although
“necessity will often be the mother of invention”,  “[i]n some societies […] resource scarcity simultaneously
increases the requirement for ingenuity and impedes its supply, producing an ingenuity gap.” (id: 108), see also
Homer-Dixon (2002).
34 See also Hanna et al (1996) or Crehan (1997).
2.4 Building the model of this thesis
2.4.1 General remarks
The framework may be seen as a conspectus of possible reactions that people can show when
confronted with the series of events, that are formed by the positive and negative influences
and circumstances from outside or from within their own ‘life’, or by the ‘flow’ itself. As men-
tioned above: “organisms and environment are dialectically related” (Barry 1999: 188). To this
I add that this applies to the dynamic part of their relationship as well: series of actions both
influence and are influenced by themselves, their users and the surroundings. This interde-
pendent mixture of (changing) facts, events and reactions of actors to these three parameters
is schematised in Figure 2.1: forming the Cascade from environmental scarcity to Violence
connected with the flows to Escape the seemingly inevitable cascade.
Figure 2.1 Violence or Escape diagram
The following applies to the legend of the figure:
The grey boxes on the left-hand side of the framework represent (changing) facts, which are
real or at least perceived by the actor. The three white boxes on the right are ‘events’ caused
by reactions of actors. The white boxes in the second row are ‘non-cascade’ events. Straight
arrows are ‘steps’, reactions of the actor. Double-lined arrows depict the influence of two types
of factors on the reaction of the actor, on events and facts or on both. Dotted lines and arrows
reflect results of actions not necessarily directly brought about by the actor; sometimes lead-
ing to (new) facts and events, sometimes to other people’s actions, mostly in a feedback loop. 
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2.4.2 The model at large
Start: left-hand side
Despite criticism claiming that Homer-Dixon is a pessimist neo-Malthusian because he warns
against something they do not see35, I do not reject Malthusian theory all together. As is empha-
sised within the (Dutch) Environmental Science Theory, attention should be focussed on the
intersection of Boserup (“the growth of population is a major determinant of technological
change in agriculture.” (Boserup 1965: 56)), and Malthus (“the power of population is indefi-
nitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.”; “Population, when
unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical
ratio” (Malthus 1798: Ch I: 4)) and the circumstances that influence the evolution of either of
these paths36. 
Thus, following on from the ideas of Malthus (1798)37 and Hardin (1968)38 that our world
is finite, and of neo-Malthusians39 that human beings are perfectly able to minimise the
resource base by unsustainable use40, I start the causal flow on the left-hand side of the diagram
35 See Introduction.
36 See De Groot (1999: 2-6), and Homer-Dixon (1999: 43).
37 Malthus (1798) has argued that the exponential growth rate of human population could not and would not be
followed by the same rise in food production. According to Boserup, Malthus states that  “… food production
[i]s a limiting factor for population growth” (Boserup 1965: 12) In the end: humankind will be faced by “mis-
ery and vice” (Malthus 1798: 5), by famine, “starvation and death” (Malthus 1803, in Mazzucato and
Niemeijer (2000: 307)), if not by war over these scarcities as well. For Malthus the core idea was that scarci-
ty and poverty are the consequence of the combination of a stable resource availability coupled with a rising
resource demand. More labour does not increase extraction from the resource base such, that an increased
demand will be met.
38 The common property theory has a biology and economics foundation. It stated that in a situation of “unlim-
ited harvesting of common and freely accessible resources”, while these resources as such are limited (Hardin
1968: 1244), in the end “[harvesting] becomes, and stays, unprofitable for all participants” (Brox 1990: 227).
This basically Malthusian view has already been voiced by Gordon in 1954 (p.131): “There appears, then, to
be some truth in the conservative dictum that everybody’s property is nobody’s property. Wealth that is free
for all is valued by no one, because whoever is foolhardy enough to wait for its proper time of use will only
find that it has been taken by another …”. Hardin has called this the “tragedy of the commons”, meaning that
(Bryant and Bailey 1997: 161) “individual action leads inexorably to social and environmental ruin in the
absence of a state to protect collective interests.” The only other possible option, adherents of Hardin’s theory
claim, is to change the commonness of the resource to something private to produce a situation wherein “both
costs and benefits of resource use accrue to individuals who rightfully control the access of others” (Burke
2001: 453). In 1990, Ostrom first challenged the wisdom of Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ and explained
that the described phenomenon only pertains to ‘open access’. Since then, Common Property Theory has
evolved from having a focus on state-dictated or private property management systems of resources, via the
Evolutionary Theory of Land Tenure, in which communal land tenure rights are claimed to change automati-
cally over time into effective and efficient yield enhancing systems (see, e.g. Platteau 1996), to more nuanced
and place and circumstances-dependent ideas of ‘ideal’ management forms of natural resources (see, e.g.,
Berkes (1996)).
39 With some minor changes, present-day followers of the Malthusian way of thinking still “emphasise physical
causes of scarcity and poverty: population size and growth, the resource-consumption rate per capita and the
quantities of natural resources available to a society” (Homer-Dixon 1999: 43). Recently researchers have
added a yet stronger reason why production would not keep pace with rising consumption, by suggesting that
a larger population might decrease the resource base through environmental degradation because of their
greater demand. In that case the scarcity is self-perpetuating.
40 This does not mean that I see this and the poverty that arises from it as an inevitable path (“a law of nature”),
with which humanity has to live.  Similarly to Ross (1998) I assume that the Malthus path is avoidable when
a sufficient and the right effort is made.
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(see Figure 2.1), assuming a negative impact of humans on their environment41. Of course such
an impact can also be brought about by ‘natural’ factors, like climatic extremes42. The reaction
to these natural set-backs can be the same as to human-induced degradation. As Homer-Dixon
pointed out, it is not only environmental degradation that leads to diminishing possibilities for
people to use natural resources. Environmental scarcities are also brought about by excessive
demand for these resources (by Homer-Dixon (1999: 48) called ‘demand induced scarcity’).
In addition, some people experience scarcities because they cannot use what they need because
others have taken too much (in Homer-Dixon’s terminology: ‘structural scarcity’). 
The problem with Homer-Dixon’s three causes of environmental scarcity is that they do not
represent the same conceptual level. I will go even further in the distinction than the funda-
mental critics, who only separate structural scarcity from the other two. It is not true that
demand and supply are of the same order and “refer to the changing size of the pie driven by
population size and consumption”, as Peluso and Watts (2001a: 18) remark. In principle, a
higher demand does not cause a generally smaller pie. It only results in smaller pieces per con-
sumer. Simple economic laws then predict an increase in production. In the case of natural
resource output, this may be reached by an increase in technology. However, natural resources
do not strictly (and always) follow normally applicable economic laws. Excessively high
demand (and thus a scarcity experienced by the consumer), that otherwise would have been
answered by an increase of the supply, may, in the case of natural resources, totally ruin the
supply because of the resulting degradation and exhaustion. 
Paradoxically, the disastrous effects on the resources of excessive demand by all may be
countered by an increase in unequal distribution. Then, scarcity for some will increase. This
brings us to the third of Homer-Dixon’s scarcity-inducing factors. Indeed, structural scarcity is
not a real scarcity, but a distribution problem that may also exist when the pie is ‘big enough’
(and as such requires different actor strategies). Indeed, Fairhead (2001) warns that Homer-
Dixon’s ‘structural scarcity’ is nothing other than the well-known inequalities tackled in polit-
ical economic approaches. Re-naming it as environmental scarcity, he says, exposes the risk
that it will be de-politicised, “[isolated] from international political economy” (id: 215), and
with this “[obscuring] more than it reveals in analyzing causes of war” (id: 214). 
Bearing in mind the conceptual differences between the three ‘sources of scarcity’ (Homer-
Dixon 1999: 47) and thus the necessity of careful disentangling of underlying causes, I agree
with Homer-Dixon that it is the dearth of natural resources (or of a specific natural resource)
for certain actors that may cause conflict43 and that the causes of environmental scarcity are not
only degradation. Besides, very often the causes of environmental degradation as such lie in
the political economic realm. Structural scarcity itself can cause real scarcity in the sense that
it can lead to environmental degradation of marginal areas. The research field of Political
Ecology has recognised this link44. Thus, focussing on the environment in conflict studies does
not mean de-politicising it. It purely means drawing attention to a field of causes that would
be otherwise overlooked (see introduction). For all these reasons the left-hand side of my
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41 Like Bächler (1999), although he considers degradation as a given fact.
42 Whether or not detected climate changes are human induced remains a topic of discussion which I will not go
into here.
43 A phenomenon that demands more knowledge and insight.
44 For an extensive overview of Political Ecology: see Bryant and Bailey (1997).
model is a little bit different from that of Homer-Dixon, although I too focus on environmen-
tal scarcity in a broader sense than only degradation.
The quality and quantity of the effect on the environment is determined by several factors,
all incorporated within the flow-scheme on the far left-hand side. I will deal with them when
discussing the different parts of the schedule. Here I only wish to mention that these factors,
contrary to the assumption voiced in Homer-Dixon’s model, do not only cause or aggravate a
negative impact. There are also positive factors, such as the positive influence of humans and
their institutions, as described in the Boserupian and Ostromian45 theories about human capac-
ities, which prevent and counteract the negative impacts on the environment and the dimin-
ishing of the resources. In consequence, both Malthus’ and Boserup’ pathways are possible and
are thus incorporated in the VoE diagram. 
One of the agencies that influence the direction of the pathway is the State (or the lower
level State-representing bodies). In contrast to what Homer-Dixon suggests in his schema
(Homer-Dixon 1999: 134), States and other institutions are not only vulnerable entities that
suffer from negative impacts of scarcities and the ways people react to that, and then give way
in reaction to violence. Positively or negatively they co-shape the factors that cause the impact
on the environment, or they determine the impact directly, for example by fixing the actual use
of someone’s ‘environmental use space (EUS)’46, via rules and the implementation (or not)
thereof (De Groot and Persoon 1999: 158). Moreover, State institutions also shape and influ-
ence the ways conflicts are handled. Perhaps even, they may cause the outbreak of conflict, out
of neglect – as Boulding (1993: 197) put it: “… wisdom and skill complex [of identity groups]
may undergo distortion and even degeneration in interaction with an indifferent or hostile
state” – or out of faulty and wrongly judged interference. For example, land registration by
States with the aim to diminish disputes have, as Platteau (1996) demonstrates, only “opened
up new possibilities of conflict and insecurity” (id: 48) “for less influential rights-holders” (id:
40). Next to that, States can lose their legitimacy by strange and not-trustworthy actions, there-
by causing (escalation of) conflict47. However, conversely, they may help to overcome discords
about resources between actors by a dependable legal system and courts (Mc Kean 1996: 240).
In short, in my model institutions figure more on all the influencing sides48 than only as vic-
tims on the far right-hand side of the diagram. It should be noted that violence at local level
does not always have anything to do with State breakdown, or rarely does so. It may, howev-
er, be related to the breakdown or the general loss of legitimacy of local governing bodies.
Continuation: Middle part
The diagram begins on the left-hand side with the elements that build up the Impact on the
environment and the factors that influence these elements. Moving to the right, each box
depicts an event. Following the Cascade to Violence each ‘event box’ leads to a new event,
ending in the event ‘violence’. On the way, each box is (or can be) influenced by certain co-
causing aspects. Next to that, the unwinding of the cascade can be stopped (that is: given
45 Ostrom (1990) describes the conditions that make sustainable use of common resources possible.
46 A term, first introduced by Opschoor and Van der Ploeg (1990) as being that part of the natural environment
that human beings can occupy without causing damage to the essential elements thereof, and thus leaving the
same ‘amount’ of natural environment for future generations to use.
47 See Warfield (1993: 182-183).
48 Also further on the right-hand side of the VoE diagram which I will refer to later.
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another direction) by ‘escapes’ at each step, which form equally important routes within the
model. Each escape has its consequences and can be enhanced or frustrated by certain facts.
Of course certain types of escapes can have the form of a negative feedback on earlier effects
and events. 
End: the right-hand side box
As explained earlier, the narrative of this research starts with environmental scarcity and ends
with the outbreak of violence. However, this is not an absolute end, because violence itself is
no one-dimensional, one-time event. It has the same complex position (and build-up) as all
other factors of the diagram. Thus, when the violence influences the Violence-or-Escape dia-
gram (= VoE diagram) again, in a kind of feedback loop, ‘that which comes after’ is incorpo-
rated into the study (see Figure 2.1). 
Hereafter, I first discuss the central steps in the framework from left to right: the Cascade to
Violence. I then focus on escapes and influencing factors for each step. By categorising these
factors and escapes I will try to generalise on peoples’ strategies, although, of course, these are
always totally context-dependent.
2.4.3 The details of the three parts of the VoE diagram
The Cascade to Violence
Box 1
As already stated, a negative impact on the environment is the basis for starting to construct a
stream-diagram of actors’ steps in the direction of violence (see Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 Violence or Escape diagram, left-hand side (Box 1).
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In the Environmental Sciences for this Impact the symbol I has been used, meaning the impact
of human beings on the environment in terms of some basic normative values. This impact is
the same as the product of three interconnected factors (I = PAT) and depends on the physi-
cal basis of the environment. For actors in direct need of natural resources, the impact on the
environment combines with the actual possibility of individuals to use, control and access the
environment (and which environment) to determine the amount of scarcity they encounter. 
In the Environmental Science equation   I = P A T, the different factors stand for:
P = Population (number of persons)
A = Affluence (turnover of goods per person, i.e. type and extent of ‘implemented’ demands
per person)
T = type and extent of Technology with a (negative) impact, i.e. impact per unit of goods (e.g.
technology that diminishes pollution is ‘positive’ technology, if it does not cause roll-offs
and externalities)
The fact that I is the same as the product of these three factors means that whenever one or
more of the factors rise, the Impact rises. I can stay the same or even diminish when one or
more of the factors diminish or the combination of increase and decrease of the different fac-
tors generates a lower product. For example, the number of persons increases, with each of
them using the same number of goods, but the technological way of production has improved
and the negative impact per good has diminished in such a way that the total impact declines.
In Malthusian reasoning, even when affluence stays the same, rising population numbers are
far greater than any technological improvement of agricultural production. On the other hand,
the Boserup line of thinking states that, even in the case of rising affluence, the increase in the
number of persons causes such a technological improvement that all negative impacts are
countered49. Access possibilities are implicitly incorporated in the P. If people are prohibited
from using a certain piece of land (for example) in a densely populated and increasingly pop-
ulated area, and if said piece of land is indeed not used, the P for that specific piece of land
returns to zero.
Physical basis
An important determining factor for I is the ‘physical basis’ of the environment. The effect of
PAT is different under different physical circumstances. It refers to the ultimate resilience of
a certain environment. This is related to long term vulnerability to changes, as well as to
desired use, which as such refers to difficult concepts such as carrying capacity50. In the
Netherlands, with its large-scale bio-industrial way of livestock keeping and the related fodder
imports and fertiliser use, the physical basis of the soils with regard to mineral content is
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49 Boserup (1965).
50 Bartels et al (1993) provided an excellent overview of the history, different meanings, confusion and (non) use-
fulness of the concept ‘carrying capacity’. “A general definition”, they said, “should encompass the elements
of animal production goal, acceptable resource condition, and  time.” (id: 94). Applicability, however, “is of
questionable validity in livestock production systems in Africa” (id 100). See also Seidl and Tisdell (1999).
almost reached. This means that the soil has reached its mineral-absorbing limit: many plants
are no longer able to survive in this ‘poisoned’ environment and any surplus minerals will be
rinsed out to the groundwater and thereby pollute this drinking-water resource.
The physical basis of the Sahel and Sahel-Soudan zone is a totally different one. Whether
it is vulnerable is the subject of ongoing debates. “[P]astoral areas [here are] characterised by
a so-called non-equilibrium environment…” with a “resource availability in these areas […]
characterised by spatial heterogeneity and temporal variety” (Juul 2002: 189). Hiernaux (1996:
14) notes that “Sahelian vegetation appears very resilient to natural and pastoral stresses
because of the strong dynamism of its seed production, dispersion and germination cycle”. The
system is used to ‘natural’ (climatic) extremes within and over the years. However, “grazing
during the growing season can significantly affect production in the same season and may
affect long-term productivity” (id: 13). Moreover, the resilience of the environment to year-
long agriculture may be low. Declining soil fertility, erosion and changes in watershed struc-
ture lead to increased vulnerability to drought.
Thus, an actual physical basis is formed partly by basic natural processes and structures and
partly by human influences that have altered the basic natural status quo and processes. These
human influences on the natural basis as such are shaped by institutions and policies, for exam-
ple those regarding property rights, being distribution, access and use-forms of these natural
resources51. In addition, human institutions and policies also influence the right side factors of
the I = PAT equation. Sometimes these influencing institutions or policies are not directly
aimed at the natural resources or the population size, the affluence or the technology, but have
other goals, while the influence discussed is only a side effect. Of course all institutions are
embedded in wider ‘environments’, from regional through national up to even global, being
structurally shaped situations or event-like. 
Increasing scarcity
To use the dynamic aspects of the Environmental Science equation, ES should not focus on
scarcity as such, but on the increase thereof. Because this study wants to focus on the local
level, the deteriorating situation of local actors is of importance: the diminishing of
‘Environmental Use Space’ (see note 46) at the personal level. In other words, the cascade of
the VoE diagram begins with an increase of the I52 for a natural resource that is important for
an actor (person), and/or with a worsening distribution of that resource.
The I is raised, diminishing the environmental space of users (meaning ‘rising scarcity’),
because of rising population pressure (either based on population growth, or on population dis-
tribution, or on both), affluence or technology or two or three of those together, under physi-
cal-biological circumstances that cannot counter-play this. For the individual actor, this ‘neg-
ative’ impact can also originate in, or be aggravated by, limiting access regimes. The influence
of access to natural resources therefore plays a role at different levels.
As has been stated above, in the Sahelian context the phenomenon of a rising human impact
on the environment can be questioned53. Scarcity of natural resources has been, and always will
be, an inherent characteristic of the semi-arid and arid regions of the world. Inhabitants of
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51 See for example Ostrom and Schlager (1996).
52 From the I = PAT equation.
53 Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1999), Mortimore (1998), De Bruijn and Van Dijk (1995).
these types of eco-regions are well adapted to these circumstances. With the insecurity of the
climate and the wave-like pattern of abundance and want, they have developed a kind of flu-
idity in their institutions as well (Berry 1993), both in time and in space. Yet, the growing pop-
ulations seem to reduce the fluidity of the systems, at least in space. Now distribution of the
resources has become important. In addition, the fluidity does not exceed a certain level. This
level may prove to be too low when environmental change passes the threshold that ecologists
warn of54. When the system suddenly changes55, personal scarcity may rise abruptly. Such a
‘flip-over’ can be due to extreme climate changes or to (direct) human impacts, for example
caused by day to day unintelligent use of the resources or by events such as war56. In such
instances, a real change in livelihood strategies, and not only flexibility, is required. “It is often
hard for human societies to adjust their institutions and technologies rapidly enough to prevent
sudden changes in environmental systems’ behaviour from producing a grave impact on
human well-being” (Homer-Dixon 1999: 191, note 46).  
On the other hand, institutions sometimes change too quickly or in an unfavourable direc-
tion, at least for some local users. Already in non-scarcity situations, not all actors have the
same position when it comes to negotiating the rules57. The fluidity of the institutions serves
the powerful, especially when resources become scarcer. As stated earlier, it may be the case
that a rising I is only perceived. Indeed, this perception can also be constructed by powerful
persons for strategic goals. For example, perceived environmental change can be used by
authorities as a pretext to overrule existing management institutions, instead of giving them
time to adapt58.
Thus, by way of institutions and policy the three basic factors, as well as the access factor,
can be influenced directly (the box furthest to the left) or via feedback after the ‘scarcity’ has
first increased or is perceived as having increased. To make it even more complex: limiting
access practices can be installed by institutions to counteract the longer term P x A x T effect59.
In that case they form both a negative and a positive feedback on the I (at least for the area
under the regime; it can cause negative effects in other places, because of increased pressure
there). Long-term and short-term as well as individual and society effects have to be detected.
As regards the VoE diagram, societal effects are only interesting as long as they influence per-
sonal strategies.
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54 Holling and Sanderson (1996: 67) warn that the renewal phase (the fourth phase in their ecological model of
adaptive renewal) “contains the potential to jump to unexpected different […] systems.”
55 “Historical events […] may trigger savannas into a new ecological state.” (Stott 2003: 2).
56 See, for example, the situation in Chad (De Bruijn and Van Dijk 2003).
57 Peters (2002).
58 See Bächler (1999) over the instrumentalisation of the environment, one of his “key situations” in relation to
natural resources engendering violence.
59 Examples thereof can be found everywhere, both in developing countries and in the West. With regard to the
latter, we can mention areas where only agriculture under strict conditions is allowed. Another example is
‘indigenous people’s reserves’ that consist of land given back by the State to traditional ethnic groups to be
used solely by them (e.g. see Aquino 2004).
Box 2
Figure 2.3 Middle part of VoE-Cascade
When people perceive their Environmental Use Space to be limited compared to what they
need, want or are used to60, they start intruding into other peoples ‘niche’ or assert the rights to
their own niche right away (e.g. in the event that the I is increased by way of rising population
numbers because of immigration). Officially, according to ecological science, a niche is ‘the
way in which a certain complex of natural resources, related to a certain place, is used’. Most
of the time people in a scarcity situation search for niches that are more, or preferably even
richly, endowed with the wanted resource61. The act of entering a niche may force the present
user into a position of competition. An example of the same use of a resource in the same way
in the same geographical area is that of two fishermen using casting nets in one specific fish-
pond62. As we have seen in the case of Padmangay versus Davagang in the introduction, this
can lead to profound conflicts over the resource. 
However, there are possibilities of resource use other than that of exactly the same niche
that cause different users to become competitors. If the resource is a ‘moving’ one, “transferred
impact” may play a role. A moving resource can be used on different spots. But, once used at
a first site, it is no longer possible to use it at a second site. The impact of use is transferred
over time and space. This is the case, for example, when fishing with a net in a river influences
the chances for a fisherman down-stream of catching the same fish. Then, although the users
are situated at different spots, competition over the resource can still flare up63.
When people use the same resource but in a different way, competition is only bound to
occur if the uses are mutually excluding. An example of this is the use of a tree for fuel-wood
or for building: these are different niches, but the user of one niche intrudes the other one and
thereby decreases the possibilities of use by others. Another possibility of such resource use
concerns the subsequent blockade of the use of a niche further away. Excluding types of use
of one resource at a certain location will hamper the accessibility of another resource.
Examples thereof are fish channels64 or agricultural fields that impede the track of cattle to their
grazing grounds. Obviously this can give rise to conflicts. 
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60 See below the sections about influencing factors at the right side of the diagram and the phases of conflict.
61 Again, an example of the importance of ‘abundance in scarcity’ (see the discussion about the role of scarcity
versus that of abundance of natural resources in the Introduction and earlier this chapter).
62 About use and management of fishing grounds in Africa, see for example Thomas (1996), Fay (1989), Harms
(1989), Casimir and Rao (1992), Van Est (1999), Quensière (1994), and Barbier, Adams and Kimmage (1991).
63 Ecologically speaking the niches are different because when defining a niche it is not only the use of the envi-
ronment for food that is important, but also the use thereof for other purposes (for example housing and shelter).
64
See Drijver et al (1995), Van Est (1999) or Loth (2004) about the sometimes km-long and metres-deep fish-
ing channels traversing the Logone floodplain in Cameroon.
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A possibility that can lead to the exclusion of the use of a niche by another user without
using the same resource is the use of a resource in such a way that it influences the existence
of another one in the same region. An example of this is the use of water for irrigation, such
that the use of the resource fish is hampered65 or the building of a dam to gather the water,
thereby causing the fish to disappear downstream because the spawning grounds are no longer
flooded66. Although this can lead to conflicts between users, the condition for such to occur is
that the connection between the two phenomena has to be clear to at least the ‘second’ user.
In short, conflicts between users can flare up not only when using the same niche, but also when
the impact of the use is transferred over time and/or over space to another niche. Thus, in the VoE
diagram ‘intrusion into other people’s niche’ also includes those cases in which the niche is not
entered, but the possibilities of use by the other are diminished via transferred impact. 
The first real step by an actor in the VoE diagram is the moment (s)he enters somebody else’s
niche. The choice for, and actual implementation of, this step is influenced by many factors.
These factors are important in the analysis and therefore have a place throughout the diagram.
I will discuss them in the next two sections. Sometimes the actor does not physically enter the
new niche, but starts the assertion of rights straight away, that otherwise would be the next step.
Box 3 
Figure 2.4 Right side of VoE diagram
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65 See, for example, the extensively documented Aral Sea history (e.g. De Villiers (1999), Smith (1995)).
66 Examples of such an impact of dam construction are the Karnali and Arun dams built in Nepal (Himalayan
Power Consultants (1989), Ives and Messerli (1989), Nepal Electricity Authority (1992)). But it is an effect
that results almost always from big dams (e.g. Goldsmith and Hillyard 1987; Bernacsek 1984).
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Following the Cascade to Violence from the intrusion into other people’s niches, the next step
is the assertion of rights to the resources, in casu the niche. This is only necessary if the other
user(s) of the niche do not agree with the intrusion or the claim made without actual entry hav-
ing (yet) occurred, after which these user(s) try to ascertain their rights. I call this ‘conflict’.
Here the word ‘conflict’ means ‘collision of interests’, in the sense that the actors go one step
further than only wanting exclusive use of a resource: they (or (s)he) actually do (does) some-
thing - more than just ‘sitting there’ and telling everybody that it is theirs - to satisfy this want67.
On the other hand, conflict can have another origin as well, such as a more normative one.
Although these other possibilities are not the focus of my research, they are of great impor-
tance in the analysis. In addition, the reason to ascertain one’s rights to resources can be influ-
enced by world views and perceptions that (also) come into conflict. Without these other con-
flict causing reasons and triggering circumstances, actors would perhaps chose another route
(in the diagram called ‘escape’). Thus, these “influencing factors” have a place in the VoE dia-
gram. They are presented, at each step, at the top half of the framework (see next sections for
a further explanation).
Box 4 (See Fig 2.4)
When people oppose each other and both claim the rights to a certain resource violence may
be chosen as a way out. ‘Violence’ here means: a physical attack against other persons or their
goods, ranging from a simple one blow on the nose to more heavy clashes between individu-
als or groups and/or with damage being deliberately caused to material belongings. The
remarks given above in relation to Box 3 and the step taken to reach this box, the step towards
conflict, also regard the choice for violence or not. This step can again be influenced and trig-
gered by many other factors and many other strategies can be used to ascertain someone’s
rights to the environment. The use of violence itself influences the conflict and therefore
forms a (positive or negative) feedback loop in the VoE diagram.
In each step of the diagram, these factors and other strategies are indicated by ingoing and out-
going arrows. In a way, those in and out-going streams are the most interesting. Dividing the
Cascade into four boxes connected by three causal arrows, the VoE diagram offers the oppor-
tunity to distinguish different influences at different times and then, in a real situation, identi-
fy the point or points at which the Cascade to Violence started (or starts) to be inevitable. 
The framework describes three big basic steps and ‘events’ (in the ‘event boxes’). In prac-
tice the steps may appear to be sub-divided into (sometimes even several) smaller steps. For
example, in his schema, Homer-Dixon (1999) uses the “social segmentation” lemma. It
emerges, according to him, as one of the social and societal answers to scarcity and forms, as
such, one of the co-causes of the direction of violence. In the framework proposed here this
‘step’ is not voiced but it is certainly one of the possible interim steps between the ‘assertion
of rights’ and ‘violence’. On the other hand, though, segmentation in the sense of niche dif-
ferentiation, with such being an ‘escape’ route in an earlier phase of the flow diagram, can be
a conflict-preventing phenomenon. Moreover, one can question whether the development or
increase of ‘we-they’ divides, as referred to by Homer-Dixon, did not already occur in a far
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67 For a more extensive explanation of the concept of ‘conflict’ see the Introduction and the section ‘phases of
conflict’.
earlier phase and is, as such, a co-causing factor in the unwinding of the Cascade that should
have its place in the in-coming arrows of the influencing factors. As Bächler (1999: xvi) stat-
ed: environmental scarcity (what I refer to as: the narrative of environmental scarcity) can be
used as an instrument “to pursue specific group interests [… and] becomes an (ideological)
issue of group identity”. These groups, then, have to exist already, albeit rudimentary68.
Escape routes
Categorisation
Now we have discussed the central part of the framework from increasing resource scarcity to
violence, all possibilities of actors to escape this route need attention. Each step from an ‘event
box’ in the VoE diagram to the next, the actor can choose to divert his pathways away from the
Violence Cascade flow. To describe this process ‘A – non-A’ models (see page 17), such as the
approach to livelihood strategies and rational decision-making, are useful. 
In a way, one could say that with growing (natural) resource scarcity the ‘output’ of a cer-
tain unit of resource has to increase. The two basic responses are: “Involution (= […] doing
more of the same69) and Transition ( = […] a qualitative system change)” (De Groot and
Kamminga 1995: 76). The first is easy to do and does not require much of an investment but
will eventually lead to a downward spiral because of a decline in labour productivity and the
exhaustion of the resource and finally a collapse: this is the Malthusian path. The second is the
one that Boserup highlights in her analysis: “Certain types of technological change70 will occur
[…] when a certain density of population has been reached”.
Apart from involution and transition of land-use, other responses to pressure are also pos-
sible. First, these may be agricultural, such as “the extension of cultivation into unsettled
areas” (Moonen and Verolme 1991: 67)71 or, as is the main item of this thesis, the extension of
agriculture into niches already being used. Although the farmers then try to do “more of the
same” they do so in a different place72, where others are trying to continue doing the same as
usual. Migration is a response that can be agricultural when farming is taken up in the new
area, or non-agricultural when urban areas are sought. Other examples of non-agricultural
responses are “… population control, manufacturing, or trade ...” (id). Even a kind of agricul-
ture-influencing, non-agricultural response is possible, as we see in the study of Mazzucato
and Niemeijer (2000: 301): “... agricultural performance is affected by the social organisations
around production [...], in the study area people have intensified the uses of social networks
for agricultural practices”. This is more or less the same as Ostrom (1990), Ostrom and
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68 See also the section on influencing factors on the right-hand side of the VoE diagram and ‘phases of conflict’.
69 I would add here: ‘at the same spot’.
70 Boserup herself spoke of yield increasing technologies. Nowadays soil conserving technologies are also
included (see Mazzucato and Niemeijer (2000: 309): “Boserup’s thesis is extended to the land degradation
debate by arguing that as land becomes scarce, the technological change stimulated by population growth will
move in the direction of conservation technologies in order to conserve the scarce, and therefore highly val-
ued resource, namely land.”) 
71 Strictly speaking this is not an answer that increases the output of a unit of resource. As long as there are still
‘unsettled’ and useable areas, the scarcity of the resource is not extremely high. Yet, in reality, most ‘unsettled
areas’ prove to be the niche of one group or another, or are claimed by the State for public goals.
72 Sometimes the incoming farmers even consider the place as being the same because they only see it as con-
tinuing their fallow rotation schedule as they have done for ages. In such situations they do not at first perceive
land scarcity. This notion only arises at the moment they encounter the other users.
Schlager (1996) and McKean (1992: 258-261) have pointed out: they focus not only on land
use transition but also on the ways people organise common use so as to prevent a diminish-
ing of the EUS per user, or even increase output. In the VoE diagram this forms the feedback
from an increased I to the box “institutions and indiv. strat.” or it is directly incorporated in
this box, as a kind of ‘prevention’ strategy of the community.
Of course, in the long run the institutional answers to resource scarcity should cause (some)
qualitative system change to increase the output per unit, or they should engender a broad tran-
sition that even surpasses the boundaries of agriculture (for example changing an agricultural
society in an industrial one).
Institutional changes can also play their role further to the right in the VoE diagram, where
they may influence decisions about (e.g.) the use of violence or not. Then they are ‘co-caus-
ing factors’ or ‘escape encouraging factors’.
Different forms of capitals
To categorise this ad hoc list of possibilities and to try to come to a more exhaustive enumer-
ation I will use Bebbington’s (1999) five types of ‘capitals’ that “give [people] the capacity to
be and to act” (id: 2022), and thus to build their livelihoods73. In short, livelihood strategies
consist of the use of one or more of these ‘assets’ to enlarge (or at least sustain) the total of the
capital74. The assumption is that an actor deliberately capitalises or enlarges his or her capitals.
Sometimes a person eats into one of the five capitals to enlarge the whole, as a kind of invest-
ment. As a consequence, the rationality, spoken of here, does not only include economic delib-
erations. As we will see from the enumeration and discussion of Bebbington’s capitals, social,
cultural, political and moral elements (etc) are also considered. Thus, in the VoE diagram, the
escapes are all composed of the use of one or more or even a mixture of Bebbington’s capi-
tals. These capitals are: Natural, Produced, Human, Social and Cultural capital75. Instead of
intruding into other peoples’ niches, nearby or far away, (or physically defending ones own
niche) an actor can choose to invest in another type or aspect of ‘natural’ capital or to extend
the investment in one of the other capitals. The other capitals can also be used to support the
assertion of rights to one’s niche. 
Examples of the investment in each of the (other) capitals, together with an explanation of
their content, are: 
1. Investment in Natural Capital means enhancement of the productivity of the threatened
niche or intrusion into a niche not (yet) being used76. This may, if possible, be a further niche
specialisation and thus lead to segmentation of society albeit – in contrast with Homer-
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73 Although ‘Livelihoods Research’ does not specifically focus on conflicts and conflict development – it con-
centrates on reasons for poverty and on methods to overcome it - its notions, concepts and methods are very
useful for the fore-lying study, because it studies social relations and the diversity of modes of livelihoods
(and the changes thereof) “at the micro-level, but related to analysis of the structural, historical and institu-
tional elements of the macro-context” (Murray 2001: 2) and the influences of policy. So, without specific use
of the Livelihoods Research framework (as far as this exists), I will implicitly be guided by this research field
(see also chapter 3).
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See, e.g., Murray (2001: 6); Zoomers (2001); Kaag et al (2004). 
75 Bebbington (1999) indicates the dual position of his five capitals, being things that “allow survival, adapta-
tion and poverty alleviation: they are also the basis of agents’ power to act and to reproduce, challenge or
change the rules that govern the control, use and transformation of resources” (p. 2022). With that they are
also influencing factors that will be discussed in the next sub-paragraph.
Dixon’s assumption - most probably in a positive way. Examples pertaining to the first
option are increasing the soil fertility through the application of fertiliser or animal dung,
or using mechanic weeding equipment. Two theories that explain certain strategies for
enhancing natural capital are that of Von Thünen and that of Boserup. I will elaborate on
them when discussing the use of capitals in escape routes (see below).
2. Produced Capital consists of stock (food and animals), “housing, equipment, machinery,
energy, infrastructure, drinking water, health care [system] and education [system]”
(Henkemans 2001)77, as well as saved money, loans, subsidies, remittances and pensions
(Bebbington 1999, Serageldin and Steer 1994). Examples of extending this capital are:
building a water pump for drinking water; a small, local barrage to hold water for cattle in
the dry season; or building a road to make the marketing of products more feasible. 
3. Human Capital means personal capabilities, skills and competences. This is based on health
and physical composure, but also on knowledge and personal characteristics such as charis-
ma or intelligence, etc. This capital can be extended by investing in schooling and training,
improved health care, etc. 
4. Although a lively discussion is going on about the exact content of the concept Social
Capital, it can be defined with a certain communal agreement as: “The stock of active con-
nections among people: the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and behaviours
that bind the members of human networks and communities and make co-operative action
possible” (Cohen and Prusak 2001: 4). These active connections can be realised at an indi-
vidual or a higher congregation level, via group and community up to the nation and, in gen-
eral, the macro level. Whether or not the definition has to be limited to one of these levels
is subject to discussion78, but the fact that individual level social capital (or even group level
social capital) is not the same or can even hinder higher aggregate level social capital is
acknowledged (see below: when ‘Bonding’ becomes exclusive). The World Bank (1999)
distinguishes personal and collective social capital, the latter is: “norms and social relations
embedded in the social structures of societies that enable people to co-ordinate action to
achieve desired goals.” (in Tadepally 1999: 45).
A society is organised along horizontal and vertical (= hierarchical) linkages. With an eye
on these two dimensions, Social Capital can be divided into properties such as 1) Bonding:
referring to “local institutions that are necessary to bind individuals together to pursue col-
lective needs” (Warren, Thompson and Saegert 1999) and to “exclusive and homogeneous
networks” (Paxton 1999) of “people-such-as-us” (Portes and Landhold 1996). The latter is
the societal segregation Homer-Dixon mentioned as a cause of violence. 2) Bridging: refer-
ring to “building ties to other communities” (Warren, Thompson and Saegert 1999), “over-
coming social divides” (Portes and Landhold 1996) and 3) the vertical connections =
Linking: referring to “the capacity to gain access to resources, ideas and information from
formal institutions beyond the community” (Portes and Landhold 1996), also embedded in
the term ‘Political Capital’, that is “the informal relationships and norms that links civil
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76 The term ‘used’ reflects the different notions about rights to resources, that is “rights to own resources, rights
to use [(have access etc., RN)] resources, and the right to intervene in resource situations” (Dietz 1996: 41).
77 To prevent confusion with human capital aspects, I have added the words ‘system’ (in italics).
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Even some founding fathers of the concept, such as Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988) and Putnam (2000), dif-
fer in their definition of the concept and their opinion of for whom the capital is a resource.
society and the state …” (Bebbington and Perreault 1999).
Broadly speaking, to arrive at the possession of Social Capital two general domains have to
be represented: Structural Social Capital, being organisations, roles, rules and networks,
and Cognitive Social Capital, being attitudes, norms, values, trust and reciprocity79.
Enhancement of Social Capital can be obtained by, among other things, bride-wealth invest-
ments, gifts to neighbours, strengthening family ties, praying together, organising women
groups and mutual cash facilities, as well as working parties and building (new) institutions.
5. The term Cultural Capital is even more disputed. Although Bebbington himself distin-
guished it clearly from Social Capital, some other scholars do not acknowledge the sepa-
rate existence of one of the two. Some, such as Berkes and Folke (1994) and Gadgil et al
(1993), do not use the concept of Social Capital, but incorporate the notion, together with
Institutional capital and Political capital, within the Cultural Capital domain (Berkes 1996:
91). Others want to divide the concept’s contents (as described by Bourdieu80) between
Human Capital (the aspects that have to do with knowledge and learning and the insights
into the value of knowledge as well as the possession of diplomas), Social Capital (when
connected with religion, for example81) and even Produced Capital (the economically
obtainable objectified objects of Bourdieu’s Cultural Capital (see note 80)). Furthermore,
several aspects of culture are not comparable to the ‘capital’ with which or in which per-
sons can invest, but are fixed to a person’s (or society’s) personality and his/her identity. It
is this line of thinking that is followed in this thesis.
There are many examples of interaction between capitals, as we can see for example in the
above-mentioned case of Mazzucato and Niemeijer (2000) concerning the influence on agri-
culture of social institutions. “On the one hand there are interactions within each type of asset
[…] at the same time each asset clearly interacts with the others [..] synergistic [or …] destruc-
tive” (Bebbington 1999: 2032). Being an active member in the collective social capital domain
(and thus enhancing it) increases personal social capital as well. Enhanced produced capital in
the form of more drinking water pumps also has a positive effect on human capital, by pro-
viding safe water and thus more healthy people. If the pumps have to be built by the commu-
nity members themselves, a certain degree of social (bonding; bridging) capital is required. For
the construction of more technically advanced wells, help from outside is required and ‘link-
ing’ social capital forms become indispensable. Using savings to buy a plough (to increase
both produced capital and natural capital), instead of organising the monthly beer party,
decreases social capital. A status (= social position) in a neighbourhood can be quickly
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79 See for example Francis (2002).
80 “Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes three forms of cultural capital. The embodied state is directly linked to and
incorporated within the individual and represents what they know and can do. Embodied capital can be
increased by investing time in self improvement in the form of learning. As embodied capital becomes inte-
grated into the individual it becomes a type of habitus and cannot therefore be transmitted instantaneously. The
objectified state of cultural capital is represented by cultural goods, material objects such as books, paintings,
instruments, or machines. They can be appropriated both materially with economic capital and symbolically
via embodied capital. Finally, cultural capital in its institutionalised state provides academic credentials and
qualifications which create a “certificate of cultural competence which confers on its holder a conventional,
constant, legally guaranteed value with respect to power.” (Hayes 2003: 248). “Bourdieu favours a nurture
rather than a nature argument. …” (id 2003).
81 For reasons in the social domain to change religion see, e.g., Van Santen (1993).
destroyed if social norms are ignored82. In most Third World communities ‘rich’ people have
to share, otherwise they lose social capital. Van Est (2000, personal comment) tells the story
of her interpreter in North Cameroon who, with the money earned, bought a ‘pouse-pouse’ (a
kind of wheelbarrow) to earn money as a transporter for others. Because he did not spend his
earnings on his co-villagers, they set up a trail of wheel-prints from a richer neighbour’s house
to his, and accused him of theft of the other wheelbarrow. He indeed ended up in jail. Social
capital is useful to enhance human capital, for example, in “collaborative learning” (Allen et
al 2001: 1). Last but not least, if too much social capital and/or natural capital is lost at a cer-
tain place, people can decide to use their produced and human capital to move away and try
their luck elsewhere83.
Use of capitals away from violence
Following the unwinding of the VoE diagram (see also Fig 2.5), the number of options for
escaping diminishes. As has been stated, a decreasing ‘EUS’ can be counteracted by using all
five capitals. Sometimes, some of these capitals are indispensable. For the transition of land-
use, for example, pressure on the land is not enough. Even Boserup herself warned against
“turning the argument upside down”:
“if it is true […] that certain types of technical change will occur only when a certain density of popula-
tion has been reached, it of course does not follow, conversely, that this technical change will occur when-
ever the demographic prerequisite is present.” (Boserup 1965: 41)
Technological improvements require knowledge (human capital) and the availability of the
techniques, materials and utensils. Boserup (1980: 413) also highlighted the importance of
produced capital for making options implementable84: “local populations in savannah regions
– and in other rural areas – are often prevented from carrying out such modernisations due to
a lack of rural infrastructure in the area in which they live …” To improve both the supply of
the technology and the off-take of products, social capital in the linking sphere is necessary.
Most of the time local individuals cannot invest in infrastructure because it does not give them
enough personal returns85. There is no motivation to implement this option, even when actors
have enough (financial) capital. Outside institutions have to be involved, that is external
authorities, aid organisations or external (private) enterprises with interests in marketable rural
products86. The latter corresponds to the location theory of Von Thünen (1826), an explanato-
ry theory of land-use transition based on economic principles, such as “… simple micro-eco-
nomic assumptions and profit maximisation” (Cleuren 2001: 28). The motivation for intensi-
fication, it says, will only be high enough when the distance to a market centre is small enough.
“The economic profitability of crops and land decreases with increasing distance from mar-
kets.” (id). Less intensive land-use patterns will be found in concentrical circles further away
from the market centre, with the farthest circle, where pioneers start to clear until then empty
bush, being called the ‘frontier zone’ .
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82 This shows that knowledge about cultural patterns is part of social or human capital.
83 Migration is one of the reactions repeatedly described in the literature (e.g. Quin (2001)).
84 See next section: ‘influencing factors’.
85 Investment in infrastructure suffers from a kind of prisoner’s (or free rider) dilemma. 
86 For example, in North Cameroon, several roads have been built and are maintained by the SODECOTON, the
parastatal institute that manages the cotton production-chain.
In contrast to the VoE diagram, migration in the theories of both Boserup and Von Thünen,
only figures as an escape route from pressure areas into ‘empty’ space. Indeed, the choice for
migration is influenced by the total set-up of actors’ capitals. In Von Thünen’s theory, migra-
tion takes place by people who lack capital to invest in the intensification. They move up to
the outer circles, where the pressure on the land is less because of its lower economic value.
In Boserup’s theory, migration is seen as a last escape from starvation in cases in which the
population does not dispose of enough human capital in the form of “knowledge of any types
of fertilisation techniques.” (Boserup 1965: 41). 
None of the two theories mentions the negative impacts and effects of migration that made
me place the phenomenon at the core of the VoE diagram (box 2). When encounters with other
groups are mentioned, only the “positive learning effects” (Boserup 1965: 43) are voiced.
However, the extreme violence by new immigrants in the Thünian frontier zone of the Brazil
forest fringe87, for example, cannot be seen as the result of an escape route away from the
Violence Cascade. 
Yet, not all invasions of new areas lead inescapably to violence. If another niche has already
been entered, apart from retreating to the former or yet another niche, thereby starting again as
it were at the beginning of the framework, in theory the option of investment in the current nat-
ural capital is available and will certainly be used (denuding of the bush, for example).
However, this can be read by others as an assertion of rights and then forms the transfer to the
next ‘event box’ of the VoE diagram. Moreover, trying to be accepted as a newcomer (some-
times by acting as an almost invisible vulnerable person who only needs a very small part of
the new niche and on other occasions by acting as the big giver that helps the new communi-
ty) is the most significant option in such a new niche status, besides launching into conflict.
The new situation, then, demands investment in capitals, such as social capital. Strengthening
friendship bonds and founding new relationships is an indispensable aspect. If the new niche
has been physically positioned in a new area88, ‘old’ cultural aspects of social capital are very
difficult to use (although overlapping belief systems and values may help) and produced cap-
ital is most probably spent on movement to the new area. If some savings or stock are still left,
they can be used to increase the social capital. Knowledge of the social fabric and cultural set-
up and rules of the new society is important and forms a human capital type of asset that can
be enlarged and used.
If the actor is opposed by others and has started to claim his rights to the niche, investment
in the natural capital is mostly only done to underline the assertion and is therefore no longer
an escape route. In Africa, the planting of trees as an investment in natural capital is a good
example of an assertion to the land itself89, although there are several places where tree plant-
ing does not enlarge peoples’ position vis-à-vis the land that is planted out. An alternative way
to ‘escape’ can only be found via the other capitals. Social position, alliance forming, knowl-
edge about recent laws, powerful villagers and the positioning of the resources, are all assets,
as in the former step, via which the use of violence can be kept at bay. Demands, negotiation,
mediation, arbitrage and litigation, as well as successful threats, all feature in the human and
social capital domain. The knowledge and intuition of which forum c.q. institution is the best
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87 See Cleuren (2001).
88 This means: a real migration has taken place.
89 For that reason several landowners do not want the users of their land to plant trees.
for resolving the problem also lies in the human capital domain, whether or not supported by
social capital, which helps to augment this kind of knowledge.
It has to be noticed, however, that a conscious unwinding of the Cascade to Violence will
make actors invest in those capitals that will help them to be successful in a later stage. I am
going to study these investments under the heading ‘influencing factors’, since the prior build-
up of certain ‘capitals’ co-determines the route to be followed.
Influencing factors
Categorisation
The last important part of the VoE diagram comprises all the factors that influence actors’
‘steps’. Both at the top and the bottom of the diagram, such factors are indicated as, respec-
tively, ‘co-causing’ and ‘escape encouraging’ factors. The top factors all depict factors that
make actors choose for the direction of unwinding of the main flow-route, the Cascade towards
Violence. Each new step again opens the possibility of escape. Therefore, at the bottom of the
diagram the factors are grouped which help actors choose other options, away from the
‘Violence Cascade’.
Figure 2.5 Escapes and influencing factors in VoE diagram
There are many factors that influence actor’s decision-making and the implementation of
these decisions. The position of capitals (as defined by Bebbington 1999) as something peo-
ple have and use or want to have and choose as an escape route, has already been described in
the section on escapes. However, in decision-making, more fluid and abstract dimensions are
also important. Indeed, Bebbington’s capitals are again involved at different moments, now as
influencing factors, in the schema of De Groot and Kamminga (1995) that I used to categorise
all influencing factors. Based on the more limited ‘options and motivations’ divide of the
‘Actor-in-context’ model of the social sciences, De Groot and Kamminga define four concepts:
“1) Potential and implementable options (potential options are defined as all actions the actor
could conceivably implement, if he availed of all necessary knowledge, power funds and so on
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[in short: of an unlimited amount of ‘capitals’, RN]. The implementable options then are the ones
he can in fact choose between, given his resources; 2) Autonomy (autonomy is defined as pre-
cisely what makes this difference between potential and implementable options.[..]. Autonomy
may be separated into (1) a set of positive resources, which may be summarized as the actor’s
economic resources, social capital, knowledge90, moral resources, organizational capacity and
so on, and (2) a set of negative restrictions such as prohibitions, taboos, denied access, the con-
ditions set by a permit or a contract, and so on); 3) Objectified motivations (This somewhat
ambiguous term refers to the motivational factors in the actor’s decision-making, ‘objectified’ in
the sense of being put as much as possible in simple quantitative terms such as costs and bene-
fits in monetary units, yields in kg per hectare, working time in hours, and so on.); 4) interpre-
tations and interpretative frames (..[…] .. ‘interpretations make the difference between the
objectified motivations and the motivations as they really are for the actor. Work is not only
measured in hours only, for instance; there is ‘good work’ (e.g. dynamic work, men’s work, sta-
tus-rich work, work that helps the community, convivial work) and bad work, and that makes a
lot of difference in the working hours as they really count for the actor. Crops are not just kilo-
grams and calories, but kilograms of things that taste good or bad, that belong to being home,
that round of a real meal, and so on. And even money – some of it tastes bad, and some of it
counts double. At a somewhat deeper level, interpretations are connected to the ‘HEC’domains91
of reasoning, to self-images and culture….” (De Groot and Kamminga 1995: 79). 
And, as has been said before, the different interpretations and interpretative frames of actors
generate different perceptions by people of their surroundings and of the influence of their
behaviour on that environment (Burke 2001), as well as of their interpretation of the ‘arrived’
information. It goes without saying that culture is an important factor in the shaping of world-
views and interpretative frames. As such it influences the “autonomy” of actors. Nevertheless,
“culture does not ‘cause’ behaviour ...” (Avruch and Black 1993: 135). Situation, “circum-
stances and historical time periods” (Druckman 1993: 33), as well as (collective) memories
decide which “cultural imperatives, […which] broad constraints within which a wide range of
[…] behaviours can occur” (Druckman 1993: 33) are chosen as a guide for action. However,
“culture is a perception-shaping lens or […] a grammar for the production and structuring of
meaningful action.” (Avruch and Black 1993: 132). In addition, ‘human capital’ in the sense
of education also shapes the interpretative frames of actors.
Relationship of categorising concepts
Indeed, Bebbington’s capitals influence the third and fourth categories of De Groot and
Kamminga. However, they play their greatest role in the first two categories. In the same way,
the entitlements and endowments of Leach et al (1999) can be assumed to have been incorpo-
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90 Not everybody has access to the same and the most important information and knowledge. And, people also
differ in the way they ‘accept’ and internalise information. Existing perceptions (category 4) colour ‘arriving’
knowledge.
91 This refers to the different ways people can be motivated for their actions. Apart from the economic mode, De
Groot (1992: 355) discerns two more “modes of reasoning” or “perspective”, being the ‘homo honoris’ mode
and the ‘ethics of care’ mode. Together these form the ‘HEC model’. For some cynics, the ‘honoris’ and ‘care’
modes are only derived forms of the ‘economic’ mode. See, for example, the reasoning of Ostrom (1990: 88-
89) that underlines a long-term economic (personal and community) benefit springing from the existence of
norms in common resource management, whether they be ‘honour’ or ‘care’ based: 
“Extensive norms have evolved in all these settings that narrowly define ‘proper’ behavior. Many of these
norms make it feasible for individuals to live in close interdependence on many fronts without excessive con-
flict. Further, a reputation for keeping promises, honest dealings, and reliability in one arena is a valuable
asset. Prudent, long-term self-interest reinforces the acceptance of the norms of proper behavior.”  
rated into the categories of De Groot and Kamminga. 
The term ‘autonomy’ can be seen as consisting of Leach’s terms ‘endowments’ (= rights and
resources actors have) and ‘entitlements’ (= legitimate - in the sense of both formal and cus-
tomary law as well as other social norms - effective command over alternative commodity
bundles), and the mapping (c. q. gaining access) thereof. Although not mentioned explicitly by
Leach et al, these are all co-shaped by the ‘restrictions’ within the ‘autonomy’ category of De
Groot and Kamminga. 
In the same way four of the five capitals of Bebbington can be seen as endowments-enti-
tlements that can be used in different bundles as well as in mutual substitutions. As such, these
lead to ‘capabilities’ (= “what people can do or be with their entitlements”, as defined by Leach
et al (1999: 233)) to actors92. The capitals therefore define the autonomy of actors. Only cul-
tural capital is of another order, as is mentioned already. Culture (not cultural capital) does con-
nect more with the 4th category of De Groot and Kamminga. Additionally to co-shaping the
interpretative frames, it may have to do with the restrictions connected with ‘autonomy’. It sets
(and changes) the structures and institutional regimes within which the actor has to act. The
autonomy defining macro structure of the global market, for example, is shaped by the west-
ern based capitalistic culture.
Leach’s and Bebbington’s frameworks show the dynamics of the autonomy concept. As can
be seen specifically in the second set of the autonomy description (but also in the first one, if
examined more closely) power relations and positions (that are part of social capital) are very
important in the construction of endowments and entitlements or ‘capitals’. Leach et al (1999:
234) regard institutions, ranging from micro to macro and sometimes changing, as shaping
these processes. This relates to the outward contextualisation of the “actor-in-context” method
of De Groot (1992). Influences on actor’s decisions and strategies can be traced in an ever
widening field of secondary, tertiary, etc. actors, who are themselves influenced by a same web
of connected categories. 
Similarly to the ‘autonomy’ category, the other three categories of De Groot and Kamminga
should not be approached as being static. For example, options and motivations are constant-
ly changing with the shifts in personal capitals that, in turn, are caused by strategies based on
the options and motivations. Neither is culture an everlasting stock of ‘things’. It also has
changing aspects that are in constant interaction with the more enduring factors. Moreover, the
birth and development or death of institutions, or changes in structures beyond the scope of
individual actors changes options and motivations as well as interpretations. In addition, inter-
pretations and their frames alter whenever knowledge grows or power exercising demands
shifts. Even objectified motivations change with market change and price differences.
An important illustration of this constant and mutually dependent change is the fact that the
moment of choice to follow one or another route of the VoE diagram is determined by the per-
taining factors and also influences the outcome. “People may be too poor and the environment
too degraded to enable a cross-over to the [transition] response” (De Groot and Kamminga
1995: 74). We can call this the ‘poverty trap’ with regard to natural resources. In addition,
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92 According to Bebbington (1999: 2032) his capitals are assets or compose of assets of rural people. What is
important are “the ways in which people are able to access, defend and sustain these assets and the abilities
of people to transform those assets into” better living conditions and better asset and asset-transformation con-
ditions.
Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994, and 1999) warns of the effect of a certain level of resource scarci-
ty under certain conditions on the possibilities for escaping this same scarcity. While high-
lighting the difference between neo-Malthusians and neo-Boserupians and while discussing
the possibility of the absence of innovation93, he stresses the importance of the ‘in-between’
position and the analysis of the whole complex set of different influencing factors.
A-rationality
The effect of the moment of choice highlights the fact that any rationality has to have a long
time horizon. In addition, it has to deal with a large number of uncertainties with respect to
what the future will bring. “Uncertainty is endemic to natural systems” say Hanna and Jentoft
(1996: 43), to which I would add: and to social systems. Nevertheless, within the limited pos-
sibilities they have, people are certainly guided by conscious calculations. For example, the
choice for agricultural transition in times of population pressure is a choice for less labour effi-
ciency94. The rising land scarcity and the rational calculation of labour input versus output may
result in the choice for a one-time investment in violence via new niche-invasion rather than
the ever-continuing higher labour costs of intensification, especially when markets are too far
away95. 
Calculations can also be connected to values other than economic ones. Rational Choice
Theory “views humans as intentional actors with rational correspondence among their percep-
tions, preferences, decision-making, and behavior [...], it also recognizes that individuals hold
non-economic preferences, such as love and respect” (Burke 2001: 455-456)96. Thus, these
rational considerations have to be taken into account when studying actors’ decision-making
and the implementation thereof. 
However, Rational Choices no matter how broadly defined and no matter how well the
‘colouring’ of the information is taken into account97, are not the whole story. Sometimes
humans do not calculate at all. Even if actors have access to the right and comprehensive infor-
mation, “[t]hey often do not make efficient use of it” (Burke 2001: 467). Most of the time they
just do what their fore-fathers did, that is act according to tradition and according to what they
have ‘seen’ being done. To that has to be added that, although perhaps intentionally ‘rational’,
actual behaviour can be far from that because, as Ostrom (1990: 21) puts it:  “The differences
between those who have and those who have not extricated themselves from commons dilem-
mas may also have to do with factors outside the domain of those affected. Some participants
40
93 In contrast with the first, who give primacy to natural factors,  “[e]conomic optimists and distributionists
emphasise social factors, that may hamper technological innovation, but they differ on which social factors are
important: economic optimists stress market failures and bad economic policies and institutions, whereas dis-
tributionists emphasise social structures and political behavior, especially skewed distribution of wealth and
power among classes and groups.” (Homer-Dixon 1999: 43).
94 According to Boserup (1965: 32) the “output per man-hour” declines in intensification. She said that, because
the fall in efficiency is a price to be paid, “the shift from efficient extensive systems to less efficient intensive
ones [are only made] when driven by the necessity of feeding more individuals.” I would add: ‘and when no
other systems have a more positive cost-benefit calculation’.
95 See Von Thünen’s location theory; e.g. in Cleuren (2001) or De Groot (1999).
96 See also note 91 about HEC domains.
97 As mentioned earlier, most of the time information is not neutral and objective but coloured by previous per-
ceptions and manipulations of both the information itself and the perceptions. This may suggest non-rational
reactions, but taking account of actor information, deliberations can still be very rational.
do not have the autonomy98 to change their own institutional structures and are prevented from
making constructive changes by external authorities who are indifferent to the perversities of
the commons’ dilemma, or may even stand to gain from it. In addition, there is the possibility
that external changes may sweep rapidly over a group, giving them insufficient time to adjust
their internal structures to avoid the sub-optimal outcomes.” 
Last but not least there is the non-rational, even non-reasonable, behaviour of humans ‘not
having control over themselves’; a state of mind which everybody encounters one day or
another but which in general depends on personal characteristics (see Sandole’s list in the next
sub-section). As such, it is therefore related to the second category of De Groot and
Kamminga: Autonomy. Some scholars even see emotion as one of the basic features of human
behaviour. Upreti (2001: 27) notes that “when people perceive injustice or conflict in their
society, they assess it with emotions and act or react accordingly”. Scimecca (1993: 213) also
considers that “deep-seated conflicts are often irrational”99. Although perhaps less frequently
applicable to land-use practices earlier in the diagram, where highly rational notions can pre-
vail in setting the strategies, all these different aspects of human choice are very relevant
specifically to conflicts and their genesis and development 100. 
Influencing factors on the right-hand side of the VoE diagram
In the early (left-side) phases of the flow-chain, strategies other than the assertion of rights are
possible. There is still a broad range of actor options and motivations. This is indeed what can
be seen in the field. The success thereof decides how vulnerable actors feel, how they perceive
their insecurities and thus how much emphasis they will place on the assertion of rights to the
environment later on. Sometimes the feeling that this environment is indispensable either for
themselves or for their offspring is an important factor in their decision to resort to violence.
Sometimes natural resource insecurities are at best a trigger in an otherwise unsatisfying situ-
ation. In other circumstances, actors choose a non-violent way to overcome the conflict con-
cerning resources. 
During the history of social sciences the development of conflicts into violence has been a
major field of inquiry. Different schools have proposed different theories of explanation,
although the concept of “basic needs” always played a big role. For example Burton (1993:
58) stresses that “… human needs deprivation forced the individual to act in ways that would
otherwise not be chosen.” With the basement of (violent) conflict in basic needs, most theories
also include contextual and structural factors. Sometimes only as variables that determine the
availability of the needs itself: “Any system [...] that fails to satisfy [...] people’s basic human
needs and long-term interests will generate instability, political repression and violence.”
(Rubenstein 1993: 153). Others, like Van der Merwe (1993: 266), stress that those needs are
only one factor between others: “If human needs are seen as one aspect (present to a greater
or lesser degree) of many real-world conflicts, rather than the defining characteristic ...”
41
98 See section ‘categorisation’: point 2 of De Groot and Kamminga: set of negative restrictions of autonomy.
99 See also Röling (1985).
100 To contradict these nuances:  Davis (1999) has found that “even within a category of political action [violence]
often thought to be dominated by fanatical and irrational individuals who act on mere reflexive impulse, there
is strong evidence that agents engage in the process of responding systematically to the constraints and oppor-
tunities that they face.”
To achieve a greater insight into the reasons and possibilities of choice during the last (right-
hand side) phase of the VoE diagram a combination of several of these theories will help the
best. “The recognition of the multidimensionality [of conflict] should sensitise us to the limi-
tations of specific approaches that offer only partial solutions ...” (Van der Merwe 1993: 273).
Thus, because it is put together from theories and paradigms from “all levels to the develop-
ment of conflict” (Sandole 1993: 20) I refer to Sandole’s list for a “basis of a generic theory
on the initiation and escalation of violent conflict” (Sandole 1993: 20-21). As can be seen, this
generic theory will be firmly based on the needs paradigm.
Sandole’s list starts from biological and physiological mechanisms that generate a certain
propensity to violence of human beings. This requires “some kind of stimulation to be acti-
vated […] which can be influenced by learning” (id). He then articulates the existence of
human beings’ biological “basic needs for security, identity [such as ethnicity] and the like”.
In this biological-psychological domain, others add the need for a “social life” (Clark 1993:
47), even “associational or organizational life” (Brown 1993: 165) and “needs that arise out of
self-awareness”, such as “the need for sacred meaning”, “creativity” (Clark 1993: 47), “recog-
nition, solidarity, and personal development” (Rubenstein 1993: 150) as well as “autonomy”
(Burton 1993: 58). Buruma and Margalit (2004) consider humiliation as a driving force
towards the use of violence. Apart from the general term ‘security’, Sandole does not mention
the ‘normal’ basic needs but, for the sake of completeness, I add food, shelter and clothing.
However, when discussing the role of physiology, he does refer to what I called non-rational
and non-reasonable reactions. When the needs are threatened, or “frustrated”, he says that the
“physiological mechanisms may come to dominate the actor’s […] rationality”. That means
that the actor then resorts to violence. 
Although the suggestion that violence is a non-rational choice in which limbic systems
dominate the more highly-developed brain may be true for certain situations, as a general con-
cept of the origin of violence it contradicts Sandole’s remark about the effect of learning.
Indeed, the use of violence can be perfectly based on conscious cost-benefit and risk calcula-
tions, in which the brain masters the emotions. Then not only the direct goal plays a role, but
also longer term societal positions. In so-called ‘cultures of violence’, such as some of the
Latin American or the Sicilian ones101, social status may, for example, depend on the early, fear-
less (and preferably effective) use of violence.
The threats and frustrations that play an important role in driving people to violence can be
caused by many things. For example, the memory of past violence can cause fear of physical
attacks and loss of life that makes people strike pre-emptively102. This is one of the reasons why
causes of the start-up of violence are often different from those that continue it (see Sandole
1999)103. Many times perceived or indirect threats play a role. “Frustration can be fed by per-
ceived structural violence” (Sandole 1993: 11)104. 
The well-known concept of ‘relative deprivation’, as voiced by Gurr (1970), is a variation of
this theme, in which actors perceive a discrepancy between “resources to which one feels enti-
tled and […] resources which one feels capable of acquiring and keeping” (Sandole 1993: 12).
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See for example Kruijt (1997) or Cottino (1999).
102 See Oketch and Polzer (2002) about Burundi: “… the importance of fear as a motivating factor for killing.”
103 See also the last of Bächler’s (1999) five key factors in conflict causation: spill-over from an historical con-
flict.
Relative deprivation is explained mostly as a situation of initially increasing welfare, followed
by a decline and thus a gap between expected and real satisfaction of needs that triggers people’s
aggression against the State and its elite (Davis 1962; Gurr 1993). This is even more so, when
this elite has both a better societal and economic position than its subjects and when they (or the
State institutions) are rigidly trying to maintain the status quo (Huntington 1968)105. This is a
reaction by the elite to the threat of diminishing well-being, a fear of the loss of wealth. Indeed,
Gurr refers to physical needs and not so much to the meta-physical ones listed above. 
These physical needs (or wants) also play a role in the type of relative deprivation that plays a
role in the greed variant of environmental conflicts. As depicted by Collier and Hoeffler (2002:
21) a combination of greed and grievance models makes more sense in explaining violent rebel-
lion than one of them alone. Here, it is the possession of fewer resources by a person or group
compared with what others, like the elite referred to, have that sets the frustration in motion. 
Mostly, though, greed for resources is mixed with greed for power (the one stemming from
the other and vice versa106). Moreover, conflict and possible subsequent violence only arise
when another party puts forward a counter claim to the wanted resource, whether out of their
own greed or out of grievance. In their articles on the incredible violence in the Great Lakes
region of Africa, Oketch and Polzer (2002) and Bigagaza et al (2002) stress that the greed of
the elite for the power to extract wealth from the scarce resource land, and its subsequent
manipulation of the masses, only led to the massacres because poor farmers indeed reacted on
the basis of a threat to, or the actual lack of, subsistence possibilities. However, it has to be
born in mind that defining the motivation for resources as based on greed or grievance is a
moral (and etic) choice107. The observer decides whether the party that strives for a resource
has, in general, enough to meet its basic needs and is thus greedy, or acts from grievance
because it does not have enough. Yet, as can be seen in the ever-expanding list of different
(possible) basic needs given above, it is difficult to decide whether or not people’s basic needs
are threatened. Apparent greed can in fact be a grievance in another domain.
Another variation in the frustration realm is “Galtung’s rank disequilibrium [that] refers to
discordant locations of actors along various indicators of socio-economic (and other) meas-
urement” (Sandole 1993: 20). This frustration-aggression mechanism can be recognised in
Richards’ (1996) observation that the Sierra Leone militia108 specifically consists of more high-
ly educated young men from poverty struck families and with no access to better (power) posi-
tions within society109. It has to be stressed, however, that Galtung adds to his theory that “these
extreme forms of aggression are unlikely to occur unless 1) other means of equilibration
towards a complete top-dog configuration have been tried, and 2) the culture has some prac-
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104 Defined by Galtung as “a structurally based discrepancy between actual and potential states of somatic and
mental well-being, it need not be perceived by its ‘victims’ or involve physical violence” (in Sandole 1993: 11).
105 See also Schoorl (1974: 237-238).
106 See also the remarks about land in the Introduction.
107 See Ballentine and Sherman (2003a: 5): “there is little consensus as to how [economic factors] matter, how
much they matter, or in what ways. In part, this disagreement has stemmed from the loaded normative conno-
tations of the terms ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’.”
108 The extremely violent struggle for diamonds in Sierra Leone (Richards 2001) or the Congo basin (Ross 2003)
have a different start-up cause, but the continuation of the fights  is due to the local abundance of this natural
resource that is scarce and in worldwide demand and, thus, has a high economic value that can provide the
warring parties with funds. These civil wars clearly illustrate Sandole’s (1999) point of a difference between
causes of start-up and of continuation of conflicts.
tice in violent aggression.” (Galtung 1964: 116). 
The frustration-aggression spiral seems to fuel itself by the mechanism that involved par-
ties “tend to overperceive and overreact to threatened and actual assaults to needs” (Sandole
1993: 20). This underlines the role of emotions in violence genesis and development.
Moreover, natural and social “environmental ‘shocks’ and uncertainties associated with devel-
opments at the international and global level” can exacerbate the “conflict-as-process” (id: 21).
As mentioned above, although most authors describe economic principles as driving forces,
frustration can also develop with regard to basic needs in other life domains. Unfortunately,
Sandole’s list does not answer the question of which basic needs from all those listed by dif-
ferent scholars are the most basic, that is which needs are more important than others (Mitchel
1990) and demand means, that sacrifice everything else. The theories about the relative short-
age of (basic) needs as a cause of violence indicate that, perhaps, the more meta-physical needs
are indeed the most important and that Sandole was right to mention only them. Also other
scholars from the conflict field discuss that people can bargain over (basic) needs, but that ide-
ological or deep-rooted values can give rise to unsolvable disparities (Druckman 1993). 
Ronen (1995: 41) distinguishes two different types of needs: in the psychic and in the phys-
ical sphere, sustaining respectively mental (e.g. pride, trust, love, sense of freedom) and phys-
ical (e.g. food, water, shelter) well-being. Compared to, e.g., Boserupian theory, one has to
note that this adds not only several aspects in the physical domain besides the strictly food-
centred one, but also a whole new domain. “The satisfaction of both sets of needs is necessary
for human physical and psychic survival” (Ronen 1995: 41). What is interesting is the type of
reaction in the case of frustration. Stone (1966) specifically mentions the strategies other than
aggressive ones as ways of reaching a solution of the perceived backwardness. He stresses that
sometimes a sequence (or even a mixture) of different ways of reacting exist. 
Phases of conflict
According to Rubin et al (1994) reactions to a conflict can be ordered along a line of dimin-
ishing attention to other party’s interests. The management of a conflict is more difficult when
parties are more focussed on achieving their aspirations, when their aspirations are higher than
usually and when they think another person’s aspirations are less legitimate than their own.
These circumstances can come about when “after a period of expanding achievements, there
is a slowdown or reversal in this achievement” and when a person “develops the awareness
that [the] other is of no greater merit than [himself], yet [the] other is afforded greater privi-
lege” (id: 18-19). This is the same as the above-mentioned ‘relative deprivation’ feelings, but
now also relative to others110. When there is a “status inconsistency” (when some people are
higher on one criterion of merit-assessment than on another, but are assessed as being less high
in status than a person with the reverse constitution), when parties both evaluate the existing
power structures in their favour and when norms “that dovetail the aspirations of potential
opponents” become weakened (id: 19), a conflict will easily spill over into the next phase.
Rubin et al (1994) distinguish four possible strategies or phases with increasing negation of
other party’s interest: avoiding, yielding, problem-solving (compromise can be one of these),
and contention. Yielding can be explained as first stating one’s claims in the dispute, but with-
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109 See also Ukeje (2001) on the role of educated youths in rebellion in Nigeria.
110 Jealousy plays a big role!
drawing as soon as the other party also makes a claim. Contention means that a party tries to
“resolve a conflict on [its own] terms without regard to the interests [of the other]” (Rubin et
al 1994: 28). The authors explain that each strategy can be “more or less vigorous” (id: 44) and
played out in a more or less rational manner. In the case of contention, more vigorous means
more intense and frequent violence, e.g. “shots instead of shouts” (id: 45). 
Rational considerations of parties that fuel the process development of the conflict are
based on thoughts about a person’s own interests and aspirations and the perceptions of the
adversary’s interests and aspirations. In addition, the perceived feasibility of a chosen strate-
gy, that is “the assessment of the effectiveness and the costs” (Rubin et al 1994: 21) is just as
important. Indeed, as has been pointed out, perceptions of the world in general and the actors’
position in it, both absolutely and relatively when compared to others, as well as perceptions
on possible livelihood strategies and the position of conflict and violence in society111, play an
important role. These perceptions are shaped by (as mentioned above in the ecological-socio-
logical theories) the mutual interaction between the natural-physical environment and the
social domain. Herein, but also in the strictly social field, personal characteristics and culture
play an important role. Within the framework of post-colonial theory it is stressed that per-
ceptions are also formed by internalised prejudices based on notions from ‘foreign’ power-
holders about their subjects as well as about themselves via their subjects, and thus by power
relations themselves112. The researcher should be aware of this. Besides this, acceptable expla-
nations (or explanations given by acceptable persons) about the relative deprivation can lessen
the frustration.
In addition, the idea of ‘having excessively less than your neighbour’ is connected to feel-
ings of powerlessness. “The distribution of power constitutes a continuing problem for socie-
ty” (Scimecca 1993: 215). Social insecurity may be countered by a better power position. A
perceived low power position vis-à-vis the adverse party may influence the choice for yield-
ing or even avoiding, but it may also trigger a strategic move towards violent contending in a
latter stage. Sometimes such a powerless position with regard to the competing party may even
engender conscious or frustration-fuelled actions against a third party (scapegoat). Thus, in
this study power, disparities and the question of the legitimacy of power both with regard to
the allocation of resources and the management of discords are regarded as influences on con-
flict development.
Trying to gain the more powerful position by force is a way of showing off one’s own
power. Safeguarding ‘your’ fish on your neighbour’s territory, as the inhabitants of Padmangay
did, is also a sign of power. “The ability to achieve one’s own will in a situation of scarcity is
what makes one powerful.” (Sandole 1993: 12). Sometimes management power over a certain
resource is sought via control of another natural resource. Then the conflict seems to be trig-
gered by the scarcity of the first resource, but it is power over the whole complex that is at
stake. In North Senegal, for example, conflicts between herders seem to be focused on the
scarcity of water wells. However, it is the surrounding grasslands that make herders want to
have exclusion-power over the wells (Juul 2002). At the same time, the control of the wells is
politicised via “struggles over difference and belonging” (Juul 2002: 186), that mean that
social identities related to ‘autochthonous’ or ‘foreigner’ have to be played out. “[R]ights to
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111 See for example De Groot (1992); Laurent and Mathieu (1994); Kruijt (1994) and Jadallah (n.d.).
112 Said (1978), Memmi (1959), Mufti and Shohat (1997).
resources often depend on social identity” (Juul and Lund 2002b: 249).  
The mix of wanting to be a member of a managing committee113 for the sake of power over
the resource or for the sake of becoming a powerful member of society in general, can be seen
in more cases of conflicts in which resources are involved. Thus, whether or not natural
resources are a direct cause for conflict or only a pretext to enhance power-positions remains
to be seen. However, it is certain that they do play a role in the struggle for and with power
that is abound in society as a whole. 
An actor’s position in his community is also important in the distinction that has to be made,
when looking at causes of the outbreak of violence, between “group aims” or “personal goals”
(Ronen 1995: 31). The sum of several of the same individual goals or strong loyalty feelings
within an otherwise formed group can lead to escalation of a conflict, whether or not over
resources. The Social Identity Theory of Tajfel and Turner (1979) states that sometimes people
identify themselves as members of a social group (i.e. the social identity114) and at other times
as unique individuals (i.e. the personal identity), depending on the situation. “..We are, in some
sense, the same, or identical to the other people. […]. When we say that we are the same, we
mean that for some purposes we treat members of our group as being similar to ourselves in
some relevant way. Social categorisation accentuates similarities within and differences
between groups. To take the most extreme example, in some violent conflicts such as war, the
members of the opposite group are treated as identical and completely different to the in-group”
(Australian National University 2003: 1). This social level of identity115 “is the level at which
individuals tend to regard themselves as relatively interchangeable (in terms of perceptions and
beliefs) with other people” (Turner 1982: 23). To achieve a positive social identity, it is neces-
sary to view one’s own group as somehow better than other groups. This is social competition. 
Thus, strong group feelings can trigger the defence of group members’ interests out of loy-
alty. Then, the strength of feelings of injustice and deprivation with regard to natural resources,
but certainly also with regard to other social issues, or the perception of those feelings, define
the choice of the strategy in the conflict. In the case of individual powerlessness, group
strength can cause highly vigorous contending actions.
2.5 In summary
The central route of the whole cascade (within the VoE diagram) is an investment in natural
capital, but with only one goal and (finally) executed with one means. As regards other
options, at each step the actor can choose to invest in (or with) one of the other capitals of
Bebbington or even in natural capital, but in another sense. Escape routes are thus found in
investment in and capitalisation of produced, human, social or even natural capital, or in com-
binations thereof. Why, how and when actors choose for a certain investment is determined by
‘influencing factors’. These can be categorised according to the four domains of De Groot and
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113 See in relation to a well-committee: Juul (2002).
114 “Social identity = that part of an individuals self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his member-
ship of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that mem-
bership” (Tajfel 1978: 35).
115 According to the Self-categorization Theory, next to individual and social it is possible that more levels of
identity exist. See Turner (1982); Turner et al (1987); Australian National University (2001).
Kamminga, being (implementable) options; autonomy; objectified motivations and interpreta-
tions(-frames). The different domains are all influenced by 
- existing capitals, and the possibilities to use them
- micro and macro structures and institutions (part of which are culturally defined with power
relations being especially important) and the possibilities to change them, which in itself
depend on, among other things, the possession of relevant capitals.
In general, explanations of strategies are sought in rational calculations. However, the fact that
humans are also emotional beings, gives rise to the possibility of causalities outside the ratio.
The human necessity to fulfil ‘basic needs’ both in the physical and meta-physical sphere con-
nects the rational calculation of strategies with the a-rationality of ‘biological predispositions’.
Both before and during the conflict, influences on choices for certain actions differ per stage
and have different effects per stage. In addition, underlying ‘structural’ patterns, both in the
biological and in the social environment, can account for the reactions shown.
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Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The research is positioned within the rich domain of research on distribution and management
of resources in general, that is mostly economically directed. Here the range of resources is
condensed into natural resources. Natural resources are entities of nature that serve different -
mostly simultaneous - functions for human beings. These different functions can be related to
human health, material wellbeing and immaterial wellbeing. As such, natural resources can be
seen as economic resources, cultural resources or health-giving resources. They have functions
that are directly connected with these three domains: for example when people gather leaves
from a certain tree to use to alleviate diarrhoea, or when a community is proud of its steep hill-
top and connects origin tales to it1. The relation between nature and its functions can also be
an indirect one, when the natural resources serve to maintain (or are) support-systems for the
three2. The central focus of the present study is whether or not a causal link exists between
environmental scarcity (that is: a scarcity in natural resources) and violence, and the possibil-
ity to discern certain patterns in this connection or in the avoidance of the connection. 
In order to study this complex, the non-violent reaction to scarcities such as the environmental
one, should also be made clearer. Only studying situations in which both violence and environ-
mental scarcity exist will lead to the conclusion that a combination of the two, indeed, exists
(Levy 1995). However, such a combined existence need not automatically also be a causal link-
age. It has to be stressed, though, that “[i]f the thesis could be proved false in the favourable
case [as could be the case when studying situations in which both variables exist, RN], then it
would most likely be false for intermediate cases.” (Flyvbjerg 2001: 75-76). Nevertheless, to
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avoid criticisms of the Levy type (“evident cases”), this research focuses on the turning point
within the causal chain of environmental scarcity towards violence as marked out in Chapter 2.
That is why the focus of the research can be described as follows: Is there a causal link
between environmental scarcity and violent outbreaks. Is it possible to discern patterns there-
in and how do people avoid the chain of actions that develop into violence when indeed envi-
ronmental scarcity has been perceived? The latter means: what is the causal link between envi-
ronmental scarcity and non-violence? In this research I am looking for patterns in both the
direction to violence and in the diversion away from violence, that is the pre-violent moment
of assertion of rights to the environment.
As can be seen in the research question, both environmental scarcities (in the actors per-
ception and in reality) as well as social patterns of behaviour are the focus of this study.
Thus, the exact status of the environment has to be established during the research.
However, to clarify the relationship between the two, it is specifically the practices and strate-
gies3 of people to overcome or prevent insecurities in general, and (growing) insecurities related
to natural resources and resulting scarcities thereof in particular, that have to be identified and
analysed. Thus, the principles that set these practices and strategies should be the focus of the
study. For that reason I have chosen to use methodological tools that are rooted in sociological
theories and that have proven to be useful for the study of the everyday life of actors. Besides using
a method that allows me to combine both the desire to add to theory building as well as to more
profound context-dependent insight, I have used methods for analysis that are actor oriented.
To avoid generating a study into too many variables, only one type of natural resource is cho-
sen as an example, namely land. The natural resource of land is an economic resource when
actors use it to maintain their material livelihoods. In a direct way, they use the land to gather
products to eat - wild products or agricultural or pastoral products -, to clothe themselves and
to build housing and shelters. Land is also an economic resource when it is used as an
exchange object in economic transactions. The example above about the hilltop shows land as
a cultural resource. As was explained in the Introduction, land can be the basis of a communi-
ty’s identity; can play a role in power relations, etc. Indirectly, land can serve as the bearer of
other useful natural resources, such as minerals, waterholes, rivers, fish-canals or trees.
Although land is a natural resource it is also, partly, man-made. Investments in physical infra-
structure, for example, define the outlook and use-perspectives of land. All these different
aspects play a role in perceptions of land-scarcity and therefore have to be studied.
The research methodology serves to answer the questions posed. Describing the methods used
for both data gathering as well as analysis provides an insight into the course of the research
and creates possibilities for later duplication of the research. Thus, in this chapter I will
describe which approach I used and how I used it. I will discuss the research questions, the
research strategy and the research implementation with regard to place, time, which data I
gathered and how. At the end I will deal with specific difficulties that arose due to this type of
research and how I tried to overcome them.
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set of repeated and related activities conducted” over a short time-span and, on the other hand, systematic and
conscious behaviour in a long-term development perspective.
3.2 Research questions
3.2.1 The main question
What are the key causalities in the linkages between environmental resource scarcity, the pre-
violent assertion of rights to the environment and the (non-)avoidance of violence itself?
3.2.2 Questions for the research
The questions to be answered in this research reflect people’s reactions in six different situa-
tions of a combination of natural resource scarcity and violence. Schematically Figure 3.1
describes the six situations in a Matrix. In reality, however, the six situations are not static
throughout time or for a specific place. Scarcity of environmental resources differs from sea-
son to season and from year to year. It differs from user to user (within one user group (rich
and poor persons for example, or women versus men) and between groups (pure pastoralists
experience a scarcity of food during the dry season, when grass with which to feed their cat-
tle is scarce while cultivators, on the other hand, have a reduced food supply in the wet season
when last year’s yields have already been consumed and the new harvest is not yet ripe4).
Figure 3.1 Scarcity versus violence Matrix
For each matrix field a research question can be formulated (I do not cover matrix field A, as
that is of no importance here):
1 (field B) How does violence develop even when environmental scarcity is not prevalent?
2 (field C) How is violence avoided even when environmental scarcity exists?
3 (field D) How does violence develop under circumstances of environmental scarcity?
Matrix field X and Y are connected to questions such as:
4 Do people ascertain their rights to natural resources when there is no environmental
scarcity (how and why) not refraining to violence?
5 Do people ascertain their rights to natural resources when there is environmental scarcity
(how and why), while not (yet) resorting to violence?
51
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no scarcity scarcity
‘no violence’ A C
pre-violent ass. of rights X Y
violence B D
3.2.3 Sub-questions
The sub-questions are posed and formalised in the so-called protocols that the research
methodology asks to draft (see below). People shape their lives based on perceived securities
and insecurities. Insecurities can be defined as situations (in different domains) in which actors
are exposed to changes in actual set-ups that will negatively affect their lives and that they per-
ceive as not possible to influence. The different insecurities and the reactions to them can be
categorised in specific domains as is described in Figure 3.2. The path of action can go from
one domain to another, but mostly goes from an insecurity domain to several other domains.
For example, political insecurity can be reacted upon by investments in both the political
domain5, the economic domain and the social domain, depending on what sort of possibilities
the actor has and what (s)he deems effective. Most of the time, also somebody’s insecurities
are not limited to one domain. Thus, in practice, people’s lives can be depicted as a complex
of different insecurities with different reactions in different domains: The Insecurity Complex.
Figure 3.2 The Insecurity Complex
The protocols demand that information be gathered in the domains of the different insecurities
people perceive and go through: their basic situations (point of departure, so to say, in all
domains wherein the insecurities can spring up), their reactions to the insecurities, the struc-
tures, institutions etc. that influence these insecurities and the reactions, the historical setting
and differences with the actual insecurities and reactions and so forth.
Because the study is intended to focus on the relationship between environmental scarcity
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5 Contrary to the categorisation of Political Capital within Social Capital (see chapter 2), here Political inse-
curity and investment in the political domain are depicted separately, in order to draw special attention to the
meso and macro levels of this type of in(security) and to prevent a possible underestimation of these aspects
which are so important for resource policies and distribution, as well as conflict management.
Domain of insecurity Domain of action/investment
Political
Economic
Socio-cultural
Environmental
Human (personal)
Political
Economic
Socio-cultural
Environmental
(rights; phys. circ.)
Human (personal)
Muddle through
action and/or strategy path
and (non-) violence, apart from an inventory of general insecurities, and even of environmen-
tal insecurities, more detailed attention should be paid to environmental scarcity as such. In the
study this is defined as: a situation wherein there is a lack of a certain natural resource, such
that not all persons who want to use it can do so. I chose this definition to incorporate emic
views of scarcity because people’s views and interpretations are the drivers of their actions. I
also hope to avoid lengthy discussions between outside specialists on technical details,
although I will describe as much of those details as possible to complete the picture with objec-
tive data to compare with the emic information. Sub-questions then fall into two types:
1 Those that ask information about the general situations of securities and insecurities. 
2 Those that ask more detailed information about the environmental situation, the scarcity
of natural resources and the specific reactions connected to that.
Type 1 questions are those that are survey-like regarding people’s basic position in the differ-
ent domains. That is those that lead to information on past and present rules and regulations
regarding rights and conflict resolution and those that inquire about changes, etc. The second
category of questions are about facts and perceptions on environmental degradation and scarci-
ty, on perceived rights and possibilities as well as on perceptions, attitudes and implementa-
tion regarding violence, now and in the past.
3.3 Research strategy
An extensive survey of the literature on the linkage between environmental scarcity and vio-
lence proved that there were still doubts as to whether the connection between the two exist-
ed (see chapter 1 and 2). These doubts were even more profound with regard to insight into
how such a link might develop in the field. Therefore, for this research, a methodology was
chosen to help build theory in both directions. By enlarging the insight into the patterns of the
causal link from environmental scarcity to violent or non-violent behaviour6, more clarity
might at the same time be offered on the question of the existence of the connection at all. To
reach that goal, qualitative research methods are the most appropriate. Wester et al (2000: 16-
17) describes the usefulness of qualitative research to test ‘new’ theories that are perhaps not
yet fully developed and to explore analytical gaps. This coincides with the assertion of
Eckstein (1975: 80), that “case studies are valuable at all stages of the theory-building process,
but most valuable at that stage of theory-building where least value is generally attached to
them. This is the stage at which candidate theories are tested”7. 
Wester et al (2000: 17) also highlight the serviceability of qualitative research when the
researcher has a desire for detailed, ‘natural’ material; when (s)he is focusing on ‘discovery’.
Thus, for this research, the qualitative methodology and specifically the case-study is apt.
Because “people act on the basis of the meanings [they attribute to] the objects [in their envi-
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ronment], that together form their world, the researcher should see the objects as the actors see
them” (id: 21). Therefore “the research procedure should be as open as possible, [with a] direct
contact with the real world” (id: 22). In order to achieve that goal, qualitative research is valu-
able because that type of research aims to look at certain phenomena in their natural sur-
roundings and studies the processes in their full dynamics over time and space. Qualitative
research of cases makes it possible to “deal with the full variety of evidence” (Yin 1984 in
Upreti 2001: 29). It recognises the fact that different actors have different psychological and
sociological ‘settings’, different options and motivations and thus different strategies to act on
that which they perceive as their realities. 
Unfortunately, the study of just one case, however deep the insights into the patterns with-
in the case might be, does not easily allow for the addition of generalities to theory, although
the case might be “strategically chosen and properly carried out” (George 1979: 53) to “add to
the generalisibility of the case study”  (Flyvbjerg 2001: 75). Giddens (1984: 328) highlighted
the fact that “traditional small-scale community research […] can easily become [generalising
studies] if carried out in some numbers, so that judgements of their typicality can justifiably
be made”. This is to say that, to make it easier to come up with generalisations, a comparison
of a certain number of different cases should be made8. The fact that these case studies are in-
depth and thus time-consuming means an excessive number would reduce the chance of reach-
ing the goal. Just adding case studies for the sake of comparison and thereby decreasing the
possibilities for an in-depth examination of each case in order to recognise controversies of the
initial assumptions9, will neither help to test the general insight in the theory, nor clarify the
context-dependent factors and processes of the case situations themselves.
For that reason the method of “Structured Focussed Comparison” of Alexander George
(1979) was chosen as a tool to use in the research. George’s method consists of the design of
a small number of “heuristic and plausibility probe case studies” (sometimes even as small a
number as two) and the use of these as “building blocks for theory development” (id: 52).  
Structured, focussed comparison works with structured protocols that operationalise the
core concepts and relationships, through which strategically chosen cases are described and
analysed, and by way of which a comparison of the cases and elaboration on the theory after-
wards can be made possible. These protocols and the general questions to be asked for each
case are formulated during the design of the study, in which phase the cases themselves are
also selected. The research then seeks to identify the conditions under which distinctive types
of causal patterns occur. Patterns of special interest are called ‘foci’. These are extra tools to
organise the study, connect it to theories and enhance the practicability. These foci will, there-
fore, feature both during the field study and during the analysis (see also Ch. 2: building of the
model). At least two foci are going to be used:
? The degree to which actions can be interpreted as being part of a Boserupian or Malthusian
process.
? Ethnic diversity or similarity.
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8 Especially for Environmental Security Research this method is apt (see McNelis and Schweitzer 2001)
9 In accordance with Popper’s example of the falsification of  an “all swans are white” theory, Flyvbjerg (2001:
77) declares that the case study is well suited to identify “black swans’ because of its in-depth approach: what
appears to be “white” often turns out on closer examination to be “black”.
The methodology of ‘structured focussed comparison’ requires a relatively simple explanato-
ry actor model. A model of ‘broad rational choice’ is used in this study, i.e. one in which cul-
tural, social or moral elements may be incorporated but under an overall umbrella of decision-
making by means of weighing the net merits of alternative courses of action. The model is
known by the name “Action in Context”. In De Groot (1992), for example, “AiC” describes
the complex interactednes of specific things like ‘deeper analysis’, ‘actor’s field’, ‘world
views’ etc. that are useful to structure the analysis. It allows the researcher to explore the dif-
ferent factors and (other) actors that influence actors’ decision-making. By doing so, the
researcher takes the actor as the central agent and contextualises10 outwards to explore the
influencing (‘secondary’) actors and, even further outwards, those that influence (‘tertiary’)
the influencing actors, etc. This allows the study of not only the actor and his livelihood in the
local setting, but also of higher level institutions, power relations and dependencies.
Substantively, the methodological framework of AiC will, in this study, be connected with (an
exploration of) some of the better known theories and concepts from the ‘conflict studies’
field, as well as those on the interface of man and his environment11.
3.4 Research Implementation
3.4.1 Selection of research area and cases
According to the methodology of structured focussed comparison, after the formulation of pre-
liminary protocols, regions with a certain mutual resemblance with regard to the concepts
formulated in the protocols, have to be chosen on behalf of in-depth study. In this study, four
criteria were formulated for the cases to comply with (see below), meaning that the cases
belong to one ‘class’. A fifth criterion employed in the selection is that every case should dif-
fer as regards one or two of the variables of theoretical interest. These should, therefore, be
cases belonging to the same class but differing from each other in certain important aspects. 
The first criterion for making sure the cases belong to the same class was that the cases
should be situated in one geographical region. Because Leiden University, in which institute this
research is (also) based, has a field research station (CEDC12) in the Far North Province of
Cameroon, this area seemed the most obvious choice to carry out the study. More than ten years
of research have already been carried out there and a host of general information and for some
regions even profound knowledge is easily accessible. There is a research infrastructure, offer-
ing possibilities for assistance, guidance and support from other (often Cameroonian)
researchers. Moreover, the researcher’s safety is enhanced thanks to the CEDC’s excellent con-
tacts with local, regional and national authorities. This Province has a high degree of environ-
mental scarcity and there is widespread conflict, which is sometimes violent. On the other hand,
compared to the Central African countries such as Chad and the Central African Republic, and
some Western African countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’ Ivoir), the overall situation is
quite peaceful. In general, people handle their everyday disputes reasonably. This situation of
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10 Based on Vayda’s (1983 ) “progressive contextualisation”.
11 Like the study of livelihood strategies and decision making in rural areas and those that focus on the use and
management of natural resources.
12 Centre d’Etude de l’Environnement et du Développement (CEDC) in Maroua, Cameroon.
‘normal’ behaviour in which negotiations and diverting strategies dominate, but in which peo-
ple nevertheless resort to (small scale) violence from time to time, offers a good climate to study
the development of conflicts in both the violent and the non-violent directions.
With a view to choosing appropriate cases, I made an exploratory visit lasting 2.5 months
to the Far North Province in the early year 2000, with the aim being to come up with a list of
cases that meet the criteria formulated beforehand. The relevant criteria are incorporated in the
research questions.
Because I chose only a certain amount of reaction to the existing conflict as a criterion, the
use of violence could still be used as a dependent variable. This, as I explained above, is a
response to the criticism of selecting “evident cases”. On the other hand, I selected according
to both environmental scarcity and conflict because “most likely cases” might help to falsify
the (candidate) theory13. I wanted to make clear with my research that the supposed evidence
might be shown not to be so evident because of the fact that a co-existence turned out to be
just that, with no causal connection whatsoever. Thus, combinations C, D and Y of the research
matrix (Fig. 3.1) are included. Cases of violent conflict or the pre-violent assertion of rights
without environmental scarcity (B and X) are not specifically selected. However, they may
turn out to be the case for some of the actors studied. Although the research results of the field
station and a general overview of the region seems to indicate that environmental scarcity is
all-around, differences in degradation and human pressure still exist. Therefore, it was possi-
ble to choose one of the cases so that, at the individual level at least, environmental scarcity
may turn out not to be present when performing the in-depth study.
In short, the case selection was based on the presence of violence and environmental scarci-
ty. However, the violence had to be of a limited scale, because large-scale violence always
brings scarcity with it and then such cases would be too ‘evident’ in the eyes of the critics like
Levy. The selection criterion ‘environmental scarcity’ was judged to be present on the basis of
information of other researchers and own, albeit preliminary, observations. However, the
choice was made such that the possibility remained open to see, during the in-depth research,
examples of violence or pre-violent assertion of rights to the environment, without there being
any scarcity (question 1 on page 51). Again, this served the possibility to show that, although
a case seems evident (both violence and scarcity are prevalent), it is not. This is meant to be
an answer to Levy and a warning to ES-scholars to check basic assumptions and not to take
seeming scarcity for granted. The choice for moderate scarcity also served the possibility of
studying different strategies of people differently positioned as regards the natural resources
(this refers to all questions on page 50, but especially question 4 and 5).
Right from the start the usefulness of the field station was evident as it provided me with
an experienced guide and interpreter for more then one language who was able to accompany
me on my inventory tour. She had grown up in the culture of the Far North, but was also high-
ly educated and had good access to, and was quite at ease with, officials, chiefs and local male
villagers. The fact that she was a woman meant I was also able to talk without restriction to
female inhabitants. In a four-wheel drive vehicle provided by the field station and together
with a driver who was acquainted with the specific region, we travelled throughout the whole
province from west to east and as far south as Mayo Oulo and as far north as Ngodeni on the
northern border of Waza National Park (see Figure 3.3).
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13 See Flyvbjerg (2001: 78-79).
Using suggestions from field station employees, key informants in local centres and formal
and traditional authorities, both regional and local, combined with field visits c.q. site-seeings
and on-the-spot group and individual interviews, I managed to obtain a list of several cases fea-
turing both environmental scarcity and profound (sometimes even violent) conflict. The abun-
dance of conflict over all sorts of natural resources, ranging from land, via water and fish to
wood, made me narrow even further the class to which the cases should belong. I decided to
focus on only land as a conflict issue. Why I chose land and no other natural resource is
explained in chapters 1 and 2. Land as a bearer of other natural resources is included, but when
these other resources as conflict sources can be differentiated from the land they are situated on,
I decided to consider the conflict as not being a ‘land conflict’ and so I did not explore it any
further. A clarifying example is the situation in which access to and the use of a waterhole in
itself is disputed:  “I dug it” and not the access over the land that leads to it, not the corridors
on the land. Whether or not these conflicts were indeed due to scarcity of land was one of the
things to sort out during the research. During this exploratory visit it became obvious that
moments of competition and, thus, conflict over natural resources, and in particular land, did
not occur throughout the whole year. I will come to this point when describing the time of the
field visits.
As for the differing aspects between cases that George’s method requires, these can be
found in positions of contested boundaries (over or within formal borders), the domain of iden-
tity formation and ethnicity and the influence of the State and its servants. Thus, the focus on
ethnic diversity and similarity is made explicit in the choice of the cases with regard to the dif-
fering aspects. On the other hand, the focus on the Malthus-Boserup divide can not influence
the choice of the cases beforehand, but it is meant to enhance the similarity of investigation
and analysis in all three cases.
With all this in mind I chose three different cases:
1. A case that seemed to be dealing with a conflict over a piece of land that is either grazing
land or farm land within one, ethnically homogeneous village. Here the State is interfering
with the installation of a pasture-forest reserve at the same spot. This case is described in
chapter 6. 
2. A case that seemed to be dealing with a conflict between different ethnicities, with differ-
ent modes of using land and making a living: agriculturalists and nomadic cattle-keepers.
The agriculturalists are expanding their settlements in the nomadic pasture area. This case
is described in chapter 5.
3. A case that seemed to be dealing with a conflict over grazing land positioned at the border
between two administrative districts. The two parties involved belonged to two communities
of two different ethnicities. Both have lived in the area for quite a long time. One of the groups
mainly comprises cattle-keepers, but who are also engaged in agriculture. The other party is
mainly, and sometimes only, involved in agriculture. This case is described in chapter 7.
Case one is situated in the middle ranges of the Mandara Mountains along the border with
Nigeria, on the high Mogodé plateau. This has been the home of the Kapsiki14 for more than
500 years. For the exact geographical position see Figure 3.3: Dzambou. 
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14 See, for example, Van Beek (1981).
Figure 3.3 Areas of research
Figure 3.3 also shows the position of the other two cases. Case two can be found in the Diamaré
plain, south of the provincial capital Maroua, in the triangle Mindif, Moulvoudaye, Guidiguis.
The bush here serves as one of the last resorts for nomadic or transhumant cattle-keepers (sev-
eral Fulbe groups as well as Choa Arabs) who, coming from their dry season grazing lands in
58
Mokolo
Dzambou
MAYO-SAVA
MAYO-
TSANAGA
Kila
Oudda
Mayo Oulo
Mora
Maroua
DIAMARÉ
CHAD
NIGERIA
MAYO-KANI
Kaélé
Yagoua
MAYO-
DANAÏ
Ngodeni
Guidiguis
Tchatibali
Moulvoudaye
Davagang
Padmangay
Waza
park
LOGONE
ET
CHARI
Kousseri
Lake Chad
Boundary département
Mandara Mountains
Capital département
Research area
International boundary
Provincial boundary
Provincial capital
0 25km
the Logone floodplain, need other grounds to graze their animals in the wet season. 
The third case is situated in the southern Mandara Mountains, slightly further to the south
than the first case (Fig. 3.3: Kila and Oudda). The two involved sub-departments are Mogodé
in the north, and Bourha in the south. The two ethnic groups involved are agricultural Bana
and cattle-keeping Fulbe. 
3.4.2 Time of field research
In the period between mid-2000 and the beginning of 2003 the three case-studies were carried
out during three different visits lasting three to four months each. Via continued contacts with
local research assistants, the research periods were more or less extended. At the end of 2003
until the start of 2004, I have paid a short visit to all 6 places of research to try and gain a quick
impression of important changes since my last stay.
The choice of the moment of study of each case was determined by three considerations.
The first was, of course, that I wanted to be there the moment a conflict actually flared up (if
at all). That would allow me to observe (and demand about and discuss) what the people were
really doing, both in their daily lives as well as during incidents. Conflict over land in the Sahel
and Sahel-Sudan zone is a seasonal phenomenon, most fierce during the onset and develop-
ment of the growing season15. It is during that period that cultivators have to secure the abili-
ty to labour on fields for their next harvest. They feel this pressure all the more because, at that
same time, the bottom of the granary becomes visible. The rainy season is the hunger period
and at the same time the period that demands the most energy output: people are more tired
and irritated due to a lack of food. Perhaps the sight of relaxing pastoralists adds to their frus-
tration since as far as the pastoralists are concerned, the rainy season is a ‘light’ period during
which fodder and water for their animals abound, milk production is high and there is no need
to walk long distances, etc. Only the rain itself makes living out in camps a bit hard because it
is wet and cold and people have to put up with muddy surroundings. Apart from the need for
corridors from grazing area to grazing area that can be blocked by fields with growing crops,
it is especially this latter aspect that makes pastoralists seek specific places to settle during the
rainy period. In the dry period, after the harvest, agriculturalists do not use their fields. Cattle-
keepers can make their cattle use whatever is left on the land and/or (finally) leave the area
altogether. In short, this ‘dead-season’ is not an appropriate period to study conflicts over land. 
On the other hand, trying to study people’s actions and motivations during the agricultural
season will be fraught with difficulties because, most probably, the investigator will not be able
to persuade the cultivators to devote their precious time to talking with her (him). For that rea-
son, the decision was taken to stay in the areas during the period after the rains had stopped,
from the time at which the crops were still standing until after the harvest. In the second case
(the new settlements) it was necessary to be around at the moment the cattle nomads arrived
to occupy their rainy season camps. So, on this occasion, I arrived just before the onset of the
rainy season and tried to meet the new settlers first while they were not yet fully occupied with
their agricultural duties. Meanwhile I kept an eye on the weather and the movements into the
area of the nomads. Unfortunately, the rains started very late in 2001, so I was obliged to leave
with a lot of work undone. As a consequence, I instructed my guide and interpreter to contin-
ue the work as best as possible, without my direct supervision.
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15 See, e.g., Van Driel (2001:154-160).
Having fulfilled these two requirements (namely being there at the moment of a possible
conflict outbreak and at the moment that respondents can spend time on interviews), the third
objective - that it had to be practically feasible to actually be on the spot – had already been
met. At the end of the rainy season, for example, it would have been quite impossible to reach
certain areas because of the big current of seasonal rivers and the fact that several places would
be flooded.
Because in each case there was a precise moment during the year at which it was best to
perform the field research, it was impossible to carry out the required tasks simultaneously. If
you have to be present from October to January for all case studies, you can only do that in
subsequent Octobers. This made an actual comparison between, for example, climatic or
macro-economic influences more difficult.
3.4.3 Information gathered per case
Which data
As already explained in the section on the method of George (1979), the data collection was
guided by protocols formulated before the area of the cases was visited and were then
revised after the inventory, case-selecting visit. In general, these protocols deal with four cat-
egories of data, that connect with the five types of insecurities described in the Insecurity
Complex, that were also noticed by Bebbington (1999) in his ‘capitals’ (the natural (or envi-
ronmental), human, economic and social-cultural-political domain16) for which both inde-
pendent and dependent variables were discerned. In addition, the research also featured inter-
vening variables.
Table 3.1 Number of persons interviewed for survey 
a = four different origin locations were surveyed, of which the fourth is geographically spread out over the
broader region around the settlements.
b = because a selection of origin locations was made and within those areas a random choice was made of per-
sons for the survey-like interview, the total number of inhabitants of origin locations is not available.
c = the total number of bush nomads in the Mindif-Moulvoudaye region is difficult to establish and differs per
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Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
place Oudda Kubadje Origin  Settlement Bush- Dzambou Baba Deli
places nomads
settlers a
Type of user Agri- Cattle- Agricult. Agri- Cattle- Agricult. Agricult.
cultural keepers / cattlek. cultural keepers / cattlek. / cattlek.
Number of 124 36 206 36 58 94 86
persons
% of adult 13 42 n.av.b 45 n.av.c 50 51
population
Number of 43 12 5 1 1 3 5
womend
Total number 160     300 180
per case
16 See chapter 2 (as is explained, the concept of Cultural Capital is not used as such; Produced capital is incor-
porated in several of the other domains of the Insecurity Complex, especially in the economic one).
year and per month. The 58 respondents were chosen randomly in the sense that those we encountered in the
bush and were willing to participate are part of the sample.
d = the number of ‘surveyed’ women is low and decreases during the research (for each subsequent case), because
it appeared that the women provided more or less the same information as their husbands; several times they
added information during the interview with their husband. Although I searched for female-headed house-
holds, I only located a few17.
Although, in general, qualitative information was gathered, a certain amount of quantitative
data had to be listed to aid the insight into the position of respondents, something the proto-
cols also demanded. This concerned, for example, the age18 and sex of the respondents, the
number of household members, the number of cattle and other animals, the yields over a num-
ber of years - in short this means survey-like data. In addition to that, quantitative data were
gathered to establish an insight into more objective environmental conditions. A good exam-
ple of this is the rainfall patterns and numbers.
Of each party within the three cases, the survey-like study was carried out as a minimum
with almost all inhabitants of the involved neighbourhoods. Moreover, the more in-depth
research tried to involve as many persons as possible to facilitate a comparison between the dif-
ferent positions within the village and therefore within the conflict and differences in strategies
and behaviour. Table 3.1 shows the number of persons interviewed (for survey-data) per case.
How was the data collected
Each case was studied during a period of residence with each of the two parties in the conflict.
In practice, this basically meant six weeks per party. With regard to “comparative analysis”
Cleuren (2001: 50) remarked that “data collection has to be swift and selective due to time con-
straints”. Nevertheless I tried to examine the local cases in as much detail as possible. In the
“new settlement” case (case 2) I also spent a number of weeks in the area from which the set-
tlers came in order to assess push and pull factors. The periods of residence were spent as a
guest in the house of one of the inhabitants of the affected village or neighbourhood. In some
cases I lived in the house of the neighbourhood chief or one of his representatives, in some
cases in the house of the person who also served as an interpreter and guide. This made it pos-
sible to observe from very nearby at least the daily lives of, and negotiations within, the house-
hold and the neighbours of one (extended) family per case. 
The field-studies contained a mixture of a broad range of methods from different disci-
plines19. First, anthropological methods were used such as participatory observation, participa-
tory mapping, semi-structured and open interviews of individuals and groups, ranking meth-
ods, and registration of life histories or other relevant narratives. In addition, observational
techniques of the social geographical science discipline were employed concerning (among
other things) spatial patterns of use and settlement, the position of natural resources and terri-
torial boundaries, the position of the local map within the broader, regional map as well as the
registration of the history of all this. Apart from the consultation of published maps - most of
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17 I talked with women more profoundly during unofficial interviews and group discussions.
18 Considering the influence of age not only on lifecycle and possibilities of livelihood strategies, but also on
behaviour during conflict (see, e.g. Obi (1999); Richards (1996)).
19 As is recommended by Livelihood Research authors (see e.g. Murray 2001: 14).
them dating back a long time20-, roaming the region, transect walking, following special area
boundaries and climbing up to regional high points to survey the area turned out to be very
helpful. 
Information was checked and double-checked with local informants and with regional
administrative civil servants and their dossiers or, if possible, NGOs working in the study area.
It proved to be very difficult to obtain more official (census) data. Provincial and district agri-
cultural and veterinary services were willing to deliver, but could only come up with limited
archival information. Moreover, with regard to reported conflicts, the authorities involved,
ranging from the police and district chief to the departmental court of justice, could not (or
would not) provide me with even an overview of incidents that had occurred during recent
years, let alone information on the causes that made people seek assistance from these author-
ities, or the narratives that should accompany each report21.
Reproduction of the findings
To make a comparison of the three cases easier, the description of the data of the three case
studies (chapter 5, 6 and 7) follows a strict format.  This is based, again, on the protocols of
data gathering, the insecurity domains and the related capitals as described by Bebbington
(1999). Thus, each of the case chapters starts with an introductory piece, followed by a histor-
ical overview. Each chapter first deals with the ‘invading’ groups, with their insecurities,
investments and claims. The focus then switches to the counter group and lastly the conflict
itself. 
In the insecurity part I start with the environmental domain. In order to acquire an insight
into this type of insecurity I use five indicators on both the aggregate (village) level as well as
the individual level where relevant:
1 the physical basis, 
2 population density, 
3 land availability, 
4 commoditisation of land and 
5 caloric needs and production (non-agricultural calories included).
The human domain insecurities can cover a very broad and diverse set of aspects, but in this
study I focus on two more obvious ones, namely health and education. Economic insecurities
are divided into agricultural (crops and livestock) and non-agricultural ones, whether or not
farm related. Cash and subsistence production, as well as on and off-farm activities are very
interrelated and mixed. Percentages of effort dedicated to the one or the other differ per
moment and depend (sometimes afterwards) on production circumstances from micro to
macro. However, the collected data has been arranged as well as possible into the four cate-
gories and in the same way for each case.
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20 For instance: Carte de l’Afrique Centrale au 1 / 50 000 (Type Outre-Mer), 1965, Paris: Institut Géographique
National; and, Map of Cameroon 1 / 200 000, reprint 1978 (Field-inspection and Photo-point control 1963-
1964-1965), Yaoundé: Centre Géographique National, Ministère de l’Economie et du Plan.
21 When visiting regional courts, archives appeared to have been destroyed by mice and termites, official
records of mounted cases were lost, etc. Regional authorities did not keep the records they were obliged to
and even accused me of secretly checking them as regards the performance of their duties.
As regards the description of the social domain insecurities, a selection has been made of a
far broader set of aspects. In the social domain, bonds between different (sub) groups as well as
linkages from group to group and from one level of society to another - together with the relat-
ed rules, norms and values - are important as regards making up for otherwise increasing inse-
curities. When normal variability in such relationships shows a downward trend and risks reach-
ing the threshold of the break down of the social systems altogether, one can speak of a situa-
tion of insecurity in the social domain. These are, therefore, the facets described in the chapters. 
Insecurities in the political area of the social domain concern insecurities connected to trust
and representedness at higher levels. Secondly, they refer to whether or not these higher lev-
els ensure proper governance of the area in the sense of general development efforts, support
of local efforts and feasible conflict prevention measures. Last but not least, the political
domain is also important as a conflict resolution institute, but this can also fuel conflicts.
Therefore, both the general political position of the groups involved and conflict mediation
systems are covered under the heading ‘political insecurities’. Land allocation methods and
general cultural settings and changes are two sub-sections of the broader social domain.
After the description of the different insecurities of the ‘invading’ group, the investments to
counter these insecurities are ordered in more or less the same way. Investments in the envi-
ronment aim to improve the quality and quantity of natural resources in general, of land in par-
ticular and to generate more possibilities for access to and use of those resources. The basic
objective is to improve the fulfilment of needs, such as those for food and shelter, both now and
the future. That means that, apart from investments in the land, direct investments in higher pro-
duction can also be made. All these aspects are described in the sections on environmental
investments.
Because drawing up an inventory and measuring the total social capital and investments
therein demand more research time than was available on this occasion, only the most obvious
indicators are given. Subsequent sub-sections describe some examples of development of
social bonds and linkages as well as the rules and norms resulting from them in the family and
clan, the political domain and the general cultural system of the groups.
The fourth section of each chapter, dedicated to the entry into the new niche, has the same
outline as the earlier sections. The fifth section that deals with the claim is different per case
because of the differences in the stories. Because the sixth section describes the counter-party,
the strict format of the four domains and the indicators used per domain are reapplied here.
However, insecurities and investments are dealt with more briefly and in a more integrated
fashion so as only to show why the counter-party is motivated to (stick to the) use (of) the
piece of land in question.
The last section of each case chapter deals with the ways the conflict is handled. In
instances in which both parties claim that the region is theirs, or is to be used as they see fit,
they have to arrange something to exclude the others or make sure they themselves can co-
habituate with the other group. As is explained in the theory chapter, strategies in conflicts con-
sist of a hierarchy of choosing more and more for one’s own interests. This goes from yield-
ing via problem solving (finding a way out to both parties’ satisfaction) to contending. This
last option can be implemented with persuasion or force, in different forms. Only by carrying
out the activities that relate to the second of the contending strategies do actors arrive in the
last box of the VoE diagram: Box 4, ‘Violence’ (Figure 2.1). All other strategies can be called
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‘escapes’. Of course, the actions of both parties are important. Sometimes (or perhaps most of
the times) third parties are also important22.
3.5 Problems
3.5.1 Language
Because of the orientation towards two different parties per case, speaking directly with the
actors would have meant learning more than 5 or 6 languages. Speaking the language of the
groups studied certainly has major advantages over the use of interpreters. “The way farmers
express themselves reveals important aspects of their way of reasoning, their way of perceiv-
ing events, mechanisms and relationships” (Zuiderwijk 1998: 358). Translations almost always
remain incomplete. They are often biased and regularly lead to misunderstandings. It is, of
course, quite impossible to learn the required languages to a level that avoids all these set-
backs and makes it possible to “’internalise’ some of the basic elements of local modes of rea-
soning and perceiving things” (id) in the limited time available for a PhD research project. 
The help of interpreters was therefore indispensable. For each residence area a key inter-
preter was hired from that same settlement. The interpreters were male because it turned out
that only men had sufficient education combined with enough spare time to act as interpreters.
These people also acted as guides in the region and village. Wherever possible a woman inter-
preter was hired for a couple of days to carry out interviews with women in the settlement. I
told all interpreters to translate ‘everything’ ‘always’ and insisted on the fact that I myself
wanted to decide whether anything was worthwhile. I also asked them to provide a translation
that was as close as possible to the local language words, or my own words when translating
in the other direction. This meant translating ‘literally’ and ‘verbally’. When this led to confu-
sion due to proverbial expressions and unfamiliar comparisons, I asked them to provide an
explanation in terms that corresponded better to the known idiom. As I experienced on a num-
ber of occasions, I had to be attentive to questions about concepts the local language did not
include because then the interpreter’s given explanation could already incorporate the answer
being sought.
3.5.2 Trust and viability
One of the major problems concerned the bias of the answers. The answers given were not
those that the respondent thinks you as a researcher want to hear, as anthropologists warn each
other about, but the answers (s)he wants you to hear. That is, the researcher is used as a strate-
gic tool and is sometimes literally deployed to win the ‘battle’. Once, after I had established
the different perceptions of different groups on the ‘real’ position of a boundary, the regional
chief manoeuvred me into our car and took me to the sub-department chief to explain his case
and, of course, win this important civil servant over to act on his behalf. To enhance the relia-
bility and validity of the research and to win the confidence of the villagers, I had to resort to
different strategies and tricks.
Before I actually arrived for my stay, I made my plans known to the regional authorities and
to the village and neighbourhood chiefs. As soon as I entered the villages (neighbourhoods) I
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22 See, e.g., Obi (1999) about the role of the State in the Ogoni conflict in Nigeria and in the Sudanese civil war.
made clear what my purpose was and that I also intended to spend time on ‘the other side’.
Mostly this was greeted with approval since it connected with the African tradition of talking
things over, listening and relistening. I told people again and again I did not take sides and
made this clear by my actions as well. When I found myself in situations on the ground in
which I had to choose sides I only expressed some doubts regarding high-level authorities and,
by doing so, showed my appreciation of the residents’ own feelings and, as I perceived, gained
their confidence.
Building enough trust to make it possible for respondents to express their doubts to me
about a controversial issue and to explain to me what they thought would be appropriate
action, was a difficult task. Stories about my presence and the reason why I was there travelled
quicker then I myself did and in certain areas I had to counter-play the prejudices that had aris-
en as a result. In the Kapsiki village of Dzambou, people thought that I was there because I
had actually bought the disputed area. It was me who had turned it into a pasture reserve in the
first place, they said. This thought made some respondents very angry towards me and it took
a lot of time and efforts to build up new confidence and trust. The fact that I posed rebellious
questions helped (“why don’t you go down to the pasture area and destroy the border poles?”),
although I used those types of questions in the first place to trigger emotions and acquire more
trustworthy answers with respect to the ideas about the controversial issue and the strategies
to be used. I deliberately informed my interpreters on this subject and instructed them on how
to act, how to pose the questions, how to explain my presence and, quite importantly, to inform
me afterwards when they thought the respondent had given the wrong information (for exam-
ple some persons even lied about the number of children they had, while the real answer was
obvious to any observer). This meant I spent a lot of time on double-checking. To safeguard
against feelings of uncertainty and doubts regarding my trustworthiness, I explained to every
respondent that I would never use any names in any report23. To stress that, I only asked my
guide, secretly, the name of a respondent once the interview had ended.  Names were neces-
sary to establish family and other social relations of respondents that could be of relevance for
the chosen strategy. They were also necessary to connect interview data with information gath-
ered during group sessions and ‘get-togethers’, such as evenings around the household fire,
market visits and coincidental meetings ‘en route’ and with field observations.
3.5.3 Researcher bias
Although I attempted to carry out the research from an emic perspective, outcomes are evi-
dently more or less blurred by the etic points of view. For example, with regard to conflicts
Warfield (1993: 176) has already mentioned that “culture provides an interpretational lens for
the origins of conflict, […] confounds popular notions concerning the role of parties in con-
flict, the role of the so-called neutral, and the concept of neutrality”. Thus, the cultural back-
ground of the researcher co-shapes the analysis. And not only the analysis, but even the data
are influenced by the person, position and points of view of the researcher. Especially when
the research focuses on vulnerable information such as conflict behaviour, the accessibility
thereof depends heavily on the behaviour of the researcher and how (s)he manages to obtain a
sort of neutral and confident position, all of which is again culturally co-determined.
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23 As regards the names that are mentioned in this book, I first obtained the unequivocal permission of the per-
sons in question.
Because of these reflections, I will briefly describe those aspects of myself that may be rel-
evant for the interpretation of the results. A very important point in the African context is the
fact that I am a middle-aged woman and mother. As a result, I was looked at as someone to be
respected and it gave starting points for discussions. I found it easy to intervene and provide
assistance with family and household matters. This also generated non-intrusive opportunities
to start conversations. On the other hand, I was not a purchasable ‘girl’ so men did not need to
‘keep up’ appearances, although jokes were made regularly to ease possible tensions. The fact
that I am a Western-European (Dutch) woman also made me a kind of specialist as regards
advice about health-related subjects and education. Although I did not tell people I am a veteri-
nary surgeon, the fact that I was very interested in and used to cattle and other livestock could
not be disguised. It opened up discussions with villagers and authorities alike. On the other
hand, my own opinion about husbandry is not biased towards cattle prevalence over agriculture. 
With regard to conflict and violence, I have to say that, having been raised in an upper mid-
dle class and a well educated environment I prefer discords to be settled on the basis of con-
sensus and by argument rather than by force. This opinion is enhanced by my own culture and
the fact that my country provides a clear and secure juridical system. I tend to speak out open-
ly, without lying, even to persons with more authority (although respect should always be paid)
and I prefer to experience such behaviour in others. In local situations, however, I always kept
a bit of a distance from others and did not show what was really going through my mind. At a
subconscious level I value people more (and their information) who do not show cruelty (for
example against children or animals) and/or who invest in communal goods (for example shar-
ing time with villagers to teach them better agricultural practices, inform them about HIV
risks, or who set up a mutual banking system), especially when this is done voluntarily. This
entails the risk that I interpret and comment on information from different people with differ-
ent sorts of prejudices. On the other hand, the fact that I was and am aware of this bias caused
me to be more careful when evaluating all the responses (which had to be carried out in a more
or less intuitive way).
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General description
Although the three case studies are to be dealt with separately in different chapters, where a
more extended description of both ecological, social, economic and political issues is given for
the actors under study, a broader insight into the setting of the three cases is necessary to make
it possible to compare local level insecurities with meso and macro level ones. Therefore, in
this chapter, I first describe some characteristics of Cameroon as a country.  
In the second part of this chapter I elaborate on the Far North Province, where the three case
studies are located. I deal consecutively with the natural resources, some human capital indi-
cators, the economic situation, the cultural and socio-political situation and the administrative
set-up. Special emphasis is given to the legal trends, especially regarding natural resources and
conflict resolution.  
4.1 The Country
Situated in the armpit of Africa (Figure 4.1), Cameroon’s roughly triangular shape, with a sur-
face of 475,442 km2, stretches over a distance of more than 1,500 km from the humid tropics
in the south to the Sahelian Lake Chad in the north1. In between, a myriad of different ethnic
groups inhabit a diversity of climate zones2 and landscapes. Rich tropical rainforests extend to
the south and east. Together with the oil fields, this is an interesting source to tap for the south-
ern bound State elite3. In particular, the wealth of timber causes a predatory pre-occupation
1 From 2º to 13º latitude.
2 All four agro-climatic zones of Western Sub-Saharan Africa, described by Jahnke (1982: 17), can be found in
Cameroon, although the real arid zone, with less than 500 mm of rain/yr forms only a small part of the Far
North.
3 For a recent report of the effects on the environment and the social conflicts engendered by the exploitation of
the forest, see Nguiffo (1998, forthcoming). Furthermore, see e.g. Robin de Bois (1998); Cleuren (2001),
World Bank Group (2003a).
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Figure 4.1 Cameroon
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with the south to the detriment of the north of the country4. This is also due to the export ori-
ented plantations in the humid south where the very large number of growing days exceeds
2705. In the north-west and centre, extended grass-fields have gained in economic importance
since they have been opened up for cattle grazing because of the eradication of vector borne
diseases, especially Tripanosomiasis6 (Boutrais 1999). 
The total population is around 16 million people, who speak over 200 different languages.
In none of the administrative units does one ethnic group have a majority status (Mback
2000:108). Although the country is officially bilingual, French is the lingua franca almost
everywhere7. Only the two western provinces are officially ‘English-speaking’. Nevertheless,
in the Far North it is easier to communicate with ‘Fulfulde’, the language of the Fulbe,
nomadic cattle keepers and the dominant group in the past8. 
Started as a Federal Republic in 1961, a year after the independence from the French- admin-
istration, the English and French Cameroon States have been united since 1972. Since 1984, it
has been referred to as a Constitutional Republic headed by an elected president.
4.1.1 Political History 
After the arrival of the Portuguese in 1472 and the subsequent development of the cross-
Atlantic slave trade by first the Dutch and then the English and the French, the Germans
became interested in ‘the land of the shrimp’9 in 1884. They invaded the hinterlands and con-
quered the different small kingdoms and ‘non-headed’ communities. In the south, after the ces-
sation of military rule, “[a]t the local level power was exercised by German civilian adminis-
trators, by military authorities and, to a varying degree, by local chiefs” (Mbuagbaw et al
1987: 64). However, when the Germans arrived in the north at the beginning of the new cen-
tury, after the defeat of the Fulbe, they chose to impose indirect rule because of the presence
of the hierarchical system of Islamic kingdoms. The colonisers divided the territory into
administrative units, each under the chieftaincy of an Islamic leader (Sultan or Lamido). With
this the independence of certain non-Muslim groups, so hard-won from the aggressive Fulbe,
was bluntly suppressed (Iyébi-Mandjek and Seignobos 2000a: 57).
When the French and British took over after World War I on the basis of the declaration of
the League of Nations10, the French used metropolitan legislation where possible. In addition,
they superimposed ‘neo-traditional’ chiefs and rules based on what they considered to be
4 In the run-up to the presidential election in 2004 several highly educated Northerners have accused the State
President of neglecting the North and of under-representation of northerners in almost all (higher positions of)
government, political and State bodies (see Eya 2003).
5 See, for example, the explanation of Van Driel (2001:8) or Jahnke (1982: 17) of the climatic zones of Western
Sub-Saharan Africa.
6 This eradication came about through more and more widely accessible pesticides to combat flies (e.g. Tse-Tse)
and ticks, and through bush clearances.
7 French is learned at school or on the streets of urban centres. School-attendance is low especially in the north,
meaning that lots of (rural) people do not speak French.
8 Fulfulde words used in this book: Lamido (pl. Lamibe) = traditional Fulbe chief, now mostly district chief;
lawan = village chief; djaoro = neighbourhood chief; karal = transplant-sorghum field; muskuaari = trans-
plant-sorghum.
9 Camerões is the Portuguese word for ‘shrimp’, a creature found in abundance in the coastal waters here.
10 The League of Nations, formed after World War I, allocated the eastern part of the German Cameroon as a
mandate territory to France and the western part to Britain.
69
native laws and customs11. Many new chiefs did not have a legitimate position because they
lacked blood bonds with the former royal lines or because they were installed in communities
where no chieftainship had ever existed (Mback 2000; Geschiere 1982). In the north the
French followed the German example of incorporating the Muslim hierarchy and installing
Fulbe chiefs to rule over formerly non-Muslim communities. With the official status in the
French system accorded to them, several chiefs mis-used their power in the north as well,
while the non- Muslim population remained powerless. Because it was difficult to dominate
the scattered mountain people, efforts to force the inhabitants to descend to lower areas were
undertaken already early in the French colonial period (Boutrais 1973; Van Andel 1998: 8).
As in other parts of the World, political parties emerged and started to demand independ-
ence directly after WW II. In the French part, in spite of a gradual increase of democratic lib-
erties12, a revolt in 1955 was put down with much bloodshed (Crawfurd 2003). Although it was
followed in 1956 by general French legislation to increase self-government of overseas terri-
tory (Mbuagbwa et al 1987: 103), violence by the rebellious party continued until 1958, when
the future President Ahmadou Ahidjo formed his ‘Party l’Union Camerounaise’ and became
the prime minister of the Assembléé Legislative (CAMLA)13.
In January 1960, the northerner Ahidjo was inaugurated as first president of the independ-
ent Republic of Cameroon. A year later he succeeded in bringing the southern part of British
Cameroon within one system14. In general, the power of ‘big men’ developed quickly in the
Federation15. Although some suggestions from the Anglophone west were honoured, in gener-
al it was French Cameroon and its president Ahidjo who managed to “establish a preponder-
ance of federal over state institutions” (Mbuagbaw et al 1987: 125), with emphasis on the
inherited, centrally directed, French administrative and juridical system. In 1966, he intro-
duced the one-party system. Manipulating personal power positions of ‘co-leaders’ within the
party and within government, as well as the outcome of a referendum on the abolition of the
Federation16, he arrived at his final goal of a united Cameroon in 197217. In 1982 he resigned
from power in favour of the then prime minister Paul Biya.
Very soon Ahidjo seemed to regret his decreased power and, with the help of his northern,
Muslim supporters, even tried to make Biya step down again. The southerner Biya started to
exercise his power by dismissing several government ministers, and even accused Ahidjo of
planning a coup d’etat in the middle of 198318. In the presidential election of 1984, the sitting
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11 See, for example, Geschiere (1993).
12 In 1952, for instance, general male suffrage was introduced; See also note 13.
13 CAMLA is the third of three assemblies set up by the French from 1946 onwards in a continuing process of
democratisation. This last one is the result of universal suffrage in 1958. Its aim was to achieve independence.
14 In a UN aided referendum the British Cameroons had the choice between joining Nigeria or Cameroon. The
Southern part chose for Cameroon.
15 See Bayart (1993) about  “the politics of the belly”. 
16 He claimed that 99.9 % of the votes said ‘yes’ to a six-line question statement, with a turnout at the election
of more than 98 % in a country where the majority of the population is illiterate and lives far away from even
small administrative centres. Especially in the Muslim North one can doubt whether women attended or gave
an independent reaction.
17 See, e.g., Chem-Langhëë (1995).
18 Ahidjo indeed had called all northern politicians, both incumbent and otherwise, to his residence in an attempt
to make a political statement. His supporters, however, argued that he should take precedence over the
President. Finally this pressure made it necessary for him to retreat into exile where he tried to win the sup-
port of the French government . Cameroon sentenced him to death, but Biya later granted him amnesty.
president again managed to be re-elected with more than 99 % (sic) of the votes. However, the
struggle for power was not yet over. When Biya tried to fire northern soldiers from the
Presidential Guard, some of them rebelled and attempted to seize the presidential headquarters
in Yaoundé. Thanks to loyalist troops, and to an Ahidjo-based anti-coup organisation of the
military ranks that set the two main ethnic groups within the rebellious ranks (Fulbe and
Tupuri19) in opposition to each other, the coup was thwarted (Le Vine 1986). But casualties
were high and distrust spread. Up to today this is setting northerners and southerners more
against each other than was already the case. As expected, Biya again took the opportunity to
reshuffle his government to the detriment of what he thought were Ahidjo adherents and to
replenish the ranks of the Guard with his own tribesmen (Beti)20. However, it did not help to
re-establish trust between the two regions of the country.
It has to be stressed, though, that Biya had no intention of increasing regional, tribal or reli-
gious differences. He hammered home his message of “one Cameroon” and stressed that the
rebels were “not from any particular province or religion” (Mbuagbaw et al 1987: 141). From
the start, the Biya administration searched for alliances with the old traditional elite to safe-
guard stability, as did his predecessor and the German and French colonial powers in the north
before that. However, the events made him look for new partners within the ranks of new edu-
cated elites. As a result, in the course of his presidency the government tried to diminish the
power of traditional (Fulbe) leaders from the north (Schilder 1994: 223-8). However, Biya still
tried to balance the influence of the different regions and to maintain national cohesion. He
tried to achieve both goals at the same time “by appointment in the administration of members
of Kirdi-groups21 [from the north], and giving high positions in the North to civil servants from
the South.”(Van Est 1999: 8). Another method to make it possible to represent all ethnic groups
was a high number of government places22 and a high turn over of ministers (Bratton and Van
der Walle 1998: 75). 
Soon after Biya changed the name of the party to “Rassemblement Démocratique des Peuples
Camerounais (RDPC) to show his distancing from the ‘ancient régime’, pro-democracy move-
ments and protests started. Because political upheaval was developing all over Africa during
those years (end of the 1980s-beginning of the 1990s), one is tempted to blame the economic
crisis and the international situation on the end of the Cold War. However, comparative analysis
of Bratton and Van der Walle (1998: 131 - 146) shows that, although the economic crisis that
struck Africa from the mid 1980’s onwards certainly did play a role in the development of polit-
ical protests, it “cannot explain the extent, timing and outcome” of these protests (id: 132).
Moreover, Cameroon managed to maintain a positive economic growth during this period (3.2
%). In addition, “international […] factors played supportive but essentially secondary roles.”
(id: 139). It was the growing frustration about regular participation possibilities (namely, 14
elections in 30 years) without any real choice, the subsequent denial of former political rights,
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19 The fact that they started their attack together demonstrates something other than age-old controversies (see
chapter 5).
20 Le Vine (1986) states that the northern coup attempt gave Biya the excuse to change even more, and more
quickly, the top ranks of government and other high strategic positions within the country.
21 Here, Kirdi means ‘non-Muslim people from the north”. For a more elaborate explanation of this term : see
the last section of this chapter, especially box 4.1.
22 He even included some Muslim members of the elite in his cabinet team.
together with political diffusion from other countries23 that led to protests. Like other Africans,
Cameroonian voters exercised the “familiar urge to participate […], this time through non-elec-
toral outlets such as strikes, riots, and demonstrations” (id: 143). Seeing the government turning
from left to right and back again in response to donor demands, and not finding solutions to
existing problems, made protesters challenge the legitimacy of the State leaders. 
In the years to come, Biya followed a path of repressing and giving in alternately and
changed tack from shooting on protesters24 and imprisoning opposition leaders25 to drafting a
multi-party system and then committing electoral fraud26. He “encouraged party fragmentation
by extending enticing provisions for state financing of registered political parties” and “[offer-
ing] individual leaders of the opposition […] various material inducements to cross over to the
government side” (Bratton and Van der Walle 1998: 168). When the north established a Muslim-
party, the UNDP27, Biya responded out of fear for his former adversary by helping to establish
a ‘non-Muslim’ party (the MDR28) that could divert votes away (Schilder 1994: 224). Indeed, in
the 1997 elections, the totally split opposition had to recognise Biya again as the president,
although large sections of the population expressed doubts as to the fairness of the process.
This doubt is fuelled by the fact that, in 1998 and 1999, Transparency International desig-
nated Cameroon as the most corrupt country in the world. One reason for this was the bad
example the two successive presidents and their staff had given the civil servants. The second
reason put forward, that of the terrible economic position at the beginning of the 1990s when
civil servants had to resolve to bribery to earn a living, is somewhat farfetched. This may have
been true for other African countries, were sometimes more than 90 % of salaries were not
paid, but, thanks to French support, currency inflation rates stayed low29 and the government
managed to maintain a relatively low budget deficit (Bratton and Van der Walle 1998: 132). In
Cameroon the government was ‘only’ not able to fulfil its responsibilities every now and again. 
By giving way to more decentralisation and with the appointment of former ‘ordinary’ peo-
ple to high-ranking State posts, together with the continued stressing of the fact that all citi-
zens were equal and should be handled equally, Biya managed to win the support of  people
who, up to then, had had no opportunities. His rigid stance in the Nigerian border affair (espe-
cially concerning the Bakassi peninsula and the Bouram island in Lake Chad), although aggra-
vating the country’s defence budget, did much to ameliorate national feelings amongst the
Cameroonians. This, together with the policy change in late 1996 - when the government
upgraded the banking and fiscal system, adopted new land tenure and forestry laws to amelio-
rate production, and thus corrected its years of economic mismanagement -  restored ‘father’
Biya30 firmly within the neo-patrimonial system at the beginning of the new millennium. 
72
23 That is, the example of protest in other (West African) countries might have been followed in Cameroon.
24 Bratton and Van der Walle (1998: 166).
25 Crawfurd (2003): for example the southern Social Democratic Front leader John Fru Ndi was arrested.
26 Electoral manipulation and fraud was found by a US observation team.
27 Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès.
28 Mouvement Démocratique pour la Défense de la République.
29 For Cameroon it was 5.3 %, as opposed to more than 40 % in other African countries.
30 Biya was often referred to in this manner during discussions and interviews with inhabitants of the Far North
Province from 1999 – 2004 . According to Schatzberg (1986: 18) the metaphor of the president as a father
derives “from an idealized vision of patterns of authority within the family” , based in the African lineage sys-
tem. “… [T]hese metaphors are culturally relevant […] the legitimate governance in Cameroon […] is based on
the tacit normative idea that government stands in the same relationship to its citizens that a father does to his 
However, the first parliamentary and municipal elections of this new era were again subject
to accusations of having been manipulated by the president’s party. “Fifteen opposition parties
filed complaints [...], and the country’s Supreme Court annulled the results in nine districts”
(Infoplease 2003). A second round only resulted in a further increase in RDPC seats: from an
initial 133 to a final 149 out of 18031. In the lead-up to the next presidential election (end of
2004) many people are worrying about the disintegrative forces within the country, such as the
growing identity consciousness related to ethnicity and region, the neo-patrimonialism and
clientalism, the distortion of the participation of civil society and the endemic corruption32.
4.1.2 Economic situation
Under the German colonial regime, Cameroonians experienced a period of relative economic
prosperity. However, after World War One, both the French and the British mandate territory
quickly declined. The only real income came from the plantations set up and later again owned
by the Germans33. After World War II, however, the United Nations Charter “proclaimed that
trusteeship was intended to promote the economic [and other] advancement of the local inhab-
itants” (Mbuagbaw et al 1987: 109) and “the period 1945 to 1960 was characterised by rapid
economic and social development […] in both French and British Cameroon” (id: 104). 
After independence, the Ahidjo regime opted for ‘planned liberalism’. This means making
efficient use of available resources by setting reasonable targets in successive five-year plans.
In contrast to other West African countries private investment from internal and external enter-
prises was encouraged. The government focused most of its attention on the development of
agriculture, but it also invested in industry to counter urban unemployment. In order to
improve the future capabilities of the population, the Ahidjo administration paid due attention
to education and health services. Infrastructure enhancement also became a government target.
Indeed, Cameroon in the years of the Ahidjo regime was “…one of Africa’s economic success
stories.” (World Bank Group 2003a), “… that has in the past two decades followed an admirable
and well-documented path of economic growth and development” (Ndongko 1986: 83). The dis-
covery of oil in the late 1970s and the fact that petrol became an important source of income
added enormously to the real economic growth rate of 8 % per year from 1976 to 198134. 
The fall in world market prices for oil in 1984 had a significant impact on the country’s
income position35. This was aggravated by the simultaneous drop in price of the other export
products. Cleuren (2001: 132) points out the devastating effects for the country’s inhabitants:
“Since the 1980s, living conditions have deteriorated dramatically for the majority of the popu-
lation as a consequence of the severe economic crisis in relation to declining export revenues
from oil, coffee, and cocoa.” Of course this added to the unpopularity of the Biya administration. 
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children” (id: 19). “Unfortunately”, Schatzberg adds, “... manipulation and misapplication of the metaphors […]
may well discredit, over the long term, a culturally valid basis for the organisation of legitimate political power.”
31 Electionworld (2002): of the specific northern parties only one obtained one seat in parliament.
32 See, e.g., Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003), or Fonchingong (2004).
33 During the early 1930s  the colonial powers wanted to sell the plantations to private entrepreneurs, but the only
people interested were the former German planters. At the start of WW II the plantations were again expro-
priated.
34 Even Cameroon’s debt position from 1977 to 1981 was the most promising on the African continent, being
only 8% of the government budget.
35 Hodgkinson (1996) in Van Andel (1998: 37): “By 1980, petroleum had become Cameroon’s principal export
commodity”.
With a view to improving the country’s financial position, international donors demanded
structural adjustments (SAPs) to the economic and financial organisation of the country. Since
1989 “markets for agricultural products have been liberalised and a privatisation program for
the public sector is slowly advancing. Ministries have been restructured and the number of
public servants drastically reduced.” (Cleuren 2001: 132). However, up to 1994, the World
Bank Group (2003b) speaks of a fiscal crisis and economic mismanagement as well as reluc-
tance within the government to “carry out necessary structural reforms.”  In combination with
the political upheavals, the economic crisis led to a halt in the growth of the GDP between
1989 and 1993 and the GDP per capita fell steeply in 1994. In spite of the January 1994 deval-
uation of the Franc by 50%, which should have “restored the competitiveness of Cameroonian
products” (Cleuren 2001: 133), the country’s economic performance did not benefit36 until
1996 onwards37. 
The international help to overcome the financial crisis led to an increase in the international
debt from $ 2.5 billion in 1981 to $ 9.8 billion in 199838. “In the fiscal year 1998-99, one third
of the public budget was spent on debt repayment, while the total external debt represented 89
percent of the GDP” (Cleuren 2001: 133). Because this is “far above even the levels considered
by the IMF/World Bank as sustainable” (Afrodad 2003), in October 2000 Cameroon was incor-
porated into the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative. In January 2001, to reward
Cameroon’s steady performance, the Paris Club agreed to reduce Cameroon’s debt by $ 900
million, thereby reaching a total debt relief of $ 1,2 billion (nominal $ 2 billion)39. 
In the meantime adjustments continued. The restructuring of the banking system and pri-
vatisation of rail and air traffic were well under way by the year 2000. Despite the low oil
prices the State finances improved. On a personal level, people’s purchasing power continued
to recover and the informal sector expanded. The Chad – Cameroon oil pipeline project, fund-
ed by the World Bank and the European Investment bank in 2000, is meant to improve the
country’s finances even further, although there is considerable protest against the risks for the
environment and the local people40. In July 2003, the first oil flowed from the south of Chad
to the coastal terminal at Kribi, Cameroon. 
Countrywide, Cameroon can be regarded as almost self-sufficient with respect to food pro-
duction, but on a regional scale there are substantial differences. Every now and again food-
aid has to be given in vulnerable areas.
Politically and economically speaking, Cameroon is one of the most stable countries in
West and Central Africa, but observers still warn about setbacks. Democracy is not fully
developed: On the one hand, Biya has retained his position thanks to electoral fraud while, on
the other hand, there are fears of the effects of a sudden death of the (old) president.
Membership of political parties is not totally free, especially not for the elite and those with
public management positions (e.g. chiefs). There is considerable pressure on people to
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36 The sharp reduction in real income due to the devaluation of the Fcfa had negative impacts on the manufac-
turing and service sectors. Together with several delays of payments of civil servants’ salaries, this made peo-
ple seek additional sources of income.
37 In 1996, growth rates returned to 5 % per year, due to a considerable extent, to services (OECD/AfDB 2002).
38 See World Bank (2002) or Afrodad (2003).
39 Several newspapers and internet pages discussed the Debt Service Relief initiative. The most important is the
World Bank itself (2000), the Afrodad website (2003) and the OECD information on Cameroon (2002).
40 See for example Nguiffo and Breitkopf (2001).
become members of the ruling party (RDPC) and this goes even as far as exclusion from cer-
tain jobs when such membership is not proven. Despite Biya’s lip service to equal rights and
opportunities for all Cameroonian citizens, his governance has led to a kind of regionalism.
The French-speaking Christian south is more or less satisfied with ‘their’ Biya. The
Anglophone west, though, feels betrayed and wants to go back to the Federal State or even to
secession41. The north, however divided it may be, has a strong opinion about the origin of the
next president. They believe he should again be a northerner, “otherwise our needs will never
be addressed.”42
Corruption is widespread both at government and administrative level as well as within the
legislature and the judiciary43. Political turmoil can start any day. And the instability in neigh-
bouring countries does not help. In addition, the economic recovery is a fragile one. Once
again, oil revenues play an important role, but these are far from certain. Moreover, other
income depends on exogenous influences such as a favourable rainfall pattern44. Unfortunately,
import increases led, in 2002, to an external deficit. In addition, despite the debt relief,
Cameroon still has to pay more in debt service than it receives in loans. In the meantime, urban
unemployment is high and “half of Cameroon’s population lives below the poverty line”
(Courier 2002). In the Human Development Index of the UNDP of 2003 Cameroon ranks 142.
Up to now, civil society has not played any role in controlling central institutions; the empow-
erment of the people remains feeble. “Sustainable development largely depends on the level of
genuine involvement of civil society and on the country’s political ability to curb corruption
and promote good governance” (Courier 2002). In short, the overall political and economic sit-
uation is not totally secure.
4.1.3 Legal situation regarding land tenure and conflict resolution
In order to facilitate an analysis of land tenure situations at the local level, as well as conflict
resolution in the event of discord, I will describe the national organisation of the two. The three
case study chapters describe daily practices in more detail.
To start with, I would like to make a general remark concerning the land tenure arrange-
ments: in spite of State law, there is no single land tenure regime in Cameroon. “It is a variety
of pre-colonial (= traditional), colonial and national land codes” (Mope Simo 2002: 40). In
addition, the customary or ‘traditional’ system is not as static and archaic as the term sug-
gests45. It only means that “there are forms of land management based on customary princi-
ples” (Lavigne Delville 2000: 99)46. Different rules can be applied to each piece of land, at the
same time or consecutively. Even the customary regime is not restricted everywhere to one
system if different ethnic groups use the same area. In addition, sometimes the traditional cus-
tomary rules are not clear because of the meddling of the colonial powers and because the
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41 See Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003).
42 Remarks to be heard in the streets and cafés everywhere in the North, from urban to rural places, during vis-
its from 2000 - 2004. 
43 In 1998 and 1999 Transparency International ranked Cameroon number one on its list of corrupt countries.
44 Apart from regular droughts in the North, in 2003, for example, the Southwest was hit by too much rain and
flooding, because of which the harvests failed. Food aid had to be provided.
45 See also Djuidje (1999).
46 Some researchers prefer to speak of “socially-determined land-use rules” instead of ‘customary’ ones (Lavigne
Delville 2000), Mathieu (1995)) to denote the flexibility and change thereof. 
lengthy experience with State interference has made such traditional local practices “incorpo-
rate external concepts” (Lavigne Delville 2000: 102), albeit in accordance with customary
practice (and thus, again, differently per group). This whole mixture makes different actors
opportunistically claim the most appropriate ‘traditional’ or formal regimes. In other words,
“land rights are being defined and legitimated at different levels in society, and transfer of land
rights […] is regulated in ways that may ignore or challenge official land tenure regulations.”
(Van der Haar 2000: 272).
Development of land rights
In agricultural and settled communities, the pre-colonial system was mostly patrilinear, with
patrilocal residence and patrilinear inheritance of natural resources. For women this meant that
they could gain usufruct rights over land via their husbands47, but they did not have management,
exclusion or alienation rights (Ostrom and Schlager 199648). The vertical dimension of land
tenure differed per ethnic community49. This dimension means that “a hierarchy of groups is the
focus of land rights, with each ascending group larger and embracing several groups of the next
lower order, pyramiding toward a king or paramount chief of the tribe’ (Bruce 1988: 26)50. Bruce
(id: 27) adds that “mostly a group’s land right does not originate at the very top of the political
hierarchy, but at some [lower] level”. In non-Islamic communities, the central chiefs were cus-
todians of all natural resources and, as such, could reserve land for special goals (like hunting,
prohibiting any encroachment), but their power to allocate land to inhabitants or immigrants was
mostly limited to giving advice to neighbourhood heads who, in turn, only represented lineage
and compound heads. In addition to those hierarchical societies, other ethnic groups only recog-
nised power at household head level, with wise-men’s councils for issues regarding the whole
community (e.g. Geschiere 1982; Iyébi-Mandjek and Seignobos 2000a: 57).
As is the case in many other areas of Sub-Saharan Africa (see Perrot 2000; Breusers 1998),
in Cameroon the personal dimension of land tenure was clear. The customary law of cultivators
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47 Of course in matrilinear societies it is different (see, e.g., Hilhorst (2000: 187), about Tanzania). In addition,
Goheen (1989a: 372) for instance mentions the original possibility for married women in the Northwest
province of Cameroon to acquire “rights of usufruct in lands belonging to their mother’s lineage, or […] in
lands of their father’s lineage”. A decrease in the availability of land, she says (id: 375), causes these rights to
disappear.
48 “Management right = right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improve-
ments; Exclusion right = right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be trans-
ferred; Alienation right = right to sell or lease either or both of the above ‘collective-choice’ rights” (Ostrom
and Schlager 1996: 131-132). Next to that, Ostrom and Schlager recognise ‘operational level’ rights, such as
access and withdrawal rights.
49 Bruce (1988) defines four dimensions of land tenure: vertical, horizontal, historical and personal. Vertical
refers to a hierarchy of ‘secondary and primary right holders’ (resp. primary and secondary actors). Horizontal
refers to differences in type of land use and the rights related (whether or not in different times of the year, and
with regard to resources that are situated on the land or otherwise related to the land; and rules for personal
use or common use). Here again primary and secondary rights can be seen. Historical refers to changes of
tenure systems over time, due to changes in land use practices, in population densities, in political systems, in
climate and to conquests etc. Personal refers to “farmers views” (id: 29) and situations (endowments and enti-
tlements: see Leach et al (1999: 232)) that influence the actual implementation of rules. The differences in
opinion about rules make it a “give-and-take” (id: 29) game, as Berry (1988, 1993) also observed.
50 For example, women as a group get their land rights from the group ‘married men’ who, as such, get their
rights from the fact that they are descendants of a certain fore-father (This touches upon the notion of Berry
(1988) that tenure rights depend on social identity).
declared rights to land to the first settler. In lots of cases, elder sons of extended lineages migrat-
ed away (sometimes staying quite close in order to show that group membership is still impor-
tant) to avoid havoc in a group that is too large, but more specifically to enlarge the lineage’s
domain in competition with other lineages. The extendedness of land surface combined with that
of members of the group defined the status of the group (Gonnin 200; Loubamono-Bessacque
2000)51. Another reason to migrate was to enlarge the surface area in view of the survival of all
current and future group members, “taking into account the equilibrium between the environ-
ment and the exploitation methods of the natural resources” (Koumba-Manfoumbi 2000: 63). 
In the new area, the first settler and clearer of the bush became chief. Whether new arrivals
were required to obtain the authorisation from the chief to clear and cultivate land depended
on the customs of the group. Afterwards, the male settlers almost always became owners of
their land, with all the rights that Ostrom and Schlager have formulated (see note 48). As
regards their offspring these lands developed into lineage lands. Because chiefs aimed at
acquiring large numbers of ‘followers’, partly to show off their importance to ethnically relat-
ed lineages and partly to be safe from enemies (building a large army against them or geo-
graphically incorporating them), newcomers were often warmly welcomed (Gonnin 2000: 47).
Individual family (household) heads delineated their fields using natural borders or erecting
stone-lines or other signs. Most societies did not hold the land in common property, apart from
some stretches to be used as grazing land or sacral land52. In most situations of land abundance,
later immigrants had to be given parts of the already cleared land (in use), although according
to custom these lands were inalienable because the property of offspring of former clearers53.
Referring to Bruce’s categorisation (see note 49), the vertical domain rights developed only
gradually, so building up the historical domain. In the more ancient systems, individual house-
hold heads perhaps started as secondary right holders, when chiefs had to give them permis-
sion to settle, but afterwards they soon became primary right holders. Only when the commu-
nity developed and/or became part of a wider system did higher levels of authority obtain ‘ear-
lier’ rights (referring to primordial rights, such as those of first settler).  Exo-intransmissabili-
ty54 grew in the customary systems in connection with the growing pressure on land (Van den
Berg 1997: 178). Especially in the north, with its dry period, personal rights over land were
only exercised during the agricultural season. In general, customary land tenure systems in
Africa are fluid (Berry 1993), because they are subject to perpetual negotiations and changes.
Also, when land was abundant, inheritance was not a big issue. Although all villagers knew
which land was the property of which lineage, everybody was able to use whatever s/he need-
ed. This applied especially to male members of that lineage. Inheritance meant that each male
member had the right of use of the land of his forefathers with decisions related to ownership
being taken by the lineage elders. In general, every member of a village community had the
right of access to and use of enough land to accommodate his or her subsistence. However,
growing pressure meant that inheritance and allocation became important and sometimes even
a cause of conflict within and between families. At such times, local chiefs and land masters
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51 In a way this is still the case in official administration: the number of people and the expanse of the land are
between “the principal determinants in the classification of chiefs under Decree No. 77/245 ...” (Fisiy 1992:
145). Also, the more of both, the higher the prestige of the chief.
52 See also Mope Simo (2002); Bruce (1988).
53 See, for example, Fisiy (1992: 128-129).
54 That is: only the local chief is permitted to sell land, as a check against alienation of land to outsiders.
had to use their position as an arbiter in conflict resolution.
With the increase of colonial influence, land tenure rules changed in almost all four of
Bruce’s dimensions. Starting from a mismatch of ideas according to land ownership, from the
1880s onwards European civilians were able to buy land at very low prices from local chiefs,
communities and individuals. For chiefs the sale of bush-land far from the village was a lucra-
tive business that did not interfere much with the village system55. On the other hand, the for-
mer users still regarded their sold lands as free to be used (to collect firewood, to graze cattle
or even to till) according to traditional customs. In addition to these ambiguous purchases, mil-
itary expeditions also resulted in the conquest of land. 
Although the customary practices did not make it possible to alienate land56 and the
Germans officially signed a treaty not to interfere with customary laws, in 189657 they formu-
lated a policy that declared all ‘unoccupied’ territory to be vacant. ‘Occupied’ meant cultivat-
ed and this did not therefore include grazing lands, hunting lands, or fallow lands whose fer-
tility was being re-established during years of non-use. In addition to that, and to encourage
plantation agriculture, they stipulated that land had to be registered58. If not, it became land
controlled by the State, or “crown land”. The State then set aside small reserves on behalf of
individual farmers for subsistence agriculture and living59. With regard to other natural
resources, the first Imperial Forest Ordinance of 1900 prohibited the illegal felling of timber
without replanting, or the use of forest products without individual exploitation rights (Egbe
2002). When all natural resources had thus been placed under the control of the colonial
administration, the regular supply of resources to the metropolis was secured to the detriment
of the local people. 
When the Germans arrived in the north in the second half of their colonial presence in
Cameroon, they had to deal with the same customary rules within the local non-Islamic com-
munities as could be found in the south, albeit with small diversions. However, because they
kept the Fulbe lords in place as their allies or even extended their realms to the detriment of
the ‘kirdi’ population60, as will be further explained in section 2, the emphasis in the land tenure
domain as well was placed on the hierarchical system of the Fulbe who had a firm grip on the
legal system by way of their network of primary, secondary and tertiary chiefs. Land was allo-
cated by, or in the name of, the primary chief who, in non-contested situations, delegated it to
lower-level chiefs or even to customary (according to autochthonous, that is pre-Fulbe, popu-
lations) chiefs and their own original system. Indeed, as far as the cattle-keeping Fulbe were
concerned, the authority of the lamibe was uncontested. In return for a reasonable tax payment,
they were able to access grazing lands and acquire protection against enemies from their mas-
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55 The fact that these traditional chiefs were able to sell land contrasts with the perception of later Western colo-
nial authorities and scientists that in traditional, communal tenure systems alienation was not possible. Yet, the
sale of land meant something different than the Western buyers thought. 
56 Although in the South chiefs did sell land to the Germans, within the framework of their vision and that of
their subjects this did not alienate the land from them with regard to user rights.
57 In 1896,  they had not yet invaded North Cameroon. This invasion took place in 1901.
58 The German land register was called ‘Grünbuch’. This Grünbuch and the rules that called for registration can
be seen as the forerunners of all later registration-based land laws in Cameroon.
59 Of course, there was widespread resistance to the entire policy, but the very small area appointed to farmers
(only 6 ha was deemed enough per household head) particularly turned the population against the Germans.
60 Because of this neglect of the rights and the position of non-Muslim people, the Germans encountered con-
tinuing resistance up till WW I.
ters. On top of it all, the Germans imposed their laws regarding the use of natural resources
and their central authority in the person of one governor with all-embracing power.
When the French and British took over, the registration of ownership (title) became the
legal norm in both parts of Cameroon. The French expanded the German legal system to
include the category of public domain. Land with regard to which individuals or communities
could not prove were being used was considered to be ‘empty’, ‘unoccupied’ and ‘ownerless’.
Cultivation and temporary occupation were not seen as ‘occupying’. For that, the land had to
be developed, that is used for commercial agriculture, industry, housing, or be (re)planted with
trees. This contradicted the customary system in which trees belong to other property regimes
than the land on which they stand. Although confirmation of customary rights was officially
possible for groups and individuals, “until the 1950s, land was registered only by European
colonists and urban dwellers” (Van den Berg 1997: 189). As a consequence, most land became
State land and from then on was administered by the colonial authorities as part of the nation-
al domain. Forests, as a potential economic asset, were given a special status consistent with
the land law of ‘non-developed land is State-land’. Indeed, the 1926 Décret classified all
forests as ‘forêts domaniales’ and put them under the control of the French Commissioner,
who had the power to decide on exclusion, allocation and involved rules. Traditional users
acquired user rights only to satisfy their direct (short-term) personal needs. Exploitation per-
mits were issued to commercial harvesters, although several hardwood species could only be
felled with special authorisation. 
During the period of French rule, the State monopoly on forest increased, limiting the pos-
sibilities of local users more and more. Land legislation acquired its most restrictive form in
the 1932 and 1938 Decrees that “prepared the ground for subsequent land colonisation by the
colonial administration” (Fisiiy 1992: 35). However, after World War II, the French gradually
started to meet people’s demands. In reaction to successive protest actions of local chiefs and
their villagers against the land-rights deprivation, the French revised the law in 1949. But it
was only just before independence in 1959 that a new land law reinforced the property rights
of local communities on ‘vacant lands’ by re-establishing customary land tenure via the author-
ity of large customary chiefs61. However, immigrants’ rights to clear land were not restored.
In the British Cameroon, on the other hand, native rights were recognised from the begin-
ning in accordance with the League of Nations Mandate Agreement62. The British recognised
so called “native lands”: “the whole of the lands in (West) Cameroon, whether occupied or
unoccupied” (Fisiiy 1992: 31), with the exception of the former German plantations, now
called ‘free estates’ or ‘Crown Lands’. However, “the Land and Native Rights Ordinance [of
1927] only acknowledged the right of occupancy, management and use of land” (Van den Berg
1997: 190). The ownership right of alienation, for example, was given to the Governor63. The
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61 Whether or not those were indeed ‘customary’ remains an issue for debate. When Fulbe rules were re-installed,
autochthonous populations still felt overrun. In lots of cases, equalising chieftainship with territory is a dis-
putable colonial invention (Mback 2000).
62 Mandate text: “In framing laws relating to the holding and transfer of land and natural resources, the adminis-
tering authority shall take into consideration native laws and customs, and shall respect the rights and safeguard
the interests, both present and future, of the native population. No native land or natural resource may be trans-
ferred, except between natives, save with previous consent of the competent authority” (in Fisiy 1992: 30).
63 With the installation of these rules, the British did not divert far from the German system that also gave all-
embracing power to their governor.
same principle was already formulated within the Forestry Ordinance of 1916 that gave him
the power to constitute forest reserves, with special, more restricting rules64. In addition, native
rights in customary fallow land were forfeited after ten years of “non-use”. However, before
that time had expired, “[t]he governor could deprive indigenous people of their rights to
resource tenure only in accordance with customary law.”(Egbe 2002: 63). In the case of free
estates, both the State and, later, private owners had the right to purchase and sell on the basis
of a Certificate of Occupancy. 
After independence, the new Federal government wanted to build a ‘modern State’ with a
mono-legal system of modern law and thus get rid of “old-fashioned” land tenure systems as
had just been restored in French Cameroon in the 1959 laws. In addition, “land [has] a central
place in the State’s effort to “capture” and control local populations” and “for the rational allo-
cation and reallocation of natural resources” (Fisiiy 1992: 1). So, to gain a firm grip on the
population and on economic development, in 1963 the latest land laws were more or less
reversed into those of 1932. The term “terres vacantes et sans maître” was substituted by the
more positively sounding “le patrimoine collectif national”. However, this did not alleviate the
problem of the new law disregarding the customary social and cultural values of land, and its
function of social binding within and over the generations. All the rights regained by commu-
nities with regard to ownership, allocation and control over their own bush, pastures and fal-
low land, were again lost65. These communities could only exercise those rights over occupied
and cultivated land (Fisiy 1992: 34). Once again, all non-registered land was to be adminis-
tered by the State. Individuals had to prove that they ‘developed’ their already acquired land,
to obtain property rights over it, via registration. In 1966, individual tenure became the ‘win-
ner’ over corporate customary ownership. By comparison, in the Anglophone part and in spite
of several amendments to Land and Forest Ordinances, there was not a great shift between the
before and after independence situations with regard to natural resource tenure. This was main-
ly due to the rejection of all ‘modernisation’ plans.
Because the unification of 1972 asked for a streamlining of the differences in legal systems
of the two Cameroons, a new land law was drawn up in 1974. This new system was firmly
based on French colonial rule, as the powerful president of the Union came from the French
part and overruled demands for recognition of their legal system from the Anglophone part.
Ahidjo sought to enlarge State involvement on the one hand and privatisation on the other. The
new laws meant citizens and communities could once more become private owners of their
land66. However, the road to registration turned out to be a long, arduous and very expensive
one, and one that was impassable for individual small-scale and mostly illiterate farmers.
“Those who register are mainly bureaucrats, highly ranked civil servants, and traders, but no
male, let alone female, farmers” (Van den Berg 1997: 192, note 22). Fisiiy (1992) found that,
after seven years, the Land Consultative Boards had only managed to finish half of all appli-
cations (in West Cameroon the total number of applications was only 900; in the north this
number was even lower) and, what is more, had only granted a title to 6 % thereof. The prob-
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64 It has to be said that such an intervention could be exercised to prevent the destruction of forests “diminishing
the water supply or threatening the continuous supply of forest produce to village communities.” (Egbe 2002:
63). In other words, not only for commercial purposes.
65 This reversion to the colonial laws of the beginning of the 20th century caused Lavigne Delville (2000: 102)
use the denomination “archaic” for the so-called ‘modern’ laws.
66 With, among other things, inheritance rights for their off-spring, and registered wife.
lem is that not registering means your land becomes national land and thus subject to expro-
priation. On the other hand, “nobody, not even the holder of a land certificate, can claim to be
free from State encroachment” (Fisiiy 1992: 52) when, for example, the State deems it in the
interest of the general public to do so. Registration, however, can also mean that the user can
be expropriated, as the owner can now use his title for that purpose, whereas in the past cus-
tomary habits and societal rules and solidarity had prohibited such actions67. Not only did indi-
vidual farmers lose their ownership right once again but also the traditional communities: “The
corporate nature of customary land rights cannot be legally enforced under the 1974 land law
reforms” (Fisiiy 1992: 52). For example, “any sale or alienation of unregistered land by the
customary community is illegal” (Fisiiy 1992: 52).
In the 1974 Land Law (Ordinance) and subsequent 1976 and other decrees and amendments68,
three types of land are stipulated, namely two types of registered land, being private or public
and, third, non-registered ‘common-pool’ land, being ‘national land’. Table 4.1.1 shows the
different legal types of land.
Table 4.1.1 Legal types of land (based on Ordinance 74 -1, -2, -3 (1974) and Fisiy (1992: 38 - 53))
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67 See also Van den Berg (1997: 192 – 194).
68 57 normative texts saw the light between 1974 and 1985 (Fisiiy 1992: 39).
69 Private State land can be appropriated via three methods: 1) Sale or lease as with National Land; 2) Exchange
between State and citizen; 3) Retrocede to a council, public body or parastatal.
70 Cannot be privately appropriated.
A. National land = land that is not registered (Art. 15 of Ordinance 74-1)
Land free of any effective occupation
Land with houses, farming fields, plantations and grazing lands
B. Registered land (may belong to private persons, private bodies or the State)
Private estates - Registered before 1974 
(10 years to transform 
documents into 'modern' 
ones)
- New registration - after purchase (has to be via a notary)
- prove customary occupation of before 1974 (10 years time to 
register)
- via concessions (with intention of development project and 
assessment after 5 years towards permanent grand (= private pro
perty) or long-term (99 years) lease (for foreigners) ; to be paid for.
- declassification of private State lands
- State private  property69 - acquired from National Lands (no compensation paid)  
- from private ownership by expropriation (compensation has to be 
paid)  
- from gifts (ordinary or testamentary) 
- recovering of public and parastatal land after institution has been 
wound up. To be used directly by the State(institutions) or to be 
redistributed to individuals in case of need ("in the general interest
of the public")
Public estates - all lands which by their nature or by their intended use are reser
ved for the direct use of the public or public services, such as 
waterways and public paths70.
Apart from the Land Laws as such, land and natural resource use and ownership are regulated
in several other laws. The most important thereof is that which deals with forests, as it regu-
lates the rights of access, use, management, exclusion and alienation of the land on which for-
est grows and of the natural resources wood (timber), fauna (wildlife) and minor products that
together make up the forest. Indeed, the first forestry law of the United Republic of Cameroon,
in 1973, dealt with timber (Egbe 2001: 8; Egbe 2002: 65) because of its economic importance.
This ordinance gave customary rights of use, but only for the minor (‘secondary’) products.
Naturally grown trees, even on private land, belonged to the State. So, only the State had all
the rights of ownership as defined by Ostrom and Schlager (1996), of which management,
exclusion and alienation are the most important here. Later amendments did not change this
rights regime. In 1994, all forest resources and genetic resources that were deemed to be part
of the national heritage were nationalised in accordance with the new Forestry Law 71, and thus
not accessible to individual or community use. This included “orchards, agricultural planta-
tions, fallow land, wooded land adjoining an agricultural farm, and pastoral and agro-forestry
facilities” (Egbe 2002: 66). 
On the other hand, in response to donor-stated conditions on Structural Adjustment Loans,
the Cameroon government began to recognise the needs and rights of local communities72. The
1994 Forestry Act granted “local communities the possibility of greater control over forests
and wildlife” (Egbe 2001: 1)73. Local council and privately planted forests were excluded from
the nationalisation wave. Local populations were now allowed to cut trees in unprotected areas
to meet their domestic demands for fuel wood and building materials, as long as they could
justify these needs to officials from the Forestry Service74. Moreover, they were given the right
to harvest wildlife and fisheries products for their personal use (not commercial), as long as
the species and area involved are not protected and as long as ‘traditional methods’ are used,
such as hunting tools made of plant material. In addition, community management is allowed
on former fallow land and agricultural or pastoral land to which no title deeds exist75.
Covenants between the State and community members can be drawn up to create ‘Community
Forests’, which then have to be managed according to a mutually designed plan. The same
applies to ‘Community Hunting Zones’, as formulated in the 1995 Wildlife Decree (see Egbe
2001, Bauer 2003: 22-23). Even the suspension of community rights in the public interest can
officially only be implemented after consultation with the local communities and with appro-
priate compensation payments (Egbe 2002: 66).
Indemnities are also prescribed in the reverse situation where the State wants to create a
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71 The law stated that 30 % of all Cameroon territory should be dedicated to permanent forest and this should
represent the ecological diversity of the country (law 94/01 of 1994, Art. 22).
72 In the course of the organisation of, and during, the UN conference on Sustainable Development in 1992, the
level of recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights steadily increased. Later, this developed within the frame-
work of the negotiations and agreements on Biodiversity. At the start of the 1990s it meant that donor institu-
tions began to ask their borrowers to fulfil related demands. As a result, global agencies began to claim rights
to intervene in tenure rules.
73 See also Didier (1998) and Mvondo (1998). 
74 “This provision is a source of confrontation between local inhabitants and forestry officials, as the mechanisms
for proving ‘justification’ are unclear.” (Egbe 2002: 66). It also opens up possibilities for more powerful for-
est-guards to accuse local inhabitants of misuse and to have them pay off the threatened fine.
75 It has to be stressed that this rule includes the risk of depriving farmers of the use of the customary method to
improve the soil quality through long-term fallow practices.
national forest on a territory that is already in use by local people (see Nguiffo 1994). Art. 26
of the 1994 Law on “Forests, Wildlife and Fisheries” obliges people to “respect the social envi-
ronment of autochthonous populations” in such a case and, when it is necessary to limit or
deny such “normal use”, “compensation, according to modalities formulated in a decree”
should be paid. Indirectly, this means that it is not per se necessary to limit or deny access to
and use of, national forests by local inhabitants (Bauer 2003).
One of the problems with the new legislation is that, especially in the north with its long
dry season, customary rules governing natural resources change over time. This can go as far
as different communities having authority over a certain territory in different parts of the year76.
As far as cultivators are concerned, rights of use and access to land are only claimed during
the production season. In general, “land rights are always more complex then public versus
private.’(Zoomers 2000 1 : 14).
In short, although operationalisation is fraught with lots of difficulties, - where concepts are
not properly defined (for example, the term ‘community’ itself77), where the position of tradi-
tional chiefs is totally subordinated to other administrative levels (Mback 2000), where factu-
al situations cannot meet formulated conditions (for example the unrealistic conditions for
hunting rights78) or demands regarding places of community forest (Egbe 2002: 67), where
routes to be followed to register community’s rights are too difficult, time consuming and
expensive (id) - the 1994 Forestry, Wildlife and Fisheries Act is a first step towards involving
local communities and creating space for customary legislation in addition to the more formal
rules. Nevertheless, the State remains the de jure owner of the resources and the Act goes only
so far as to give communities some management rights.
In theory, the land registration laws give women more land-tenure security than customary
rules79. Traditionally, almost all customary rules excluded women from land-ownership. They
obtained access and use rights via male farmers, mostly husbands (these were therefore sec-
ondary rights)80. The death of such a husband made the woman vulnerable for expropriation
by, for example, brothers or sons (of co-wives) of the deceased81. Because the registration rules
required actual improvement of, and work on, the land, women stood a fair chance of obtain-
ing ownership. However, for them, access to the difficult registration procedures was more dif-
ficult (and too expensive). Another option for women was the new law on matrimonial regis-
tration. A marriage certificate can also be used to secure the inheritance of the husband’s prop-
erty. However, most women were unaware of this possibility and, when they did find out about
it, they discovered that it was still the husband’s decision as to whether to register his marriage.
This was, once again, a difficult route which cost money and generated no benefits for the hus-
band82. In addition, trying to get official title had a detrimental effect on the woman’s social
position in the village, where the customary land ownership rules still considered a woman’s
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76 See Van Est (1999) about Kotoko management of fishing spots in the Logone area, or Van Driel (2001) about
former management of the Niger valley.
77 See Egbe 2001: 3-4.
78 See Egbe 2001: 6.
79 “Since 1974 Cameroon has adopted a land tenure regime that guarantees access to land ownership for every-
body, included women and the very poor.” (Anonymous, 2000: 30).
80 See, e.g., Hilhorst (2000: 181).
81 Insecurity may also arise when the relationship with the husband deteriorates, when a second (or other) wife
enters the household, etc.
82 See also Van den Berg (1997).
land title as a threat to family property and identity83.
In practice, the increase of cash crop production and of husbandry for cash income made
men seek more security to land at the detriment of access and usage possibilities for women.
Even the arrival of foreign cattle keepers, agreed upon by local chiefs because it meant tax rev-
enues, restricted women’s farming options84.
Conflict resolution
As depicted above, before the colonial period the different ethnic groups had their own rules
to manage land and other resources. The same applies to conflicts about resources and other
issues. For land-centred communities, the head of the land-owning lineage (that is the lineage
that descends from the first settler on that piece of land) had to decide about land allocation
issues and had to settle related disputes. Contesting members of the lineage who were unable
to agree with the decision, “would generally break off from the main compound and migrate
to foreign lands to create a new home, this new home constituted the nucleus of a new line-
age…” (Fisiy 1992: 57). This could easily be done where population densities were low. In
other locations, where there was a greater demand for land, war was often waged to decide
which individuals (or group) could settle and take command. This seldom led to a continuing
conflict, while the conquering lineage would restrict itself most of the time to the acquisition
of just the political and economic control of the land, thereby leaving the “initial settlers to
maintain the spiritual control” (Fisiy 1992: 59). However, when the warriors chose to “estab-
lish new links with the gods of the land”, this resulted in “deep-seated distrust and hard feel-
ings” (Fisiy 1992: 60), that were not easy to resolve.
Yet, within a community, conflicts could usually be settled not through mediation by the
chief but by asking the gods of the land themselves to pass judgement. This involved libation
of the disputed territory by the lineage heads85. Because the gods of the land were involved, the
community did not have to support a kind of police force to impose implementation.
Incoming nomads usually obeyed the rules of the inhabitants of the territory on which they
grazed their animals. In cases of discord with the population that had settled in the region they
accepted the judgements of the local authorities, whom they considered to be ‘masters of the
land’, or they simply went away.
Other types of conflicts, such as those concerning family matters (bride wealth (re-)pay-
ments, divorces, property inheritance - for example when the eldest sons did not divide the
inheritance equally between their brothers – adultery), contract breaches between herders
and cattle owners86, or criminal offences (theft, murder, witchcraft), were judged by the vil-
lage elders and the chiefs, depending on the cultural habits of the different groups. In
extreme cases, land could be used in punitive acts. Confiscation (sometimes to transfer the
land to the victim or his family), or even banishment from the entire territory of the group
could be the outcome of the judgement. Otherwise, and especially in cattle-raising groups,
the conveyance of animals might settle the discord.
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83 As Toulmin and Quan (2000a: 27) already remarked: “it may be problematic trying to improve the security of
women’s rights of access to land without opening up a much broader discussion regarding the rights of women
within society in general.”
84 See, e. g., Fisiy (1992: chapter 8).
85 See Goheen (1989) and Fisiy (1992).
86 See for example, Van der Ploeg (2001). See also the increase of this phenomenon in Benin (Van Driel 2001).
Most nomadic cattle keepers have strong lineages, with strong lineage heads. If the bush
was large, it was free to be used as pasture. Conflicts would more likely to develop over the
use of water sources (between and within groups) or, indeed, over family matters87. In such
instances, lineage heads passed judgement, assisted where necessary by other elderly and wise
group members (men). In cases in which some of the cattle keepers were settled and a ‘royal’
(or an administrative) hierarchy had developed, a local (lawan) or regional (lamido or sultan)
leader was seen as the master of the land and he was required to resolve disputes over both
land use and access to water between different groups or families of cattle nomads. These
chiefs also had judging power (although this was often delegated to special judges at their
courts) because of their role as religious leader within the Islamic system88.
The power of the invading Fulbe and their hierarchical governing system went so far as to
assign their leaders the arbiter role in discords between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ people. In con-
flicting situations with cultivators, these same lords tended to approve the cattle keepers’
actions. Thus, when the different customary systems clashed, the Fulbe system appeared to be
dominant. In the areas where up until the German invasion the Fulbe had not been victorious,
their system can only be called ‘neo-traditional’89.
When the colonial administration took over, “family matters were adjudicated according to
customary law in Tribunaux Coutumiers, except for those educated people who explicitly
renounced their customary status and wished to be treated as French assimilés” (Van den Berg
1997: 161). Conflicts over land between local users were still handled by the traditional
authorities, despite the fact that overall re-establishment of customary land tenure via the
authority of large customary chiefs was only carried out at the end of the colonial period (as
we have seen above). In the British parts of Cameroon the customary courts already played a
more important role in conflict settlement and land tenure arrangements in general. 
From the colonial time onwards, State-claims to land or to the right to attribute land engen-
dered conflicts between that State (or its representatives) and local communities and individuals.
Just as in cases of conflict between inhabitants or communities, again the State tried to involve
and take into account customary practices and rules to avoid excessive resistance. However,
because all the power was generally vested in the State, and because the State had to take above-
local level interests into account, most of the time the basis of State’s decisions could not be chal-
lenged. “What could be challenged was the quantum of compensation paid by the public body
85
87 Moritz (2003: 343-347) describes conflicts within Fulbe families over cattle. The fact that cattle were a com-
mon resource for Fulbe pastoralist families under the management of the ‘family head’, more or less regard-
less of ownership of the cattle, clashes with the Islamic inheritance (and private property) notions. For exam-
ple, according to Islamic law, women have private ownership over inherited cattle, but in reality they cannot
enforce such rights under the original Fulbe rules. Depending on the importance of the herd size for survival
of the family versus the importance of adherence to religious rules and, thus, the piety of the group and the
judges, a woman can try to get decision rights to her cattle.
88 See De Bruijn and Van Dijk (1995), or Moritz (2003).
89 Even where the Fulbe had been victorious, and had installed their law system, it was only superimposed on the
local tradition of autochthonous people one century earlier. For some of those groups in the areas conquered by
the Fulbe, the system found and nourished by the Germans (although called ‘traditional’ by them) was not real-
ly traditional, but fairly new being therefore ‘neo-traditional’. In addition to that, it was also changed by the
colonial powers adapting it to their own legal perceptions and views. See Olivier de Sardan in Lavigne Delville
(2000: 99-100): “customary law was derived from the way the administration interpreted rights over land and
people as described to them retrospectively by the chiefs at the beginning of the colonial occupation”.
expropriating land” (Fisiy 1992: 145), not the expropriation as such. This is necessarily an
administrative challenge instead of a juridical one, going from Prefect to Minister (see below).
In short, during colonisation, three different legal systems co-existed. Apart from the statu-
tory law on land tenure and conflict resolution, popular customary law regulated daily land
interactions. In between, the “State’s customary law” could be involved. However, according
to Fisiy (1992: 133), the latter was “out of tune with local practices” because it ignored the fact
that customary law changes with the alteration of society90. “Some court pronouncements have
not kept pace with socio-economic changes”, such as the increase of market forces and the
“emancipation of the individual from strict ties of kinship” (id: 131). 
After independence, the focus quickly shifted to privatisation and the registration of land,
and with that, State involvement increased again, also as regards conflict mediation. However,
it became apparent that “ignoring […] local structures simply creates conflicts” (Fisiy 1992:
126). So, while land law was being created after unification, and even before this new law was
officially enacted, the State had already installed a special institute to incorporate traditional
leaders. This Land Consultative Board had to deal with the registration of land as such (see
former section), but also with conflicts and ensuing disputes. Although the traditional chiefs
constituted only a minority within the Board, they did have a large influence, because of their
high legitimacy at the local level. 
Since the unification, the State juridical system in the Republic of Cameroon has been organ-
ised according to the French system. The British Common Law system of the Anglophone part
has more or less disappeared91. Conflicts are dealt with as in the French Code Civil, with more
serious cases being subject to the French Code Penal. Based on the recognition that all different
regions and ethnic groups have different land tenure and conflict resolution systems, the State
has created space for customary courts at the unofficial, local level and installed Tribunaux de
Premier Instance (Magistrate’s courts) as the first level in the official judiciary system. These
are located in the departmental capitals and mostly use regional customary law. In civil cases
they are only competent when both parties in the conflict agree to submit disputes to such courts.
A practical problem is the frequent linguistic difference between the parties and the Magistrate,
together with the lack of well-trained (juridical) translators92. The parties that do not consent with
the Magistrate’s decision can go to a Court of Appeal in the provincial capital. Finally, the
Supreme Court (Tribunal de Grande Instance) can check the decisions of lower-level courts. It
has several chambers for both “legal and administrative matters as well as the appraisal of
accounts” (Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, 1996: art 38).
In cases that deal with penal justice such as theft, murder93 or (e.g.) disturbance of enjoy-
ment of land94, the police have to bring charges at the Magistrate’s Court, for example based
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90 See also Mathieu (1995) and Lavigne Delville (2000).
91 See Fonkah (1997).
92 In the summer of 2000, I witnessed a case of an accusation of witchcraft between two inhabitants of Sirlawé,
at the Magistrate’s Court in Yagoua in the extreme north of Cameroon, being postponed for days and in the
end even for months, because no ‘neutral’ translator from French to Tupuri and vice versa was available.
93 In Cameroon, witchcraft has been officially declared non-existent, so accusations of witchcraft are difficult to
handle. Nevertheless, most customary courts (dependent on the chief’s attitude) and even some Magistrate’s
Courts deal with conflicts related to this matter. Geschiere (1997) even speaks of State interventions against
the rising witchcraft activities designed to defend or to gain wealth and power: a judicial offensive to convict
alleged witches.
94 In such cases, a registered title of land is unnecessary. Proven cultivation and use of the land is sufficient.
on accusations against civilians filed by (higher) members of the administration, based on
accusations of civilians against each other or based on their own findings. 
An example of how the Magistrate’s court can include customary rules and practices in mod-
ern law is described by Van den Berg (1997: 241-242). In a case between a brother and sister over
the ownership of a piece of land - both claiming the inheritance of it95 - the Magistrate took into
consideration the accounts of the family members as well as the village notables. These testi-
monies were quite contradictory, but the court chose to follow the explanation of the village eld-
ers that the land was given to the woman by her mother and that she planted trees on it. The
development of the land by the woman (tree planting), in combination with the fact that the fam-
ily involved was Islamic and thus that the woman had the right to inherit lands from her mother,
made the Court decide in her favour96. Had the woman been a Christian or a follower of a tradi-
tional religion, the Court could not have given her ownership to the land.
As can be seen, the settling of land disputes is a difficult affair. It is even more difficult
because the hierarchy of courts as depicted above does not exist in relation to land matters.
Instead, the land law of 1974 “has come up with a hybrid group comprising bureaucrats and
local authorities” (Fisiy 1992: 141). It has given97 pre-eminence to the Land Consultative
Board. Although this Board also has a role in land registration it is, as before the 1974 law,
“empowered to settle disputes relating to the membership and boundaries of a community”
(Egbe 2001: 4), as well as disputes relating to the registration and property of unregistered land
(Law No. 19, 26 November 1983). As a result, it is an arbiter in its own decisions. During the
registration procedure, appeals against decisions by the Board are “possible at the Tribunal de
1re Instance or the préfet (under droit immobilier)” (Van den Berg 1997: 317). However, such
appeals are seldom implemented because recommendations concerning titling are not made
public before they reach the Minister of Domains and only therefore once the decision has
already been taken. Fisiy (1992: 141) also points out the fact that the Board cannot give “a
well-motivated legal opinion on rights infringed in any of the land cases” (id: 141) because of
its administrative instead of judicial background. In addition, because the position of the Board
is purely advisory “the Minister alone has the final word” (id: 142). One can only appeal
against a decision by the Minister “to the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court,
which involves a highly complicated procedure for introducing litigation.” (id). This is, under-
standably, an impossible course of action for local peasants.
Therefore, and because the Board officially has only authority to handle issues of land proper-
ty (of registered land)98, titling and registration, land disputes find their way to the civil courts via
the formulation of land use rights, the infringement thereof and, specifically, the trespassing on
somebody’s land, although more often than not the latter is in fact also a dispute over ownership99.
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95 In fact, the case was subject to the penal code because the woman had accused her brother of infringing the
peaceful enjoyment of the fruits of her land. A land ownership claim would have been dealt with by the admin-
istrative Land Consultative Board (see there).
96 This case also shows that, within Islamic families, inheritance rights are not secure, and often clash with more
customary rules (see also Moritz 2003).
97 Re-enforced officially in an amendment of 1983 to the 1974 laws.
98 Van den Berg (1997: 317) mentions the fact that the Mindif Land Consultative Board nevertheless handles con-
flicts over unregistered land.
99 Indeed, conflict parties’ opportunistic use of different formulations and denominations of the same conflict, so as
to make it fall under the jurisdiction of either the Board or the Court, has engendered disputes between the two
institutions itself.
Infringements of land use rights and trespassing can also be dealt with in Criminal Courts,
depending on the access route of the complaining party. One of the issues that may be brought
before one of the two courts is the use of fire. Fire sometimes leads to the destruction of standing
crops and sometimes to the premature burning of grazing land. In addition to Civil and Criminal
Courts (Magistrate Courts), Customary Courts are also competent to handle land conflicts. Thus,
based on normative and cognitive awareness, financial capacities100, manoeuvring skills and social
relations, litigants can and do choose which forum will most serve their interests101.
Even at a local level, different fora can be chosen due the overlapping administrative and
political entities. Normally, local-level problems are first discussed by the persons involved
and, if this does not solve the issue, with sub-local or local authorities102. Their role in conflict
mediation is firmly embedded in customary law and habits and may therefore differ from
locality to locality. On the other hand, their position in land and resource management and
related conflict mediation is officially recognised in the new constitution of 1996 (art 55 - 57),
with the appointment of Regional Councils, in which traditional chiefs and communities have
to be represented, together with a description of its rights and duties.
Local authorities are not only village and neighbourhood chiefs which although unofficial
are recognised by the State. Lots of ethnic groups have different ‘masters’ who have local
authority over the use of natural resources103, such as those related to land (who decide over the
appropriation of land for new comers, for example, and therefore over conflicts over land and
land boundaries between indigenous people and foreigners) and over social matters, that is
conflicts about resource or non-resource issues.  It depends on local coherence and social
bonding as to whether these traditional institutions still have (enough) legitimacy to perform
their conflict mediating tasks. 
The fact that traditional and formal conflict mediating systems do not always coincide, and
even contradict each other from time to time, is magnified by the competition of the different
authority systems at local level. Nowadays, to solve their conflicts, litigants not only choose
between traditional or statutory courts but, locally, between the involvement of the police, the
traditional chief, the elected mayor or the heads of the regional administration or line agen-
cies104. A ‘wrong’ choice, can lead to a negative outcome which favours the adversary or to lost
court fees and bribe money without any solution having been reached. Arbiters can use the
ambiguity of the system to perpetuate the conflict in their own favour. ‘Solutions’ can then
give rise to more frustration and new problems in the future105. This is aggravated by the high
level of corruption that influences the behaviour of chiefs, civil servants (like sub-prefects, line
agents and police) and judges alike. 
Nevertheless, “local customary laws […] provide the social legitimacy [for] interactions at
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100 Court cases are expensive actions. So, “… just the threat of initiating a court action at the State level could
serve as a strategic move during the dispute management process at the local level” (Fisiy 1992: 133).
101 See also Von Benda Beckman and Von Benda Beckman (1994).
102 So-called administrative authorities of ‘second’ or ‘third’ degree, who are customary chiefs.
103 See Van Est (1999), Seignobos (2000b: 44), Iyébi-Mandjek and Seignobos (2000a: 57).
104 See also Lavigne Delville (2000: 103): “The real problems arise […] from the multiplicity of arbitration
authorities.”
105 Indeed, according to Mathieu (1995: 56): “the confusion and the non-application of land rules are not simply
accidents or unfortunate imperfections” of conflicting law systems, but they are the conscious outcome of
managed coexistence of different rules, by “those who have privileged access to political power and strategic
information” (id).
the local level” (Fisiy 1992: 148). Only “when local norms are contested by the parties” (Fisiy
1992: 148), or when local norms collide, such as in cases where different cultural systems have
to be applied to the same piece of land, does State law have to be resorted to as a last option.
Whereas, in the past, that same piece of land and related conflict was managed perfectly by the
system of one of the now conflicting cultural systems, it may take time before the different par-
ties agree that State law can now offer a way out106. Changing societal patterns and the loss of
legitimacy of the formerly overruling system are hard to accept for those who lose their prima-
cy. The loss of status of several lamido courts in the north of Cameroon may serve as an exam-
ple107. Of course, when the conflict extends beyond the local arena (for example in border con-
flicts between different districts or when authorities themselves are involved) higher-level
authorities and statutory law have to be involved. For most of the local inhabitants, however, the
involvement of State law and State Courts entails problems because they “do not have the finan-
cial or cognitive resources to seek redress under the 1974 land reforms” (id: 149). In addition,
according to Fonkah (1997: 2) “Cameroonians do not have any confidence in the courts, because
most of the decisions that come out of them depend on the whims and caprices of the judges.”108
The fact that ‘getting your rights’ also depends on social position locally, but especially in
the higher-level political forums, is demonstrated by the struggle for the pasture territory in the
mountains of North-West Province between a rich rancher and M’bororo cattle herders who
have been indigenous since the 17th century. To reach his goal, the rich business man, who is
a prominent member of the ruling party, ordered the local administration to back him and used
the gendarmes to arrest, detain and even torture M’bororo who resisted his attempts to deprive
them from their lands. Without any government objections being forthcoming, he tried to
frighten away his adversaries by stealing their animals and harassing their wives and daugh-
ters. Other tactics even include imprisonment without charge a M’bororo man who was film-
ing a disputed piece of grazing land and trying him before a military tribunal109. Marginal eth-
nic groups and individuals are hardly able to defend their interests in such situations.
In the case of crop damage by livestock, the gap between local farmers and official courts
is filled by the institutional installation by the State of the so-called Land Consultative
Commissions. The frequent crop damage by roaming livestock (which in the past was handled
by the parties involved with some assistance from neighbours or local chiefs) appeared to be
developing into a growing source of severe conflicts. Now, for each case of discord over such
damage, the Land Consultative Commission is called together by its president, the local sub-
prefect. The rest of the members are the regional heads of the veterinary service, the agricul-
tural service and the forestry service, the local police superintendent and the ‘traditional’ land-
chief110. The first two line agents in particular are easily accessible to peasants. The
Commission has to descend to grassroots level and judge the amount of damage and the level
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Although State law does not offer a consistent, congruent system.
107 See Moritz et al (2002) and Scholte et al (1999).
108 For a comparable legal culture, see, e.g. about Honduras, Roquas (2000:178): “Latin American legal culture
combines a great respect for formalities and rituals with a complete denial of the content of law”. “Landholders
[…] have no confidence […] in the ability of courts to solve their problems [...], it only leaves them with an
empty wallet” The avoidance of the judicial system results in “long, violent disputes that transcend genera-
tions.” (id: 177).
109 See information of Survival International (2002), Afrol News (2002, 2003) and Amnesty International Reports
(1998, 2000).
110 The lamido in the North of Cameroon; the Fon in North-West Province etc.
of culpability of the livestock owner. After that, it takes decisions on compensation payments.
Officially, the parties can still go to court but, in reality, this hardly ever occurs. The Land
Consultative Commission can also be called upon in cases of field or pasture damage by fire,
cases in which cattle tracks are blocked by new fields or in cases of discords over access of
livestock to public water wells. It is even consulted sometimes in cases of boundary disputes
between neighbouring farmers.
Thus, conflict resolution normally starts at an interpersonal level. When this does not work,
parties can (and do) choose from a myriad of possibilities of which the official route via the
courts is but one. Due to “too few magistrates and judges” (Fonkah 1997: 3) and an exces-
sively arbitrary way of decision-making, most inhabitants do not have much trust in this route.
Combined with a shortage of (juridical) knowledge and the fact that court cases are expensive,
the most accessible route is usually via traditional authorities or the administrative Board (or
just some of its members).
4.2 Far North province 
The (again) triangular shape of the Far North Province stretches over 350 km from the south-
ern border with Chad to Lake Chad at the far northern edge of the country. From east to west
it is situated between the Logone River that forms the Chad border and the escarpments of the
Mandara Mountains along the Nigerian border. With a total surface of approximately 48,125
km2 it constitutes 10 % of the total land surface of Cameroon (see Figure 4.1). Far North
province is home to a wealth of ethnic groups111, originating from three basic language
groups112. It has the highest population density of the whole country (an average of 77 persons
per km2, and a total of 17 % of the national population). Some parts are even home to more
than 250 inhabitants /km2 (e.g. the northern Mandara Mountains), but other areas are without
habitation (for example Waza National park)
At the same time, Far North Province is the most poverty-stricken area, with a poverty
index well above that of the other provinces113. Infant mortality, for example, is as high as 200
per 1000, in contrast to 79.3 per 1000 for the country as a whole114. The general poverty inci-
dence in the Far North is 56.3, as opposed to a countrywide poverty incidence of 38.7. This is
partly due to the fact that the vast majority of the population are rural farmers, the poorest
group in the whole country115. However, the farmers in the Far North are relatively poorer
because of the low agricultural yields and the recurrent harvest failures there116.
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111 Boulet (1984: 115) mentions 42 different ethnic groups in the North of Cameroon (from the southern border
of Waza National park to the Benoué river.) See also Meur and Felix (2001).
112 At least seven language families are represented (between others: Semitic (Arab) and Chadic (e.g. Bana, Mafa,
Giziga) from the Afro-Asiatic phylum; West-Atlantic (Fulfulde) and Adamawa-Oubangui, (e.g. Tupuri,
Mundang) from the Niger-Congo Phylum, and Saharian from the Nilo-Saharian phylum (see Barreteau and
Dieu (2000: 64)).
113 http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/projects/608400e.pdf
114 See OECD/AfDB (2002).
115 Ministry of Economy and Finance (2002: 40).
116 According to Njomaha (2004: 34) agricultural yields “have remained almost stagnant over some 30 years” and
“the population growth rate in the region has remained higher than the staple food growth rate.”
Figure 4.2 Far North Province
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4.2.1 Environmental domain
Climate
For the inhabitants, both humans and animals, the most important climatic characteristics of
the Sudano-Sahelian and Sudano Savannah environments117 of the Far North are the two dis-
tinct seasons - the wet and the dry (of which the latter is divided into a ‘cold’ and a hot one,
according to the inhabitants) - the amount and pattern of rainfall in the rainy season, the
amount of solar radiation and the winds. These four together influence factors such as water
availability, possibilities for plant growth, and soil erosion, not to mention general feelings of
well-being and possible levels of activity.
The alternation of the two seasons is caused by the change of anticyclonic winds. In the
dry season (December and January) the Intertropical Front moves southwards from the
Sahara desert and brings the dry and often sand-bearing Harmattan winds. During June and
July the anticyclonic wind blows from the Atlantic Ocean and brings moisture-bearing
clouds and rain. The amount and distribution of rainfall over the days, months and years
varies enormously, but the monsoon normally starts in the beginning of April and continues
until the end of September or the beginning of October. The highest rainfall is recorded in
August118. 
The Far North can be divided into three sub-climatic regions (see Figure 4.2) with dimin-
ishing mean yearly and monthly rainfall: 
1. the Mandara Mountains (weather station in Mokolo at 795 m altitude), 
2. the Diamaré (weather station in Maroua at 430 m), and 
3. the extreme north (weather station in N’Djamena, Chad, at 295 m). 
Due to the high altitude of the Mandara Mountains on the west border of the Far North
Province, the sub-humid zone that stretches between the same latitudes from west to east all
along the Sub-Saharan continent north of the equator119 includes a lump northwards into the Far
North Province. Although the rainfall may be relatively high, the Mandara Mountains suffer
from the same unpredictability in rainfall patterns, over the years and within years, as the rest
of the semi-arid north. 
Towards the north and east, precipitation diminishes from 1100 mm per year in the south
west Mandara Mountains, bordering the Benoué basin, to 400 mm per year above Lake Chad.
Only in those most northern regions does the climate resemble that of Jahnke’s “arid zone”
(Jahnke 1982: 17). In general, in the whole Far North, the agro-climatic conditions are such
that they can support both agriculture and husbandry, e.g. of grazing animals. In all three cli-
matic areas, precipitation in the 1970-1990 period was lower than before, increased again in
the first half of the 1990’s120 and then decreased again, albeit less dramatically than in the
1970’s and 1980’s (see Table 4.2.1). The latter can also be concluded on the basis of the
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117 Semi-arid and sub-humid in the terminology of Jahnke (1982).
118 It is claimed that the unpredictability of the amount and distribution of rainfall is increasing, while the
total amount is diminishing, due to global climate change (see Obale-Ebanga 2001:25). Indeed, the last
hundred years have seen one extreme long, more or less continuing, period of drought during the last quar-
ter of the century (from 1970 to 1989), compared to only two short ones from 1910 - 1914 and from 1940
- 1944.
119 See Van Driel (2001: 6) or Jahnke (1982: 17).
120 Information based on Beauvillain (1995), and L’Hôte (2000).
necessity of food aid to counter drought effects in 3 out of 5 years since 1995121.
Table 4.2.1 Mean year precipitation per period (Beauvillain 1995; l’Hôte 2000; a = Qwikcast.com weath-
er forecast). NB. ‘n.av.’ means ‘not available.
Long-term pluviometric data recorded in Mokolo (10° 44’ N; 13° 49’ E; 795 m altitude) and
Maroua (10° 35’ N; 14° 18’ E; 402 m altitude) show in the advanced mean over 3 years a dry
period from 1937 to 1947 and from 1980 to 1989. The period at the end of the 1950s also had
a lower than long term mean precipitation, although it was less dramatic than the other two
periods (see Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3 Advanced mean over 3 years in Mokolo and Maroua (Beauvillain 1995: 72 and 74)
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121 See www.wfp.org/country_brief/projects/608400e.pdf, which deals with food aid in 1998 due to the shortage
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The length of the rainy season is more or less the same in Maroua and Mokolo (5
months), but further north, where measurements were taken in N’Djamena, it lasts only 3 to 4
months. According to Njomaha (2004: 34), the duration of the rainy season has diminished122
since the 1970s and this has threatened the maturing of the crops and has also made people
abandon their long cycle crops. For a good cultivation season, at least four subsequent months
of more than 100 mm of rain are said to be necessary.
Solar radiation depends on the seasonal variation and latitude. Of course, during the rainy
season, clouds cover the sky for much of the day, thereby decreasing the amount of sunlight.
In addition, the Harmattan winds bring a dry fog that absorbs radiation, sometimes from
November until the end of March, but which is most prevalent in February. In total, both radi-
ation and temperatures increase in line with the gradient towards the north. For example, in
1996 in N’Djamena there were 3150 hours of sunlight while, at the same time, there were only
2900 hours in Maroua. Year means of temperature decrease from N’Djamena via Maroua to
Mokolo, mainly due to a rise in altitude there123 (see Table 4.2.2). Evapo-transpiration also
increases alongside solar radiation and temperature increases. The maximum mean monthly
temperature is lowest in August and highest at the end of the dry season (April). The differ-
ence between the means of the hottest and coldest month in the whole province can be as much
as 6.5 to 7° C. The lowest temperature is recorded during the nights in December-January,
when there is little cloud. At that time, the difference between day and night temperature is also
very high, especially further north (see Table 4.2.2). This makes living conditions difficult. For
example, susceptibility to respiratory viruses increases.
Table 4.2.2 Divers climatic parameters in the three climatic zones (based on L’Hôte (2000), and Olivry 
(1986, 1996) in L’Hôte (2000)).
Wind force can differ dramatically, especially during the rainy season. Construction damage and
soil erosion by heavy winds occur especially just before and during downpours and thunderstorms.
Geology and Soils 
Geologically speaking, the Far North Province can be divided into two parts which are north
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Mokolo Maroua N'Djamena
Solar radiation (in hours) n.av. 2900 3150
Mean year temperature (in ° C) 26 27.6 28
Max. mean monthly temp. (April; in ° C) 37 39 42
Min. mean monthly temp. (January; in ° C) 18 17 14
Mean daily temp. minus mean nightly temp. 12 16 20
in January (in ° C)
of rain, locusts and grain-eating birds in 1997 and  with food aid provided in 1999, due to an excessively late
start to the rainy season, the effects of grain-eating birds and stray elephants in the Mindif area and caterpil-
lars in the Mandara Mountains; www.cidi.org/disaster/01a/ix1202.html which deals with food aid provided in
2001 because of an excessively low precipitation in recent years ; and www.fao.org/docrep/1004 etc.
122 This depends on the area: for example, the data of Beauvillain (1995) does not reveal this for Mokolo. In
Maroua a diminishing trend can be observed, but this started as long ago as in the 1960s.
123 L’Hôte (2000: 17): “… le paramètre déterminant de la valeur de température moyenne annuelle, la latitude n’é-
tant qu’un facteur secondair”.
and south of the great sand dune which stretches from Yagoua in the south-east to Limani
which is more in the north-west, and which is probably “a beach related dune” (Obale-Ebanga
2001: 27) of eolin origin from the time that lake Chad was much more extended. North of this
line the geomorphology is part of the Chad basin. Here the vast floodplain of the Logone
stretches out, without any distinctive interruptions. “The Chad basin is […] composed of sed-
iments from several sources, including lacustrine deposits exposed through the regression of
the lake; alluvium, comprising fine and coarse feldspatic sands from the Logone and Chari
rivers and sandy clayey alluvium from the Mandara highlands.” (Obale-Ebanga 2001: 27).
Along the Logone, the soils are mostly hydromorphic vertisols consisting of mainly argilic
particles. On the inner (= north) side of the Yagoua-Limani sand-dune, soils are mostly of the
planosol type (Brabant & Gavaud 1985). 
South of the dune ridge, the landscape consist of subdivisions and compartments, erupting
in small massifs with high rising inselbergs (especially on the Mandara Mountains plateau)
and, in the pediplain along the southern border, bristly rock stumps. It is possible to distinguish
four relief zones (see Figure 4.4, in colour quire): 
1) the Mandara Mountains in the west,  
2) the foothills to the east, 
3) the Diamaré plain, again eastward, extending into the Chadien plains, and 
4) the pediplains of Kaélé in the south, more or less parallel to the southern border of the
province with Chad.
The Mandara Mountains are the continuation of the western volcanic range that starts in the
south with Mt. Cameroon, the highest point in West Africa, and still an active volcano124. In the
north the rocky solitary peaks and steep slopes up to 1300 m are a popular tourist destination125.
More to the south the slopes are less steep. There the landscape consists of high plateaux at an
altitude of around 1000 m, with occasional granite inselbergs rising yet another 200 to 300 m
(Morin 2000). The mountains consist of gneiss and granite covered with soils composed of
lithosols of volcanic origin. In the southern plateau region they have a thin profile and a low
clay content that makes them less fertile and not suitable for highly productive agriculture
(Boutrais 1984: 76). These soils are supplemented with regosols, sometimes from alluvial and
colluvial deposition and with local hydromorph characteristics. The soils in the steep, north-
ern mountains vary in a normal fashion from thin rock layers to pockets of deep and fertile
soils, improved over centuries of human activities such as terracing (Zuiderwijk 1998, Van
Andel 1998, Ndoum 2001).
The foothills have a similar basis and are covered with tropical ferruginous sandy soils of luvi-
sol type, supplemented with leached planosols. “These soils […] are highly susceptible to degra-
dation of their chemical and physical properties when converted from natural savannah vegeta-
tion to cropland, largely because of the loss of organic matter…” (Obale-Ebanga 2001: 28).
The same two soil types can be found in the Diamaré on acid rocks, together with cam-
bisols. However, the most important types here are the vertisols with a sandy or clayey com-
position on basic rocks. These vertisols “are naturally fertile with high moisture retention
capacity and with high potentials for crop production” (Obale-Ebanga 2001: 29). The heavy
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124 Mt Cameroon is 4,095 m high and erupted last in 1999.
125 In 2000, almost 5000 tourists visited the valleys and cliffs of the Mandara Mountains.
clay vertisols in the lower lacustrine and fluvial parts are specifically suitable for dry season
sorghum production. Although all vertisols are easily affected by physical degradation, the
deep and fine textured soils on the lacustrine plains do exhibit a certain robustness. 
Vertisols with a dry pédoclimat or local patches of planosols also cover the granite and
gneiss basement of the Kaelé region.
Surface water and groundwater
Within the Far North Province the only permanent river is the Logone River, although in wetter
years some of its tributaries in the Far North, like the Logomatya, also keep flowing. The Logone
originates far south in the Adamaoua highlands, flows east, passes through Chad, where it is
joined by lots of tributaries of varying sizes, and, turning north and slightly to the west again,
forms the Cameroon Chad border before ending up in Lake Chad. Its permanency makes it an
important fishing river. The duration of flow in the seasonal rivers depends on the rainfall of the
previous rainy season, the width of the streambed, obstacles in the streambed and the catchment
area. In general, the Far North surface water as well as groundwater flows from the mountains
to the Logone, in a north-eastward direction (Olivry and Naah 2000; Detay 2000). In conclusion,
the Diamaré and extreme north of the province depend on rainfall patterns and the filling of
groundwater reservoirs in the Mandara Mountains, as well as on the precipitation along the
lengthy course of the Logone. The south-western part of the Mandara Mountains and a strip of
land along the southern border of the province, however, are not connected to the Chad basin.
For example, the river Louti, which starts west of Mokolo, finally discharges into the Benoué
River. So here the rivers flow south (see Fig. 4.2). The same applies to the filling and flowing of
the aquifers in this Atlantic basin, although Detay (2000) also stresses the fact that lots of aquifers
in the Mandara Mountains are discontinuous, that is they do not connect to the southern ones.
Two artificial lakes (near Mokolo and near Maga) serve the drinking water supply of
Mokolo town and function as irrigation pool for rice production respectively126. The second one
was constructed in the late 1970s by way of a dam in and along the Logone river. The rice was
meant to feed the urban populations, but it turned out to be too expensive in comparison with
Asian import rice. Locally it resulted in an ecological127 as well as social disaster128. Therefore,
in the early 1990s, a project was started to redress the implementation of the irrigation scheme
and diminish the negative effects129.
Furthermore, lakes and rivers can be a rich source of fish, both to enhance the biodiversity
of a region and as a natural resource for human inhabitants. Examples of fish-rich natural lakes
in the Far North are Lake Chad in the uppermost north part of Cameroon and Lake Fianga on
the southern border of the ‘bec-du-canard’ with Chad. Because of their position, both lakes
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126 There are some smaller ones as well, but some of these are so small that in dry years they do not survive to the
next rainy season. The barrage of Rhumsiki (in the Mandara Mountains, between Mogodé and Bourah), for
instance, serves a small, but year-round artificial lake, used mostly for drinking water for animals in that region.
127 The fish stocks in the Logone and therefore in Lake Chad became disturbed, the make-up of the grazing lands
of the floodplain changed to include more annual instead of perennial grasses (Scholte et al 2000) and the
availability of water in the Waza Nature Park diminished (see also Vanpraet (1976), Coe and Foley (2001),
Drijver and Marchand (1985) and SOGREAH (1980)).
128 The function of the floodplain and the river as a resort for diverse ethnic groups in the further dry Sahel sur-
roundings diminished dramatically. Fishermen and cattle keepers had to look for other sources and even farm-
ers saw their yields decline (see Drijver and Van Wetten (1992) or Van Est (1999)).
129 See Drijver and Van Wetten (1992); IUCN (1996); Scholte (2003), Kari and Scholte (2001) or Loth 2004.
have to be shared with neighbouring countries. Lake Chad is particularly suffering from a con-
tinuous depletion over the years, in addition to a seasonal halving during the dry season due to
evaporation. The Logone River is the most important source of fish in the region130. Several
ethnic groups, like the Kotoko, have based their livelihoods almost solely on fish131. Like many
other renewable activities related to natural resources, almost all fishing is a seasonal occupa-
tion, especially in the Far North where the seasonal flooding of the Logone sets the time for
spawning and growth.
Natural vegetation 
The diverse types of soils together with the climatic circumstances contribute to several dif-
ferent vegetation covers, from tree and shrub savannahs to extended grass-fields in the Logone
floodplain. There, due to month-long inundations, trees cannot easily survive. Because of the
age-long habitation and the high population density, almost all natural vegetation is of a sec-
ondary nature132. Fotius (2000) speaks of “dégradeés ou anthropiseés”. This description refers
to the classic ecological categories of the exploitation and conservation phases, in which the
latter, on the basis of slow accumulation and the storage of energy and material, was called the
climax stadium, or primary forest. However, this notion passes over new ecology ideas of a
permanent cycle of discontinuous patterns of change in four subsequent ecosystem ‘functions’
(or stages), in which not only accumulation of capital, but also “the degree of connectedness
among the variables” (Holling and Sanderson 1996: 62) plays a role. In this concept man is a
normal part of the ecosystem.
Nevertheless, nowadays some areas of the Far North are totally bereft of human habitation
and sometimes even totally or seasonally unused by humans. Where population densities are
low and climate and soil condition are favourable, almost fully grown savannah woods can be
found. Examples are certain areas on the Mandara Mountains Plateau or that part of the
Diamaré that stretches between Mindif and Moulvoudaye. The most notorious examples are
located north of the sand-dune, namely the two nature parks of Far North Province being the
small Kalamaloué, in the floodplain far north, and the bigger Waza National Park, one-third of
which is covered by Acacia Seyal forest. The second park in particular, with its high biodiver-
sity, is an attractive tourist destination. 
South of the sand dune the vegetation mirrors the soil types of the four relief zones.
According to Brabant and Gavaud (1985), the natural vegetation in the mountains consists of
woody savannah of the Medio-Sudan altitude type with Isoberlinia doka being the most impor-
tant tree. Further to the north Anogeissus leiocarpus and Acacia (or Faidherbia) albida domi-
nate the tree species. The foothills are home to the same woody savannah with a Anogeissus /
Faidherbia composition, supplemented in some areas by Boswellia dalzielii133 and Combretum
spp.. In the Diamaré plain, where there is still some rocky subsoil, Anogeissus leiocarpus is
again dominant, together with Sclerocarya birrea. In addition, sandy-clayish areas are dominat-
ed by Acacia Seyal and Balanites aegyptica. Moving further to the south-east, there are vegeta-
tion covers of Amblygonocarpus andongensis and Detrium microcarpum, together with Guiera
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130 See, e.g. Drijver et al (1995).
131 See Van Est (1999). 
132 According to Brabant and Gavaud (1985).
133 Obale-Ebanga (2001: 30) refers to this species as growing on the inselbergs.
senegalensis. Approaching the Chadien plain, in the ‘bec-du-canard’ corner, these species dom-
inate in interchanging areas134. In the open savannah where there are a lot of anthropogenic influ-
ences they are supplemented with Acacia species and Piliostigma reticulata.
All these different natural bush areas can serve as grazing lands for livestock because of the
growth of fine (and coarse) annual and perennial grasses, such as Hyperrhenia bagirmica, sev-
eral herbs and edible bushes, whose leaves provide food for small ruminants135. According to
Gaston (1996) the general year round carrying capacity of the Sahelo-Sudan is 3 – 9 ha/TLU136.
A Tropical Livestock Unit  (TLU) is equivalent to 1.42 head of cattle, or ten (hair) sheep or
goats (Dietz et al 2001: 198). Breman (1975) has calculated a more positive outcome in the
1000 mm rain belt of up to 1.2 TLU/ha137.
In addition to that the bush is useful for the extraction of fuel wood and timber, both for
direct use and to sell to urban centres138. The bush is also indispensable for all sorts of minor
‘forest’ products that are used directly in households or as raw materials for small-scale man-
ufacturing139. Examples are grass for roofs, mats and storehouses for own use or sale, wild
berries used to prepare cookies for sale and several sorts of green leaves used as ingredients to
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134 See, e.g., Donfack et al (1997), Fotius (2000), and Seignobos (2000a).
135 Some of these bushes and trees, such as Balanitis and Acacia species, have high protein contents.
136 Gaston (1996) divides the Sudano-Sahel pastures of the Lac Chad basin into five different types. The most
important in Cameroon are 1) the waterlogged soils (flooded during and after the rainy season: the Yaéré) that
can produce 2000 kg DM/ha, especially when managed by burning; 2) the sandy soils which produce, on aver-
age, 1000 kg DM/ha and have a year round carrying capacity of 4.5 ha per TLU. This type is useable all year
round, although the browse layer is somewhat over-grazed and the amount of coarse grasses that are inedible
in the dry season increases; 3) antropic formations with a cultivation-fallow complex. During the rainy season
the livestock here have to survive on the fine grass layers of the fallow fields (e.g. Eragrostis tremula) that can
produce up to 1000 kg DM/ha, and during the rest of the year on crop residues and the browse layer. In moun-
tain areas a production of 2000 DM/ha can be achieved (rainy season carrying capacity of 3 ha/TLU) with
Aristida kerstingii and Loudetia togoensis, but both are inedible in the dry season, thus resulting in an out-
migration to the Yaéré . Under very unfavourable conditions up to 9 ha / TLU is needed.
137 According to Breman (1975) palatable primary production (DM of herbaceous cover) of grazing lands in the
1000 mm per year precipitation belt is roughly 2.8 ton / ha / year (NB on favourable soils etc.); according to
Boudet (1975) a TLU needs 6.25 kg of dry matter per day as feed. These two assumptions together correspond
(roughly) to a capacity per ha of 1.2 TLU (over the year), when the rainfall reaches the average of 1000 mm
per year. NB. Total biomass production is not only dependant on the precipitation but also on evaporation and
the water-holding capacity of the soils (see De Leeuw and Tothill 1990), vegetation species, etc. Thus it also
varies greatly according to area (see De Leeuw and Tothill 1990: 7). The number of possible TLU / ha also
depends on forage quality and on the spreading of the available forage over time. De Leeuw and Tothill (1990:
2) mention a decline such that “at the end of June only 10% of the original biomass was left.” When grazers
are present, however, part of this assignment of “a 50% decline in standing biomass from October to March”
with a subsequent acceleration of ‘climatic’ decline does not take place, because the animals have already eaten
part of that biomass. The quality of forage depends on soil fertility, growth phase of the grass (older grass con-
tains less protein) and precipitation level (higher mean annual precipitation gives lower protein contents). De
Leeuw and Tothill (1990) mention that a certain soil type in a 400 mm rain belt  gives an end-of-season N-
content of grass of 1 %, while this same soil type only produces grass with 0.5 % nitrogen in the 1000 mm
belt. Even when there is enough bulk grass, cattle will lose weight at the end of the dry season in this precip-
itation zone.
In addition, Breman (1975: 6) estimates that there is a more real capacity for cattle in the 1000 mm belt of 0.7
TLU/ha, because “productivity under an average rainfall one or two times less than the standard deviation” is
more interesting to “avoid the risk of destroying the grassland beyond repair during relatively dry years”. 
138 See, for example, Geist and Lambin (2001); Ali and Peters (2001).
139 See, e.g. Den Heijer (1998), Van Ommeren (1998) or Quan (2000: 32).
make sauce. Another example is wild vegetables or small game that can serve as emergency
food in times of hardship (e.g. wild yams, mice) or as a steady stock to add to the normal diet.
The last important supplies from the bush are the traditional medicines, from plant origin and
from (small) animals.
Subsistence production
Although big differences in intrinsic fertility and vulnerability for erosion exist, most of the
soils are useful for agricultural purposes. In general, rural farmers produce for their own sub-
sistence and that of their family members. However, all surpluses of this domestic production
can be (and are) sold on local markets, both directly and sometimes via small-scale middlemen. 
The most important crop that the inhabitants of the Far North produce for subsistence pur-
poses are different sorts of sorghum (Sorghum bicolor bicolor140). Pearl or finger millet
(Pennisetum glaucum and Eleusine coracana) is only rarely cultivated. Without sorghum or
millet, people feel undernourished. A preference for what the inhabitants call white, yellow or
red sorghum141 depends on the area and ethnicity of the farming group. The so-called sorghum
réplicé (called ‘muskuaari’ in Fulfulde) has been cultivated for approximately fifty years,
especially in the Diamaré plains from Mokolo to the south boundary of the province and up to
the ‘bec-du-canard’ in the east, on clayish vertisols (called ‘karal’ in Fulfulde). This sorghum
type does not need rain while maturing since it grows on the water-table in the soil. At the end
of the rainy season it is sown in beds. Later the seedlings are transplanted to fields that have
to contain enough water in the subsoil to support growth until the end of January or beginning
of February, when the grains are ripe. If the field as such cannot hold enough water, conser-
vation measures, such as small dikes (tied ridges), can improve the water-content by giving the
fallen rain more time to penetrate the soil. Obviously, this crop can help to prevent shortages
in the next cropping season, especially after a bad harvest due to pests (e.g. locust142) in the
rain-fed crops. Nevertheless, after a year of bad precipitation, most of the time the transplant-
sorghum yield also fails.
Maize (Zea mays) and rice (Oryza sativa) are gaining in popularity as part of the staple diet.
The Fulbe, for example, prefer maize to sorghum. Especially the short cycle maize varieties
that are already mature in August can help to get through the hunger period, although total pro-
duction is lower than in the case of experimental production143. One of the problems with maize
production is the risk of low yields due to high water demand and a susceptibility to weeds. In
addition, maize requires good soil fertility. Farmers mostly cultivate this crop adjacent to the
compound so they can administer household refuse144. Subsistence rice production takes place
mostly in areas that are swampy (during the rainy season); irrigation rice is mostly a cash crop
(see section 2.3.1).
In addition to these cereals almost all farmers produce other crops, such as cowpeas (Vigna
unguiculata), common beans (Phaseolus vulgaris) or Bambara groundnuts (Vigna subter-
ranea)145, all of which forms an easy protein source and, being leguminous, enhances the fer-
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140 Raemaekers (2001).
141 To complicate matters, in the North the general translation of ‘sorghum’ into French is “millet”.
142 Njomaha (2004: 27) noted 9 famines in the Far North since 1960, of which 4 caused by locust infestation.
143 See Njomaha (2004: 30).
144 Raemaekers (2001:23 - 45).
145 Almost all ethnic groups consider the Bambara groundnut as a typical women’s crop.
tility of the soil146. Diverse root and tuber crops and vegetables also supplement the household
food supply147. Although groundnuts and soya beans (rare, but on the increase) are mostly pro-
duced for cash, they do supplement the food supply of the producing households. In the
Mandara Mountains, before the cash crop varieties were introduced by the French, a local
groundnut variety was already produced148. Several farmers also grow tobacco in a corner near
the compound for their own use and, if the harvest is sufficient, to boost the household income.
Lemongrass (Cymbopogum spp) is only cultivated occasionally, mostly within the compound,
to be used as essential oil in herbal teas and by healers against various diseases. Several types
of fruit trees are planted adjacent to the compounds or on the river banks.149
4.2.2 Human domain
Health
In the Far North, all indicators with regard to the health situation are worse than the country
average, except for the rate of visits to informal health centres (see Table 4.2.3) and some
infectious diseases that are related to a more humid climate. Nevertheless, “surveys show that
Far North province is still a region with widespread endemic epidemics” and that “the most
frequent diseases are almost all related to problematic hygiene” (De Backer et al 2000: 138,
translation RN)150. This is mostly due to poor health information and education services. In the
whole country, as well as in the Far North, some indicators score lower for poor people (and
therefore farmers) than for non-poor people. Examples are the rate of visits to formal health
centres, the average annual spending on health and the percentage of vaccinated children. With
regard to the latter indicator, the Far North reveals a smaller difference between poor and rich-
er households than other Cameroonian provinces. This may be due to an overall less adequate
vaccine supply to the Far North than to the rest of the country.
Table 4.2.3 Some health indicators for the Far North province compared with rural and total Cameroon (when
no other information is given, the data concerns the year 2001. Source: Ministry of Economy and
Finance 2002)
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Far North Province Cameroon rural Cameroon total
Doctors per capitaa,f 1 : 46 972 n.av. 1 : 14 730
Nurses per capitaa,d 1 : 8500 n.av. 1 : 2725g
Formal health centres per capitaa 1 : 34142 (where n.av. 1 : 10 000
of 34 hospitals)d
Formal health centre visits 67.5 72.2 75.5
Informal health centre visits 32.5 27.8 24.5
Distance to nearest health centre (in km) 4.05 5.26 3.86
Distance to nearest health centre (in min.)b 35.0 39.7 30.6
Percentage of vaccinated children aged 34 50.3 55.3
12 - 23 monthsc
Perc. of > 23 months never vaccinated 32.8 22.8 19.2
Annual spending on health per capita (Fcfa) 6,220 12,922 22,036
Share of health spending on overall 3.2 7.6 6.5
expenditure (%)
HIV/AIDS prevalence (%) 13.1 n.av. 11
Prevalence of other infectious diseases (in %) Malariae: 8.6 n.av. Malaria: 11
Diarrhoea: 2.1 Diarrhoea: 2.8
Respiratory: 2 Respiratory: 9
Life expectancy 42 n.av. 48h
a = worsened since 1987 (e.g. then the number of nurses reached WHO standard with 1 for every 3000 inhabi-
tants); there has been a slight improvement only since 1995
b = the nearest is not always the one visited, because of a “lack of technical equipment needed to treat the main
diseases that occur in the geographical area” (Ministry of Economy and Finance 2002: 63)
c = vaccinations are: TB (for the Far North and the whole of Cameroon resp. 40.5 and 70 %); DTP (50 and 50%);
Polio (47.9 and 68.4)151 and measles (14.6 and 61.2)
d = information for 1997 (De Backer et al 2000: 135-137)
e = the diagnosis ‘malaria’ is not always confirmed with laboratory tests. In most small health centres and by all
lay people all unknown fevers are referred to as such.
f = information for 2003152
g = information for 1998 (World Health Organisation 1998)
h = over 2003: UNDP Human Development Indicators
In addition to the disequilibrium between the provincial population and the number of medical
personnel compared to other provinces (in 1995 the Far North was home to 17 % of the coun-
try’s population and only 7 % of its nurses and doctors153) the health centres and health per-
sonnel are not evenly divided either over the regions or according to population densities.
Maroua, as the provincial capital has a disproportional amount of doctors (15 of the total of 48
in the whole province154) and more than its proportional share of hospitals. In some areas there
are several hospitals less than 1 km from each other, while other areas suffer from a total lack
of health centres. Most nurses work in health centres, instead of leading rural health posts as
recommended by the WHO. Another problem is the distribution of medicines. This is difficult,
now the State institution assigned this task (Onapharm) has been closed down because of
budget shortages. Especially in the Far North, with its poor infrastructure and distance to the
metropolis, many health centres are not able to distribute enough or the right medicines.
Education
The Far North literacy figures are very low compared to those of the rest of the country. Although
numbers have been on the increase since 1995 (after a steep decline due to the economic crisis
of the 1980s), differences between the north and the south remain almost the same. In 1999, the
whole country had a school enrolment percentage of 69.22, while the Far North only achieved a
meagre 25 % (Yaya 1999). Differences between school attendance by boys and girls are high in
the Far North province, especially in the rural areas where almost no girls attend school.
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146 Leguminous plants bind nitrogen out of the air due to their symbiosis with nitrogen-binding Rhizobium bac-
teria in their root system.
147 For example: (sweet) potatoes, yam, African eggplant, hot pepper, pumpkin, and several leaf vegetables.
148 See, for example, Van Beek (1989: 622).
149 Especially guava, mango, papaya and citrus, but occasionally also a small type of banana.
150 In the beginning of the 1990s severe epidemic outbreaks of yellow fever, cholera and meningitis were record-
ed. Almost every year during the dry season, a number of areas of the North are hit by meningitis outbreaks.
A measles outbreak, with mortalities amongst young children and old aged, was recorded during the dry sea-
son of 2001, especially in the south-east of the province.
151 Especially the low vaccination rate for poliomyelitis in the Far North is a subject for concern because of the
influx of wild polio-virus from north Nigeria, where traditional leaders have forbidden vaccinations against
this disease.
152 Eya (2003).
153 See World Bank Group (1996).
154 De Backer et al (2000: 135).
Unfortunately, the economic crisis has resulted in the current low number of teachers. This
is because insufficient young inhabitants have been educated to fulfil the role. This is espe-
cially a problem in the Far North, where less than one teacher with an official degree is
employed per primary school. The rest of the teachers are so-called parent teachers. These are
voluntary teachers, paid by the pupils’ parents and mostly with only some years of secondary
education themselves. In 1999, the number of pupils per teacher nationwide had increased to
84 from 66 in 1995. In later years, the number of pupils per teacher increased further. In the
Far North this amount frequently reached 150 (Yaya 1999). For some literacy figures of the
Far North compared to those of the whole country: see Table 4.2.4.
Table 4.2.4 Education-related indicators for the Far North and country in 2001 (source: Ministry of Econo
my and Finance, 2002; Iyébi-Mandjek 2000, and Yaya 1999)
a = figures over 1990 from Iyébi-Mandjek 2000 and Unesco Annual Statistics 1999
The situation with regard to secondary education is also disheartening. As can be seen in Table
4.2.4 less than four percent of all pupils in secondary schools are from the Far North. Since
1990, the total numbers have increased but provincial differences have remained the same.
With a population equal to 17 % of the country’s total population this is a grave under-repre-
sentation. As regards the first secondary education cycle of four years, there were 32 colleges
for general and 7 for more technical education in 1997. Thirteen post-primary education units
for arts and household-related issues are situated in rural areas. The second cycle of three
years, leading to a baccalaureate, was only covered by 15 ‘lycées’, of which only two offered
technical subjects. There are no higher education institutes in the Far North Province. The
nearest university is in Ngaoundéré, some 500 km south of Maroua.
4.2.3 Economic domain
Cash crops
Of the cash crops produced in the Far North, groundnuts and cotton155 are the most important.
Both were introduced by the French colonial administration, before and after World War II
respectively. Since the 1990s, beans have gained in importance now that there is demand on the
internal and Nigerian market and because the Far North has a favourable climate. Predominantly,
these are all small-scale cultivations, apart from the more extended irrigated rice schemes of
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155 Where no other reference is given, the information about groundnuts is based on Iyébi-Mandjek and Seignobos
(2000b) and that about cotton on Roupsard (2000).
Far North Province Cameroon rural Cameroon total
Literacy for men 36.1 66.5 77.0
Literacy for women 14.3 46.6 59.8
Total literacy 24.4 55.7 67.9
Average spending (per capita) on education; in Fcfa 11 536 n.av. 48 046
Distance to nearest primary school (in km) 2.56 1.99 1.62
Number of pupils per teacher > 100 (up to 200) n.av. 84
Percentage of 6 - 14 years old registered in schools < 50 n.av. 78.8
Number of pupils in secondary educationa 17 500 n.av. 500 272
SEMRY156 (created in 1971 by the government) along the Logone157. 
In some areas onions, which were introduced by the Islamic population158, and sometimes
garlic are produced with the help of small-scale irrigation. Substantial areas along rivers are
used for onion production in particular. This can, in turn, cause a rapid rise in the commercial
value of the land. Nowadays, North Cameroon is known as the major onion-producing region
in the country (Njomaha 2004: 193). It can generate high incomes for the farmers involved. The
supply of taro, potatoes and sweet potatoes to the towns originates in the Mandara Mountains
and foothills. In addition, the French introduced fruit as a cash crop in the 1950s. Since new
varieties were developed in the 1980s (Njomaha 2004: 164), commercial fruit plantations now
exist around Maroua159. In the towns and along the major roads small quantities of tomatoes and
carrots are sold. In addition to that, tomatoes are produced for ‘export’ to the south of the coun-
try. In general, commercial vegetable cropping is only carried out near towns (such as Maroua,
Mokolo, Yagoua) because they perish quickly if transported over any longer distances. 
After a start of the cultivation in around 1930, groundnuts remained the only export crop
from North Cameroon until well into the 1950s. The French encouraged cultivation by means
of favourable prices, they introduced new, high-yielding varieties and provided all the farmers
south of the sand-dune, from the mountains and mountain plateaux to the eastern borders with
Chad, with information on good farming practices in relation to groundnuts. However, when
cotton cultivation started in the Far North, the two crops became competitors and groundnut
production survived only in the foothills and mountain plateaux where there were favourable
physical circumstances. In the Diamaré plains, the better cotton soils, the high prevalence of
groundnut diseases and the easier combination of cotton with (the increasingly prevalent)
transplant-sorghum, caused an almost absolute disappearance of groundnut production. Only
on the Yoldé and Yolkonde160 soils further east did some groundnut-production persist.
Nevertheless, production more than doubled between 1958 and 1983 (15,000 ton of grain)
despite the drought years. Both the surface and the yield/ha increased. The latter changed from
500 kg/ha in the late 1960s to 1,000 kg/ha in the Diamaré in 1985. At that moment, the State
did not believe any profit was to be gained from groundnuts and ceased all its involvement.
However, commercial groundnut production, albeit as a lower proportion of the total produc-
tion, continued. The groundnuts were sold partly on the foreign market, especially Nigeria, but
mostly on the internal market. A high quality groundnut is transported from the northern
Mandara Mountains to the south of the country for oil and sweets, while the mountains
plateaux and the Kaélé plain export a low quality groundnut to the west for paste. Small entre-
preneurs buy at village level from the end of October to mid February and sell to bigger mer-
chandisers. Finally, the large-scale trade is in the hands of only a small number of merchants.
Prices differ according to month or even week of the month - when festivities are imminent -
according to yield and supply and according to the market location (e.g. on the Nigerian bor-
der prices can be twice as high as in inland areas). 
The new cash crop of beans also competed with groundnuts as regards land and agricultur-
al labour. Nowadays, lots of farmers throughout the north cultivate this crop. The average yield
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156 SEMRY = Société d’expansion et de Modernisation de la Riziculture de Yagoua.
157 See, for example, Harre et al (1992), Van de Walle (1989) or Van Est (1999).
158 See Njomaha (2004: 157).
159 See for example Timmermans and De Groot (2001).
160 Fulfulde for Cambisols.
is 900 kg/ha. In general, commercial hauliers take 30 bags of beans to the south and west for
every 100 bags of groundnuts. This crop is increasingly traded in the wider region, for exam-
ple, in Nigeria and Gabon (Njomaha 2004: 194).
Commercial cotton cultivation started in the Far North in the beginning of the 1950s. The
French (State and private interest) set up a system of seed, chemical fertiliser and information
distribution throughout the whole north up to the sand dune that traverses the Far North161. They
offered a fixed price independent of distance between production place and export harbour, with
such disturbing a possible Thünian process (see chapter 2). The foothills of the mountains
appeared to offer the best physical circumstances, resulting in the highest yield (700 – 1000
kg/ha) and the highest total production to date. Moreover, the soils in the plains were good and,
as already mentioned, the easy combination with muskuaari transplant-sorghum meant that cot-
ton started to dominate the groundnut fields in the Diamaré. According to Njomaha (2004: 164)
the amount of land devoted to cotton is still on the increase. This is probably due to the access
cotton production generates to farm inputs such as fertilisers, which can subsequently be used by
the farmer on his other crops. Yet, cotton could never replace groundnuts in the high mountains
and plateaux of the Mandara. After a temporary decline in production during the late 1980s162,
cotton production in the whole north of Cameroon was estimated at 115,000 tons (Raemakers
2001) in 1992-1993, while this increased again to 223 100 ton from 190,920 ha in 1997.
From the beginning, the French and Cameroonian cotton promoting institutions (nowadays
SODECOTON163) organised the production in a kind of production chain from seed supply, via
fertiliser and equipment supply to guaranteed sale by the farmer to the SODECOTON, binding
the producers with easy credit in the early days of the growing season. This institute constructed
proper physical infrastructures for more remote areas. In order to reduce the labour competition
with the food crops, it encouraged the use of ploughs in cotton production. On the one hand this
meant a disposal of the soil to easy dehydration164; on the other hand it meant an increase in ani-
mal husbandry by farmers who presently did not have their own cattle, donkeys or horses.
Farm animals
The Far North Province, with its extended, almost parasite free bush lands, was an ideal region
in which to keep livestock. For that reason, various nomadic groups migrated there over time.
Invasions, raids and unfavourable climatic circumstances, as well as imprudent policies may
from time to time have hindered the increase in the number of cattle in certain areas or the
whole province but, in the long run, the total number of livestock has steadily increased. In
certain areas numbers increased quickly, for example, in the Kar-Hay sub-department (see Fig
4.2: Mayo Danay department with its capital Doukoula) an increase of up to 100 % was
observed between 1950 and 1980, due to the increased wealth of the people through cotton
production and the capitalisation of migrant remittances.
During the droughts of the 1970s, the total number of livestock in the whole Sudano-Sahel
zone decreased. But in the Far North of Cameroon, cattle numbers did not decline because lots
of cattle nomads sought refuge in the water rich areas of some of its regions (e.g. the plateaux of
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161 See Zuiderwijk (1998: 152-192) for a history of cotton production and cotton institutions in Cameroon and the
Far North.
162 Although the production in the Far North in 1989 was still as high as 66,000 ton on 53,500 ha.
163 Société du Développement du Coton (Cotton Development Corporation).
164 Especially in the Mandara Mountain plateaux this turned out to be disastrous: see Van Beek (1989: 636).
the Mandara Mountains). However, the total of small ruminant numbers did decline during the
1972-1974 droughts because this type of animal is more easily commercialised or used as food.
The subsequent 1980 droughts also depleted the wells in the former refuge areas. This time, the
total livestock numbers decreased to less than 30 %. The transhumance areas were especially
badly hit, such as Logone-Chari department (halving of the numbers from 228,000 in 1980 to
122,000 in 1990) and the Mindif region, where a 30 % decrease occurred. This is notwithstand-
ing the fact that, in 1985, herds that had sought refuge in Chad in the 1960s and 1970s returned
because of the civil war there (Seignobos 2000e: 115-119; Boutrais 1984: 433; Beauvillain 1989:
428). This time the numbers of cattle declined dramatically in Kar-Hay as well.
Table 4.2.5 Livestock numbers in the Far North over the years (long term). 
Source: Seignobos (2000e: 115-119); Boutrais et al (1984: 433); Beauvillain (1989: 428); 
Djonwé (2001); Délegué Vetérinair Provincial (2003); Njomaha (2004: 47))
a = this augmentation is mainly due to a rise in numbers in the Logone floodplain since the restoration of the
flooding by the Waza-Logone project165.
b = between 1985 and 1990, sheep and goat numbers remained more or less the same.
After the start of a livestock number restoration from the late 1980s onwards, a drought peri-
od that influenced numbers occurred again in the early 1990s. Since 1995, numbers have again
been on the increase (see Table 4.2.6), although certain areas are still subject to ongoing
decline. For example, according to Djonwé (2001), cattle numbers in Mayo Tsanaga depart-
ment decreased from 92,428 cattle in 1991 to 73,250 in 2000.
Pig numbers increased from the early 1990s onwards, because of the rising demand from
the south. There, pig production stagnated due to severe epidemics. Only the non-Muslim pop-
ulation is engaged in pig farming and it is done especially in beer brewing and rice-producing
areas where left-overs are abundantly available as pig feed166.
It has to be realised that all numbers (especially of ruminants) are estimates. It is very diffi-
cult to count the numbers of cattle and small ruminants. Animals are constantly on the move with
their herders, not only during the seasons and years, but also during a single season. Cattle
herders always seek the best places to graze their herds, whether this is across the border of a
department or the country. Asking owners about cattle numbers does not work. It is a cultural
habit not to tell anyone about it, because showing off about your wealth can cause general mis-
fortune or make others jealous and thus bring you bad luck (e.g. by performing witchcraft or by
accusing you of witchcraft). Even counting during vaccinating procedures does not provide any
real numbers because not all cattle are brought. Due to the fact that a head tax has to be paid on
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165 See, e.g., Scholte (2003) or Loth (2004)
166 Njomaha (2004: 166)
1950 1980 1987 1993 1998
Cattle 484 000 908 000 605 333 689 040 1 147 038a
Sheep 960 000 433 000 720 000b 750 000 688 471
Goat (together) 623 000 920 000b 937 500 988 763
Horses 12 180 n.av. 6 090 n.av. 6 561
Donkeys n.av. 20 000 n.av. n.av. 23 216
Pigs n.av. n.av. n.av. 24 000 62 253
Poultry n.av. n.av. n.av. 1 025 000 1 146 630
cattle, owners only get that number of cattle vaccinated that they deem necessary to obtain
travel licenses and to obtain high enough protection levels against the diseases.
Table 4.2.6 Livestock numbers over the years (shorter term) in Far North Province
Source: Djonwé (2001) and Délegué Veterinair Provincial (2003)
Non-agricultural economic activities
Off-farm
The off-farm activities performed by town people are of particular importance. Apart from a
large number of civil servants, who come mostly from the rest of the country, and employees
of international NGOs and churches, some of whom come from abroad, most people who earn
their income from non-agricultural sources, are (bigger and smaller) traders. The merchandise
may be import or export products of (small-scale) industrial or agricultural origin. Import and
export can take place over international boundaries with Nigeria or Chad, or over provincial
boundaries with regions as far south as those bordering the Atlantic Ocean. The transport with-
in the province of fuel wood from rural areas and regional markets to towns can also form an
important element of trade for individual middlemen or bigger urban-based companies167. In
the towns and larger villages, several types of service-related employment can be found, for
example in restaurants and shops, in motorbike ‘public’ transport, in education or in health
centres. The rise in the number of mobile telephone networks has led to an increase in indi-
vidually-operated, roadside telephone posts.
Trade is also one of the most important off-farm activities in rural areas. Some regions attract
tourists leading to employment opportunities in hotels, as guides, etc. However, this option is
only limited to very few localities. For example tourist trips from Maroua to Waza National Park
or to the Mandara Mountain ridge along the border with Nigeria serve as a source of income.
In a number of areas, whole ethnic groups base their life on fishing. The Kotoko in the
Logone floodplain are a good example. There, most of the time women catch fish for house-
hold consumption and most men catch fish to sell at the market. According to Prins and
Mahamat (2003), a total of 12,000 tons of fresh fish per year is caught in the floodplain and
Lake Maga168, most of which is sold to the towns of the Far North and exported to Nigeria and
Chad169. Further to the south, some fishermen and fish traders use the catch from Lake Fianga
in Chad to sell at local markets.
Several young men regard banditry as a way of living. They form groups of highwaymen and
rob rich merchants on their way home after a day of healthy trading at a regional market. The
State’s response to this phenomenon was the installation of a semi-military ‘anti-gang’, with a
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167 See e.g. Ali and Peters (2001); According to Njomaha (2004: 166-67) fuel wood extraction and sale take place
in accordance with Thünian processes (see chapter 2).
168 Worth 2.3 million Euro (Prins and Mahamat 2003).
169 Because of a lack of fuel wood with which to smoke the fish properly, an enormous amount of pesticides is
used to conserve it. This poses a major threat to the environment and to the health of the fishermen and con-
sumers (Prins, pers. comm.).
years 93 - 94 94 - 95 95 - 96 96 - 97 97 - 98
Cattle 689 040 585 400 987 000 1.004 000 1.147 038
Sheep 751 048 593 000 622 650 653 782 688 471
Goats 938 393 784 998 824 276 865 489 988 763
broad mandate. Some say they even had the license to kill directly, but this has given rise to deep
concerns in the international community fearing a downward spiral of diminishing human rights170.
On-farm
Both men and women gather and cut fuel wood for sale from nearby bush areas and their own
fallow land. This has increased since the 1970s – 1980s droughts as an alternative income
source when crops failed.
The petty trade of various types of handicrafts and prepared foodstuff or drinks based on agri-
cultural crops or bush products serve as a permanent cash provider, especially for women. For
men, labour migration is an important income-generating activity in the Far North. Men tend to
follow the harvest season of the various crops from densely populated areas such as the north
Mandara Mountains or towns. Between the sowing and harvesting of the fields a migration wave
moves towards the North Province (Bénoué area) to help in the earlier harvest there. After the
harvesting of personal crops in December-January, the transplant sorghum (muskuaari) harvest
in the Diamaré plains attracts lots of labour migrants from all over the province.
4.2.4 Social domain
Political-economic factors are not only important for the way natural resources are exploited,
they also co-determine whether or not these resources diminish. In addition, they set the stage
for (connected) conflicts and the resolutions thereof.
The actual situation is based on former constructions (either being in accordance with such
constructions, or rejecting them) and on “situated knowledge” (Harraway 1988) that “not only
results from a researcher’s specific location in the material and cultural realities of the world,
but also in the chronological particularities of a certain moment in time” (Frances Gouda 2002,
personal comment171). For that reason, I will describe the political-administrative circum-
stances from the pre-colonial time onwards. Because the situation in the Far North Province is
deeply influenced by the powers and influences of successive local and invading ethnic
groups, this description will take the form of a short, general historical overview. It has to be
added, though, that the information on which this description is based is derived mainly or
even only from sources of dominating groups, such as Islamic invaders or European colonis-
ers, and as such is unavoidably biased. 
Apart from the information on the cultural domain given in this historic overview, the actu-
al cultural diversity and the related issues relevant for the research are dealt with in a separate
section below.
Political and administrative organisation and history
The north of Cameroon is often called the “crossroads of Africa”. This means that many dif-
ferent ethnic groups have moved in and intermingled between the escarpments of the Mandara
Mountains in the west and the floodplain of the Logone River in the east. From early times
onwards, incoming peoples have swept across the country and have (mostly) incorporated the
people already there into their cultural and political systems172. 
170 See, for example, Amnesty International reports (1998 or 2000) or IRIN (2002).
171 See also Francis Gouda (2001).
172 See, e.g., Martin (1981).
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One of the oldest known civilisations was that of the Sao people in the eastern parts of the
Far North. This civilisation expanded in the early centuries after Christ and then met its demise
in around 1000 AD when the area was invaded by Kanem warriors. 
The Kanem Empire started to invade the region and put southward pressure on it from the
7th century onwards, especially when they converted to Islam in the 11th century. Islam gave
them access to horses, chain armoury, weapons and, last but not least, the incentive or legiti-
macy to conquer their surroundings on religious grounds. From the 6th century onwards, var-
ious tribes developed and became established in the Mandara Mountains, first in the north (e.g.
the Mafa) and later in the plains more to the south. According to current theories they all orig-
inate from the same ancestors in Gudur, which for most groups is still the religious centre173.
When the Kanem were defeated by the Bulala from the north-east (who also pushed other
people towards the south-west) in the 15th century, they changed their headquarters to the south-
west of Lake Chad and formed the Bornu Empire. These Bornu, and people from the eastward
neighbouring kingdom of Wandala (or Mandara) that established itself in the 15th century in the
eastern foothills of the northern Mandara Mountains coming from the Baguirmi region in
Chad174, then started to conquer the Sao, Gamergu and paléo-Marghi (the predecessors of, among
others, the Kapsiki). In 1576, for example, the troops of sultan Idriss Aloma forced people to hide
in the inaccessible mountains and swamps, or flee as far south as the Benoué basin. 
In the heyday of its power the Bornu realm stretched into the Adamawa grasslands in the
south and into the Haussa lands of Nigeria. The great king and statesman, Alma, strengthened
the links with the Muslim world of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire and installed a Sharia-type
of law around 1600. Even at that moment, autochthonous groups were effectively able to use
their own legal system of customary law most of the time. 
Although in the latter days, Bornu became a centre of learning and scholarship, due to the
scarcity of natural resources in the Sahara and Sahel zone, the empire (and other empires
before) had used war to acquire wealth and power over the crossroads of trade. Even in the
early centuries after Christ, the inhabitants of North Cameroon established contacts across the
Sahara dessert with the coastal peoples of North Africa, the Egyptian dynasties and the Roman
Empire. In addition to salt, gold, ivory and ostrich feathers, the most important commodity was
slaves. Slavery was a common practice in Africa, where inter-group wars and in-group fights
led to the capture of adversaries. Also food deficits resulted in the sale of family members to
groups seen as belonging to the same ‘super group’175. However, a totally different fate await-
ed those domestic slaves who stayed within the region, since they were treated with respect or
regarded as kin within the receiving families. This is in stark contrast to the lot of those who
were transported for economic reasons along the trade routes, first to the Mediterranean and
later across the Atlantic (Mbuagbaw et al 1987: 13). The arrival of the Islam caused the
demand for slaves in North Africa to increase176. 
During the Bornu reign in the west, the new predatory empire in the north-east was that of
the Baguirmi, with its headquarter being Massénya. They drove away the Bahr Erguig from
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173 Mohammadou (1984), Van Beek (1989) or Njomaha (2004).
174 See Njomaha (2004: 42).
175 This was probably related to mutual language origins and resemblances. 
176 The “trans-Saharan trade in goods and people [only …] came to an end at the close of the nineteenth centu-
ry.”(Mbuagbwa et al 1987: 14), when the power of both the Fulbe and the Bornu Empire came to an end.
their Banre homeland between Logone and Chari177. After passing the Logone, those peoples
first stayed for a number of decades in the Musgum area, before moving on. Various displaced
groups travelled via the Diamaré plain as far west as the mountains, where they started to make
a living and merged with the present populations. Some of these groups later returned to the
central-southern Diamaré178 and established the Zumayo kingdom there. More individualistic
movements were engaged in by those who worked with iron. The work of these blacksmiths,
the symbolic power of their forges and their basis in towns179, determined the structure of the
societies in the pre-Baguirmi era. The Bahr Erguig, who are said to be the forefathers of,
among others, the Tupuri and Mundang, travelled upstream along the Logone and Guerléo
until they reached the Guissey-Tikem region. The blacksmiths are said to be the first to arrive
in the Fianga and Tikem area (see Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 5.3). 
More recently, in the 17th and 18th century, a counter movement started. In the Bénoué
escarpment180, pressure from the east (by Sara-Ngambay people) made the pre-Tupuri and pre-
Mundang head northwards again. 
In the middle of the 18th century, the eastward wave of Fulbe migration that started in
Senegal several centuries earlier181 reached the Far North Province. There they met the
Mandara kingdom in the north, which was a former province of the Bornu Empire and whose
people had already converted to Islam earlier that century. Just like the travelling Haussa mer-
chants, nomadic Fulbe pastoralists sought a living in the savannah areas of Cameroon. They
first cohabited peacefully with the existing populations, paying tribute whenever necessary.
Nevertheless, even at that time fights took place between pastoralists and agriculturalists for
autonomy and control over pastures. Pontié (1979: 119) stresses the frequency of these con-
flicts: “continuous struggles between herders and agriculturalists [because of] cattle theft, crop
damage and the payment of tribute to the Zumaya chiefs”. 
In the first half of the 19th century a Jihad swept through West Africa. The Fulbe armies
conquered the region and established their chiefdoms, lamidats, as sub-emirates under the
influential Adamawa Emirate of Yola. This, in turn, was part of the big Caliphate of Sokoto182.
The Fulbe subdued the original populations in almost the whole of North Cameroon. In the
Diamaré plain, the Zumayo kingdom was defeated and the population enslaved and/or con-
verted to Islam. As was the case with other oppressed groups, over time they were complete-
ly assimilated into the Fulbe population. After several generations, the original background of
the conquered groups was no longer recognisable. On the other hand, as the current non-Fulbe
populations underline when they describe the disdain of the Fulbe, the Fulbe themselves are
not entirely Fulbe because of their non-Fulbe lineages based on Fulbe men having married the
women of their subjects. In addition, slaves that converted to Islam were given more possibil-
ities and a better life and they therefore assimilated to the culture and religion of the Fulbe. As
a result, the term Fulbe became almost equal to the term ‘Islamic’ in the Far North Province. 
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177 At a latitude of 11 to 11.5 degrees, to where the Bahr Erguig river enters the Chari.
178 Where Moutourouwa and Lara are now situated.
179 This can still be seen in the different mini-fortress-like shaped villages along the Logone, as well as in the
Banre societies. 
180 Upstream parts of that river along what is now the Cameroon-Chad border; latitude 9 – 9.5 degrees.
181 According to De Bruijn and Van Dijk (1995; 47) “the Fulbe entered the inner delta of the Niger during the 15th
century”. From there, they spread further to the Hayre in the east.
182 See, for example, Njeuma (1978).
Of course several defeated ethnic groups kept on resisting their conquerors because of their
desire for autonomy and the harsh practices of the Fulbe183. In the Diamaré, the Guiziga have a
reputation for being very fierce in that respect. In addition, some ethnic groups resisted Fulbe
domination by hiding in the mountains (Mandara) or the swamps, as their forefathers had done.
These populations attacked incoming Fulbe and (later) others from their refuge positions.
Because the political organisation of the mountain peoples was totally decentralised, - meaning
that each household head was chief in his own dominion - defeating such a group was almost
impossible. As regards the Matakam, for example, Martin (1970: 180) describes the necessity of
“conquering house per house”184. And some groups did manage to defeat the Fulbe completely.
For example, the Mandara kingdom in the north-west, the Kotoko in the Logone floodplain and
the Tupuri in the ‘bec-du-canard’ (See figure 4.5), who never became Fulbe subjects. In the sec-
ond half of the 19th century, the Tupuri’s system of habitation in concentration centres made it
possible for them to halt a major Fulbe coalition in Gouyou185. Nevertheless, the Tupuri-north-
ward movement was halted and they even had to retreat to the Touloum-Guidiguis-line until the
beginning of the 20th century, when the Germans took over (Seignobos 2000b: 44-47). 
At the end of the 19th century, a new conqueror - this time an Arab from the north called
Rabah - invaded the region. Although he put an end to the violent internal conflicts between
local populations, his forces massacred these same inhabitants. After seven years of terror he
died in 1900, after the French had defeated him in the neighbourhood of Fort Lamy
(N’Djamena). 
The Germans had started crossing the region on expeditions in search of natural resources
in the early 1890s. Because the Fulbe sultans in the more southern areas objected to their pass-
ing through their territory, fights took place. It was only in 1901 that the Germans really start-
ed to conquer the region. They tried to pacify the area and used violence against humans and
the destruction of belongings as a means of achieving this. They did not interfere with the
lamibe (Fulbe chiefs) except from giving them guns to consolidate (and in practice improve)
their position186, thereby allowing the Fulbe chiefs to continue dealing with the Kirdi187. It was
only in 1913 that the Germans started to transfer some authority to non-Muslim chiefs in cases
of ethnic resistance against Islamic chiefs. 
The violence against the ‘local’ population continued during World War I. On the one hand
these were war-related actions: different persons and ethnic groups were mobilised by allied
forces or the Germans and had to fight for their ‘friends’, after which the losers were punished
by the winners. On the other hand, in the later war years, the war was used as a pretext to con-
quer the last Kirdi groups in the mountains, who had never before been subdued. 
This continued after the war when the French were in control. In addition, the French want-
ed to stop the aggression between the different groups, for example over wanted or raped
women or over contested borders, the violent plundering of neighbouring villages, violent
actions against (suspected) sorcerers, the existence of customs of specific ethnic groups of it
110
183 English expeditions crossed the region from the beginning of the 19th century onwards. It is from them that
we have learned about the slave tributes, raids, trade and transports of different ethnic groups, as well as the
pillage of villages, the burning of crops and the confiscation of cattle perpetrated by the different Fulbe chiefs.
184 “…il faudrait conquérir gay [= household, RN] par gay, jusqu’au dernier”.185
See Taïwé (2003).
186 Van Beek (1989: 619): “…matters grew far worse for the local people after the installation of indirect rule.”
187 For an explanation of the term ‘Kirdi’, see next section and box 4.1.
being honourable to kill, the assassination of Fulbe authorities and the theft of their cattle on
the basis of age-old hatred by non-Fulbe and because of tax-collections, etc. Ancient French
colonial administration reports of ‘expeditions’ reveal a certain astonishment at the resistance
offered by the indigenous population: “Quoiqu’on en ait dit, c’est une fait que les Kirdis de
ces régions montagneuses inexplorées continuent à vivre à l’état de guerre endémique et font
fi de l’autorité” (ANY, APA 11768/D in Beauvillain 1989). 
Although the French administration imposed the rule of non-violent intervention in their
pacification campaigns, those villages that had the reputation of terrorising their neighbours
were severely punished: “Les représailles administratives peuvent faire plus de victimes que
les incidents eux-mêmes” (Beauvillain 1989: 336). In cases of tax-collection, as well, the mil-
itary basically used force to coerce the population to pay. Reversely, they encountered violent
resistance from those Kirdi people who used pre-emptive defence. The use of the Fulbe chiefs
as go-betweens in the French system and the fact that these chiefs continued with their slave
trade activities, as well as their abuse of power until even after World War II, gave rise to many
skirmishes, military reprisals by the French, etc. However, the involvement of Fulbe chiefs in
cross-border thievery (Nigeria, Chad) was never punished by the French, although they were
removed from their function if the practices became too obvious. However, not all regions
were ruled indirectly by ‘traditional chiefs’. 
From the mid 1920s onward, several cantons were placed under direct administration
because of failing legitimacy and growing abuse of power by the Fulbe chiefs, and thus a
growing agitation among their subjects, the indigenous inhabitants who were referred to by the
French and the Fulbe alike as ‘pagan’. In these regions the French tried to install ‘animist
chiefdoms’ with the aim being indirect rule which would avoid direct confrontations. Another
reason was that they did not have enough civil servants. “L’idée directrice est la suivante:
pénétrer et pacifier le pays et rendre à la majorité païenne (93%) sa liberté vis-à-vis des
envahiseurs Foulbé.”(ANY, APA 11618, in Beauvillain 1989: 362). Because the French want-
ed the chiefs to comply with their administrative system, they overlooked the fact that most of
the animist chiefs only had a moral-religious role. Once again, the traditional system was
moulded into western ruling ideas: ‘neo-traditionalism’188.
Apart from military interventions the French also set up medical care facilities, helped to
improve cultivation practices, built wells and established schools (mostly to provide for edu-
cated chiefs and civil servants). Because they only ‘modernised’ the more accessible areas,
people were pulled out of the mountains and sometimes even pushed by forced resettlement.
Because the Fulbe elite did not ‘give’ their own sons to the ‘whites’, but forced the sons of
their slaves to go to the ‘white’ schools, western education was synonymous with the emanci-
pation of the non-Muslim groups. After independence, not much changed at first. President
Ahidjo kept his Fulbe ‘kin’ in place as chiefs of the traditional Fulbe courts. Despite the fact
that, in general, Fulbe education continued to lag behind, he also allocated them good positions
in the national government189. Although he managed to incorporate the elite from other parts of
the country as well, other ethnic groups from the north were still excluded. Yet, some of the
lamibe who nowadays serve as official first degree administrative leaders are converted
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188 “European colonialism was carried out through the imposition of a hierarchy of ‘traditional’ chieftaincies,
some created anew where there were none.” (Ignatowski (2001: 39).
189 See, for example, Gaillard (1994) or Mouiche (2000: 54-55).
autochthons who ‘bought’ their positions in a kind of election procedure. Indeed, most admin-
istrative posts in the Far North are nowadays occupied by non-Muslims190.
Cultural differences and identity 
Islamic influences and the invasion of the Fulbe in the ‘Grand Nord’ at the beginning of the
19th century initiated the development of a “northern Cameroon” identity. Until then, the area
had been a multicultural melting pot of different ethnic groups, mostly related to each other via
mutual ancestors, but with more emphasis on differences in culture than on similarities. The
subsequent ‘foreign’ Empires with different centres that mostly left the autochthonous popu-
lation in peace (after victory) did not try to bring together the various subjects, but they gov-
erned their territory from afar on the basis of regional (however vague and shifting) bound-
aries. This continued under the Fulbe reign. Yet, the overtone of the Fulbe hegemony and their
political and administrative organisation of one Emirate covering the whole of Adamawa, con-
structed a regional political-economic realm vis-à-vis (this time) the rest of the Sokoto
Caliphate of which it was part.
The building of precisely this region was based on geographical features that had for cen-
turies promoted cross-cultural interactions. “In origin, river Benoué and its tributaries together
with Lake Chad and the numerous rivers that drain into the lake provided the natural regional
foundation” (Njeuma 2000: 3). It was the abundance of the grazing lands in this whole area that
the Fulbe had sought when they first came to Cameroon, as dispersed groups of herders. With
their wealth of cattle and the regional possibilities to maintain them, they transformed Adamawa
into the richest of Sokoto’s emirates.
Here, like more to the west, the Fulbe mixed the Islamic religious values and the hierarchi-
cal political organisation related to it (for example chiefs were also religious leaders) with their
own “pulaaku” culture and concept191, that was built on the possession of cattle and the resist-
ance against “ecological and social insecurities inherent in the pastoral […] way of life in the
Sahel” (De Bruijn and Van Dijk 1995: 193)192. In general, De Bruijn and Van Dijk say, “the reli-
gion of the Fulbe is an amalgam of [Fulbe] custom […] and Islam” (id). They included in their
cultural religious complex all those individuals who wanted to acquire the same (socially ele-
vating) opportunities and who therefore converted to Islam193, the Fulbe overlords also did not
hesitate to use “local knowledge and popular acclamation” (Njeuma 2000: 6) and to incorpo-
rate local leaders in their sub-regional councils. Yet, their efforts to “subdue all peoples in the
geographical region equally” (Njeuma 2000: 7) while these had been used to unrestricted
movements, and the Fulbe disdain of non-Islamics as ‘barbarians’ and Kirdi (see box 4.1) unit-
ed those erstwhile so divided ethnic groups. 
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190 Prefects and sub-prefects are mostly from the South, where Christianity is more abound.
191 See VerEecke (1999: 96-99) or Breedveld and De Bruijn (1996) on “Pulaaku”, and Breedveld (1999) on Fulbe
identity and sub-groups. 
192 See also Moritz (2003) on the mixing of Islamic religious notions and rules (for example on individual rights
on property) with original Fulbe values, such as the family survival on the basis of common resources (cattle)
as highest good.
193 This is called “fulbeïsation”. In those days it entailed an almost total change of culture. Fulbeïsation was also
expressed as a general incorporation of Fulbe customs in habits of other ethnic groups (for example the Fulbe
dress code, especially for chiefs). Nowadays, the term is almost totally restricted to Islamisation.
Box 4.1 The Term Kirdi
Thus, although on the one hand the Fulbe managed to unite the north and to develop the iden-
tity feelings of belonging to the north of Cameroon, on the other hand they succeeded in bind-
ing the rest of the population together in a non-Fulbe, non-Muslim identity. Other Muslim
groups such as the Mandara or the Kotoko were exceptions because they formed their own
states, even before their Islamisation, and were not subdued by the Fulbe194. Neither did the
Haussa and Shoa Arabs regard themselves as being from the same Muslim lineage as the
Fulbe. The divide between the Muslim overlords and the rest was intensified by the way in
which the colonial powers ruled and their preference for Islam as a “civilising” mission
(Murffet 1964, in Njeuma 2000: 31) over the traditional religions. On the other hand, the
Germans favoured the south with its geographical wealth over the north, therewith creating a
regional dichotomy that emphasised again a northern versus a southern identity. 
The dual identity of ‘being a northerner’, but at the same time ‘being a Kirdi’, that is ‘not
a Muslim’ (heralded by Christian priests, see Box 4.1), continued during the French colonial
period. Especially in the early French period, and again under Ahidjo, non-Arabic Muslims195
were favoured politically and in the administration. This duality still persists today196 despite
the break up of the north into three different Provinces by president Biya who feared religious
regionalism. However, it seems as if religion is not an important factor. Within ethnic groups,
different numbers of people convert to Islam or Christianity197 although a certain pattern can
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194 For the Mandara, see Boutrais (1984); for the Kotoko, see Van Est (1999).
195 In contrast with the Shoa Arabs in the northern parts of the province, who the French feared would collabo-
rate with people like Rabah (see the former sub-section) and form a pan-Arabic realm.
196 See all the “open letters” to the President in various newspapers in Cameroon in 2003 and 2004 from the
Northern elite who refer to their northern identity when they claim more investments and more State positions
for the North.
197 Different sub-groups can be found of both religions in the North of Cameroon (see, also, Seignobos and Nassouri 
When the Fulbe first arrived in the north of Cameroon, just before the beginning of the 18th century, they
had not yet (totally) converted to Islam. In those days they used to call the non-Fulbe “haabe” (sing.
“kaado”), which means ‘barbarians’, ‘those with a different, inferior culture’. Only after the start of the
jihad did the Fulbe start to denounce all non-Islamic, non-Fulbe, groups using the kanuri word “Kirdi”.
Originally this term meant ‘pagan’. According to Mohammadou (1984: 140) the term was brought by the
French from Chad after the defeat of the Germans in 1914. Ignatowski (2001: 359) traces the origin of
the term back to the Arabs (Kurds), and gives Rabah the honour of having introduced it for the Mandara
Mountains inhabitants during his attempt to conquer the region. Anyway, the name soon became short
for - in the eyes of the Fulbe - un-civilised and rebellious peoples. The European colonisers (German and
French) first used the term with a same negative denotation, namely ‘savage’ and ‘violent’. It was only
after independence that the term acquired a more positive meaning being used by Cameroonian Catholic
priests who were trying to mobilise the multitude of indigenous ethnic groups in the mountains on the
basis of a shared interest vis-à-vis the ruling Muslim population. Schilder (1994): “Baba Simon redefined
the pre-existing kirdi term into a positive social identity, generating self-esteem rather than feelings of
inferiority”. With the introduction of the multi-party system in Cameroon, the term Kirdi quickly
acquired political overtones. In the same vein as the negritude movement of Senghor, ‘kirditude’ was
instigated by the cultural-political movement in Yaoundé of northern non-Muslim elites: Dynamique
Culturelle Kirdi (DCK).
be distinguished per ethnic group. This only adds a third variable to the identity formation.
However, the strongest loyalties still seem to lie in original ethnic values as well as the ‘North
Cameroonian’ position. According to Njeuma (2000) the ethnic factor is predominant. With the
emergence of the multi-party system, he recognises a development of “boundless political
competition, especially ethnicisation of political ambitions” (id: 28). 
However, the different ethnic groups are too small to form a threatening unity vis-à-vis the
ruling party. Historically, the Far North can be separated into regions of ethnic groups that show
cultural and organisational similarities, mostly born from the similarities in the physical sur-
roundings and the historical patterns and economic ways of living that those physical surround-
ings have incurred. Thus, in general, the population of the province is divided into the ethnic
groups from the mountains, the plains and the floodplain. More precisely, these regions are sub-
divided into the mountains proper and the high plateaux, the foothills, the plains more or less
surrounding these foothills and the plain in the bec-du-canard, with the floodplain and the adja-
cent river band and its dwelling mounts during the inundations as the final area with adapted eth-
nic groups198. It has to be stressed that within such regions the diversity is also enormous (see
Figure 4.5), both because the different groups each chose different survival options from the sur-
rounding environment, and because a group always wanted to distinguish itself from another. 
In general, the Kirdi groups are all quite ‘egalitarian’, although still more or less a-
cephalous groups versus hierarchical organisations with a central chief can be found199. The
first, the individualistic construction of society, is a way of living in the mountains and
plateaux where the remoteness from other groups and the relative security from invasion ren-
dered a one-person authority and a strong coherence unnecessary. In the plains, on the other
hand, the pressure from invaders and the quick acceptance of strangers within the villages
(both as refugees and as a result of the more wide-spread migratory habits) increased the threat
to ethnic stability, whereupon members of the group started to stress their ethnicity and inten-
sify the links to own rules and customs (socio-religious control). It is a normal pattern of cre-
ating we-they divides whenever physical and economic boundaries are less pronounced.
As a result, the different ethnic groups in the plains and along the river show great differences
with regard to proneness to adopt modernisations, both in agriculture and in schooling, differ-
ences in the influence of land masters on allocation of land, in inheritance practices and, as has
been mentioned, as regards the adoption of ‘new’ religions. Ways of dealing with violence also
differ enormously. In some societies conflict is hushed up and violence is a taboo200, in others
ancient warrior heroes are constantly remembered in songs and narratives which urge the same
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(2000)). The major divide in the Christian churches is that between Catholicism and Protestantism. But the lat
ter is again made up of several church communities, such as Lutherans, Pentecost, Adventists, etc. Islam is
adhered to in different forms, from very strict to more or less loose (for example the nomadic Fulbe, called
M’bororo), and is varyingly influenced by ethnic customs. The form of Islam practised in the floodplain is more
similar to that of the Arab world. Seignobos (2000c: 56) mentions that the new Islam converts in Maroua are
more radical then the old Fulbe Muslims who “donnent dans un intégrisme plus intellectuel avec le Wahabisme.”
198 See also Njomaha (2004: 41 and 49-50).
199 According to Anyangwe (1984: 30) neither of the two extremes can be found in Cameroon. With its historical
high frequency of mutual contacts between different groups, the mutual exchange of habits has been such that
every group has at least a kind of chief, and even highly centralised groups do not permit their chiefs to have
total political and military power.
200 For example, the Hopi Indians in the United States or the Ayur Vedic tradition in India.
Figure 4.5 Ethnic Diversity (impression) (based on Beauvillain 1989; Meurs and Felix 2001; Seignobos
2000b)
115
Southern plains
Foothills
Mountains
Mountains plateaux
Bec-du-canard
River band
Floodplain Logone
Shoa Arabs
Kotoko
Kotoko
Shoa Arabs
Mousgoum
Massa
Bougoudoun
Moussey
Guissey
Tupuri
Guiziga
Mundang
Guidar
Kola
Daba
Hina
Goudé
Djimi
Bana
Kapsiki
Mofou
Fulbe
Mouyang
Baldamu
Tchouvok Mada
OuldéméMafa
Hedi
Mandara
Podokwo
Vamé
Fulbe
Minéo
Mouktélé
Zumayu
fearlessness201. Such songs can be used by leaders - or mutually within groups - to engender a
sphere of bravery and this can then lead to the use of violence202.
Last but not least, the different groups also show great differences in engagement in political
affairs. As a result of these differences, of the ‘cross-cutting’ religious conversions and of the
existing North Cameroon identity, the above-mentioned ethnicisation of politics does not
strictly follow ethnic boundaries203. Some groups with high political ambitions try to promote
their own party, thereby transgressing group boundaries (e.g. the MDR204 of the Tupuri205), but
lots of own group members still (or again206) follow the lead of the RDPC207. On the other hand,
the original “Fulbe-party”, the UNDP208, is seen by many, Fulbe and Kirdi alike, as the only
way to break the dictatorial power of the RDPC. The stronger, southern opposition party
SDF209 has not (as yet) succeeded in binding followers in the north.
Therefore, depending on the wisdom of the next president (elections in October 2004) and
his government, the North will act as a bloc vis-à-vis the rest of the country, the different eth-
nic and religious groups will oppose each other or a strong and self-confident but diverse North
will serve as an enriching, constructive entity in the whole of the United Cameroon.
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201 For example in the Zulu tradition.
202 Conversely, different groups can have different reputations regarding their fierceness in conflicts. Generally, this
is (also) based on past experiences or historical narratives, whether or not nurtured by the involved group. An
example is the resistance of the Tupuri to the Fulbe that quickly gave them a majority position in the military
ranks (Ignatowski 2001).
203 In some cases it does, but then the ‘before politics’ period already revealed a problematic ethnic divide that is
now used by certain leaders (see, e.g., Socpa (2002) or Onambele (1992) about the controversies between the
Kotoko and Shoa Arabs in the Logone floodplain).
204 Mouvement Démocratique pour la Défense de la République.
205 However, Mouiche (2000: 66) states that “le recrutements politiques du RDPC et de UNDP permettent de rel-
ativiser les clivages ethnico-religieux”, but the MDR is still a “parti tribunitien Toupouri”.
206 In the first multi-party elections in Cameroon (1992) the UNDP and MDR gained quite a lot of seats in par-
liament as a response to the economic malaise under the RDPC. Biya reacted with a policy of dividing the dif-
ferent groups of the North along ethnic lines (see Mouiche 2000). For example, he made the UNDP lose its
‘Islamic’ identity: based on the preference the Fulbe and Kotoko had acquired during the Ahidjo period,
Haussa and Shoa Arabs could easily be persuaded to vote RDPC. Combined with fraud and intimidation dur-
ing subsequent elections (Mouiche 2000: 73-83), and the inevitable fear of the Fulbe elite of losing their posi-
tions if they continued to follow the UNDP, the RDPC gained in numbers at each subsequent election.
207 Rassemblement Démocratique des Peuples Camerounais.
208 Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès.
209 Social Democratic Front.
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Struggling for land in the Diamaré
The bush has totally gone!” That was the only thought that entered my mind when I saw the
vast stretches of bare soil between Kolara and Kobo. Two years before, an extended savannah
forest had covered this part of the Diamaré. Now the strip of dense trees and shrubs along the
Kobo-Kolara road hides the evidence of the heavy clearance activities that have taken place
more to the centre of the bush. The process is continuing in all directions. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the bush area south-east of Maroua has been invaded
more and more often by cultivators who clear the bush and establish agricultural fields. For
ages this area has been used by cattle keepers during the rainy season, when the dry season
pastures of the Yaeré plain become flooded with the waters of the Logone River.
Unfortunately, the use of the land by these two user groups coincides. However, as we have
seen in chapter 2, different use of the same resource in the same space need not always lead to
conflict. If the uses are complementary, different users can live together in the same space. In
addition, when the bush is large enough and the pressure of users low enough, in reality the
same space can be divided into parts that do not coincide. Growing population density means
‘the space’ is becoming more and more ‘the same’, competition is growing and therefore con-
flicts as well. Nowadays both parties regularly collide. Indeed, there are growing reports of
violence used by the members of one group against the other1. Whether or not it is the dimin-
ishing space that causes violence remains to be seen.
In this chapter I focus on the explanation of this conflict, in accordance with the VoE model
(Figure 5.1).After some historical information, I start investigating insecurities in the areas of
origin of the invading group. In the third section I explore the different options to improve the
situation. Then, I focus on the specific investment described in box 2 of the diagram: the intru-
sion of another niche. This can be divided into two parts: first, the move from the historical
origin region to the Diamaré, and secondly - the focus of this study - the invasion from differ-
1 See, e.g., Van der Ploeg (2001).
ent origin areas into the ‘undisturbed’ bush. In order to clarify the possible step to box 3 of the
VoE diagram (the conflict situation) the insecurities, the options for overcoming these and the
claims of the invading people are described in sections four and five. Subsequently, to pinpoint
the conflict (box 3 of the diagram), the focus in section six is on the opposing party. In section
seven I end this chapter with a description of options and motivations of both parties to resort
to, or abstain from, violence (box 4 of the VoE diagram).
Figure 5.1 The VoE diagram
5.1 Background: History and culture of invading people
The area studied stretches over approximately 850 km2 and is triangular with the southern
edge at Guidiguis and the two outward points at Mindif and Moulvoudaye (Figure 5.2). In the
middle of this bush zone the small neighbouring villages of Kolara and Kobo form the focus
point for the research. These two villages are mainly inhabited by two ethnic groups: Fulbe and
Tupuri. In the bush, which belongs to these two villages, new settlements have developed in
recent years and are continuing to develop at a rapid pace.
While talking with the inhabitants of the new bush settlements it became clear that (almost) all
of them belong to the Tupuri ethnic group. Their direct ancestors, they say, were inhabitants of
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2 Interviews showed that most people’s grandfathers came from Chad, or the Tchatibali-Doukoula region (see
section 4.1).
Tchatibali, Doukoula and neighbouring villages, as far north as Touloum2. This is a region that,
together with the Fianga area just south of the Chad-border, is called “the heartland of the
Tupuri” (Seignobos 2000b: 44). 
Figure 5.2 Research Area
It is in the southern range of this heartland that the different Tupuri clans came together after
centuries of migration (Figure 5.3). Three big clans are distinguished: from the North the
Banre3 (blacksmiths) arrived first. Later, from 1674 onwards, the settlement in the Fianga-
Tikem region was completed by the Dore who, like the Guwa (meaning “the rest”: including
clans that arrived before and after the Dore), came from the Peffe area near lake Lere in the
south. During their southward move, some of the Banre travelled more westward and set up a
stronghold in Moulvoudaye4. 
In the period during which the pre-Tupuri left the Peffe region, new ways of land use and
habitation patterns were adopted (among other things, the abandoning of fortress-villages).
The integration of different cultural practices (with regard to institutions, myths, rituals, reli-
gion and material culture) of the different groups on the one hand and the crystallisation of
complexes of new ones on the other resulted in the emergence of an ethnic identity of both
Tupuri and others. One of the important habits that Tupuri adopted, in addition to their cul-
3 Nowadays, the name Banre is used by Tupuri to indicate the Masa in the Logone region, whose ancestors also
come from the land between Logone and Chari (Seignobos and Tourneux 2001: 7-8).
4 Moulvoudaye remained one of the northernmost Tupuri concentrations during the Fulbe hegemony in the
north-west.
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tivation, was the living with cattle5 and the ritual of the gurna (milk cure)6. From that
moment onwards Tupuri were an agro-pastoral group, with a lot of knowledge of, and feel-
ing for, cattle7.
The arrival of the Dore at Lake Fianga’s borders coincided with the installation of central
chieftaincies that influenced the surrounding countryside. The new socio-political organisation
made the large-group movements further northwards possible, because it increased cohesion and
brought former powers together. Dense settlements came into being in sheltered places at the
foot of the massifs and in wetland zones like Lake Guissey and Fianga or the borders of Guerléo
River (see Fig. 5.3). Subsequently, the migrants went as far north as Midjivin, Moutouroua,
Maroua, and even Kalioa. Soon, the Dore themselves started colonies in Dziguilao, Touloum,
Tchatibali and even Guidiguis. It is said that, where they arrived, autochthonous populations
acknowledged the Dore authority and accepted the chiefs appointed by them. From the Banre
village of Moulvoudaye, further expansion to the west and north-west was easy.
Although it is difficult to trace back the origins of all different ethnic groups and clans,
because of age-old mutual influence, manipulations and mixtures, it can be concluded that
Tupuri were already present in the Diamaré plain long before the Fulbe conquest of that area.
After the Fulbe defeat of the Zumaya kingdom, some of its citizens found refuge in the Tupuri
realm more to the east, although in time they disturbed the Tupuri with their slave and com-
modity raids. The Fianga-and Doukoula-region has always remained free of foreign invaders.
Fulbe raids did not extend that far because of fierce resistance of the Tupuri. 
Because of the habit of concentrating people in centres - although the villages as such con-
sist(ed) of dispersed houses - Tupuri were used to living in situations with a high population
pressure on the land. They therefore adopted a way of life based on a diversity of economic pos-
sibilities8. At the same time, in contrast to their neighbours, they were and are willing to exploit
different and even difficult soils by paying them a lot of attention and care. As is shown by their
early use of fermented beer9, Tupuri cultivated cereals in an early era. They have a lot of dif-
ferent sorghum varieties at their disposal that each fit the different soil types they toil. Their use
of the transplant-sorghum babu means they were easily able to incorporate the dry season
Kanuri and Fulbe based muskuaari sorghum. On the other hand, finger millet is used far less
120
5 This was adopted from the Masa, with which group Tupuri still share many similar cultural habits.
6 See Ignatowski (2001: 5-6): the milk cure stands for the period in which young men are occupied with the care
of cattle in a camp in the outskirts of the village. During the day they herd the animals. When they return they
drink a special milk-sorghum porridge which is intended to increase body fat, which itself is seen as a sign of
beauty and wealth. “Gurna is a dance society”, “it has been the main avenue for young men and women to
learn local history, to enter into sanctioned sexual relations [at the end of each day the girls arrive in the camp
and are offered the porridge], and to find marriage partners.” It forms life-long friendships and, one of the more
important aspects, there the burial songs and dances are learned.
7 Seignobos (2000e: 116): “L’obligation de posséder  du betail est, chez les Tupuri primordiale.” He also men-
tions (p. 115) the existence of special Tupuri cattle (also called “the cattle of the Logone”), kept by Tupuri,
Musgum and Masa. It has a Bos taurus origin. After decades of interbreeding with Zébu, nowadays it has the
appearance of a small Zébu, but with different characteristics according to fattening and calving.  The zebu with
which Tupuri mixed their smaller cattle came from the Fulbe. When I asked Tupuri about their ‘own’ cattle
breed, they said: “How can we have a separate breed? We used to steal our cattle from the Fulbe, didn’t we?”
8 Seignobos (2000d: 63) attributes the capacity of Tupuri to survive in densely populated areas to their combined
use of rain-fed agriculture, transplant sorghum in the first half of the dry season and sedentary cattle-keeping.
9 It is said that Tupuri imported the recipe of brewing sorghum beer to the Fianga region. (Seignobos and
Tourneux 2001). See also Feckoua (2002) about the origin myths of the Doré chiefs and the brewing of beer.
10 In some clans the land master uses babu-plants for rituals as well, for example to predict his (future) position.
and mostly only for ritual purposes10. Another aspect of their propensity to invest a lot in their
land is the care for and maintenance of trees, such as Calcedra and Faidherbia. Their ‘heart-
land’ is famous for the extended Faidherbia parks. However, the ever-growing population and
the subsequent rise in land and fuel-wood demands nowadays lead to difficult trade-offs
between the maintenance of trees and direct survival. 
Figure 5.3 Migration patterns (source: Seignobos 2000b: 45)
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5.2 Insecurities: Box 1 and onwards
This section will start on the left-hand side of the VoE diagram (Fig. 5.1) with a description of
Box 1, the diminishing environmental space (scarcity) for Tupuri. The step from Box 1 to Box
2 is not only caused by environmental insecurities. It is a complex of personal, socio-political,
economic and environmental factors and insecurities11 that shape the strategies of Tupuri.
These are the influencing factors, mentioned in the diagram, that determine whether or not the
actors will enter into Box 2 or use an ‘escape’ route.
So, after a description of the environmental situation, I then assess the other (possible) inse-
curities of Tupuri, in the human, economic and social domains. 
5.2.1 Environmental insecurities
Physical basis
Soils
As indicated above, the Tupuri heartland consists of a diversity of soil types that are all used
by the Tupuri inhabitants. They have experimented with different sorghum types in different
soils and with their limited means they have reached the summit of possible production levels.
Some of the soils are rich and weather at a pace that more or less maintains fertility. At other
locations the soil is quickly exhausted. In general, the Tupuri heartland is a flat countryside
covered by alluvial soils that alternate between sand dunes (in a north-west to south-east direc-
tion) and argyle-sandy depressions. Both types of soil are acid and poor in organic material and
minerals. The best soils can be found at the edge of the depressions, where more organic mat-
ter is present, but here fertility is still not high (Hallaire 1984: 389). The Tupuri used to enrich
these soils with animal dung. The use of chemical fertilisers for cotton production does not
help in the long run as it disturbs a well-balanced proportionality of organic matter, diverse
physical particles and chemical components. 
Some soils have such a texture and composition that water does not easily penetrate, lead-
ing to surface run-off and soil which is too dry for agriculture. At the bottom of the depres-
sions this type of soil leads to puddles that hold water too long for plants to survive, or even
to complete inundations. People affected by this inconvenience tend to dream about big, state-
driven civil works of dyke and canal construction. When speaking about erosion, half of the
respondents come up with an explanation of standing water that makes it impossible to culti-
vate millet or rain-fed sorghum. Although it is ideal for transplant-sorghum, most people in the
heartlands are culturally attached to the ‘red sorghum’ as their daily meal and cannot make do
with only the white or yellow transplant-sorghum.
Climate
Another basic feature is the rainfall pattern. The whole heartland lies in the climatologic band
that receives between 750 and 900 mm of rain per year. One of the research villages in the
heartland was Tchatibali, where the SODECOTON factory has its own pluviometric station.
The other village is Sirlawé, exactly between Tchatibali and Doukoula (somewhat more to the
north) that also has a SODECOTON pluviometric station (see Fig. 5.2). Doukoula, for exam-
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11 See chapters 2 and 3.
ple, had a mean between 1945 and 1969 of 870 mm per year and between 1970 and 1995 this
was 780 mm per year (L’Hote 2000: 19). The low second figure is basically due to the droughts
in the 1970s and 1980s that struck the whole Sahelian region. In Doukoula the decennial mean
figures at that time were 753.5 and 773.5 respectively (Beauvillain 1995: 64). For both plu-
viometric stations, precipitation over the last five years of the 1990s is depicted in the
Appendix, in Tables 5 and 6.
The last five years of the 90s produced more promising figures, with a mean of 1019 mm
in Tchatibali and 956.5 mm in Doukoula per year. It has to be said, however, that differences
over the years can be considerable (see Fig. 5.4). In 2000, for example, total rainfall numbers
were well below 700 mm in the whole region and only in two months was rainfall greater than
100 mm. 
Figure 5.4 Mobile average precipitation over 5 years in Doukoula plus years with bad rain distribution for
agriculture (a dot means that in that year the rainy season was shorter than 5 months and/or that
there were fewer than 4 consecutive months with more than 100 mm of rain) (Source: 
Beauvillain (1995) and SODECOTON Pluviometric station Doukoula, year reports SODECO
TON and archives12)
Indeed, trust in the reliability of rain has diminished: during the rainy season of 2001, which
started badly, more than 60 % of the respondents referred to a deterioration in rainfall since
their own or their parents’ youth. A large proportion of the population thinks the rains are too
variable13. “Some years there is no rain at all, other years there is too much14. The variation is
excessive even during the year: today your small plants suffer with their roots and stems
drowned and tomorrow they are thirsty. A generation ago it was better. When my father was
young he could depend on the rain.”15
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12 For 1998 and 2001-2002 the Tchatibali data has been used because of a gap in the Doukoula data. The ten year
mean has been used for 1963, for which there is no data.
13 64 % of the 123 respondents thinks the precipitation either too low or too high over the different years.
14 For example, in 1996, both Tchatibali and Doukoula suffered from flooding.
15 After a lack of rain in 2002 (year total of 687 mm in Tchatibali), the year 2003 was again too wet (in Tchatibali
region with a year total of 1,100 mm over almost seven months, although there was not much in May). Many
farmers suffered from flooding and therefore a loss of crops.
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Population density
While facing these circumstances of different soils and various rainfall patterns, Tupuri have
always gathered in population centres as a political and strategic method. There they achieved
high birth rates and then went on to invade the surrounding areas. Between 1948 and 1951, a
high emigration flux of around 10.5 % of the population per year matched the high birth sur-
plus of 2,298 births minus 807 deaths (Beauvillain 1989: 491).
Table 5.2.1 Population densities over the years (in persons per km2)
a = Source: Beauvillain (1989: 491) over Doukoula district
b = Source: Guillard (1958: 415) for Yagoua sub-department (i.e. Doukoula, Tchatibali and Datchéka districts)c
= Source: Beauvillain (1989: 497-501) and Seignobos (2000d: 63). Apart from almost empty strips, towns like
Doukoula, Tchatibali and Datchéka have a very high population densityd
= Source: MIDIMA, January 2003
e = Source: Beauvillain (1989: 497; carte hors texte) f
= Data on the sub-department Moulvoudaye, home of Kolara and Kobo. Source: Seignobos (2000d: 63)g
= estimated (based on increase of new settlements, own observations)
Between 1968 and 1984 the population increase in the Tupuri heartland was also only 1% per
year due to a high level of out-migration16. Between 1987 and 2001, another picture emerged:
the population of the whole Kar Hay sub-department increased from 71,985 to 116,006 which
is an increase of more than 60 %. 
For generations now, the population growth in the Tupuri heartland has been below the
national average (2.3 % in 2001) and even further below the Far North Province average
(3%)17. This is partly due to high out-migration figures. At the moment, the population densi-
ty of Tchatibali, the town, is higher than that of Sirlawé, the village (centre Tchatibali: 6828
inhabitants on 100 km2 (= 85/km2); Sirlawé has 2,386 inhabitants in an area of 40 km2 (=
60/km2)).
For Kolara and Kobo sub-districts, the population increases between 1968 and 1987 were
2% and 0% respectively. Even in 1997, the population density was very low (see Table 5.2.1).
I assume that the density in Kobo sub-district has increased particularly quickly after 1997 due
to the new settlements in the Kobo bush. Although the surface of the involved village areas is
known (200 km2 for Kolara and 55 km2 for Kobo) it is difficult to determine the population
density of the two villages. Because of the difference in concentrations of people in the cen-
tres and emptiness of the bush, a village average does not mean anything either. The numbers
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16 Sometimes the out-migration was spontaneous, at other times it was inflicted by institutionally organised re-
settlements, such as those of the SODECOTON (to enhance cotton production) to the Benoué region (see also
Zuiderwijk (1998)). 
17 Based on Seignobos (2000d: 63): between 1976 and 1995, the growth increased each year, from around 2.5%
initially to 5% later on.
1940 1958 1980 1997 2000
Kar Hay sub-department 25 - 40a 60b 100 (range 1-200)c n.av. 235d
Diamaré plain 10 - 25e n.av. 25 - 40e n.av. 50 - 60f
Kobo n.av. n.av. 4 (0-9)e 7 (1 - 25)f > 10g
Kolara n.av. n.av. 10 (0-50)e 30 (8-100)f > 40g
shown are based on settled people. If cattle nomads were also counted, population densities
would differ tremendously over the year. 
Additional information on population growth for the research villages can be found in
household composition data based on the interviews taken in May-June 2001. This data is
shown in Table 5.2.2.
Table 5.2.2 Mean number of children and wives per household, over the generations18
a = first number given is sons, second is daughters
b = this number will increase in the near future because half of the households are not yet fully grown19
c = this number will increase in the near future because 56 % of households are not yet fully grown.
d = these numbers are conservative, because respondents only count uncles and aunts they know. 
e = first number given relates to sons of father or grandfather, second number relates to daughters thereof (for
example, 67 + 60 means: 67 of respondents know something about the sons of their fathers and 60 know
something about daughters of the fathers.)
f = this is data for the Tupuri neighbourhoods studied in Kolara village
In reality it is very probable that the number of children per grandfather was higher20. That
would give weight to the idea that the total numbers of children per household head diminish
over the generations. Whether or not this is due to better healthcare, more education for girls,
increased population pressure, greater use of contraceptives or other reasons, is outside the
scope of the research. Only Kolara reveals a different picture if we examine the number of chil-
dren of respondents older then 50 years, but the ‘n’ is very low and the number of children per
grandfather is probably far too low21. 
In short, population densities in the heartland are high, those of the Diamaré villages are
high in the inhabited centres, but low when the surrounding bush is also included in the cal-
culations.
Land availability
In all three villages land availability diminished over the generations (see Table 5.2.3).
Although the figures of the different generations do not always cover the same area (as Tupuri
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18 Children that died before their 5th year are not counted, except for children currently in that age group.
19 If the father of the house is under 50 years of age the family is considered to be not fully grown.
20 Respondents do not know all their aunts, because these have married ‘away’. That less is known about the
number of aunts than the number of uncles is also revealed by the lower numbers of children in the case of
grandfathers, caused by more “I don’t knows” when asked about number of aunts. If this is the true explana-
tion, then the real number of children of grandfathers is higher, especially due to a higher than acknowledged
amount of grandfathers’ daughters.
21 Probably, respondents mention less than half the number of aunts that existed (97 aunts versus 195 uncles).
Child.  n of Child. n of Wives Child. n of Wives Child. n of Wives 
of respon- of resp. respon- of of fatherse of of grand- of
respon- dents > 50 dents respon- fathers fathers grand- fatherse grand-
dentsa years > 50 dents of respon- fathersd fathers
dents
Sirlawé 3.3+3.4b 68 9.8 29 1.7 12 67+60 2.9 13 54+49 3.1
Tchatibali 3.3+2.7c 87 8.3 38 1.6 11.8 85+84 2.9 11.8 7 +76 3.8
Kolaraf, b 3.8+4.1 37 13.2 17 1.6 11.7 36+36 2.6 8.6 35+34 2.6
tend to migrate a lot22), it does represent the trend of diminishing possibilities. In addition to
this decline over the generations, the table shows the lesser land availability in the heartland
compared to Kolara. There in the town of Tchatibali, people have the lowest amount of surface
area available for agriculture.  
Table 5.2.3 Mean surface of arable land (in ha) per household in three origin villages; divided per gener
ation and ownership (‘own’) and cropped (= ‘used’) or fallow23
a = first number is for 1999, the second for 2000. 
b = of the 37 respondents, 15 did not know the amount of ha of grandfathers and 10 only said that their grandfa
ther had “a lot of fields”. Conservatively counting “a lot” as the mean figure of the respondents themselves
(= 15.3) means that the mean for grandfathers would rise to 14
c = for Kolara the higher amount of fallow in 2000 was not due to fallow rotation to improve field fertility but
has to be attributed to the lack of rain at the end of the rainy season that made the cultivation of transplant
sorghum impossible.
NBthe difference between ‘total owned’ by respondents and what they say they have cropped plus left-over fal-
low is due to the fact that all given numbers are estimates.
In all three villages a mean household can more or less dispose of the necessary 0.25 ha per
person24, although in Tchatibali this amount is only just met. In addition, differences between
households are large (see Table 5.2.4).
Table 5.2.4 Surface of land per person (source: fieldwork 2001)
In the heartland, more than half of the households suffer from insufficient land surface. The
amount of fallow land needed to restore used fields, differs depending on soil type and the fer-
tility restoration pace. However, more households than those that do not have enough surface
area are unable to use the age-old fallow system any more.
In the three origin villages 4 % of respondents do not dispose of any own fields (2 of them
are not primarily farmer) with the highest number being in Tchatibali.
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22 See section 5.1.
23 Source: fieldwork May-July 2001.
Kolara Sirlawé Tchatibali
Respondent (own.) 3.83 2.65 2.03
Father (own) 4.75 (or more) 5.75 5.45
Grandfather (own) 3.23 (probably more)b 9.0 7.33
Respondent (used)a 1.78 and 2.50 2.33 and 2.83 1.55 and 1.48
Respondent (fallow)a 0.85 and 1.78 0.30 and 0.25 0.38 and 0.45c
Mean number Arable surface Mean surface Range of Number of
of persons per per household per person surface per households
household (ha) (ha) person (ha) with < 0.25 ha
per person
Sirlawé 9.4 2.65 0.28 0 - 1 23 (46%)
Tchatibali 8.6 2.03 0.24 0 - 2 49 (56%)
Kolara 10.5 3.83 0.36 0.13 - 6 5 (14%)
Land commoditisation
Obtaining extra space in addition to one’s own fields is becoming more difficult. In this respect,
the insecurity for the poor in particular is growing. The increasing pressure on the land theo-
retically leads to increases in its monetary value with free loans being less frequently available.
Tchatibali inhabitants in particular do not loan out their fields any longer. At least 10 % of the
respondents explained that their fathers (from time to time) used borrowed fields. For percent-
ages of the current population that hire or borrow fields, see Table 5.2.5. 
Table 5.2.5 Percentages of respondents hiring (plus prices) or borrowing fields (because people mostly do
not hire or borrow whole hectares, the table shows the prices per quart, which farmers call ‘a 
plot’)
a = this is the range, but mostly the price is 5 – 6000 Fcfa / quart.
It was impossible to ascertain whether or not the price of hiring a plot is higher now than in
the past.
Differences between rich and poor people increase as those with more fields have the
opportunity to make money out of the situation and the poor do not have the opportunity to
acquire additional land. Poor people in the Tupuri heartland expressed their current uneasiness
regarding the possibilities of accessing other people’s fallow land in the event that they had no
other opportunities. “I cannot afford to pay for a field. In the past I could use some of my
uncle’s or neighbour’s quarts, but I think they will charge me to do so in a couple of years”, is
a statement often heard.
Thus, although a real land market has not (yet) developed25, (poor) inhabitants feel a rising
insecurity.
Calorific needs and production
Amount of production
Production figures of both the heartland as well as Kolara village are based on fieldwork sur-
veys (May – July 2001). Because respondents are household heads, the figures given in tables
5.2.6 are also the production figures per household. No official records have been included
because neither agricultural services nor SODECOTON have village or neighbourhood figures
available26.
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24 Dietz et al (2001).
25 Platteau (1996: 69) explains that “the notion of land as a (freely tradable) commodity remains deeply alien to
most African people”, because of the high emotional and cultural value attached to land. Thus, the amount of
commoditisation may be an indicator of land scarcity, but it should not be compared with other geographical
areas.
26 According to the respondents, the years just before 1999 and 2000 were better because of the better rains, but
people do not remember the exact amounts.
% of respondents Prices for hiring % of respondents % of respondents
hiring fields (in Fcfa / qu) borrowing fields that bought fields
Sirlawé 20 2 - 5000 9 0
Tchatibali 14 3 - 7000a 5 0
Kolara 2 4000 16 0
Table 5.2.6a Production and used surface of respondents of Sirlawé in 1999 and 2000 (NB. ‘n.a.’ means ‘not
applicable’)
Table 5.2.6b Production and used surface of respondents of Tchatibali in 1999 and 2000
Table 5.2.6c Production and used surface of respondents of Kolara in 1999 and 2000
a = with ‘other’ is meant crops like Bambara groundnuts, fournion, etc.; potatoes, yams, manioc or fruit from trees
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1999 (n = 51) 2000 (n = 56)
Mean prod./ Mean surf./ Prod/ surf. Mean prod./ Mean surf./ Prod./surf.
resp. (kg) resp. (ha) (kg / ha) resp (kg) resp. (ha) (kg / ha)
Cotton 430.9 0.52 838 720.4 0.70 1031
Rain-fed sorghum 952.9 0.93 1020 957.1 0.98 973
Transplantsorghum 271.6 0.58 467 151.8 0.53 287
Maize 539.2 0.04 1291 61.6 0.06 950
Rice 0 0.00 0 0 0.01 0
Groundnut 35.7 0.10 343 57.6 0.10 600
Beans 79.2 0.17 474 72.3 0.23 318
Othera 119.6 0.20 610 103.8 0.20 528
Total n.a. 2.5 n.a. n.a. 2.8 n.a.
Fallow n.a. 0.32 n.a. n.a. 0.27 n.a.
All cereals 1278.4 1.56 820 1170.5 1.58 739
1999 (n = 87) 2000 (n = 87)
Mean prod./ Mean surf./ Prod/ surf. Mean prod./ Mean surf./ Prod./surf.
resp. (kg) resp. (ha) (kg / ha) resp (kg) resp. (ha) (kg / ha)
Cotton 62.9 0.15 421 45.4 0.07 631
Rain-fed sorghum 623 0.95 659 609 0.86 707
Transplant sorghum 139.7 0.26 528 137 0.30 458
Maize 2.3 0.00 800 17.2 0.01 1389
Rice 25.4 0.07 368 9.8 0.12 85
Groundnut 8.6 0.17 577 3.5 0.01 240
Beans 45.8 0.08 569 43.8 0.09 516
Othera 9.0 0.02 390 3.6 0.01 270
Total n.a. 1.7 n.a. n.a. 1.5 n.a.
Fallow n.a. 0.37 n.a. n.a. 0.21 n.a.
All cereals 790.3 1.28 617 774 1.29 601
1999 (n = 37) 2000 (n = 37)
Mean prod./ Mean surf./ Prod/ surf. Mean prod./ Mean surf./ Prod./surf.
resp. (kg) resp. (ha) (kg / ha) resp (kg) resp. (ha) (kg / ha)
Cotton 187.7 0.3 628 199 4.04 611
Rain-fed sorghum 1125 1.0 959 989 1.09 856
Transplant sorghum 1264 0.97 1124 61.4 0.07 782
Maize 2.19 0.01 350 5.9 0.09 786
Rice 0 0 n.a. 0 0 n.a.
Groundnut 7 0.01 120 4.1 0.24 171
Beans 63.5 0.13 480 57.3 0.14 400
Othera 8.6 0.01 842 5.4 0.13 526
Total n.a. 4.4 n.a. n.a. 1.9 n.a.
Fallow n.a. 0.83 n.a. n.a. 1.72 n.a.
All cereals 2392 2.0 554 1056 1.24 807
is not counted, because of the difficulty of expressing both the yield in kg or the used surface in ha. In general
only a very small proportion of the population cultivates these crops on a very small area.
In all three origin villages and over both years the crops show lower yields per ha than the
1988-1989 means for North Cameroon or the Diamaré as such27. The amount of maize pro-
duction differs a lot over the years, but is mostly higher than what Ali et al (1997) found for
the whole of North Cameroon. Surprisingly, in Sirlawé and in Tchatibali, a very high produc-
tion was achieved in two different years 28. The tables do not show a trend between 1999 and
2000 of lower or higher production, except for the cereals. These had a very low production in
2000 due to the extremely low precipitation. Over all three villages, production levels stayed
way below the figures of De Steenhuijsen Piters (1995, see note 27). An obvious difference
between the three villages cannot be discerned.
In the eyes of ordinary people yields are declining. Almost all respondents complained
about the difficulties of obtaining enough food from their own fields. They refer to their fathers
who, in their time, easily survived on the products from their own fields. Both the total arable
surface area per household and the production per ha was better then. “And”, many respon-
dents remark, “When they did not have enough space, they migrated to new and especially fer-
tile fields. In those days, such fields were easy to find”. 
Needs
Although energy needs differ over the year with differences in the amount of work per season
(see Chapter 3), for the sake of simplicity we use a simple sum to illustrate the extent to which
in all three origin areas calorific needs are met over the year. 
Table 5.2.7 Cereals needs and production per mean household in the three villages (in kg), according to the
perception of the respondents and to the calculation of the FAO29
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27 Ali, Peters and Fozein (11997) describe a year-production in the North of Cameroon of 
sorghum 1130 kg/ha
maize 740 kg/ha
groundnuts 820 kg/ha
beans 670 kg/ha
Their figures are those of 1988-1989, published in the regional analysis (1995) of SNV (a Dutch development
NGO, that works in Cameroon). FAO statistics has counted a mean production for the whole of Cameroon dur-
ing the 1990s of 869 kg/ha for sorghum, 1745 kg/ha for maize, 407 kg/ha for groundnuts and 838 kg/ha for beans.
During the first years of the new century, production levels were higher: the means for 2000-2003 were 1201 kg/ha
for sorghum, 2404 kg/ha for maize, 1076 kg/ha for groundnuts and 848 kg/ha for beans. However, the whole of
Cameroon is too big and too diverse, both climatically and with regard to soils, to make those figures adequate
(maize, for example, does produce very well in the southern regions as compared to the dry north). According to
De Steenhuijsen Piters (1995), sorghum yield in the early 1990s in the Diamaré was 1600-2500 kg/ha.
28 It is not possible to draw any conclusion because the total surface area cropped with maize was so low and the
work was carried out by so few people.
29 According to the FAO (FAO/WHO/UNU 1985) norms, the calorific need is 2500 kcal/adult (2300/woman and
2800/man) and 1670 kcal/per child per day (the latter is my own rough summation of different age-group
necessities); 1 kg cereals contains 3342 kcal (3000-3600 kcal).
Sirlawé Tchatibali Kolara
Needed Produced Needed Produced Needed Produced 
1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000
According to respondents 825 1278 1171 1250 790 774 1830 2392 1056
Acc. to FAO calculations 1984 n.a. n.a. 1827 n.a. n.a. 2178 n.a. n.a.
Table 5.2.7 shows that the perception of the inhabitants of the amount of cereals needed per
year is lower than that indicated by FAO figures. This is due to the fact that the FAO figures
shown are based on a diet of only cereals in order to meet calorific needs. As can be seen in
Table 5.2.6, other crops are cultivated as well. It is not surprising that, on average, Tchatibali
(the place with the lower arable surface area per household, a small number of cattle and a
town-like attitude) reports a cereal need that compares more with that of the FAO figures.
However, the fact that Kolara’s perceptions about needs compare even more significantly with
those of FAO is a miracle. 
Nevertheless, when the amount of calories produced in the total of the crops is compared with
the (FAO-calculated) needs, a general shortage in all three villages can be seen (Table 5.2.8). 
Table 5.2.8 Comparison of calorific needs and calorific production from agriculture per (mean) household
per year
Although, from time to time, Tupuri eat some meat or fish, cattle keepers and their family
members drink milk and everybody tries to gather some bush products in the pasture areas30,
the low calorific values in Tchatibali and Kolara in particular make one wonder about the food
status of the inhabitants of these villages.
Indeed, Table 5.2.7 also shows that only Sirlawé managed to produce enough kg of cereals
(according to respondents own perception on needs) over the two years. Tchatibali in particu-
lar was confronted by a considerable shortage. Two years of shortage in a row means that none
of last year’s stock can be used. In the villages, shortages can be even more disastrous for some
people because of the uneven distribution of production and needs (see also Table 5.2.9).
All the places of origin of the Tupuri regularly need external aid to supplement their food
requirements. Government aid (flour) was provided in the heartland in 2000 and 2001. In
2001, the Kolara area also received much needed flour from the government31. However, most
of the time, this aid does not meet the need per household and does not reach the households
that are most in need (see also note 31). People are embittered. They say, “In former times, we
normally had some millet left from other years to help us through the ‘soudure’32. Nowadays,
even when the rains are good, yields are low and the area of usable fields is even smaller.”
Of course, what a household head states as being required for his compound family differs
from person to person and from household to household because such needs are affected by
the ages of the children and the status of women (lactating, pregnant). Obviously, some fami-
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30 In Sirlawé, with its already brighter calories picture, the livestock situation, and thus the possibility of acquir-
ing additional calories from meat and milk, is better.
31 In fact this came down to (in some cases) only one calabash of flour for a family of more than 6 persons. Some
respondents told me that they thought it shameful to come home with a handful of flour that could not even
feed the children for one day and therefore did not even want to collect it.
32 That is the yearly hunger period of the rainy season.
Kcal needed Kcal produced 1999 Kcal produced 2000
Sirlawé 6 547,735 5 083,082 4 768,129
Tchatibali 6 029,800 2 868,024 2 734,667
Kolara 7 187,945 3 861,636 3 514,253
lies house more guests than others, some families experience more deaths in a year and have
to provide for more funeral rituals and the accompanying guests, etc.
Table 5.2.9 Percentage of households without enough cereals or calories from agriculture.
a = people’s perception of need measured against production
b = FAO’s figures of need measured against production
Of the households with two consecutive years of a shortage in agricultural production, only
five (11 %) could make up for that with their animals (using milk and meat, within the normal
offtake rate). Nineteen households (40 %) did not have any animals. The rest would have to
use more than the normal offtake and will therefore lose out in a couple of years, sometimes
within just one year. Most of the households in such a situation do not totally eat up their live-
stock. They go on hoping for miracles and/or prefer to sell. Above all, one last and usually
meagre goat does not add much to the total food supply. 
A comparison of Tables 5.2.8 and 5.2.9 indicates that the food situation in Sirlawé is the
best of the three villages of origin, but a substantial part is still suffering from calorific short-
ages. On the other hand, the households with a shortage in Kolara have a very high shortage
because a relatively low number share a high level of total lack.
It is important to measure the way inhabitants interpret the insecurity of the food situation
and not only the calorific supply. In this culture, only cereals are seen as a real meal and all the
other calorie providers are regarded as ‘taste-givers’ or just ‘extras’. Thus, because the amount
of cereals does not meet the villagers’ expectations, the general vision of the inhabitants is that
the food situation is insecure. 
5.2.2 Human domain insecurities
Health insecurities
Declining food production and inappropriate aid distribution due to corruption and adminis-
trative disorder33 means the energy and protein needs of the population are not (always) met
(see above). This decreases resistance to diseases, minimises labour capacity and causes stunt-
ed growth in children, both physically and mentally. 
Access to ‘modern’ healthcare is difficult because of a lack of money and because of long
distances. This is especially true for Sirlawé that does not have even a small nursery post, and
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33 For example, in June-July 2001, radio announcements promised governmental aid for the Far North Province
of 300,000 tons of rice or maize flour. When the flour finally arrived in Kolara village, only those with good
relations with the chief knew about it and managed to obtain some, whether they needed it or not. Yet, they all
ended up with very small amounts due to the fact that only a small proportion of what should have been
brought to the village had actually been delivered.
Not enough cerealsa Not enough caloriesb
1999 2000 Both years 1999 2000 Both years
Sirlawé 76 78 59 24 29 13
Tchatibali 80 73 70 55 64 42
Kolara 38 71 31 13 34 6
for Kolara that only has a small ‘dispensary’. The hospital in Tchatibali is bigger but still does
not have many facilities. More often than not, vaccination campaigns do not reach the popu-
lation. Sometimes this is due to a lack of involvement of the population itself and sometimes
to poor organisation or a lack of necessary equipment. At the end of the dry season of 2001,
for example, the Tupuri heartland was hit by a measles epidemic because of a regional short-
age of vaccines. As a result, a lot of children and several adults without immunity died. 
Traditional health systems were more embedded in the social fabric of the community and
payment could take forms other than monetary ones or could be postponed until, for example,
the patient had recovered. However, traditional healthcare is declining. In the heartland the
remaining small holy bushes next to the chiefs’ compounds cannot make up for the disappear-
ance of the bush and its supply of traditional medicines. In the longer run, a loss of tradition-
al knowledge of health issues is a serious risk.
In all three origin villages drinking water is supplied during the dry season via dug wells.
Unfortunately most of these are not covered and are therefore usually contaminated. 
Educational insecurities
Access to knowledge and information, both for daily life affairs and to improve human capac-
ity in the long run is a difficult business. The quality of school teachers is not as it used to be
because of a lack of training places. Nowadays, most primary schools perform their jobs with
only one graduated ‘director’ and several ‘parent’ teachers who are young people who have
sometimes not even finished their own secondary school education and who are paid by the
parents of the children attending the school. This means that the policy of free primary schools
is, in practice, being replaced by a system of school fees and (to cut down on expenses) class-
es of sometimes over 80 pupils. A lack of school utensils and books completes the grim pic-
ture that has arisen since the economic crisis of the early 1990s. Education to secondary school
level or higher is beyond the financial reach of most inhabitants of the three origin villages.
On the other hand, as is described in section 5.2.3 on the economic insecurities, those that
did receive a higher education were unable to find work. They returned home to take up agri-
culture again. In Sirlawé and Tchatibali this was the case of several frustrated young men who
had received an agricultural or technical high-school education. Here the macro economic
insecurity leads to personal frustrations because of a lack of possibilities to put capabilities
(which have been heavily invested in) to work and to enhance people’s individual situations.
5.2.3 Economic insecurities  
Cash crop insecurities
Cash crop production is suffering from a lack of agricultural fields, poor soils, a low market price
in general and too variable precipitation. In the past (1950 onwards), the Tupuri heartland gained
a great deal from adopting cotton production in a time that world market prices for cotton were
high. Since the second half of the 1980s, however, these plummeted and they have still not recov-
ered34. Nevertheless, for most peasants, cotton is the only way of acquiring some surplus money.
In optimal circumstances a production of 1400 kg per ha/year is possible (giving a profit of
approximately 200,000 Fcfa). Although in village circumstances production never reaches this
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34 According to Oxfam International (2004) world cotton prices have fallen by half since the mid-1990s. 
amount35, almost all younger, male cultivators perceive the growing of cotton as the only way to
earn some cash to meet household needs such as clothing and housing, but also calamities such
as illnesses and death36, or educational dispenses.
For that reason many farmers invest in cotton production37. They use the credit option of the
SODECOTON at the onset of the rainy season to buy their seeds (cost 600 Fcfa/ha), the indis-
pensable chemical fertiliser (48,000 Fcfa/ha) and herbicide (6400 Fcfa/ha) from this institu-
tion38. To cultivate cotton they need a plough, a weeding device and a device to make the lit-
tle dikes on which the cotton plants stand (‘corps biteur’). After the harvest, several farmers
are unable to make ends meet due to insufficient production: they have to pay back their loans
at the moment they need the money for school fees, or to enter the market at a favourable
moment to purchase agricultural equipment, extra millet as a stock for worse times etc. They
then do not have enough food in the following sowing season and have to buy food at high
prices, using the credit of SODECOTON for their cotton. If the rains fail they are worse off
because of their debts (see Table 5.2.10).
Table 5.2.10 Number of respondents that did not cultivate enough cotton to make up for the investment and
the range of money they lacked 39
The lack of cotton yield is sometimes accompanied by a lack of calorie-production for subsis-
tence purposes. 
Wallidjo from Tchatibali (32 years old; 3 wives and 7 children) had a debt at SODECOTON of
101,080 Fcfa at the end of the 1999 harvest. He had sown 2 ha of cotton but, because of floods there
was zero yield. Fortunately, that year the yield of the food crops had been good and he had pro-
duced a surplus of 370 kg above the calorific needs of his household. This is an equivalent of
approximately 30,000 Fcfa at the moment of harvest. However, in 2000, the cotton failed again due
to a lack of rain (and, says Wallidjo, because his fields are not fertile, and he has no money to buy
more fertiliser). This time the debt amounted to 35,187 Fcfa and the food crops did not generate
enough yields to meet the calorific needs, being 123 kg short. To buy this in the form of cereals,
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35 Raemaekers (2001: 1061): 1400 kg/ha is possible, but normally the production is 330 – 1110 kg/ha. He iden-
tifies the West African countries as the highest producers.
36 The death of a family member is not only a sad occasion, but also means a burial ceremony has to be organ-
ised for the whole village and many  family members and friends who come to visit from far-flung places for
at least a couple of days. All these guests have to be offered meat and beer; the musicians have to be paid, etc.
Such a ceremony is therefore an expensive event.
37 Cotton is a specifically male crop and is not cultivated by many women although, very often, they help their
husbands with the cultivation work.
38 Because it is this organisation that sets the prices, in the whole Far North Province the prices are the same.
39 For the total number of people that cultivated cotton see section 5.3.3.
1999 2000
Number of respon- Range of Number of Range of
dents (and shortage (Fcfa) respondents shortage (Fcfa)
percentage) (and percentage)
Sirlawé 6 (10 %) 245 - 25,270 3 (5 %) 5,624 - 6,734
Tchatibali 7 (8 %) 560 - 10,1080 3 (3 %) 4,366 - 35,187
Kolara 2 (5 %) 6,720 - 40,080 3 (8 %) 3,360 - 36,800
Wallidjo would have had to spend 9,840 Fcfa. However, because he obviously did not have the
money, he had to wait and had to pay the higher ‘soudure’ price of 2001: 24,600 Fcfa. In short, over
the two years, Wallidjo built up a debt of 130,876 Fcfa.
In short, cotton is regarded as a necessary profit-generating crop, but production levels vary
widely between the different producers and over the years40. For an individual farmer, thus, it
is an insecure investment.
The same can be said of groundnuts. With hindsight it is possible to detect whether or not
it would have been better to invest in an additional field of cereals instead (see Table 5.2.11).
Table 5.2.11 Benefit calculation with alternative of rain-fed sorghum production instead of groundnuts41
Table 5.2.11 shows that in Kolara and Tchatibali groundnut production in 2000 was less prof-
itable than sorghum production (compare column four with seven)42. The rest of the time and
at the other places the reverse was the case. For a farmer the choice is difficult, because the
outcome is not sure. Other considerations also play a role. For example, the fact that the rota-
tion of crops, especially in the case of groundnuts, is better for the soil and for pest prevention. 
Insecurities with regard to farm animals
With regard to animal husbandry, a more insecure situation has also developed compared to
that of ancestors. In general, there has been a decline in numbers of cattle per household over
the years. The number of livestock possessed per household head43 is higher in Sirlawé than in
Tchatibali (see Table 5.2.12).
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40 De Steenhuijsen Piters (1995: 91) measured a difference of mean cotton yield over two years of 520 and 1000
kg / ha. The variation between the farmers was as much as 40 to 2530 kg / ha. A comparable variation can be
observed in the three origin villages of this study.
41 This calculation is based on the December prices of both peanuts (26 000 Fcfa per 100 kg) and sorghum
(10,000 Fcfa per 100 kg).
42 Under the condition that, for both crops, the seeds are already available in the household (meaning no pur-
chasing costs) and labour demands are more or less the same and do not compete.
Mean 1999 groundnut production per producer Sorg. prod. 1999
1999
n In kg In Fcfa Used ha Fcfa / ha Alternative 
benefit
Sirlawé 10 182 47,320 0.53 65,900 34,927
Tchatibali 5 150 39,000 0.26 102,000 26,520
Kolara 8 32.5 8,450 0.06 95,900 5,754
Mean 2000 groundnut production per producer Sorgh. prod. 2000
2000
n In kg In Fcfa Used ha Fcfa / ha Alternative 
benefit
Sirlawé 17 190 49,400 0.31 70,700 21,917
Tchatibali 4 75 19,500 0.31 97,300 30,163
Kolara 6 25 6,500 0.15 85,600 12,840
Table 5.2.12 Number of some farm animals per household in current and former generation
a = these figures are based on a very small number of answers because most respondents did not know how large
their fathers’ flocks were. Thus, although all respondents that did know the answer always stated that their
fathers had more stock than they themselves, sometimes the village mean seems to have been lower in the
fathers’ generation. This is due to the fact that those respondents owned themselves a lower than (this-gener-
ation) village mean.
A decline in cattle numbers per household is not per se due to a rising scarcity of grazing areas.
During the 1970s - 1980s in the whole province, the numbers of cattle declined because of the
drought (Seignobos 2000e: 115). Tupuri did not escape this disaster and they have still not
returned to pre-drought figures. Table 5.2.13 shows trends from 1950 onwards.
Table 5.2.13 Number or density of cattle over the years and per region.
Source: Seignobos (2000e: 115-119); Boutrais (1984: 433); Beauvillain (1989: 428); Djonwé 
2001)
a = this increase is mainly due to a rise in numbers in the Logone floodplain since the restoration of the flooding
by the Waza-Logone project.
b = a large part thereof are the cattle of nomads and rich cattle owners from the towns.
Part of the decline of cattle numbers per household in the heartland is due to a decline in graz-
ing area44. As has been mentioned before, Tupuri adopted cattle-keeping as a lifestyle in addi-
tion to their agricultural activities more than three hundred years ago. They used to live in areas
where wild bush could support extensive herds. Because they managed to withstand the Fulbe
and other cattle nomads, they did not need to share their grazing lands with others. However,
over the years, with the growing numbers of people, bush land decreased and sometimes dis-
appeared altogether, as is now the case in the town of Tchatibali. Although a small band of
grazing land is left for Tchatibali cattle owners, it is far from the city centre and it is far too
small for all inhabitants to graze a substantial amount of cattle on. In addition, most respon-
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43 For the Tupuri cattle are mainly, if not solely, men’s property.
44 According to Gaston (1996: 75 etc.) each TLU in the non-mountainous Sahelo-Sudan zone needs at least 4.5
ha/year. Depending on soils and rainfall, etc. this can amount to 9 ha/TLU (see chapter 4, section 2.1).
Mean cattle / Mean cattle / Mean small Mean small Mean chicken /
household  household ruminants / ruminants / household
in former of household household of
generation respondents in former of respondents
generationa respondents
Sirlawé 8.9 7.2 8.4 10.9 16
Tchatibali 5.2 2.0 7.2 7.0 8
Kolara 7.4 7.2 6.5 8.6 12
1950 1980 1987 1993 1998
Far North Province 484,000 cattle 908,000 cattle 605,333 cattle 689,040 cattle 1 147,038a cattle
Kar Hay department 12 - 25 cattle / 25 - 50 cattle / 15 - 30 cattle / n.av. 44,400 cattle
km2 km2 km2
Mindif region 7 - 17 cattle / 10 - 25 cattle / 5 - 15 cattle / n.av. 60,000b cattle
km2 km2 km2
dents in Tchatibali are too impoverished to have cattle at all. As a consequence, the amount of
cattle dung available to fertilise the fields has also diminished45.
Even in Sirlawé, where a pasture area has been retained which is big enough for the whole
village to graze their cattle (see Box 5.1), grazing possibilities have diminished because of bad
management. 
Box 5.1 Pasture-land project in Sirlawé
In Kolara people do not consider a future lack of grazing space as a problem. They perceive
the proximity of the bush as a perfect grazing option. It is the lack of agricultural land in the
village itself that bothers them. This, and the minimal harvest yields, threatens their daily exis-
tence. Nevertheless, for the cattle owners, the immigration of more and more cattle-keeping
nomads each year is a threat to their grazing options. Some of them, with substantial herds,
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45 A rough calculation reveals that for the production of 500 kg of cereals in the Sudano-Sahel zone 3.5 TLU is
needed (Breman, pers. comm., in Leloup 1994).
In Sirlawé a mutual Swiss – Cameroonian government project installed a grazing area of
approximately 25 ha some 30 years ago. In fact it was part of an agricultural learning centre
at Dadjamka, a village just north of Sirlawé, whose aim was to invite couples to spend a year
at their premises to find out about modern and integrated agricultural systems. For that reason
the Swiss needed arable land in addition to range lands and they expropriated large amounts
of ancestral fields, mostly from Sirlawé inhabitants without prior consultation or reimburse-
ments. Nevertheless, after some time the Sirlawé agriculturists came to appreciate the pasture
zone because it fulfilled their need. After a few years the Swiss withdrew, as was the original
plan, and handed the centre over to what they called ‘local people’. However, the director, a
graduate of the agricultural University of Dschang, is not a local at all. Although he is from
the Far North Province, he is not a Tupuri, let alone from Sirlawé. In addition, meeting the
centre’s financial obligations is a difficult task. It should have been self-sufficient, but this
appears not to be possible. At the moment the institution is under threat. The director of the
Dadjamka agricultural learning centre tends to lend pieces of the grazing lands to (mostly ‘for-
eign’, i.e. not from Sirlawé or Dadjamka) cultivators, probably to boost his own income. He
himself, however, explains that his actions are based on the difficult financial position of the
centre as a whole. 
The diminishing pasture area annoys the former land owners. As more than one Sirlawé
inhabitant told me “I gave up parts of my land to be used as pasture, because I think it is nec-
essary to have cattle in the village to fertilise the soil and to provide milk for the children, but
that man at the agricultural centre is having outsiders cut the trees and brushes and use the
area again as fields. Now our cattle have less area in which to find fodder”. 
Bad management has changed a situation of common grazing lands into one of “the tragedy
of open access” (see Hardin (1968) and others who enhanced his paradigm, such as Ostrom
(1990)). Because bush land is given to incoming people the local inhabitants, who perceive
the land as theirs in the first place, also start using it for agriculture:  “It is no use to wait until
all those others have cleared the bush and there is nothing left for us, neither for grazing nor
for cultivating, not even one parcel.” And they refer to Tchatibali where people complain of
both a lack of fields and a lack of pastures.
explain that they seek other places to send their flock, like the grass fields of Chad or
Adamawa46. However, if the herd is not within reach, it is more difficult to control herders and
this leads to bigger losses47.
Yet, the level of possession of cattle and small ruminants by Tupuri in Kolara village is, like
in the heartland, lower than in former generations (see Table 5.2.12). This trend of fewer cat-
tle started one or two generations ago. Older people complain about the diminishing of cattle
numbers: “when I was a boy we could drink a lot of milk.” And indeed, not only the total num-
ber of cattle has decreased but also the relative number of cows, because more bulls and oxen
are kept as draught animals. There are several Tupuri nowadays who have lost their ability to
handle cattle, as they never had the chance to get used to it. When they are in a position to pos-
sess them again (or use them for labour) their capability to handle their animals, to recognise
illness, to treat them with (traditional) medicines etc. fails and they risk losing their cattle
because of excessively late or erroneous actions. 
Although Cameroon has a network of veterinary services and has managed to eradicate
some of the widespread cattle diseases by way of vaccination (rinderpest; pleura- pneumonia,
anthrax), proper access to veterinary aid is expensive. Several minor, but economically impor-
tant (especially for the small owner) diseases continue to exist and modern medicines are
almost non-obtainable. On the whole, a lot of owners lose animals each year due to disease
(see Table 5.2.14). On the market, cheaper medicines can be found, but their effectiveness is
disputable. 80 % of respondents who had had to deal with animal diseases over the last years
referred to the use of market medicines being a waste of money.
Table 5.2.14 Number of households of respondents that lost animals because of disease
With regard to small ruminants, a lack of knowledge about simple accommodation measures
and anti-diarrhoea treatments during the rainy season causes unnecessary losses. Veterinary
services did not develop vaccination programmes for small ruminants with enough enthusi-
asm and information to motivate owners, nor with the same strict implementation and con-
trol measures as for cattle vaccinations. For this group of livestock, as well as for chickens,
epidemics of endemic diseases are normal. The widespread markets visited and the friend-
ly exchange of animals does not help to keep diseases in check, but that is not a new phe-
nomenon. 
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46 For example, the village chief of Kolara (a Fulbe) wants to transfer his herd to Adamawa. But rich Tupuri
explained that they also use this strategy.
47 See, for example, Van Driel (2001).
Cattle Small Chicken Ducks Pigs Donkeys Total
ruminants
Sirlawé Households with animal losses 7 28 14 3 0 0 34
Households with animals 35 46 44 17 4 0 55
Tchatibali Households with animal losses 0 39 62 2 1 0 72
Households with animals 29 67 67 37 61 1 84
Kolara Households with animal losses 2 19 22 0 1 0 31
Households with animals 16 25 31 19 16 13 34
Another insecurity as regards farm animals is their vulnerability to theft. In the densely pop-
ulated heartland areas this is virtually non-existent because of the high levels of social control.
However, the more extended bush lands of Kolara, where the herds and flock graze, are more
difficult to control. Almost 30 % of the inhabitants there complained about the loss of rumi-
nants by theft somewhere in the last 5 years. According to the chief of Gadjia, a village near
Kolara, the number of thefts in the region has increased over the years.
Insecurities with regard to non-agricultural activities
Off-farm activities
Sirlawé and Kolara inhabitants could only start off-farm labour when they migrated away.
However, in general they do not perform migrant labour. Only 1 person among all respondents
tried his luck in Chad or other parts of Cameroon during the dry season. In the villages them-
selves both civil servant jobs as well as industrial jobs are not available, apart from a couple
of posts as school teacher (for at the most 5 of the village inhabitants), or extension officer (less
than 3 of the villagers). These jobs are not always given to local inhabitants. In particular, posts
which require more highly educated staff are occupied by people from the city. They some-
times come from the south and mostly have family relations within the system. Younger, more
highly-educated Tupuri complain about the lack of governmental jobs. When they started their
high schools and further education they had hoped for an increase in the demand for their capa-
bilities but “the number of jobs for the government seems to decrease each day.”48 Moreover,
people have to travel a lot to trade. Because safety on the roads changes a lot, long distance
trade can be a risky undertaking. Again, only 1 % of respondents supplements his income by
way of trade.
In Tchatibali, on the other hand, SODECOTON installed a cotton processing factory in
1982 that provided several jobs for less educated workers. In June 2001, four percent of the
people from Tchatibali Centre found a job there. However, during the last couple of years,
rumours have spread that SODECOTON is due to close down this factory and employees are
therefore very unsure about their future income position.
The higher population numbers here, and especially those of officials49, merchants and
truck-drivers50, offer more possibilities for shops, restaurants and bars. In the centre of
Tchatibali there are officially eight bars and restaurants and four shops. But, again, the num-
ber of customers will decline if the factory closes. In addition, after each heavy downpour, the
road to the south (the Chadian border) is blocked by the gendarmes to protect it from being
ruined by excessively heavy traffic51. In 2001, several shopkeepers complained about the lack
of customers compared to the past. 
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48 More than one respondent uttered such a phrase during the fieldwork.
49 As a district and trade centre, Tchatibali town has a sub-prefecture, a police post and a gendarmerie. 
50 The town is situated on the crossroads of several important trade routes which, for example, lead to Chad in
the south. In addition, heavy traffic is also related to the cotton factory.
51 This can easily be circumvented by bribery: who pays, goes. However, in the longer run this is contra-pro-
ductive. When the road is ruined, nobody can pass.
On-farm activities
On-farm or house industry opportunities depend on, among other things, the availability of raw
materials. Mostly these are growing in wild bush locations. Then again, the town does not offer
enough supplies, and even in the village of Sirlawé the decline in the bush area is leading to a
decrease in the availability of materials like grasses for mats, granaries and roofs. In Kolara
the bush offers possibilities, but gathering always, means a long walk and an arduous return
trip. Only a very low percentage of respondents owns a cart or wheelbarrow. 
It is also difficult to gain access to wider markets, both for home-made merchandise and for
agricultural products. In several neighbourhoods of the three villages there are only small
weekly markets at which local products are sold and bought by locals themselves. Tchatibali
town market, which takes place every Thursday, is somewhat better equipped, even offering
fresh fish, pottery and, when the season permits, guinea fowl eggs, for which the region is
famous and which attract outsiders. But again, in the event of diminishing rains, the fowls can-
not find enough food and the number of eggs therefore drops.
Many women brew sorghum beer in order to sell the surplus at the market or for use at
drinking parties at home. However, insufficient sorghum production for use as subsistence
food also has a detrimental effect on these possibilities. 
In general the inhabitants of the three villages do not have much trust in economic options
other than agriculture. 
5.2.4 Social insecurities
Family and clan insecurities
In the social domain, bonds between different (sub) groups as well as linkages from group to
group and from one level to the other are important. Insecurities arise from the fact that fami-
ly ties weaken. For example, in the past, fathers with cattle helped their sons to pay the bride
price, but nowadays even a goat or two pieces of cloth are asking too much. In the past, out-
migrating brothers and uncles kept their contacts with those that stayed behind. Within the
migration tradition of Tupuri the moving frontier was seen as an outpost of the clan and the
family. Most of the time, the new area was connected with the old one by a series of micro-
migrations and in-between settlements. The whole area became the property of the whole lin-
eage52. Today migration is discontinuous in the sense that between an existing settlement and
a new one, large areas of non-group territory are situated. Although in modern times transport
is far easier using bush taxis, bicycles and even private motorcycles, distances are regarded as
long. Next to that, modern times require the building ‘of a new life’ in new areas, instead of
perceiving this new life as an extension of the old one. 
Individualisation grows. Waibe (63 year)53 complains about the behaviour of his oldest son: 
“I suffered to let him go to school. Because I sold all my cattle, he was able to attend sec-
ondary school. But now he is a policeman, and thus works where Biya sends him, he never
visits me anymore. Nor does he send any money, while I have nothing left. He certainly
earns enough. He does not even help to pay the school fees for his younger brothers. The
only person he cares about is himself!” 
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52 For the same mechanism in other parts of Africa see e.g. Perrot (2000).  
53 Tchatibali, June 2001.
The age-old obligation of looking after one’s mother and father seems to be declining. Only
35 - 40 % of the respondents seem to be bothered by the feeling of such an obligation (even
fewer people in Kolara, as can be understood from their shorter period of settlement there).
Moreover, the thought that somebody should look after the fields - and even the graves - of
ancestors is becoming obsolete. This is partly due to the increase in Christianity (34 % of
respondents is of the Christian faith while only 12 % of their fathers adheres to that religion).
Also the possibility of falling back on brothers etc. in times of hardship or when in need of
cash for investment (in merchandise or schooling) meets with more restrictions nowadays.
Those brothers with higher positions elsewhere, for example, seem to have loosened their ties
with younger brothers and sisters at home. Less than half of the population now counts on fam-
ily in times of crisis54.
The bride price institution that used to serve as a security valve for older parents and that
linked brothers and sisters to each other is on the decline. In the past, cattle received as bride
price for daughters were sold directly for other needs, kept for the future or used to marry-off
sons. But nowadays bride prices are lower than a generation ago. Mohammadou (1988: 107)
mentions a bride price in Tupuri neighbourhoods of Moulvoudaye in 1956 of more than 10 cat-
tle per marriage. Fathers of marriageable daughters now expect at the most three cattle. On top
of that, these days most young men marry without having paid their whole bride price and are
therefore indebted to their family-in-law. There are also couples who do not even consider
sticking to the old tradition. This lessens the direct burden on the young couple, but it decreas-
es the bonds with parents generations55 and brides’ brothers who still (have to) give in to the
payment of the bride price. The current vagueness of bride prices makes the whole situation
unclear and thus insecure.
When social capital declines, possibilities for organising collective investments decline as
well. Sometimes, when a group manages to organise something, the lack of bonds makes the
people involved choose for themselves instead of for the community. An example of this is the
theft by the treasurer of the money collected in the Yolawo neighbourhood for the construction
of a new well56. At the same time an attack on capital in other domains can no longer be coun-
tered with the help of the social bonds and linkages of the past. Claiming one’s right is more
easily done when backed by a strongly linked group.
Political insecurities
A feeling of belonging is also important for vertical linkages to politicians. A group needs to
feel represented at the higher political and administrative levels and needs to have trust in its
representatives. When these are of the same ethnicity and are shown to be connected to the eth-
nic group, this group has a platform in the political arena to voice its interests. This has to be
accompanied by an implementation of general development efforts and effective conflict pre-
vention measures, otherwise such a group can feel alienated and the political domain can start
to booster conflicts.
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54 The family is regarded as a security valve by 41 % of Sirlawé, only 14 % in Tchatibali and 29 % in Kolara.
55 More than one young, married, man has major rows with his father-in-law because he did not pay (and will
not pay) the bride price this father thinks is necessary. These fathers also have quarrels with their daughters
because they do not obey the command to leave their young husbands who do not pay the bride price.
56 This example shows a positive aspect that I will deal with in the investment section.
With the growing strictness of president Biya’s reign from the beginning of the 1980s onwards,
Tupuri had to withdraw more and more from the political arena. When, in 1984, not only north-
erners from the Fulbe ethnicity, but also from the Tupuri elite corps appeared to be involved in
the coup against the president, the feelings of the political party in power turned against Tupuri.
Not only were the fragile attempts to establish a multi-party system totally dropped for a number
of years, but when it got momentum (at the beginning of the 1990s: see Ch. 4) the Tupuri party
encountered only distrust and deliberate counteractions by the government.  
Nowadays, lots of Tupuri complain about the lack of secrecy during elections, and they
abstain from voting for their ‘own’ party out of fear. “If you do not support the RDPC57 you
will never get a governmental job or even famine relief aid”. Joining the ranks of the MDR58
to empower that party is, evidently, out of the question. Both in the heartland and in Kolara
village only 14 % of the population dared to admit their support for the MDR during the elec-
tions and that applied only to municipal elections. The number is half this in the case of elec-
tions for the national assembly or presidency. How many people actually vote for the MDR
remains a secret but the election outcomes suggest that it is, indeed, a very small number.
Because of that, political representation of Tupuri is low and they feel ‘forgotten’. “The gov-
ernment does a lot for the whole country”, they say, “But what has it done for us?”
Indeed, several times over the last five years the government agency that should see to the
construction of a water point took the money collected by the community but never supple-
mented the rest, nor sent workers to fix the well in question.
The difficulty of a multiparty system under an enlightened dictator is clearly demonstrated
by the events of the 1997 municipality elections and their aftermath in the Kolara/Kobo region.
After extra efforts from the politically aware Tupuri, the MDR succeeded in getting a MDR
mayor in 1997 in the Moulvoudaye community (under which ranks both Kolara and Kobo
resort). However, within two years this man surrendered to the ongoing pressure of the admin-
istrators surrounding him and changed his party membership for one of the RDPC. His con-
stituency was deeply disappointed. Some of them have now announced that they will vote
directly for the RDPC next time, instead of via a detour59, although this will not result in any
more implementations of their needs.
For many Tupuri the democratic system did not bring them more rights and security. Given
the distrust of the ruling party towards them, the fraud that took place during elections and the
pressure exerted on party members, getting their needs fulfilled is more difficult than in the
past. “Being a citizen of Cameroon with democratic rights does not mean the same for each
and everyone”60.
Conflict mediation
The modern system led only to ambiguities about legitimate authorities. Particularly in the
case of conflict mediation, which in the past was the domain of the village chief, all the dif-
ferent roles and positions make the outcome of a conflict unsure. Discords are not solved strict-
ly by the village chief anymore. Instead, the parties involved can choose to approach other
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57 Rassemblement Démocratique des Peuples Camerounais,  the party of president Biya.
58 Mouvement Démocratique pour la Défense de la République, the Tupuri’s party.
59 Indeed, in the municipal elections of 2002, the Moulvoudaye population elected an(other) RDPC mayor.
60 More than half of the respondents in the three origin villages voiced this idea. In the Kolara and Kobo settle-
ments the number of persons who experienced this frustration was even higher (80 %).
authorities directly or later, if they are not satisfied with the chief’s decision. For example, the
village chief of Sirlawé had to visit the sub-prefect in Doukoula with two parties in a conflict,
because the accused party did not want to accept his condemnation. This party (two inhabitants
of Sirlawé) had not used the fertiliser that was collectively bought to increase the yield of a
quart of their fields that was agreed to be used for a common goal of the same group. They had
sold it. During the harvest their yields appeared to be lower than expected. Nevertheless, they
wanted to participate in the group’s stock possibility and the selling of sorghum when the price
would be high. The other members of the group wanted to kick them out or wanted them to
pay back the profit of the fertiliser sold. As far as the accusing party was concerned, this ‘shop-
ping’ for justice cost money and time in a period of harvest, and outcomes are more depend-
ent on bribery. 
In the Tupuri tradition, women had an important role in conflict mediation and prevention.
Old mothers (Wog Clu) could call conflicting parties before them to decide how to settle the
discord. On the other hand, certain women (Naré Bounsonre) have contacts with god or ances-
tors as well as with nature and they can communicate advice and instructions to prevent dis-
turbances of the peace. Some of these women only became active to warn against bad spirits
that try to disturb relationships between community members or when natural disasters will
strike. Others had the task of looking after daily conflicts and consulting the ancestors in order
to reconcile them. However, the traditional concept of peace is disappearing and with it the
role of women in conflict mediation (Ngongo Mbédé 2003). 
Because the gurna (see note 6) is the place where Tupuri discuss and fix morality and val-
ues, it is another important institution in the realm of conflict prevention and mediation. In the
songs and dances, misbehaviour (even of powerful persons) is ridiculed and publicly
denounced, but the people who are the object of the derision also have the right to take revenge
and clarify their case61, as in a judicial court. However, with the migration to towns, the
increase of modernity and the loss of cattle, this institution risks suffering a decrease in sig-
nificance and ultimately disappearing altogether.
Land allocation and insecurities
As has been mentioned in section 2.1, access to (new) land is becoming more difficult and
depends on social relationships. According to Tupuri tradition, land is inherited by married
sons. Once cleared, land is the possession of the clearer and his off-spring. As in most parts of
Africa, without the addition of new area, the division of land amongst all sons makes the inher-
itance per person smaller every generation. Therefore, occasionally a specific son is the only
one to inherit from the father. Some Tupuri say that only the eldest gets it, others say land can
be allocated to the youngest son if he has the special task of looking after his father, while his
elder brother has the more pioneering function. In general, younger sons have fewer chances
to inherit since by the time they get married, their elder brothers will have already received
everything there is to allocate. In today’s reality, all sorts of sons can inherit in all sorts of com-
binations. Even cousins and nephews can inherit62. The personal relationship between the
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61 See, e.g., Ignatowski (2001).
62 In the past, this was a good method for making sure that the land would stay in the hands of the family once
the first clearer and his off-spring left the area. For them this would more or less guarantee that they could
come back and take up cultivation on the same fields, should the move turn out to be disastrous.
father and the son (or even with the mother of the son) is becoming more and more important.
Fathers tend to give some land to married sons while they themselves are still alive, but then
again they do so only to those sons they feel affinity with.
In the case of borrowing and even hiring and buying, social bonds with the owner are also
important. It appears that just being family is not always enough anymore, even when the
uncles or cousins dispose of a large area themselves. They feel too much of a distance with
these non-direct family members and would prefer, for example, to sell to the highest bidder.
In addition, in the past being a neighbour could be seen as a relationship that secured mutual
use of fields, but nowadays borrowing is only possible from so-called ‘friends’. This is a high-
ly insecure position, as friendships can easily end because of minor quarrels, or because of the
passing to another generation. For example, somebody may have a kind of life-long appoint-
ment with a friend to use one of his fields but the moment this friend dies, his offspring will
claim the borrowed field back (or vice versa).
The position of, and thus the relationship with, the neighbourhood chief is decisive. It is he
who has the power to allocate ‘new’ lands to newcomers or new grown-ups without (enough)
land. Djaoro’s (or land masters) benefit from out-migration, because abandoned land is
returned to them. As long as they obey the rules of the lawan, the lamido, or the official author-
ities63, they can use it to give to whoever they want. This can be their own sons and relatives,
but may also be (sons of) those that have proven to be useful, or towards whom they have
friendly feelings. At the same time, the decrease in the amount of ‘free’ land means the possi-
bilities djaoros have to decide about other people’s access to land are diminishing64.
Allocation of land as a place to dig water wells or small lakes for livestock is mostly based
on community decisions (neighbourhood or whole village). A group of wise men, inspired by
ideas of the inhabitants in general, decide where the well has to come and where the corridors
for the cattle have to be delimited65. Access to water is open for all. In times of scarcity the rule
is: first come first served. Rules of proper use exist for artificial lakes and a kind of social con-
trol is in place66. When cattle owners do not follow the rules, there is for example an increased
risk of the spread of diseases. In Kolara, people complain about a lack of water wells in the
dry season for both men and livestock. Roads and cattle tracks are sufficient, so the artificial
water points constructed by the Mindif-Moulvoudaye project employees can be used through-
out the dry season, but one has to pay. 
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63 They have the right to designate certain areas as, for example, grazing lands. See Chapter 4 about official and
customary laws regarding land tenure.
64 In addition, the decision power to decide of the djaoro can be limited via another custom. The Tupuri know
the institute of ‘keeper of the wood’. This djaksiri guards the small holy bush that is conserved in each neigh-
bourhood, next to his house. He has to guard the relationship with the spirits, for example by way of regular
rituals (for example the moment a new piece of bush is cleared evil spirits have to be satisfied with sacrifices).
Sometimes the functions of djaoro and ‘djaksiri’ are not performed by one person. In such cases, the djaoro
should contact the djaksiri to deal with important and difficult issues.
65 As described by Seignobos (2000e: 115) the Tupuri have the custom of marking out cattle tracks from village
to pasture with rows of Jatropha curcus, Ipomoea fistulosa and other densely growing plants. They do the
same, if necessary, in order to reach watering holes for the herds.
66 For example, such an artificial lake has been dug in the centre of Sirlawé. It has a big fence around it to pre-
vent both misuse and children falling in. Some concrete devices have been constructed nearby to water the ani-
mals without contaminating the lake.
Cultural insecurities
Culturally-based habits in relation to, for example, conflict resolution can be a source of inse-
curity. Problems with family or other co-villagers can give rise to a fear of revenge or a
decrease in the general legitimacy to stay. Four percent of respondents refer to quarrels with
family or village members as the reason for out-migration (more often than not over trivial
things). A lack of conflict settlement possibilities can give rise to the necessity to make a sud-
den move to other areas in order to be safe from revenge from within the village. 
As in other African countries witchcraft accusations can strike at any moment67. Frustration
with one’s own circumstances and jealousy of someone else’s can cause people to think that their
luck has been stolen by the other with the help of magic spells. In Sirlawé the death of a young
man, after he had suffered from several different diseases and had become very thin, made his
mother accuse the village chief of witchcraft. The chief, a fairly prosperous man, had tried to help
this patient with traditional medicine (as is the role of such a chief), but had failed68. If such an
accused person does not have a very high standing in the village and if trust has declined, the
only possibility (once again), is to go away. Indeed, Van der Ploeg (2001) encountered in one of
the new Diamaré settlements more than one person who had left his home area because of accu-
sations of witchcraft. Thus, wealth and prosperity can be a cause of insecurity, especially for
those who do not play the political game or do not have brothers in the higher realms of the State.
As a result of modernisation and increasing migration to towns, the age-old institution of
gurna (see note 6) - with its function of ensuring a social bond within clans and over the clans - ,
runs the risk of disappearing. As “the Tupuri recognize the gurna as a repository of commu-
nally-held moral values, and as a guardian of an ideal of Tupuri personhood” (Ignaotowski
2001: 7), its disappearance would have grave repercussions on the social and cultural capital
of this ethnic group. As mentioned above, the effects will also be seen in the domain of the cul-
turally specific methods of conflict mediation.
Although the ‘new’ religions offer strong ties to new communities and thus strengthen social
networks, the choice of Tupuri for Christianity alienates them even more from the Islamic Fulbe
in the Diamaré region. There were already significant differences between the two groups, for
example in relation to housing patterns (settled Fulbe tend to live ‘wall to wall’ in centred vil-
lages, Tupuri dispersed between their fields), food preferences, the role of women and school
attendance. The fact that Tupuri do not converse to Islam means they do not join in the after-
prayer discussion next to the mosque in Kolara centre, nor celebrate the same festivities nor
adhere to other general cultural customs. On the other hand, all three religious groups admit that
they worship one and the same god and that only their rules and habits are different. These dif-
ferences are not only due to religion. As mentioned in Chapter 4, both Islam and Christianity are
firmly embedded in the customs and values of the ethnic groups that converted to them.
Because the Fulbe are currently the local holders of power in Kolara and Kobo, the increas-
ing distance between Fulbe and Tupuri is reducing the opportunities open to the latter. In the
long run it may engender conflicts and power shifts that may be decided using force.
144
67 There is a wealth of literature on witchcraft and magic in Sub-Saharan Africa. For information on the use there-
of in the political (and power) plays of the ‘modern’ states: see Geschiere (1997).
68 Other, more educated Sirlawé inhabitants voice the opinion that AIDS was the cause of this young man’s death,
but the accused still had to go to court to prove his innocence. That is in itself a difficult undertaking.
5.3 Investments: going to box 2
As depicted in the “insecurity complex” in Chapter 3, when people experience insecurities in
a mutually influencing complex of domains, they search for strategies to overcome these. In
the “To violence or escape (VoE) diagram” actors perceive the different possibilities in the step
from box 1 to box 2 (Figure 5.1). To understand the step to box 2 of the VoE diagram the diver-
sity of options that lead to certain strategies and the choice for specific options have to be
explored. With a variety of capitals at hand (see Ch 2) the different Tupuri invest in the social
relationships, economic goods, personal capabilities or environmental circumstances they
encounter to improve their future and that of their children. Theoretically, in all these domains
a diversity of options are open to them, namely in tackling (combinations of) all the insecuri-
ties (see section 2 of this chapter). Sometimes people do not really invest in anything, but just
‘muddle through’, perhaps only hoping that their positions will improve in the future. The
actual investments are shaped by the combined effect of each of the four categories of the
Actor-in-Context model as formulated by De Groot and Kamminga (1995; See Ch 2): the
extent to which options can be implemented, objectified motivations, interpretations and the
autonomy towards implementation per actor. I will describe the factors that influence these
options and make people chose ‘escape routes’ (downward arrows from the central part of the
“VoE diagram”, see figure 5.1) or make them follow the route to the invasion of a new niche
(box 2 of the VoE diagram).
5.3.1 Environmental investments
Investments in the quality of land 
There are several options for improving the quality of the land and thereby increase agricul-
tural production. Apart from the use of more fertilisers (natural or chemical), more labour
resources (directly in the production process itself as well as in the construction of soil and
water conservation structures) or more technological equipment can be used. Important
aspects in this context are the availability of these three factors and access to them. Another
aspect that has to be borne in mind is that, although Tupuri are seen as conservative – for exam-
ple in contrast to the Mundang who are quick to adopt new crops and technologies, such as
cotton and ploughs in the early 1950s (Hallaire1984) -  nowadays Tupuri cultivators would
certainly adopt new agricultural methods if they guaranteed their interests69. 
In theory the options with regard to chemical fertilisers in the three areas are to buy them at
the market or to acquire them from friends and relatives or from agricultural extension servic-
es and the para-statal SODECOTON. In the latter case it is possible to choose between the use
of special sorghum fertiliser for cereal production and the use of the cotton fertilisers on other
fields as well. The times and methods of application are important (for example dispersed or
only at the exact location of the seeds). The price of fertiliser is approximately 50,000 Fcfa/ha.
There is no problem with supplying those who can pay in all three origin villages.
The use of natural fertilisers can consist of the application of animal dung (from own or bor-
rowed animals or purchased or gathered manure), the application of household waste, the use
of leaves or stems from harvest residues, the application of ‘wild’ organic matter (leaves of
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69 They have shown capacity to do so:  first, when they adopted cotton cultivation as a new cash earning possi-
bility and second, with their migration to the Maga irrigation project to earn a living in the rice fields.
standing or planted trees, directly or gathered in the bush and dispersed over the field) and, in
Tchatibali, residues of the cotton processing village factory (see Table 5.3.1). In principle, the
use of natural fertiliser only involves labour hours (except when cattle owners ask for money
for the use of their animals, but that has not (yet) been established in the three origin villages).
Table 5.3.1 Fertility ameliorating measures (numbers and percentage of respondents; some actors use sever
al measures simultaneously)
a = in the heartland this is only crop rotation
b = five times SODECOTON factory residues (in Tchatibali); one time stems and one time planting of Faidherbia
tree in Sirlawé
c = Faidherbia tree planting
Farmers spread the household waste over the fields located in the immediate vicinity of their
houses. They do not carry it to fields further away. Indeed, the compound fields are the most fer-
tile. Yet, most of the time this waste is insufficient to fertilise a substantial surface. In Kolara a
handful of respondents even knew about the method of making and using compost (although
only one actually did so). However, it does require basic materials such as animal dung and
water and demands some extra labour (although not all of it in the rainy season). In addition, a
significant disadvantage, according to the users, is that the practice attracts maggots in dry years.
On the other hand, gathering leaves in the bush to disperse over the fields is an excessive-
ly demanding exercise. It takes more energy to gather enough to fertilise one field than the
level of energy equivalents that the field would produce thereafter (let alone the fact that, in
the heartland, the bush surface is very limited). Even the cotton factory residues are only used
to a limited extent. Only a very small proportion of the population makes the effort to pick up
the remains and carry them to the fields. It is, indeed, heavy work, but it can be done in the dry
season after the harvest. It would therefore not interfere with the significant number of labour
hours. When asked about the reason why they refrained from carrying out this activity, people
indicated that they consider it too arduous without a cart to transport it, or too expensive. This
last point is surprising because others, including the factory director, explain that it could be
done for free. 
With regard to further labour input the options are: working more and longer days by house-
hold heads and household members or involving friends and relatives. Another possibility is
to hire labourers. The first is only possible in households with grown-up children, although rel-
atively small children are left at home unguarded when the demand for labour is at its highest.
On the other hand, farmers already tend to work from first light to late in the evening when the
circumstances demand it. Wives start even earlier in order to prepare the meal that farmers take
with them to the field. Working more days is only possible when the rains are plenty. Without
146
n Rotation Animal Animal Household Natural Chem. Nothing
manure manure waste fertiliser, fertiliser
(own animals) (other's not of 
animals) animals
Heartland 143 40a 60 10 49 7b 90 15
28 % 42 % 7 % 34 % 5 % 63 % 11 %
Kolara 37 1 18 4 10 1c 16 13 %
3 % 49 % 11 % 27 % 3 % 43 %
rain ploughing and sowing is not possible. In the north of Cameroon, schools are already
organised in such a way that in the rainy season children can assist their parents (a three
months ‘holiday’). Involving friends and relatives is a well-known strategy throughout the
whole Sahel-Sudan zone. So-called ‘working parties’ are organised by farmers to make it pos-
sible to finish a certain job in a limited amount of time (for example: harvest of millet needs
cutting of stems, drying and battering of the grains in just a couple of days). In addition, it is
more fun working together. It demands a certain level of social bonds, but it also adds to the
social fabric. Most of the time, it is done on the basis of mutual exchange. The total amount of
labour for a certain community does not increase, of course. The second option demands a
monetary input that is only possible for the rich. Again, when the hired labourers are from the
same village, the total labour force used does not increase.
Some types of requested labour for improvement of field-output are not restricted to the peak
period. For example, several soil and water conservation structures can be constructed in the
non-agricultural season. In such cases, an extra labour input is possible. On the other hand, not
all measures require extra labour. For example, the blockade of surface run-off in a field by
bands of wild vegetation crossways to the run-off only asks for less labour. Both types of meas-
ures are only necessary for those that encounter this kind of erosion. Table 5.3.2 depicts num-
bers of inhabitants suffering from erosion or water problems, and their strategies against it.
Table 5.3.2 Number of respondents with erosion or water problems and their countermeasures (NB. Only
used measures are depicted; the figures depict problems as perceived by respondents)
In total, 36 % of respondents complained about erosion or water problems in their fields, but
only 15 % tried to do something against it. In Tchatibali, where inundations were the only ‘ero-
sions’ signalled, farmers explained that the soil was too heavy to make dikes or canals by hand
in the dry season, and that they did not have the money for or general access to heavy ground
moving machines. They requested assistance from the government, but added that they did not
have any trust therein. On the south-west side of the centre a kind of dike had been raised in
the past by an NGO which offered some resistance to flooding. Yet, the benefits were not
spread equally, so now some other fields are suffering from water problems, or even a lack of
humidity.  Five people with a run-off problem could not make clear why they did not use coun-
termeasures like the ones employed by their fellow villagers. The sixth gave the same expla-
nation as some of the inundation victims: making a dike or canal would make the water stream
to the neighbour’s fields and give him problems so that was not an option.
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Problems Surface run-off Inundation Gully erosion Wind erosion
Measures No mea- Dikes Plant Cross- No mea- Dikes Canals No mea- Plant No mea- Leaving Tree
sure plan- strip sure sure plan- sure stem plan-
ting ting ting
Sirlawé 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Tchatibali 0 0 0 0 29 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
Kolara 2 13 2 1 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Total 6 13 2 1 31 6 2 0 1 0 1 2
The planting of trees to increase the production capacity of the land is subject to a number
of several problems, such as an unsuitable subsoil70, not enough money to purchase the
seedlings, no permission from the land owner or lawan to plant trees (depending on custom-
ary rules and personal social bands)71. To this should be added the general set-backs related to
cultivation, such as too much shade in the growing season. However, most people explain that
they leave existing trees standing in their fields if they can see that there are advantages to
doing so, such as a fertilising effect. If possible they plant shade or fruit generating trees
around their compounds (40 %) which can add to general household waste to be spread over
the fields.
One of the options apart from aiming at an increase in crop yield is to try to increase the
carrying capacity of grazing lands. When this indeed leads to a higher number of cattle, then
it can also, via the manure, help to increase yields. In the Doukoula region (that includes
Sirlawé and Tchatibali) the veterinary surgeon has started initiatives to sow higher yielding
grasses72. He informs agriculturalists about it and sees to it that interested farmers get the nec-
essary instruction and seeds without too many financial investments. At the moment, only a
handful of farmers are involved. Investment in this seems only to be interesting for cattle own-
ers. Even in their cases, it should not interfere with labour demand for cash or subsistence
crops. Most respondents seem to be reluctant to “sow in the wild areas. Normally fodder
should grow automatically there.” The free rider problem is also mentioned as an obstacle:
“Why should I work there, while everybody else can make his cattle eat the results…” Because
the whole village could benefit from an increase in bush quality, a community initiative could
support this development. However, up until now, this need has not been acknowledged.
More technological equipment consists of improved heels, ploughs and weeding tools and,
as far as cotton is concerned, ‘corps biteurs’73, or de-weeding chemicals. All this aims to
reduce labour requirements per ha or to open up otherwise un-usable soils. In connection with
conservation structures, the possibilities include mechanical earthmoving machines, etc. (see
above). Cattle, horses or donkeys are needed for ploughs and draught weeding tools. Like
bicycles and (for the rich) motorcycles these animals can also be used to transport products
(from fields to granaries, from compounds to markets), especially when the animals can be
used together with carts. This saves labour input (time) that can be used elsewhere. In the
heartlands a third of the compounds have a bicycle. In a way it is a feature of Tupuri culture.
Even a lot of women can and do ride bikes. Bicycles are used to transport all sorts of items,
but also to visit family and friends, as well as to attend church ceremonies in town (the
Catholics of Sirlawé, for example, tend to go to Sunday services in Doukoula, some 7 km
down the road). Therefore, bicycles also serve the build up and maintenance of social rela-
tions. 
Another technological improvement to reduce the insecurity of excessively variable lengths
of the rainy season is the new higher yielding or quicker maturing varieties of crops. However,
these sometimes entail higher risks, as they are less drought-resistant and harvesting has to be
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70 During the field work several farmers asked for help to purchase tree seedlings, but others (mostly higher edu-
cated persons) explained that the region of, for example Yolawo, had an impermeable rocky underground that
prevented trees from maturing. 
71 See, for example, Van der Ploeg (2001) or Scholten (2002).
72 Information from June 2001. He had started this initiative several years earlier. 
73 The utensil necessary to form the small ridges which have to be formed around the cotton plants. 
done in the already labour demanding times of the rainy season. In addition, in the event of
abundant rainfall the risk of rotting is high because the grains cannot dry properly after har-
vest. Nevertheless, all Tupuri are interested in the new varieties and many people ask exten-
sion workers to bring seed, for example from Maroua. However, only a small proportion of
them actually cultivate quick-maturing cereals. The seed supply is low and those who want to
use it need money to buy the seed.
De-weeding chemicals are not widely used due to a lack of information on how to use them
or even on the possibility of using them (and where to purchase them). The one user I spoke
to complained that he had also destroyed the growing capacity of his millet plants, because he
had obviously used too much. 
An increase in most of the methods described or an improvement therein is difficult. Since
time immemorial, Tupuri have used all sorts of soils and the different cultivars that best grow
in these. It is Tupuri that see the value of the bare hardé soils in the Diamaré: “If only I had a
good plough and a pair of strong oxen, I could turn the soil and have a very rich field here.”74
They improved their soils with appropriate trees and brushes to counter fertility loss and ero-
sion. For example, almost all respondents in Sirlawé and Tchatibali are familiar with the fer-
tilising effect of the Faidherbia albida tree, and mention Ipomoeia mauritiana as a gully-
restricting device. In addition, the use of animal dung is an age-old habit that fits in with their
cattle culture. Moreover, while other ethnic groups were still dependant on strict fallow rota-
tion, they already had intensified their methods with the construction of dikes to hold back
water or to retain water in transplant-sorghum fields. 
However, declining yields and income, as I explained before, make it impossible to invest
in existing measures, let alone new instruments and methods whose benefits are still vague.
Indeed, the only tool that is quickly gathering in popularity is the plough. Since the introduc-
tion of cotton, ploughs have been incorporated in people’s worldviews, in spite of the high
monetary investment needed75. As can be understood in the Tupuri cattle-culture, oxen are the
main labour animals, although this means a higher investment than donkeys. The owner needs
two (more expensive) oxen for the plough as opposed to one donkey. Some households even
have more than one set of animals. The costs are recouped when a matching number of ploughs
is available (and the necessary labourers) or when there are so many labourers and fields that
only one set of animals would quickly be over-used (and cannot work at all76). Especially in
Kolara, the farmers with more ploughs mostly also own several sets of draught animals (that
is: two or more donkeys and/or four or more cattle). The use of ploughs and animals depends
on the monetary or social situation of the farmer: does (s)he have money to buy or hire the
equipment or does (s)he have a relevant social network to borrow. Table 5.3.3 shows the
spreading of ploughs and draught animals.
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74 Remark by three different respondents, independent of each other, on three different occasions while walking
a transect in the surroundings of Kolara and Kobo, June – July 2001.
75 In 2001, a donkey cost 70,000 Fcfa (the price of approximately three bags of 100 kg of sorghum in the rainy
season), a labour-oxen up to 100,000 Fcfa (and then it still has to be trained). A plough itself cost at least
45,000 Fcfa when bought at SODECOTON. Local ploughs cost approximately half that, but break down eas-
ier. Both a weeding tool and a biteur cost 40,000 Fcfa.
76 This happens more than once, especially when the owner/user is not experienced enough and is unable to dis-
tinguish stubbornness from exhaustion.
Table 5.3.3 Percentage of households using ploughs and draught animals. (NB. The total number of plough
users is not the same as the total of animal users because some farmers use donkeys and cattle).
Until recently, the use of milking cows was not even considered. It is now being introduced by
the agricultural learning centre at Dadjamka (near Sirlawé). But it takes time to change cul-
turally-embedded habits. Still the vast majority only use oxen. Of course, donkeys can only be
used when the soil is not too heavy. In addition, some cultivators prefer cattle because of the
wider furrow they produce.
It has to be stressed that ploughing is heavy work, and that, for the use of cattle, more than
one person is generally needed. On top of that, the drawback of plough use is mostly well
known, as is that of chemical fertiliser use: it disturbs the soil too much and, after an initial
production increase, the decline follows all the more quickly. “However we have no choice:
with the decline of the rains, we need to plough and sow all the fields in just one or two days.
And we need a real yield this year!”
Investments in quantity of land
Investment in the quantity of fields can be made while continuing to live in the same com-
pound. That means that somewhere in the neighbourhood (in principle within walking dis-
tance) new fields have to be cleared or fields that have already been cleared have to be bor-
rowed, hired or bought. In the heartland, the new clearing of fields is impossible. In Kolara,
clearing within village distance is difficult, because much of the bush is further away, or the
lawan has forbidden clearing. “On the other side of the road”, he says, “the project ground is
situated. That is for cattle to graze.”77 As has been mentioned, the possibilities of increasing
one’s available area with someone else’s old fields are declining. People who are in elevated
positions in society or who have bonds with those who have power (in terms of position and
of money) have a greater chance of gaining access to land. Indeed, more and more people in
the three origin villages are asking for money to help them cultivate their fields. Now respon-
dents say, “It is difficult to find somebody who does not use his fields and is willing to lend
them to you for free. In the past you only had to give a bit of the yield after the harvest, or your
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77 There are, however, certain Kolara neighbourhoods that started new fields “on the other side of the road”. For
ten or fifteen years they followed the rule of the lawan, but now they have had enough of resisting looking at
empty arable land next to their compounds.
Households Households with Households with Household 
using ploughs labour-cattle donkeys with horse
One More One pair More pair One More One
Sirlawé Own 50 4 27 18 0 0 4
Hire 5 0 9 0 0 0 0
Borrow 27 0 36 0 0 0 0
Tchatibali Own 31 0 25 0 0 0 0
Hire 21 0 26 0 0 0 0
Borrow 6 0 6 0 0 0 0
Kolara Own 38 14 19 5 27 5 5
Hire 5 0 0 0 3 0 0
Borrow 3 0 0 0 5 0 0
wife would prepare some beer to drink together.” Nevertheless, commoditisation of land is not
very widespread yet, and borrowing and hiring do occur (see Table 5.2.5). Young farmers
invest in building social networks in the hope that this will lead landowners to lend out fields
to them. For example, they hang around the compounds of the rich and are quick to help them
personally. They assist with the set up of a grass mat construction, help somebody to get to the
hospital or explain difficult homework to children.
A last option is to go to a new area: the intrusion of a new niche (Box 2 of the VoE diagram
in Figure 5.1). Those that indeed intruded into the bush of Kolara and Kobo will be dealt with
in sections 4 and 5. Here I describe the options and ideas of those that are still living in one of
the origin villages. Table 5.3.4 depicts which category of landowners considers leaving as a
good option and which percentage per category gives land scarcity as a reason for this desire
to move.
Table 5.3.4 Percentage of population wanting to leave for certain reasons per surface-category of land 
possession
a = 15 ha is the maximum a farmer in one of the three villages possesses
b = one person (= 1 %) mentions as reason a quarrel with another villager
Of those that express their wish to move, 22 % (2.2 % of total population) mentions the
Diamaré plain and bush as their destination. They consider this bush region as being near their
current villages and as historical Tupuri land. They have heard from friends or relatives who
have settled there or who have seen the vast bush, that it is a good option. Nevertheless, half
of the household heads that express a wish to leave the current village express doubts as to
whether they will actually go. “It is very difficult”, “I have many social obligations here”, “To
move you need a lot of money” and other constraints besides are often mentioned. In reality,
a detailed balance of push and pull factors combined with negative and positive influences
determines the implementation of a move.
5.3.2 Human domain investments
Apart from personal characteristics that are not easily changed, the human capability domain
consists of health status, knowledge and education. Good health makes other investments more
possible and ensures that capabilities in other domains can be used. Knowledge and education
can open up jobs or increase access to political positions. 
Health investments
Mostly, investment in health is an ad hoc activity. It is not an investment with a more or less
long-term strategic aim. In the whole research area no person invested in the prevention of dis-
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Arable land surface in possession
0 0.25 - 2.5 ha > 2.5 ha 0 - 15 haa
N 8 99 73 180
Number considering to leave 2 8 8 18
% giving lack of land as reason 25 % 4 % 8 % 10 %
% giving hunger as reason 0 % 1 % 1.4 % 1 %
Other reasons to leave 0 % 3 %b 1.4 % 2 %
eases, for example by buying a mosquito net to prevent malaria. Health services, backed by
the government and international donors, organise yearly vaccination campaigns against cer-
tain diseases. Unfortunately, not all mothers (and their children) attend these, although most of
them do. On the other hand, with an outbreak of measles in the Tupuri heartland, all inhabi-
tants complain that the government did not do enough to protect children. The story of a lack
of vaccine spread even more quickly than the virus78. 
Improving the general hygiene of the whole population is another option to prevent dis-
eases. Investment in hygiene at home is a regular and internalised activity. Tupuri tie up their
small flocks so they do not spread their dung throughout the house. Small children are washed
often, older people wash themselves every day and clothes are cleaned regularly. Most people,
including children, wash their hands before eating. 
In addition to this, time and energy is devoted to improving the health status by teaching
(small) children some basic hygiene measures regarding the use of water. Open wells are
equipped with side constructions to make it possible to rest buckets and ropes where no ani-
mals have tresspassed.  Nevertheless, the strict implementation of hygienic use of wells is dif-
ficult. Many open wells are contaminated due to improper use. Cultural patterns brought by
new religions, such as the Christian one, sometimes improved these habits. This was especial-
ly so when the churches invested in information campaigns and material aid was provided for
the construction of closed wells. Even then, hygiene depended on the implementation and con-
trol of good habits by those involved. A sound communal approach to using the wells is indis-
pensable. However, in most cases, nobody feels responsible. 
The importance of latrines is explained at schools and by special regional information teams,
but still not every household has such a device as yet. For older, non-Muslim inhabitants these
constructions are too modern (“we always did without”). However, in the heartland, almost every
house has a latrine due to an active policy of the former mayor79. This means that, apart from a
community level investment, every household there has worked hard to construct these latrines.
In general, though, disease prevention with ‘modern’ means has no priority. However, in tra-
ditional religions a birth or name-giving ceremony is held to firmly embed a new-born child in
the society and also in the world of “good gods” in order to protect him or her from evil (and
thus diseases). The new religions (Christianity and Islam) also have these types of birth cere-
monies to commend the new child into the care of god and the community members. Apart from
being social happenings, these ceremonies are also investments in health (via prevention). Only
when people fall ill (and cannot work anymore), or when children are really suffering from
some kind of disease or other, will money be spent directly in this domain. Then, capitals from
other domains are used. However, the small monetary possibilities open to poor peasants means
investment in health is marginal: only small improvements are possible. Often, cheap, but
unsafe medicine is bought on the market because hospital treatment is too expensive.
At the same time inhabitants of the smaller villages try to invest in hospitals via the social
and political domain, mobilising their deputies and mayors to build at least a nursing post with
medicines and to pay a salary for the nurse employed there.
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78 Such an outbreak is not only dangerous for the life of children and non-protected adults, but also impedes the
activities of mothers when they have to enter into quarantine together with their babies.
79 In 2004, the number of latrines was decreasing because the current mayor did not control their existence.
Latrines can easily be destroyed by the heavy rainstorms of the rainy season.
Educational investments
Tupuri love education. They send their kids to school partly to acquire enough education to
become “a civil servant” or “to give him better opportunities when he gets involved in trade”
and partly because education is a goal in itself: “It opens up your mind”, “It makes you think
better”, “It is the basis of development of your children in general” and, “When you go to
school you can speak with foreigners such as you yourself, and that is a good thing!”80 Several
persons literally said that the education of their children need not lead to a job per se. If peo-
ple can afford it, they send their daughters to school as well, but to a less high level. Especially
when a household has to choose between the education of sons or daughters, the boys get pri-
ority. Only a small 2 % of respondents considered school a waste for girls. In the three villages
I did not encounter one family with a daughter at university, against several sons.
Table 5.3.5 School attendance of respondents and their children (of school age)
Except for one or two respondents that did not and will not send their children to school, all the
rest claim they will send at least some of their children (sons) to school when they are old
enough. Sometimes parents decide to send (almost) all their children to school up to a certain
level (half way or the end of primary school is a usual level to stop), but make one or two carry
on even to university to try to obtain at least one or two higher employment positions in order
to safeguard the financial position of the whole family in the future. Several households are will-
ing to incur debts (asking money from relatives) to ensure some of their children go to school.
In a corrupt society, such as Cameroon, to obtain diplomas it helps when pupils have family or
ethnicity ties with professors at high school, or when they have established other social bonds.
Buying your way through baccalaureates or other exams is a frequently used tactic.
In short, with a good eye for hygiene and a real hunger for education (even if one knows
beforehand that it perhaps will not pay back economically speaking), a lot is invested in the
human domain.
5.3.3 Economic investments
Investments in cash crop
One of the cash crops of Far North Province is groundnuts. Yet, only 12 – 15 % of the inhabi-
tants of the three origin villages cultivate this crop81. The choice for a variety of crops can dimin-
ish vulnerability caused by the climatic unpredictability of the Sahel zone and the risk of pests.
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80 Fieldwork May – July 2001.
81 See Chapter 4.2.
% of respondents % of respondents % of resp. who % of resp. who
who visited who visited higher send (or have send (or have
school than primary school sent) children to sent) children
school higher than 
primary school
Sirlawé 39 27 55 30
Tchatibali 59 14 70 34
Kolara 46 5 54 19
In the two years studied, groundnut yields were not very high compared to North Cameroon
means, but they still added to the income or calorific position of the farmers involved. 
The other, and most important, cash crop in the Diamaré and in the Tupuri heartland is cot-
ton. As stated in section 2, most Tupuri consider cotton as the only crop that can bring in cash.
Indeed more household heads choose to cultivate cotton than groundnuts as a cash crop (see
Table 5.3.6).
Table 5.3.6 Number of respondents (household heads) producing cotton or groundnuts (n = 180 in total)
Comparing the production in Fcfa per ha of the two cash crops with rain fed sorghum shows
that it is very difficult to predict the best strategy. Depending on the place and year of produc-
tion, soil conditions and precipitation, any one of the three crops can generate the best results
(see Table 5.3.7).
Table 5.3.7 Production in Fcfa / ha of three crops in the three origin villages
Each individual farmer can more or less estimate soil quality and possibilities for improving
it. Based on the available knowledge a farmer can make a sophisticated guess as to which crop
he can best cultivate. Building in some security against rain failure makes people opt for a
variety of crops. 
Some use the cotton cultivation and the connected chemical fertiliser gift to rotate products
from year to year and then use the remaining fertiliser in the soil to improve the sorghum yield
a year later (23 % referred to this strategy). 
Although one would have thought that the flood areas of the Tupuri heartland are perfectly
suitable for rice cultivation, less than 9 % of (only) the Tchatibali population actually grow it82.
“With the insecurity of rains”, the rest of the respondents explains, “rice is no option”. During
the start of the SEMRY rice project in Maga, many Tupuri went there to cultivate rice, but after
a number of years they abandoned the project because it did not seem to have any future. 
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82 In 2000, the number had reached 11 %, with a total mean surface of 1 ha, but production failed because of the
drought.
Number of producers in 1999 Number of producers in 2000
Cotton Groundnuts Both Cotton Groundnuts Both
only only only only
Sirlawé 38 2 8 23 2 15
Tchatibali 21 5 0 15 3 0
Kolara 16 3 5 19 0 4
Production in 1999 in Fcfa / ha Production in 2000 in Fcfa / ha
Sorghum Groundnut Cotton Sorghum Groundnut Cotton
Sirlawé 65,900 89,283 91,210 70,700 159,353 135,295
Tchatibali 102,000 150,000 18,235 97,300 62,903 61,295
Kolara 95,900 140,833 54,460 85,600 43,333 57,595
Furthermore, some people explain that they have tried to grow a surplus of food crops for
the market, to sell when the price is really high in the hunger period, but that the rains did not
help.  In Sirlawé this is done as a collective initiative. In the centre a large storage building has
been constructed in which members of the group (everybody who is prepared to adhere to the
rules) can store several bags of sorghum until the right moment of sale (see for further expla-
nation the social investments (section 3.4)). The growing and selling of fruit can also add to
financial income, but this demands a long-term investment with only slow returns and is,
therefore, restricted to the richer inhabitants.
Investments in farm animals
Apart from cash crop cultivation to gain extra income, animal husbandry can also be consid-
ered. According to Tupuri customs, cattle are preferred. Nevertheless, less than half of the pop-
ulation can afford to keep them. After the reductions in herd sizes during 1980 droughts,
increasing livestock numbers has been an expensive task. Small ruminants can offer a solution,
or an in-between step towards restoring cattle herds. Indeed, several persons try to breed small
ruminants or chickens to set up a trade thereof. Most small animal owners (and even cattle
owners, who have more than only draught animals) regard them as a banking deposit to sell or
to eat in case of need, or in case of social obligations. Table 5.3.8 shows numbers and per-
centages of ruminant-keepers and the ranges of animals per keepers’ households; Table 5.3.9
refers to chickens and ducks.
Table 5.3.8 Number of respondents with small or large ruminants, and mean per keeping household.
The (relative) wealth of Sirlawé is reflected in the figures for ruminant possession. The high
number of cattle is also due to the fact that the Sirlawé inhabitants have managed to maintain
a special grazing area (see Box 5.1). In addition, they still adhere to their age-old tradition of
maintaining cattle-tracks measuring several meters across, lined with bushes and stretching
from the compounds to the grazing areas83. This avoids conflicts between cultivators and
herders and cattle are able to graze abundantly. Cattle-keeping is integrated more into the daily
life of the village. Both in the heartland and in Kolara, giving additional food to cattle in the
form of ‘cotton-cake’84 has become a regular habit since the end of the 1980s. In Kolara, after
the cotton harvest, the cake, which is processed by SODECOTON from the remains, is
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83 See Seignobos (2000e), page 115: “The blam day (cattle tracks in tupuri) are situated, as a boundary, between
the different neighbourhoods, and are aligned with Jatropha curcus and Ipomoea fistulosa”.
84 In French it is called “tourteaux”.
Respondents Cattle per Respondents Small ruminants 
keeping keeper keeping small per keeper
Number cattle ruminants
n keeping
both Number % Mean Range Number % Mean Range
Sirlawé 56 27 36 64 11.2 1 - 32 46 82 13.3 2 - 43
Tchatibali 87 27 29 33 6.3 1 - 36 68 78 9.5 1 - 50
Kolara 37 15 16 43 16.7 2 - 112 25 68 12.7 1 - 31
deposited in 50 kg bags on the doorstep of the lawan. He organises the distribution. Everybody
who produced cotton and has cattle is allowed a portion. 
Although chickens seem to be easy to obtain (you just have to ask for a grown chick or two
from your friend or brother and perhaps give him some beer in return) and to keep (they run
around the compound looking for food themselves), they are not owned by 100 % of house-
holds in any of the three villages. This is partly due to the fact that they have a commercial
value85, so people are not that willing to just give them away. They also have a social value as
a gift on special occasions or are used to prepare meals for visitors. In addition, just letting
them roam about is not sufficient. They have to be given additional food to keep them in good
condition and they (and their chicks) have to be protected from wild cats and birds of prey.
Some of the (especially older) household heads seem not to be interested in the extra work-
load, albeit small. Some of the younger household heads have not had the possibility yet to
establish a flock of chickens. Ducks are even more difficult to keep since they need at least a
bit of water to wash themselves. This can meet with problems during the dry season.
Nevertheless, more than 40 % of the population invest in ducks. These are mostly people who
already own chickens.
Table 5.3.9 Number of respondents keeping chickens and/or ducks, and mean birds per keeping household.
In the Tupuri heartland guinea fowls are a good option as regards breeding and selling eggs,
for which the region is renowned. Indeed, a fifth of the population keep them, but others say
that they are a nuisance because they make too much noise at night and cause destruction of
freshly sown fields in the day time. With the majority of Tupuri still adhering to the tradition-
al religion and the rest mostly Christian (Catholic), pigs are also perceived as a good econom-
ic alternative by some, although others reject the idea: “Pigs eat too much. And you have to
keep a constant watch on them, they ruin everything”. In the heartland ‘town’ quite a lot of
people keep pigs (See Table 5.3.10 for pigs and guinea fowl keepers), because it is easier to
raise this type of animal, when you do not have lots of land.
Investment in the health of farm animals can be considered a way of improving economic
accountability. The vaccination of cattle is an obligation in Cameroon, and most owners recog-
nise the necessity thereof. Nevertheless, almost everybody considers the vaccination of only
grown-up cattle and only up to 80 % of the herd86 as enough to protect all animals. Owners are
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85 A medium size chicken of good health can cost 1500 – 2000 Fcfa on the (local) market.
86 This is a rough estimate, based on information from different veterinarians throughout the region.
Respondents Chickens per Respondents Ducks 
keeping keeper keeping  per keeper
Number chickens ducks
n keeping
both Number % Mean Range Number % Mean Range
Sirlawé 56 17 44 79 20 1 - 100 17 30 2.5 1 - 5
Tchatibali 87 32 67 77 11 1 - 49 37 43 4.1 1 - 10
Kolara 37 19 31 83 15 2 - 40 19 51 3.3 1 - 9
afraid of showing the real size of their herds because that goes against cultural practices and
makes you more vulnerable to higher tax demands (namely, per head of cattle). On the other
hand, less than 2 % of the population thinks about, let alone actually performs, the vaccination
of small ruminants, despite this also being obligatory according to Cameroonian law. Because
implementation by veterinary services and control is less widespread, and official papers are
not requested for transport and transhumance, people do not regard the vaccination of their
sheep and goats as important. Every now and again an outbreak of one of the more contagious
diseases makes some people resort to the immunisation of their flock for one or two years, but
this is only a minority and only for a short period of time. 
Table 5.3.10 Number of respondents keeping pigs and/or guinea fowls, and mean animals per keeping 
household
Treatment against intestinal parasites is suffering from the same lack of preventive measures.
Even when some of the sheep have died from diarrhoea in the rainy season, most owners do
not perceive the selling of one or two of the remaining animals as a good income-generating
facility to make it possible to treat the rest. Sometimes this is due to a difference between those
who own and those who herd and a lack of persuading capacities from the herder. However,
most of the time it is just something that has not (yet) entered the interpretative frames of the
farmers. During the vaccination campaign for small ruminants in June 2001 in Kolara, the vet-
erinary assistants complained about the low attendance percentages, although they had made
several rounds through the village the days before to inform and motivate owners.
The same story applies to chickens. Agricultural extensionists try to persuade people to vac-
cinate their poultry. It is not expensive and quite easy to do, especially when a whole neigh-
bourhood cooperates. But, people only think of arranging vaccinations when it is already too
late and then vaccination does not really help. As a result, the next time they consider it to be
a waste of money. That even such simple things can depend on social ties can be shown by the
presence of the veterinary surgeon in Doukoula region. He is a Tupuri, appointed in his own
home area and is very active in trying to inform the local farmers about all sorts of improve-
ments relating to animal health, medicines, accommodation and fodder87. For him, as “one of
us”, it is easier to get things implemented. 
87 Most veterinarians in Cameroon are soon promoted to high administrative levels and are no longer involved
in implementation in the field, let alone in their own home area. The vet from Doukoula was personally asked
by the Doukoula traditional authorities to stay for a time to help overcome some basic problems. Yet, in 2002,
he was chosen to be mayor so his responsibilities were diverted away from animal husbandry.
Respondents Guinea fowls / Respondents Pigs / 
keeping household of keeping  household of
guinea fowls keepers pigs keepers
n
Number % Mean Range Number % Mean Range
Sirlawé 56 19 34 9.7 1 - 24 4 7 4.5 1 - 12
Tchatibali 87 7 8 9.1 1 - 28 61 70 3.7 1 - 20
Kolara 37 6 16 7.2 1 - 20 16 43 2.6 1 - 7
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An important product of cattle-keeping is milk. Yet, this is not often produced for the mar-
ket. Milk serves social binding purposes which have been incorporated into the Tupuri culture.
Often it is given to children (especially grown up boys88) to improve their health.
Investments in non-agricultural activities
Off-farm activities
Off-farm activities can be divided into full-time jobs or additional income-generating activi-
ties. Such activities can be performed inside or outside the village, but with the village as the
place of settlement. Apart from the big labour migration to the rice fields of Maga in the 1970s
and 1980s Tupuri do not work much as cultivators for others outside their village. When they
want to cultivate elsewhere, they move. 
Within the village, however, some of the inhabitants work for others as herder, grinding-
mill labourer, house constructor or as paid agricultural labourer. But these labourers do not
form a large proportion of the population. Many people herd their livestock in collective herds
being herder in turn with other owners and almost every household has at least one member
who knows how to construct houses and the accompanying roofs. Only the rich can afford to
pay for agricultural labour, but often they do not need it. The younger families with a labour
shortage do not have enough money. Another set-back to paid labour in the rainy season is the
fact that hiring oneself out to work on somebody else’s field is detrimental to the work on one’s
own fields. Most of the paid labour in the villages is done by young adults or adolescent boys
and not by household heads.
Alternatives to non-agricultural jobs in the village are limited. In Tchatibali, as an adminis-
trative centre, some inhabitants found work in the offices of the sub-prefect, the police or the
health centre. One has to be good friends with the authorities in which one has to invest before
a job can be acquired. Additionally, a certain level of education is needed (most of the time).
The same applies to the SODECOTON factory, although non-educated labour is also possible
there89. Sirlawé and Kolara do not offer these possibilities. In all three villages certain persons
can act as teachers (in Tchatibali even at secondary school, although the State does not specif-
ically appoint locals there) or agricultural extensionist and information officer90.
Off-farm jobs are also possible within the framework of private enterprises. With a small
amount of money one can start as a small trader, working as a kind of hawker for products like
soap, matches, biscuits, sugar, batteries, cigarettes and salt. To reach the different markets in
the region a bicycle is more or less indispensable. If enough revenue can be generated, the
next step could be to invest in more specialised products such as cloth, plastics (buckets, mugs
and pots), or medicines. Two or three people in the Tupuri heartland villages are involved in
the trade of (fresh) fish from Fianga Lake. Some people work as butchers, travelling from
market to market, where they slaughter a (small) ruminant bought for the occasion, to sell in
portions.
Next to that, people can earn by providing services like water transport (a cart has to be bought
as an investment), healing rituals, as undertaker, as musician or as priest. Each village has its
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88 In the form of the ‘milk cure’, an individual or group activity comparable with initiation rites (See note 6).
89 Approximately 3 % of Tchatibali inhabitants find work in the factory for at least part of the year (dry season).
90 These jobs can be done for the State, agricultural organisations such as SODECOTON, or foreign NGOs that
are involved in development, health or relief aid (also a possibility for women).
(motor) bicycle, watch, radio, mill-engines or even electricity connections (in Sirlawé and
Tchatibali) repairmen. All this requires special knowledge and thus initial investment, at least of
time. Many times youngsters learn the ins and outs by hanging around with the practitioners.
Although not a very big income provider, the gathering and commercialisation of (small)
forest products, such as fuel wood and timber, fruits, traditional medicines etc. can certainly
improve the financial position of a household. If there is enough bush and walking distances
are not too excessive, this is a good option. Almost all inhabitants (especially in Kolara) earn
some income this way, in addition to their agricultural activities.
A final off-farm option for acquiring an income is theft: in or between villages, as a kind of
‘ad hoc’ activity or as real banditry. Small thefts can pay off because of a lack in some areas of
(social) control and legitimacy of customary law based arbitration. The second criminal activi-
ty is a more structural way of life with investments in equipment and weapons. In the social
sphere it demands investment in a ‘gang’ and on one’s position within this gang. In the human
domain, good health and knowledge (for example of where and how to sell) are important. One
has to be ‘daring’ and to have a certain (cultural) baggage. Bandits make a cost-benefit calcu-
lation of the risks of getting caught, the consequences thereof (financial; social; for life and
body (freedom, torture, execution etc.)) and the general loss of ‘normal’ social position ver-
sus the wealth that can be acquired. In the villages I did not meet any persons who freely
admitted that this is their way of life. However, some adults remarked about neighbours that
is was rumoured “that his son is involved in the attacks on travellers in such-and-such area.”
The creation of a para-military anti-gang meant a reduction in the options for young bandits.
However, this activity takes place in waves of action and reaction.
An economic investment in the collective sphere could take the form of working on the im-
provement of roads. This could be done personally or via social or political bonds. However,
both in Tchatibali and in Sirlawé, access to the roads that lead to market centres (Tchatibali
itself, or Doukoula, as the bigger trading centre in the region) is no problem during the dry sea-
son. Only some of the respondents complained about the state of the roads, and then only dur-
ing the rainy season. Most of the times they blamed the over-loaded international trucks and
stated that they wished the government would handle the situation better. But nobody invest-
ed in addressing authorities or politicians, nor did anybody try to organise a village initiative
to improve the (rainy season) roads. In Kolara the roads to the regional markets in Lara, Kaéle
and Moulvoudaye are good. The only problem here is the long distance. 
For that reason, in Kolara the non-existence of a good, near enough and big enough and thus
regional market is an issue for a number of people. They talk about persuading the lawan,
because he has his doubts and has so far forbidden it. He fears an increase in improper behav-
iour that could offend the Muslim inhabitants (like he himself). Even worse, it would enhance
criminal behaviour, he says91. For those who want to invest in trade, this is an impediment to
their activities. They are willing to invest in social bonds to find alliances to put pressure on
the lawan.
On-farm activities
The additional income from wild products can be higher when they are used in home indus-
91 Interview June 2001.
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trial activities. The home production can range from grass mats to granaries, roofs, brooms,
rope, fruit cookies, etc. for which wild products have to be accessible, both by law (that is no
problem in the areas of the heartland or the Diamaré) and from the point of view of distance
and transport possibilities. The proximity of a market is important to increase sales, but the
goods can also be sold in the small village markets as well. Most of the products can easily
be made after years of ‘learning by seeing’. However, the construction of granaries and roofs,
for example, is a real skill that has to be explained and practised over and over again92.
Besides this, the processing of agricultural products at home and the trade thereof at local
markets or neighbourhood festivities is especially interesting for women. Depending on their
religion, the total yields and their position in the household (and the permission, when neces-
sary, of their husbands), they brew sorghum beer or prepare fermented sorghum drinks
(yoghurt-like), fry beans or cereals balls (doughnuts) or grill salted peanuts. Although these are
always small quantities, women can gain up to 3000 Fcfa a month. Normally this is enough to
pay a hospital bill, school fees of children (when husbands do not provide for these), soap,
cooking salt or cloth.
Mostly people perform a combination of one or more of these together with agricultural
activities. Almost all respondents93 claim to be cultivators first and foremost.
A kind of economic investment that saves labour and material later on is the construction
of more and more (expensive) brick houses and huts with tin roofs. These buildings last longer
than the traditional ones with loam walls and reed roofs that are easily destroyed by a heavy
thunderstorm. Especially in Kolara, but also in Tchatibali and Sirlawé, several people have
constructed such houses, and several others are saving money to make it possible to buy the
materials. Initially it seems to increase affluence (one of the factors in the environmental
impact equation I=PAT94), sometimes wanted to increase the status position, but in the longer
run it may turn out not only to be a good personal investment but also good for the environ-
ment. 
5.3.4 Social investments
As mentioned in the chapter on methodology the measurement of the total social capital and
investments therein demands more research time than could be spent during this research.
Therefore, I will only give some indicators and examples of social bonds and linkages as well
as the rules and norms springing from them that are present or developing in the Tupuri heart-
land and Kolara.
Investment in family and friends
There is a difference between social mutual help in the ‘town’ of Tchatibali or Sirlawé and the
newer village of Kolara. An objective way to measure this is to count the free exchange of
utensils, such as ploughs and draught animals (see Table 5.3.3). Loaning out a plough or
another tool is at the same time a sign of social bonds and an investment therein. Sirlawé
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92 The Tupuri are experienced in the construction of grass roofs without a wooden frame. This is a good method
in places were longer, straight branches are missing. This art has to be passed from father to son. With less
bush and fewer good grasses, this technique runs the risk of disappearing.
93 Except for 7 % in Sirlawé, 12 % in Tchatibali and 0 % in Kolara.
94 See Chapter 2.
shows a more than six times higher percentage of lending out of ploughs and draught animals
than Tchatibali or Kolara. In Sirlawé people seem to invest in social bonds. A direct exchange
of a plough for a couple of cattle was observed only once (in Tchatibali). In Tchatibali, with
its more ‘city-like’ ambience, labour equipment seems to have become more commercialised.
In town, social bonds have changed into economic ones. In Kolara village, however, percent-
ages are the same for hiring and borrowing. In general, the people there use their own equip-
ment. One could say that social bonds are declining, but commercialisation is not yet wide-
spread.
At the same time, several groups of people are trying to start mutual cash-boxes, commu-
nity granaries or fields to help in times of need. In Sirlawé a community granary has been
installed95 (with the help of a foreign NGO96), that stocks grain or cotton surplus97 until the next
rainy season to make it possible for members to buy back at the lower post-harvest price when
necessary. In addition a group of women here have developed a mutual banking system togeth-
er with their sisters from Doukoula (the nearby town) which combines its collective bank serv-
ices with the distribution of information on children’s health and nutrition, agricultural mod-
ernisations and fuel wood saving methods. This is a women’s only group (although assisted by
a man “to keep the financial flow accurate and going”, as they say), that functions alongside
an ‘all inhabitants’ group, consisting mostly of men, but with more emphasis on Doukoula
itself. In the village of Kolara half of the inhabitants are members of a mutual deposit group,
sometimes combined with a communal field and granary. Everybody knows of the existence
of these groups, but some do not want to be a member (or have organised grain stockage with
a smaller family group) and some consider themselves too poor to attend. “I have not enough
yield or money to become a member”. Some of these groups are organised with the help of the
government98 and SODECOTON and some are developed with the assistance of the catholic
or protestant church. The latter sometimes also serve as security for widows and elderly peo-
ple of the same congregation.
Horizontal ties can also be established with regard to status and money: the notable ladies
of Tchatibali have organised themselves into a group which is separate from the rest of the vil-
lagers. Like in all other mutual cash-box systems, each month they come together to pay a
stake. Together these make up a capital that can be borrowed in turn by the members, for trade
investment, illness or agricultural equipment. Their bank deposits are, naturally, higher than
that of the poorer citizens and so they also have quite a lot of possibilities for increasing their
capital, charging different interests for commercial than for emergency loans. The monthly
meetings also serve as a means to strengthen the friendship ties between the ladies and to
widen the gap with the rest of the population. For others, thus, it is important to keep ties with
this small group. And indeed, several women and girls can be seen regularly bringing water
95 First it was started by SODECOTON, then PAM took over and nowadays it is an autonomous group called
‘Postroc’.
96 The PAM, a FAO sub-institute against poverty and hunger.
97 Farmers put one or two bags of their yields in the warehouse directly after harvest and acquired the post-har-
vest price for them so that they can pay their debts. If they need cereals in the next rainy season, they are then
able to buy their own (or co-members’) bags back for the same price. If they do not need their own stock a
year later, it can be sold at pre-harvest prices and used as a bank deposit for members’ needs. Thus, the group
had 3 million Fcfa for sorghum and 2 million Fcfa for cotton in cash in December 2003. 
98 So-called “GIC’s” = Groupe d’Initiative Commune.
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or helping with small tasks during the meetings. It has to be said, though, that the ladies them-
selves work in their fields like the others, organise working parties in harvest times and help
in those of others. In short, they also build on their wider social network to enlarge it beyond
the small circle of the notables. Namely, wives of high civil servants, can suddenly disappear
from the neighbourhood because their husbands are transferred to another post99.
Distance as such (or the absence thereof) plays a role in the formation of social ties. Living
in the same neighbourhood binds people together. Neighbours can quickly give a helping
hand in case of need (for example, when the construction of a grass roof is finished and has
to be lifted onto newly erected walls, one shout is enough to bring several people together),
and doing that means that others will help you. In addition, the living conditions are more or
less the same. For example, the lack of a water well is felt in the same way by all inhabitants
of a neighbourhood. In several areas of Kolara people join forces to organise the digging of
a water well. In Yolawo they collected money to fulfil the basic condition of a certain com-
munal investment requested by aid agencies, before they came into action. Unfortunately,
first the responsible governmental institute accepted the money, but never sent the workers to
fix the well and later the local treasurer stole the cash and spent it on personal affairs. The
group demonstrated the social bonds within this neighbourhood by accepting him back as a
member on the condition that he refunded the stolen sum. Indeed, he is busy telling his story
to everybody and without shame asks money to help him, in this way doing penance for his
sins.
Nevertheless, this example also shows the setbacks of strong social bonds. It is not the first
time that people get away with the theft of community savings without any substantive pun-
ishment. The first efforts to construct a water well date from ten years ago. Individual char-
acteristics therefore play an important role. Can a treasurer resist the temptation of having so
much money within reach? But also the principles and stubbornness (or wisdom) of people
who hold power are important. In Kolara as a whole a small group of Tupuri had organised
the supply of tree seedlings, but they forget to ask permission of the local lawan. Thinking
that his authority was threatened, he could not (or would not) agree with the planting without
a kind of ceremonial procedure; starting more or less at the beginning of negotiations. It took
a lot of time. In the meantime, the plants withered away in the dry climate. This initiative did
not result in a new orchard-like aspect of the different homesteads around Kolara Centre.
Political investments
In Sirlawé only one person actually performed political activities for his Tupuri party, the
MDR. He talked to village members about the political program and the importance of having
an opposition party that would voice the needs of the Far North, the ‘bec-du-canard’ and
Tupuri in particular. Although he makes his own official position difficult, with his firm stand-
points he has built up trust for himself amongst his fellow villagers. In the village he has
gained what he lost in the more official realm. Many others agree secretly with him, but point
out that they have no choice. 
In Kolara some inhabitants also back the MDR openly, but they also fear for their future
possibilities. The adjunct of the mayor (and also of the MDR) heavily contests the switch his
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99 Indeed, in December 2003, the ladies group had vanished because most of the former members had moved.
The new ladies have not (yet) managed to set up a new banking group.
boss made to the RDPC and is trying to raise co-villagers’ awareness of fraud in the system.
As in Sirlawé, most people agree, but the facts make them more afraid and they vote all the
more for the ruling party. At village level the brave are very honoured, but one rung higher they
are condemned.
In all three villages of origin several people give in to reality and try to change the lack of
involvement of the State via the RDPC. Attentive observers can see the ongoing efforts of vil-
lage and neighbourhood chiefs and their wise-men to influence the regional policies. But they
have to act careful. Too much emphasis on governmental faults and they lose their position:
nobody in the administration will listen anymore. Not enough support for the Tupuri cause …
and the villagers will choose another representative. 
Also in the realm of conflict resolution the chiefs have to manoeuvre very cautiously. If too
many conflicts are not resolved in the village the community will spiral down to a state of
upheavals that hinders development. Chieftaincy is an elected position, but many adversaries
do not take the chief’s decisions for granted. Constantly he has to build his legitimacy by way
of social investments. He has to find a good equilibrium between friendliness and generosity
on the one hand and firmness on the other. Other methods can also be used. The Kolara lawan
has managed to build a strong reputation of magic power, with which he can make people
adhere to his rules and solve accusations of witchcraft. Other chiefs try to make their subjects
have trust in the official courts, so that larger conflicts can be handled there.
Cultural investments
According to Bebbington (1999: 2034) games, festivities and sports add to as well as form the
cultural capital of a community. For Tupuri the “festival of the cock” in October to celebrate
the beginning of the harvest, is a good opportunity to demonstrate social cohesion. Even in
times of hardship, after a year of low rainfall, this festivity enhances mutual ties. This is impor-
tant in order to overcome the rising scarcity. The beginning of the sowing season is also cele-
brated with a reunion, on which occasion the century-old drums100 are played to signify the
unity of Tupuri in and throughout the generations. A more contemporary way of building com-
munity ties is the very popular football match. During the dry season boys and young adults
defend the honour of the village or neighbourhood every now and again with real fervour. Girls
and women attend to cheer their heroes to victory.
In contrast with the declining family and clan ties in the origin villages, clan membership
and ethnicity congruence are important when far from home. There, in ‘foreign’ realms, all
other Tupuri are seen as brothers. They share the same cultural identity and that has to be
stressed or even re-invented. Co-Tupuri are greeted with warmth and many hours have to be
spent together, talking and drinking beer. At the same time this creates bonds so that there are
always friends around in times of hardship. 
100 In Sirlawé, for example, this drum is said to be three hundred years old. The excavated tree trunk, which is as
long as a  man is high and whose diameter is at least a metre, is placed on a small pedestal under its proper
roof, next to the compound of the village chief. Only the covering hides have to be replaced from time to time.
When it is played the beats can arouse even the inhabitants of Doukoula, more than 7 km away. Each occa-
sion has its own rhythm to pass the message around.
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According to Ignatowski (2001) young Tupuri in schools and universities far from home
invest in the re-vitalisation of their culture101, especially the gurna. Although adapted to the
new situation (without cows) the social, moral and 'judicial' function is still visible in the newly
composed songs.
Part of the TupurTupuri identity is based on the traditional religion in which some people
indeed invest in an attempt to convince others of the value of collective rituals. The Sirlawé
lawan explains the sufficient rainfall in his village by the continuing habit of ancestor worship,
bringing them sacrifices at the start of the rainy season102. Therefore, he stimulates his subjects
to attend the periodic festivities that go together with sacrifices. For example, he makes sure
there is an abundant supply of food and drink for the occasion.
At the same time, the old religion is disappearing. More and more young men and women
are converting (mostly) to the Christian religion. By doing so they become members of a new
and equally strong social group and one that extends the narrow boundaries of their ethnicity
and region of habitation. They invest in this new life by attending Sunday services, praying
with co-believers and trying to follow the rules of the church. Some go further and are really
active in the Christian community. In their spare time they visit other church members and talk
about the bible or they help individually or in groups to persuade non-believers to become
member. The Christian church can be a good choice because it helps in times of hunger and
provides more structural assistance in connection with development issues such as schools and
hospitals. It can even be a route for personal growth103.
In short, Tupuri in the heartland and in Kolara village have a broad spectrum of options to
counter insecurities. Most of the time they manage to find enough of these options which can
be implemented according to their wishes and interpretative frames, without it being neces-
sary to leave. Yet, from time to time they decide that they need to seek the solution of their
insecurities by going away. One of the goals of such moves is the intrusion of other (arable)
land.
The general livelihood situation as well as the insecurities that exist in the villages of origin,
together with people’s investments as described in section 3 are summarised in Table 5.3.11.
In short, insecurities can be found in all four domains. Especially in the heartland the natural
domain offers no security. In the villages of the Diamaré, scarcity of natural resources is mod-
erate, but even there individual actors suffer from large shortages, which can not be curbed by
personal investments.
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101 See also the articles in the Ka’arang (e.g. 2002, 2003), information bulletin dedicated to “reflections on Tupuri
culture”.
102 “The neighbouring village of Tchatibali”, he says, “has problems with the rains because they have lost their
respect for the ancestors” (interview May 2001).
103 During my field work in Sirlawé the son of my host served as a catechesist in his spare time; when I came
back in 2004 he was away in Yaoundé to follow a two years course of the Catholic Church, after which he had
a job guarantee.
Table 5.3.11: Summary of current level insecurities and investments in the domains of the ‘insecurity com
plex’, based on ‘capitals’104 of the origin villages as a whole
(- = bad; o = moderate, + = good; in the investment column: - = no investment; o = a bit investment; + = a lot of
investments)
5.4 Intrusion of other niche: Box 2 
In spite of different other options (‘escapes’) to counter insecurities, still a substantial propor-
tion of the Tupuri population chooses to move from origin regions into new areas. In the VoE
diagram this is called the ‘intrusion of other people’s niche’ (see Figure 5.1: box 2). This study
focuses on the intrusion of Tupuri into the Diamaré bush between Kolara and Kobo. The fac-
tors that co-influence this step will be described in the following section. Part of the push fac-
tors from the Tupuri heartland (and the origin village of Kolara) are explained above. The dif-
ferences therein for ‘stayers’ and ‘go-ers’ still have to be analysed. Also, why people choose
the Diamaré, and subsequently the Diamaré bush as a settling area still has to be made clear. 
5.4.1 History of Kolara and Kobo settlement
Although absolute Fulbe supremacy declined with the arrival of the Germans, they sometimes
acquired more de facto power from the colonial overlords. Therefore, ongoing unrest in the
whole Far North Province with regular attacks of ‘Kirdi-groups’ on both the Fulbe and the
Germans, prevented Tupuri from really resuming their age-old move into the Diamaré plain.
104 See Chapter 2.
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Average Situation Security (= Invest- Investments details
level of of worst expected ments
villages off third level
of pop. in future)
Physical basis o to - o to - o to - n.a. n.a.
Population. density - and o - - - o in Kolara; No real family planning
Land availability o - - or + o Diverse quality improving methods; 
+ Bush is considered free and abundant
Commod. of land - - o o Rising, surprisingly low
Food production versus needs o - - o Increase of ploughs; quicker maturing
varieties when possible
Health o o o o to + Rising
Education o o o + Culturally important
Cash crops o o to - o o Cotton important (world price low); 
worst off 10 % incur debts 
Livestock - - o or + o or + Heartland pigs and poultry; Sirlawé 
positive
Non-agricultural possibilities - - - o Via education; in Tchatibali in services
Sociocultural o o o o Loss of old systems, some increase of
new ones; not more bonding with 
Fulbe
Political - - - - Almost nothing
Land allocation - - - - Only in bush age-old system still pos
sible; dependent on chiefs
Conflict resolution - - o o Forum shopping; much expected of 
formal administration, judiciary
Nevertheless, a handful of them from the South had started to re-invade the Daram territory
already before the Europeans arrived and this immigration intensified after 1901 (Moham-
madou 1988: 99). Only when the French were firmly established in the country and were loos-
ening their ties with the Fulbe authorities to give some higher positions to Kirdi rulers, did
larger waves of Tupuri from the heartland invade their (as they call it) former territory in the
Diamaré plain (Fig. 5.3). From Guidiguis and Moulvoudaye onwards they returned to this
region which has good, fertile lands105. According to French colonial archives106 new non-Fulbe
villages started in the outer region of the Mindif lamidat from the early 1930s onwards. Before
that time some individual Tupuri had come into the area offering their labour force to the
incumbent Fulbe107. The increase in immigration was partly due to the locust originating
famine of 1930-1931 that made many people start looking for other possibilities. On the other
hand, in this same period, the rest of the Mindif lamidat saw a net decrease in the population
because of emigration, again due to the famine, but also due to the harsh ruling methods of the
then lamido and his son and successor, Yérima Hamadou. This last reason continued to apply
until 1940, when 1200 inhabitants had fled the region. Together with the human out-flux, the
number of cattle also decreased108, although part of this decrease was due to cattle-sale and con-
sumption in the famine years. Over the years Tupuri numbers kept on growing. Although first
at a low pace, the numbers later increased more quickly. In 1937 2752 Tupuri inhabitants were
counted in the Mindif sub-department. In 1941, this number had already grown to 6544 (of
which two-thirds were in the lawanat of Moulvoudaye, the original stronghold of Tupuri
blacksmiths).
One of the settlement areas was the lawanat of Kobo. This village was already occupied by
Mundang the moment the first lawan, Ardo Haman Djam, settled there, coming from Gadjia109.
Between 1930 and 1934 the French administration decided to put this small lawanat under the
authority of Kolara, but in 1934 it was returned to the direct responsibility of the lamido of
Mindif. Nevertheless the incumbent chief did not pay much attention to either of the two author-
ities. Under his leadership the number of Tupuri and Fulbe increased110. Later the total popula-
tion diminished again111. This was partly due to an out-migration of Mundang, who returned to
their places of origin, such as Gaban. Only some very rural neighbourhoods far from Kobo cen-
tre remained intact.
The territory of the lawanat of Kolara was another of those net immigration areas. Counting
backwards from the 1937-lawan Yéro, the 6th lawan of Kolara112, it can be assumed that Kolara
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105 See Texier (1937) in Beauvillain (1989: 243).
106 In Mohammadou (1988: 92) and Beauvillain (1989: 492-504 and 524).
107 See also Feckoua (2002: 2) about “les salariat agricole …”; in good harmony with the Fulbe landowners.
108 Between 1930 and 1934, cattle numbers decreased from 4127 to 2646 and small ruminants numbers from 6823
to 2582.
109 Ardo Haman Djam was the great-grandfather of lawan Saïd who was the sixty-year-old chief in 1937.
Calculating backwards means that Haman Djam settled in the Mundang village of Kobo around 1850.
110 In three years time the non-Muslim inhabitants increased from 8 to 44, the Fulbe from 266 to 391 (Beauvillain
1989: 243). According to Mohammadou (1988) in 1935 the number of inhabitants was 312.
111 In 1968: 303 inhabitants (Mohammadou 1988).
112 He descended from Ardo Naï Houdou from Boula near Mokong, from the ‘Illaga’ family that formed the chiefs
of the Fulbe group of Gazawa (Texier (1937) in Mohammadou 1988: 96-97).
was founded by the Fulbe in approximately 1860113. After a slowly start, it grew by 10 % in
three years from 909 to 1001 inhabitants between 1930 and 1934. After a short decrease114,
from 1935 to 1937, the increase was even bigger: a doubling in 2 years115. Later in the centu-
ry the population increase lessened, but until 1976 the total increase amounted to some 2 %
per year. 
That this village remained attractive for immigrants in contrast to the surrounding Mindif-
lamidat villages can be traced back to its de facto independence. Although this village offi-
cially belonged to the “outer-region” of the lamidat of Mindif and was therefore officially sub-
jected to the lamido, in reality the chief of the village, a Fulbe from the same high family as
the lamido of Mindif himself, ruled his territory without any consultation with his formal chief
in Mindif. This regularly resulted in hard feelings of the lamido. Texier (1937)116 mentions the
“rancune du lamido contre le louanane” de Kolara, that made it difficult for the French admin-
istration of the time, which wanted a simpler authority system, to re-divide the municipalities. 
During the rest of the century Tupuri from the heartland continued to settle in the Diamaré.
Most of the time they constructed their homesteads in the vicinity of existing villages, where
patrilinear or matrilineal family members or friends had preceded them or where they had rela-
tionships with the incumbent neighbourhood chief. Settling in the ‘empty’ bush, ‘totally
alone’, was no option. Thus, the different neighbourhoods of Kolara are founded in a sequence
from one-and-a-half century ago up until today.
An example of a Tupuri neighbourhood founded in the early 1930s is the Kolara neigh-
bourhood Tchoufi, on the road to Gaban117. At that time, Tupuri from Tchatibali arrived ,
attracted by the abundance of Karal surface and options for white sorghum that cannot be
found in the North of Kolara and Kobo. In the same period Fulbe from Guidiguis, who had
quarrelled with their chief, settled there (1935). In contrast with suggestions about inherited
revenge-feelings etc, the two ethnic groups seemed to get along well with each other. 
Two of the neighbourhoods of Kolara that have been studied, namely Pitoa and Djendje-
rengue (together with some others) were founded in the early 1950s or late 1940s
118
. These
neighbourhoods continued to grow because of immigration up to very recently119. The third
113 This is consistent with the stories of the current lawan of Kolara and the djaoro of Gadjia, who is of the same
descent. According to Toukou, the current Gadjia djaoro, Naï Houdou was the first settler in Gadjia. His son
Haman Djam became the first  lawan in Kobo, his grandson Oumarou founded Kolara to defend Gadjia against
the attacks of the Lara inhabitants (the name Ko-lara means: the people from Lara will not come here). The sec-
ond, third and fourth lawan of Kolara were brothers. The second went away after a conflict with his lamido.
114 According to Mohammadou (1988: 97), in 1935 the number of inhabitants had again diminished to 689.
115 The Kirdi population increased from 152 in 1935 to 597 in 1937 (increase of 293 %), while the Fulbe increased
from 528 to 883 inhabitants (Beauvillain 1989: 243).
116 In Mohammadou (1988: 98).
117 Texier (1937) in Mohammadou (1988: 96-97).
118 This can be deduced from the fact that 73 % of the respondents of Pitoa and Djendjerengue (n = 26) were not
born in these neighbourhoods and only three of the fathers were born in Pitoa (no one in Djendjerengue),
whereby two of them did not stay there long enough to make their sons be born there. 43 % of the respondents
came to the neighbourhoods with their fathers, while they were still boys.
119 Only four respondents (out of 26) said that they had come to the neighbourhood where they now live less then
10 years ago. One of them has only been there for two years, but he moved from an adjacent neighbourhood,
while he had already some fields in the current one. Another person arrived ten years ago but never cleared
new fields: he inherited all he uses now. 
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neighbourhood of study, Yolawo, is newer still120, dating from the late 1950s or even early
1960s121. For birth places of respondents, their fathers and grandfathers, of the three neigh-
bourhoods, see Table 5.4.1. The regions of origin of the three neighbourhoods show a slight
difference: most fathers and grandfathers in Pitoa came from Tchatibali; those from
Djendjerengue originated mostly in Chad. Yolawo has its origins in the rest of Kolara or other
Diamaré villages. Before they settled in the Diamaré, most of the fathers of Yolawo respon-
dents came from Chad and some from the Doukoula-Tchatibali region.
Table 5.4.1 Percentage of persons in three Kolara neighbourhoods born in a certain place of origin
a= In Yolawo half of the respondents were born there, but none of their fathers or grandfathers. In the other two
neighbourhoods approximately a quarter of the respondents were born there. 
History of bush encroachment in Kolara and Kobo
While Tupuri from the heartland area, or ‘nearer’, are still arriving in the original settlement
neighbourhoods of Kolara, a further movement into the open bush area has started. (See in colour
quire Photo 5.1 see the centre of this book.) After twenty years of strict control over the use of
this area because of an ambitious Pilot Project with a combined agro-pastoral goal, the end of the
project in the middle of the 1990s opened up the bush (see Box 5.2). Some Kolara neighbour-
hoods, situated along the road that serves as the boundary of the former Project area, crossed the
road to start clearing the bush opposite their compounds (see Fig 5.5). The Kolara lawan object-
ed to that, even after the end of the Project, but he seemed to have lost the battle. The more
remote, central parts of the bush were the destination of settlers in even earlier times. According
to Van der Ploeg (2001: 90) since 1995 “seven new Toupouri quartiers – Boulam Balé, Kobo
Gar, Werdje, Balane, Souka Lougol, Haiga Yewa and Badadji122-, have been created on the terri-
tory of the Kobo Lawanat”. Villagers themselves say that Boulam Balé was founded in 1996 and
Balané in 1998. Other lawanats in the region are also having to cope with new settlements. “The
other two new settlements in the area, Damdama and Bela, were created in the brousse of the
lawanats Kolara and Gaban respectively.” (id. note 138) and this process is continuing.
In the dry season of 2000 (February-March) new clearing activities took place in the centre
of the bush between Kolara and Kobo (Fig. 5.5). In 1995 the now djaoro of Yameda neigh-
bourhood decided that he wanted to start a new village in the Kobo bush, because in his home-
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120 One of the older respondents recalls the fact that he was living in Djendjerengue together with his uncle when
he decided to move to the empty bush of Yolawo together with the then future neighbourhood chief to start a
settlement.
121 This is consistent with the information of the Yolawo neighbourhood chief, and one of his subjects (81 years
of age) who stated (June 2001) that the neighbourhood was founded 46 years ago.
122 Van der Ploeg (2001) discusses whether or not Badadji is actually situated in the lawanat of Kobo. He devotes
a whole chapter to this settlement and the controversies about the boundaries and responsibilities between the
different lawanats over this settlement.
Current Rest of Rest of Heartland Chad unknown
neighbourhooda Kolara Diamaré
Respondents 33 16 16 27 8 0
Fathers 11 8 5 43 30 3
grandfathers 0 0 3 22 50 25
village Sirlawé (Gaban)123 he only had access to 0.25 ha of fields. He knew the place: there was
a lot of space, no nomad camps and good, dark soil with a lot of “brem” bushes that signified
a high fertility124. He approached the lawan of Kobo, who only asked whether he had children.
When the answer proved to be “yes”, the lawan referred him to the official administration for
permission. So the djaoro went to see the sub-prefect of Moulvoudaye and the police superin-
tendent there. Without any payments he got his permission, upon which he started to look for
other people to join him.
123 Tupuri are used to giving the name of their old village to a new settlement to denote the link between the two.
Therefore there are, for example, several Sirlawés. The one referred to here is a Sirlawé in the Gaban territo-
ry.
124 The Tupuri name Brem denotes Acacia ataxacantha, a bushy acacia species that grows where the soil is over-
rich with cattle-dung. For agriculturalists this means: highly fertile. For cattle-nomads this means: overstock-
ing by cattle and a lack of pasture management with fire. In short, too many inedible bushes and too great a
risk of bush-encroachment by insects and insect-born diseases (interviews in May- July 2001 with cattle
nomads and farmers, as well as personal comments of Onana, pasture expert of CIRAD; see also Mvondo
Awono et al (2001)).
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Figure 5.5 Place of new bush settlements (and research neighbourhoods)
After a year he had found three others with whom he rechecked the area. They chose the
exact territory and asked the lawan again. With this information the djaoro continued his pub-
lication rounds and managed (individually or via a meeting of six persons from different vil-
lages in the following year) to inform several household heads of the initiative. This last group
affirmed his leadership, as he was the oldest and the one that had started it all.
Because of a deterioration in the security situation (an increase in the incidents of banditry
along the secondary roads and in the bush of the region) they postponed the clearing–phase of
the whole plan. Finally, in the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 the djaoro and three fel-
low-settlers started with the clearing. They were soon followed by others. Up until May 2000,
nineteen persons in total had prepared fields in the Yameda territory that was called ‘Haiga
Wega’ in that period. All settlers repudiate the presence of nomad camps on the exact spot of
their clearings. Nevertheless, in early 2000, here the researcher has seen the signs of at least
two of these in short distance from each other. In mid 2001, no nomads claimed the Yameda
territory to be their former camp-site. From after the rainy season 2000 up until July 2001 six
other families have arrived. 
Most of these immigrants had heard about the settlement on the market, from the djaoro
himself or via friends and relatives. Only four out of the twenty-five household heads knew
the area from hunting or wood gathering. All immigrants, except one, who used to live in
Touloum, came from the surrounding Diamaré villages: six of them from Gaban, and five from
Kolara; three even from the nearby village Gesai, where the settlers have to gather their water,
some 10 km away125.
Next to Yameda – sometimes very close by - other new settlements continue to come into
being. The djaoro of Domo, for example, who had recognised the good soils in this bush spot
already five years ago when he came here from Gesai to gather wood, had quickly obtained
the Kobo-lawan’s permission. He straight away paid this lawan half of the asked sum for the
administration (20,000 Fcfa), but then the lawan told him to start his neighbourhood first. Only
when some compounds had been built would he, the lawan, come to see and to collect the
other half (“and a small gift, such as a chicken”, adds the djaoro).  Thus, the djaoro started to
clear his part, keeping the (tertiary) road from Doyang-Gaban to Kobo as the boundary
between himself and Yameda as he had already discussed in Gesai with other candidates for
re-settlement (see Figure 5.5). 
From the harvest of 2000 until April 2001, ten more household heads arrived in the Domo
territory. Again all these came from the Diamaré surroundings, this time no fewer than five
from Gesai. All pioneers come, look around and, seeing the richness of the soil, ask permis-
sion of the djaoro of their choice to stay. Then they walk through the bush with the chief and,
depending on their capacity and wishes, determine the limits of their territory. The Yameda
chief has established a limit of 3 ha per household for transplant-sorghum fields alone to
ensure all new settlers will have at least that. Although he assumes that the bush is “endless”
he also anticipates a lot more immigrants, so he “wants to be sure”. 
In addition, which part of the transplant-sorghum surface area has to be for Domo citizens
and which part for Yameda has already become an issue between the two djaoros, the more so
now the Yameda chief and some of his subjects do not recognise the existence of two more
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125 One of these settlers only stayed one year in Gesai, as a bridge year before he had cleared enough area in the
bush to expect enough yield.
neighbourhoods in the vicinity. Although there is quite a band of bush between Yameda and the
two new compounds of Gwar, the neighbourhood that is started in 2001 by two families from
Benene (an older Kolara neighbourhood), again with the permission of the lawan of Kobo, the
Yameda djaoro considers all the new clearings to fall under his authority. He is the only one of
the three djaoros with an official status. In the course of 2000, the Yameda-djaoro paid for and
succeeded in obtaining his official chieftaincy papers from the authorities in Moulvoudaye.
At the time of the interviews (June-July 2001) Yameda together with its brother settlements
Domo and Gwar consisted of 38 households, counting approximately 220 persons.
Box 5.2 History of the Pilot Project Mindif-Moulvoudaye
126 Annex I of the Project Grant Agreement, 3 April 1978: “[The goal of the project is] to intensify and integrate
livestock and agricultural production in the central plains of the north while at the same time halting and even-
tually reversing the current degradation of the range and agricultural lands.” Later, the “improvement of the
socio-economic standards of the rural population” was added (Annex I of Amendment No. 5 of the Project
Grant Agreement, 15 July 1982). See Ithaca International (1984).
127 The whole project consisted of 250,000 ha in the Mindif-Moulvoudaye region and a complementary grazing
area of 96,000 ha in the Yaéré of the Logone near Zina (Van den Berg 1997: 89).
128 Interviews in the bush area of Kolara, Kobo and Daram June-July 2001.
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In 1978 the Mindif area became the focus of a project to improve the production and integra-
tion of pastoral and agricultural activities, and to stop the degradation of natural resources126.
Recognised tensions over grazing and declining bush and soil quality made a US-based donor
(USAID) come up with an integrated plan in co-operation with the Cameroonian government.
Apart from, for example, crop rotation implementation and the introduction and testing of
higher yielding crop varieties, the plan consisted of the installation of  land zones (blocks) for
controlled grazing during the wet season, meaning that in each block divisions could be used
in sequence and rested alternately. In the then sub-department of Mindif (divided into the two
sub-departments of Mindif and of Moulvoudaye after 1979) three pilot areas of approximate-
ly 5000 hectares each127 were delimited where subdivisions allowed sequential grazing. These
were for use by inhabitants of the region only, meaning that nomads were excluded. Several
cattle owners lived in the region and only sent their cattle away with sons or herders during
the dry season, thereby retaining their rights of use. The real nomads did not have any other
options than to leave and to install their rainy season camps just outside the Pilot Project areas,
for example just south  (direction of Horlong and Kaélé), or even in a totally different region.
Chad was one of the refuge areas. Amazingly, they did not even protest against the rules of
this project. “We do not own the land, so others can decide to use it.” Nowadays they say that
in those days they had enough other possibilities128. 
Because the project was aimed at involving local people, each block was managed by a local
council. Like colonial powers before, project organisers used incumbent, ‘traditional’ authorities
to create these councils, with the result that only Fulbe authorities got a say in project imple-
mentation. This explains the bias during implementation of the project towards pastoral activi-
ties and the neglect of both the integration of agricultural and pastoral activities as well as agri-
cultural improvement as such (Van den Berg and Van Est 1991; Van den Berg 1997: 90). One
can say that, during the project period and some time thereafter, the cattle owning Fulbe elite
‘captured’ the possibilities and resources available, to the detriment of both nomadic cattle keep-
ers and agriculturalists. They did not, however, encourage good management of their pastures 
Now the pattern of settlement is clear, I will describe the reasons in the different domains for,
first, the settlement in the Kolara neighbourhoods. Subsequently, I will come to the reasons of
invasion of the bush. In general, insecurities of both ‘stayers’ and ‘go-ers’ may be the same,
but they encounter differences in the implementability of and motivation for options.
5.4.2 Reasons for intrusion in the environmental domain
The physical basis of the environment in the receiving area
The plain of the Diamaré between Mindif, Moulvoudaye and Guiduiguis (Figure 5.2) is built
on a substrate of volcanic, metamorphic rock which is difficult to traverse. For example, con-
structing new water points to reach the well-filled aquifers that flow from the west to the east
(Boutrais 1984: 52-58) almost always requires large mechanical equipment. Sometimes the
rock layer almost reaches the surface and then even planting trees is difficult. On top of this
rocky under-layer several sediments have been deposited. The most obvious of these are: first
alluvial sand and heavy clay during the period that the outer banks of Lake Chad extended to
this point129. The second deposit is formed by colluvial sands eroded from the inselbergs and
rock outcrops.
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129 More to the south-east some sand dunes can be found from the period Lake Chad extended to this point. This
resembles the Tupuri heartland aspect (see section 2.1).
during that time. Several times Van den Berg and Van Est (1991: 34) mention traditional
authorities who “did not respect the grazing discipline”.
Although the project did not achieve the desired results and ended in intense discords
between USAID and the Cameroonian authorities in the mid 1980s (Van den Berg 1997: 90),
it did have some spin-off for the region. The most important of these was the preservation
(for the time being) of the bush areas on the one hand, as agriculture in the grazing blocks
was prohibited and the number of cattle did not increase as quickly as it would have done if
access had been open to nomadic herds. On the other hand, the project resulted in the for-
mation of artificial water points, and an increase in the number of cattle of local inhabitants
(Van den Berg 1997: 90-91). The cultivation areas outside the project zones, however, suf-
fered from more intensive use and shorter fallow. In contrast to the theory of Homer-Dixon
(1991, 1994, 1999) that resource capture by elite can lead to violent conflict, both agricul-
turalists and nomadic cattle keepers did accept the privileges of the settled cattle-owners
without any obstructions or official complaints. 
After the withdrawal of USAID in 1985 (Van den Bergh 1997: 90), the Cameroonian
project leaders continued the project officially until 1993 but it actually went on, at least in
some shape or form, until the end of 1999. After the expiration of the official project period
the number of cattle increased rapidly. This was because nomads returned with their herds and
urban based cattle owners from, for example, Maroua, made their herders drive the cattle to the
(temporarily) improved pastures of the project grazing areas. For people living in the neigh-
bourhood of the grazing blocks, the reality of the restriction on agriculture applies even now,
especially when the local (traditional) authorities involved stick to the old rules or even try
to extend them to non-project areas and villages. On the other hand, all inhabitants of the
Diamaré (and wider area) know of the official ending of the project, and for them this has
opened up possibilities to look for new land.
According to De Steenhuijsen Piters (1995: 43-48), four major soil types can be distin-
guished. Roughly one quarter of the surface consists of Vertisols, with a high clay proportion
and a vertical construction, developed in the Lake Chad era. These soils are difficult to culti-
vate and have very poor drainage characteristics. Even though this is a set-back for rain-fed
cultivation, it makes them perfectly suitable for transplant-sorghum cultivation. In the
Vertisols, good water-retention capacities go together with high intrinsic fertility. 
In addition to these Vertisols, Brabant and Gavaud (1985) claim that the rest of the soils in
the Diamaré here are Planosols, with “stagnic properties and abruptly overlying a slowly per-
meable horizon within 125 cm of the surface”. Yet, De Steenhuijsen Piters (1995: 44) at best
only finds Planosol-like soils that sometimes have an “abrupt impervious clayey horizon at 40
– 80 cm” depth. Despite the poor drainage, shallow root development and sensitivity to
drought spells, these soils can and are used for rain-fed cultivation (De Steenhuijsen Piters
1995: 58).
The third soil type found in the Diamaré is that along ephemeral rivers: the Fluvisols.
Depending on the position with respect to the current, these soils have a (variously coarse)
sandy to clayey texture in which the original inhabitants of the plain, the Mundang and
Guiziga, are used to planting trees and root crops, such as cassava.
The largest part of the area is occupied by Cambisols that make good agricultural land. Of
these, the less frequent sandy-clay type is the most preferred, because it has good porosity and
is slightly more fertile than the clayey-sandy type, called Yoldé by the Fulbe. However, both
types have a low organic matter fraction and low phosphorus content. Both soils are liable to
loss of fertility because of their low intrinsic fertility and low cat-ion exchange capacity (De
Steenhuijsen Piters 1995: 46). Moreover, both types, but especially the sandy-clayey one, are
vulnerable to over-use with resulting crust formation and superficial loss of good hydrological
properties because of their high fine sand fraction. These so called ‘hardé’ develop in case of
continuous over-grazing by cattle. They are characterised by a decrease in organic matter, a
loss of structure and alkalisation in the surface areas. A lot of manure combined with plough-
ing can restore the hardé.
In general, the fertility of the region is not only a pull factor for Tupuri. Almost all sandy-
clayey Cambisols and a lot of Vertisols are already under permanent cultivation. Settlements
used to be at locations in which these two soil types, but especially the first, could be found.
This happened even more in areas close to seasonal rivers (both for water and for the possi-
bilities of the planting of orchards and root crops).
On the remaining Vertisols, as well as on the clayey-sandy soils and colluvial soils that are
considered infertile130, there are savannah shrubs and trees with, in the rainy season, herbs and
grasses: the so-called ‘bush’. Parts of the bush are indeed hardé, the overgrazed and crusted
sandy-clayey soils. There, almost no vegetation can be found: bare spots of (sometimes) up to
a hectare between the vegetation131.
Climatic circumstances in the Diamaré plain of Kolara and Kobo are slightly less
favourable than in the Tupuri heartland. Precipitation is markedly lower, as the studied bush
130 Or only suitable for groundnut cultivation (De Steenhuijsen Piters 1995: 47).
131 See, for example, Moritz (1995).
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area is situated in the 700 – 800 mm per year precipitation band132 and the heartland in the 800
– 900 mm per year precipitation band (L’Hote 2000: 19; see also Fig. 5.4). Although there is
a significant lack of data with regard to the precipitation in the area133, a rough comparison with
the heartland is shown in Table 5.4.2.
Table 5.4.2 Comparison of year precipitation between heartland and Kolara – Kobo (in mm/year)
Both in Kolara and Kobo, the rains mostly start in May, while in the heartland the onset of the
rainy season is in April134. In general, Kolara inhabitants state that Kobo suffers more from lack
of rain. They explain it by referring to the nearness of the river(bed) and a larger number of
high trees in the village centre that attract the clouds. Table 5.4.2 indeed shows a big differ-
ence between the precipitation in Kolara and Kobo in 1999. Also in June-July 2001 Kolara
neighbourhoods received some rain (albeit not much) while Kobo-bush remained totally dry
(personal observation). However, the small amount of data for the Kolara and Kobo area
makes a conclusion impossible.
Land availability
As stated in the colonial reports135 Tupuri (and others) came to the Diamaré because of the
abundance of Karal fields: a Fulbe term for the rich transplant-sorghum fields. Indeed, per-
sonal information from respondents confirmed that push-reasons to leave the homeland were
often the seeking of land or food. Table 5.4.3 summarises reasons for leaving the homeland for
fathers and grandfathers of respondents as well as for their sons and brothers. In this table the
figures of fathers and grandfathers of Kolara provide an indication as to why people came to
that village, while those of sons and brothers and (grand)fathers of the heartland explain why
people left those villages. 
Thus, as far as Kolara inhabitants are concerned, the push factors which caused people to
leave their homelands are clearly related to the fertility and surface of arable land in the origin
regions. The push factor for the ancestors of Sirlawé and Tchatibali-inhabitants cannot be
deduced from the table. Some respondents there can tell family histories about the origin of
their great-grandfathers and the reason for them to have left their origin regions (in Chad).
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132 During (approximately) 1985 – 1995, year means on surrounding pluviometric stations were as follows:
Guidiguis: 795 mm; Touloum: 785 mm; Moulvoudaye: 725 mm. The yearly mean for Mindif between 1975
and 1995 was 785 mm (L’ Hote 2000:19).
133 Both in Kolara and in Kobo a SODECOTON agricultural extension worker has the task of monitoring the pre-
cipitation. The data, however, was submitted to the SODECOTON headquarters in Maroua where it was
processed into regional means. Thereafter, the local data was destroyed. Data given here is the only data that
could be retrieved.
134 This information is based on real precipitation data when available. It is confirmed by the personal informa-
tion of respondents.
135 Texier (1937) in Mohammadou (1988).
1997 1998 1999 2000
Kolara n.av. n.av. 836 643
Kobo 646 865 643 n.av.
Doukoula 857 n.av. 811 691
Tchatibali 883 1049 960 661
More often than not these are anecdotes about daring heroes that withstand the difficulties of
climate and enemies to demonstrate their bravery. Only scarcely an over-populated home-area
is depicted, with too many brothers who had to share too few acres of land. Most of the time,
the only reason to go was “he wanted to”. “He was a Tupuri, so it was in his blood”; a reason
also given by several present day migrants.
For the last two generations the push factor for leaving Tchatibali is clearly related to the
available area and the fertility of the land, in spite of the (few) employment opportunities in
the SODECOTON factory or in the bars and restaurants of this town. As shown above, land
scarcity is indeed more pressing in Tchatibali than in Sirlawé. The push factor is less clear for
Sirlawé and Kolara, at least for the sons’ generation. In Sirlawé the youngest generation
obtained a lot of jobs outside the village, perhaps due to their generally higher level of educa-
tion. The data for Kolara is too low to draw any decisive conclusions.
Table 5.4.3 Percentages of persons with certain reasons to move away (based on interpretation of respon
dents; rest percentages are unknown; higher than 100 % is due to more reasons per person).
a = not all families have sons or brothers who went away. Here the percentage of families with such sons or brothers
is given
b = this means “insufficient arable surface”
c = the percentage is of the number of people who left
Pull factors for the Diamaré are related to the push factors that made people leave their region
of origin. Migrants chose Kolara because of the good agricultural possibilities it offered, related
to the option to clear new fields in the bush136. People mention the importance of having the per-
mission of the neighbourhood chief and lawan.
When fertility in the original Kolara neighbourhoods declined and new clearing possibili-
ties diminished people moved on to, for example, Yolawo137. From the compounds, especially
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Sons gone Brothers gone Reasons to go % of % of % of % of grand-
sons brothers fathers fathers  
% % of fama % % of fama with certain with certain with certain with certain
reason  reason reason reasons
to goc to go to move to move
Sirlawé 12 18 34 54 Insufficient surfaceb 4 34 14 23
Infertile surface 4 7 9 20
Other 65 71 29 25
Tchatibali 9 17 20 59 Insufficient surface 9 30 1 2
Infertile surface 26 5 1 0
Other 44 55 26 6
Kolara 8 14 29 62 Insufficient surface 0 10 35 8
Infertile surface 0 22 27 8
Other 46 32 46 11
136 78 % of fathers and 52 % of respondents themselves mentioned “good agricultural possibilities”, “land abun-
dance”, and “land fertility” as a reason to come to Kolara. At least half of them came to join a friend or rela-
tive, or had “heard” that it was good to cultivate here. Almost the same percentages indeed came to clear fields.
137 Nearly 60 % of respondents declare that they or their fathers had these reasons to move from a former neigh-
bourhood of Kolara into Yolawo.
those of Yolawo, it is still possible to reach bush zones where clearing is allowed. “As long as
you do not traverse the road”, everybody says, “the lawan does not oppose new clearings”138.
The newer fields in the neighbourhood itself are not yet (totally) exhausted. As a result, in the
newer neighbourhoods almost everybody has at least some fertile fields. In other neighbour-
hoods of Kolara this number has declined to only half of the farmers. The vulnerability for
drought is higher in less fertile environments. In the beginning of July 2001, when the rest of
the village suffered from stagnation in the rainfall, the maize and sorghum plants of Yolawo
were relatively high. “Our plants are already high enough not to suffer too much from this peri-
odical stop in the rains. That is because of the high fertility, and therefore the good humidity
of the soil139. Thus, here in Yolawo, we can cope with the low rainfall”, the neighbourhood
chief and some other respondents explained.
In spite of the good perspectives described by the Yolawo inhabitants, many long-time
Kolara inhabitants or those that are just arriving see a high population density in the original
neighbourhoods. Most of them wonder where they can find additional surface to cultivate,
where to find fields for their grown-up sons… Many persons welcome the new possibility of
bush settlement. Some indeed express their wish to leave (for the reasons depicted in Table
5.4.4, where also their surface of arable land is given), although as yet they did not go (referred
to as ‘persons wanting to leave’). Others moved into the bush area. Also their surface of arable
land in the home areas is given in Table 5.4.4.
Table 5.4.4 (Potential) migrants access to arable land, fertility status of these lands in the places of origin
and reasons to leave (sometimes higher than 100 % due to more categories per person)
a = 19 % did not have any land; 60 % thereof considered the fields they could borrow or hire as infertile (all in the
original area)
b = 28 % complained specifically about the very low surface of karal-fields
None of the bush-settlers had any opportunity to enlarge their surface in the village of origin,
as the numbers of brothers to share with was high and bush was not at hand. Eight respondents
(= 22 %) mentioned the high number of sons for whom they have to guarantee fields in the
future. Buying is almost no option, because no sellers are present (see above sections). Most
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138 As stated earlier, several inhabitants alongside the road did cross it to start cultivation on the “project-side”.
139 This remark shows the knowledge of the inhabitants of the relation between a high organic matter fraction in
the soil and soil humidity.
Surface of Fertility status of owned- Reasons to leave (% of persons 
owned land land (% of persons with that reason)
per house- withthat idea)
hold (in ha;
mean and Good Moderate Bad Searching Hunger Conflict Other
range) land over land job
Persons Heartland 1 (0 - 2.3) 8 38 63 74 4 7 30
wanting (n = 27)
to leave Kolara  2 (0 - 4.3) 50 75 25 80 40 0 0
(n = 5)
Bush settlers (n = 36) 1.4 (0a - 7.1)b 8 11 44 81 3 0 0
people refer not only to a general lack of field-surface at the place of origin but specifically to
a lack thereof in the hands of friends and relatives, so borrowing is also no option. If it were
possible to buy or hire at all, the settlers mostly belong to the poorer part of the population.
Thus, neither hiring nor buying fits within their financial means. 
The financial threshold for hiring or buying was extra high because the fertility status of the
available fields was such that there was a big risk of not regaining the money with the yield.
Even 60 % of those with a field area that theoretically should have been enough to feed their
family (2.2 ha or more)140 mention a failing production due to infertility. Those with more than
1.5 ha for transplant-sorghum or more than 1 ha for rainy season production also referred to
the bad status of those fields.
Fertility and yield improvement
Enhancing the field quality with the help of manure from own animals was only a possibility
for a small number of respondents now living in a new settlement. A smaller number still had
the opportunity to borrow manure form other people’s animals (see Table 5.4.5). Surprisingly,
those were not persons with a high arable surface and no animals themselves.
Table 5.4.5 Livestock ownership of migrants and use of animal manure in origin region
For most of the respondents the reason for the lack of use of manure becomes clear, namely a
lack of fields, a lack of animals or a lack of both. Sometimes persons with livestock used the
manure even when they did not have a large area to cultivate. For example, two people with 7
cattle each also have more than 20 small ruminants141 and, indeed, they use(d) their animals’
droppings to improve the fields: one time the fields of the father and in the other case one small
field of only 0.5 ha. 
Of the six persons with both more than 1.1 ha of surface and more than 0.7 TLU (see Table
5.4.6, the nine squares in the lower-right corner) only one used his animals’ manure. Why the
manure of a flock of seven small ruminants or more or that of one cattle or more is not used
on badly infertile rainy season fields remains a mystery. It is perfectly possible to gather the
manure at night when the animals are locked up during the rainy season, and even at the end
of the dry season when extra fodder has to be given, although the latter would require extra
140 The mean family size of the settlers is 8.6 persons. With 0.25 ha per person they should have enough (Dietz
et al 2001).
141 A TLU of more than 6.9.
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Cattle numbers owned Small ruminant numbers TLU owned
owned
1 - 3 4 - 6 7 - 10 1 - 3 4 - 6 7 - 10 > 10 0 0.1 - 0.6 0.7 - 1.3 1.4 - 2.5 > 2.6
No. of owners 7 0 2 11 3 6 3 10 12 6 5 3
(n = 26)
No. users manure  0 0 2 0 0 1 2 n.a. 0 1 0 2
own animals
No. users manure  2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 0
borrowed animals
labour (at a moment that there is plenty of it). It is also possible to attach the animals on the
fields just after the harvest, let them eat the stubble and feed them extra if necessary142. 
Table 5.4.6 Numbers of settlers with a certain arable surface in the origin region versus TLU ownership
Other ways of improving the fertility of fields were not widely implemented. Eight persons
use(d) some sort of chemical fertiliser on their sorghum fields, half of which was in fact for
cotton fertiliser, bought from SODECOTON. The real sorghum fertiliser had five different
sources. In addition, only two people used stems of harvest left-overs and leaves of wild trees
(standing in the fields).
To increase labour input, half of the respondents in the settlements used ploughs, mostly in
their own possession (see Table 5.3.3). In the heartland, a lower percentage of those that want-
ed to leave owned ploughs143 than of those who indicated they wanted to stay. In Kolara there
was no difference between the two groups. The settlers used (and owned) less ploughs than the
other groups (see Table 5.4.8). Only the heartland people that wanted to leave had less. This is
partly due to the fact that several shop and bar owners from Tchatibali are incorporated in this
group. Because the use of ploughs (and especially ploughs that are always available, such as
one’s own ploughs) helps to shorten labour time per ha, those with access to ploughs are better
off. With the bad rains of the last years they had the possibility of sowing a larger area at the
right time, thus increasing proving yields. Nevertheless, because the farmers could not use the
free labour to invest in more fields, from this perspective it did not improve the total yield.
Therefore, the possession of ploughs caused a bigger wish of accessibility of more fields. On the
other hand, those that worked by hand wanted to acquire some more wealth in the new settle-
ment area to enable them to buy a plough.
All respondents, both those who considered leaving the origin villages and those who had
already moved, tried to acquire high yielding or - better still - quicker maturing varieties.
However, the supply thereof is quite meagre and arbitrary. There seems to be no difference in
supply between the bush settlements and the older Diamaré villages. Most of the time people
cannot wait to sow until those seeds finally arrive.
In short, with regard to environmental factors, people who chose to invade the bush had to cal-
culate the costs and benefits of, on the one hand, an abundance of still fertile lands, especial-
ly for transplant-sorghum but also for rain-fed sorghum, combined with a lack thereof in the
origin villages. Indeed, on average the settler families had the lowest arable surface at their
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142 This can be done with fodder gathered from the bush (in the Diamaré), or with dry leaves from beans etc.
143 And fewer of them used ploughs, although with a lower difference.
Arable surface (in ha)
TLU 0 0.1 - 0.25 0.26 - 1.0 1.1 - 1.5 1.6 - 3.1 3.1 - 5
0 2 1 4 1 1 1
0.1 - 0.6 3 0 0 2 6 2
0.7 - 1.3 1 0 0 3 1 0
1.4 - 2.5 1 2 1 0 1 0
> 2.6 1 0 1 0 1 0
disposal of all the different categories of the study (see Table 5.4.7). Because the settler fami-
lies are relatively young, for them the expected surface area per person could only decrease in
the future (see also section 4.3).
Table 5.4.7 Disposition of arable surface (in ha) in origin villages of different categories
On the other side of the equation, the vulnerability for droughts and the quick ageing charac-
teristics of the soil are a setback, especially when the enormous amount of work in clearing the
bush from its decennia-old trees and brushes is taken into account. Also, people know that the
production of the soils after clearing will not reach its full potential until three or more years
have passed. Thus, they have to get through some difficult years. In addition, non-bush inhab-
itants of the Diamaré consider the bush area as a very dry spot with almost no rain, no rivers
and no water points144. Constructing the latter is almost impossible because of the rocky sub-
strate. Another risk in the bush (more than in the more populated villages) is the occasional
arrival of elephants that destroy the whole yield145.
5.4.3 Reasons for intrusion in the human domain 
With all the costs as mentioned above, the decision to go to the bush is a difficult one. For that
reason only a small proportion of those who want to leave their villages consider the bush a
good option146. Only those families that have young household heads and thus the strength to
withstand the extra workload, combined with the certitude of diminishing possibilities in the
homeland because of a growing family size, will make the effort. Indeed, the mean age of
household heads of settlers’ families is almost ten years lower than of those in the heartland
villages and Kolara. That the wish to move at all is connected to younger (and thus more ambi-
tious) men and women in general can also be seen from the low mean age of those that
expressed their plans to leave: 33 years versus 48 years in the whole villages.
Settler families are in general healthier, with fewer health problems than the other ones. This
is a positive feature, especially in the bush, where there are no health services at all. The young
men and women in the bush refer to the abundance of traditional medicines around them. “My
little girl had stomach aches yesterday but I only had to take five steps to that tree over there to
peel the skin and boil a curing drink with it. You would not find this tree in the village.” 
144 Within the settlements this is considered the biggest problem. Water has to be fetched in Gesai, 10 km away.
145 Several respondents in neighbouring settlements mention their encounters with these big mammals that
destroyed fields and crops. Six out of 35 respondents actually suffered own crops to be destroyed by elephants.
See also Van der Ploeg (2001); Zwaal (1995) or Tchamba (1996).
146 Three out of five people in Kolara indicate the bush as a region to go to. In the heartland nobody refers exact-
ly to the Diamaré bush although six out of 27 persons mention different Diamaré villages in general.
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People wanting to leave Total
settlers Kolara heartland Kolara heartland
Per household 1.4 2.0 1.0 3.83 2.34
Per person 0.16 0.40 0.23 0.36 0.26
On the other hand, water and sewage hygiene are non-existent in the bush. Both the construc-
tion of wells and the digging of latrines is difficult because of the rocky underground. In spite of
that, government agencies have already discovered that this remote place is a source of revenue.
In April 2001 they stated that if the village had not built latrines within a couple of months, each
family without one would have to pay. So the new inhabitants discussed between them how much
money was required to buy it off. Country-wide corruption became prevalent almost before the
new settlers had arrived! Beforehand, nobody could have counted on that happening.
Being more daring and more ambitious may also be influenced by education. As Tupuri
themselves say: “Education opens your mind. It makes you see more options.” Indeed, the per-
centages of people who attended primary school are higher for the settlers than for the origin
villages. However, the reverse is true of the percentages for secondary school attendance. In
the settlement, only three percent of the household heads visited more than primary school. In
total the number of persons that visited a school is more or less the same147. It seems as if a
lower level of education has made people not only decide to move but actually to do so, while
a higher level makes people more frustrated (that is why they express the wish to leave their
home-village), but indecisive as to where and when to move.
With regard to the schooling of children, it is difficult to make comparisons because the
settlement population is younger than that of the origin villages and thus a larger number of
their children are of pre-school age. The exact age of children is difficult to estimate because
many parents do not know how old they are and children of the same age can differ greatly
in outward appearance. Also, different fathers regard ‘school age’ in different ways. Some
fathers send their sons to school when they are barely five years old while others make them
herd the cattle until they are ten years old. Secondary school attendance by children is in par-
ticular far lower at the moment in the settlements148, but again, this is certainly due to the low
age of the children. Fewer of the children of those who want to move attend school than of
the three villages in total (40 % versus 55 %), but then again this group is younger than the
average age of the whole villages population. Because all household heads indicate that they
will send their children when they are old enough149, future school attendance numbers of
children will increase, especially for those that indicate their wish to move. For the settlement
inhabitants school will become a problem because children then have to walk long distances.
As a result, those parents that regard school as a necessity (perhaps more so if they them-
selves have a higher level of education), can have problems with the remoteness of the set-
tlements.
One of the negative conditions that was incorporated in the cost-benefit calculations of new
settlers, namely that less information would reach them, proved to be unfounded. Already sev-
eral governmental and NGO extension workers have discovered the new hamlets and provid-
ed information on the curbing of erosion, how to plant fruit trees and, as stated above, on how
to construct latrines. People consider themselves lucky here: old and new methods of agricul-
ture and the knowledge thereof are easily available.
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147 Only those Kolara inhabitants that wanted to leave have a 100 % school attendance, but the number is low.
148 6 % versus 26 %.
149 I think these are “desired answers”, meaning that parents give the answer they consider the most appropriate,
and not the truest. But perhaps they believe it themselves and indeed want to send their children, but perhaps
they will not be not able to do so.
5.4.4 Reasons for intrusion in the economic domain
Whether or not wealth or the lack of it can form a trigger to leave a village and invade the bush
remains to be seen. An indication of wealth can be offered via the ownership of cattle and
ploughs: Table 5.4.8 gives a picture of the wealth of the different categories to make compar-
ison easier. Indeed, a lower percentage of settlers has ploughs, cattle and small ruminants.
They also have fewer donkeys than the donkey village of Kolara. In short, although they
explain that for moving you need a lot of money (for example to rebuild the compound, to buy
transport etc.), the settlers are (and were) in general poorer than the people that stay behind
(and not because they sold their animals or ploughs).
Table 5.4.8 Livestock and plough ownership and use by different groups of respondents (percentages of 
group)
Surprisingly, inhabitants from Kolara who want to go away, own more ploughs than the aver-
age inhabitant; 60 % have donkeys but none of them have cattle. Therefore, the extent of their
wealth is disputable150. 
With regard to the keeping of farm animals, the bush offers more opportunities to graze
them. The fact, though, that settlers in the bush are poorer as far as farm animals are concerned
makes it clear that they did not seek this pasture option when they came to the bush. The
reverse is even truer: in the bush the risk of cattle theft or losing livestock because they get lost
in the undergrowth is quite high. Some cattle owners have (as yet) left their animals with
fathers or brothers outside the bush. The lack of veterinary services and medicine may also
have made them take this decision, but this fact in itself did not make them refrain from seek-
ing a new settlement.
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% of % of households % of hh. % with % with
households having / using with small donkeys horses
using cattle ruminants
ploughs
1-3 > 4 Draught 1-3 > 4 1 > 2
Heartland total (n=143) Own 43 16 29 36 14 66 0.7 0 3
Hire 13 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0
Borrow 17 0 0 18 0 0 0.7 0 0
Heartland wanting to Own 30 19 15 19 15 59 0 0 4
leave (n=27) Hire 15 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0
Borrow 22 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0
Kolara total (n=37) Own 52 14 30 27 14 54 73 14 14
Hire 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Borrow 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kolara wanting to  Own 60 0 0 0 40 20 40 20 0
leave(n=5) Hire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Borrow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Settlers (n=36) Own 39 33 6 14 31 33 22 6 0
Hire 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
Borrow 8 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 0
150 Here, we have to remember that cattle-keeping used to be part of the Tupuri culture. When people do not have
them, this is certainly a sign of poverty.
Apart from the poorer position in general, and specifically that regarding ploughs, the lower
field availability and the reduced fertility of these fields formed a mayor setback for cash crop
production. It means that settlers had fewer options to earn a living or at least an additional
income from cotton or other crops in their home villages. 
An economic consideration that pulls people to the bush is the fact that material for home
industry is abundantly available just two steps away. Although, to sell it they have to walk
long distances. Yet, the production of mats, granaries, brooms, etc. becomes so easy that the
transport is no problem in comparison. People do not even count it, as they have to go to
markets anyway to purchase indispensables and to meet other people. Naturally, this takes
time, but they can choose to postpone the task until the dry season, when labour time is not
a problem.
Of course, of those who stayed behind, some had additional income sources, sometimes
other than farm jobs. Opportunities for the ‘movers’ to obtain such jobs differed. Of all those
who wanted to leave, nine percent earned a substantial part of his income from another job.
But, they explained that this only provides for a small salary, which is also not at all secure.
They preferred to farm somewhere with more (fertile) fields or to move with their shop (for
example) to the city, where there are more potential customers. Some work demands a higher
level of education than primary school level and, as has been stated, settlers do not have a very
high level of education. None of the new settlers abandoned another primary income source or
the possibility thereof to move to the bush. The fact is that they did not see any other possi-
bilities to obtain such jobs in the future. According to them the situation with regard to off-
farm jobs was very insecure and was set to deteriorate further.
5.4.5 Reasons for intrusion in the social domain
The social position of settlers was (and is) no better than that of their co-villagers in the regions
of origin. Belonging to a poorer segment of the population and without a big herd to use as a
source of (pay-off) gifts, climbing up through the social hierarchy is almost impossible. They
could have invested in the organisation of social institutions to improve the general position of
the origin village, but then again their low social position would have hindered this. Even if
such institutions could have been implemented, it would have taken a longer time than they
were prepared to wait. Now the Project Mindif-Moulvoudaye has ended, the bush looks entic-
ing and “you need to be there before others. Otherwise only the lesser fields will remain, or
you will again acquire only a low position in the new hamlet”. Those who arrive first acquire
a higher status.
Although the lawan of Kolara still tries to implement some of the project rules, especially
the most important one, namely inhibition of encroachment151 - because he wants to preserve
the bush for cattle grazing152 - he is almost powerless. The settlers know this. It seems as if only
State law regarding land tenure is important and that law backs the settlers although, strictly
speaking, State law also calls for forest protection and is therefore opposed to bush clearances
(see chapter 4). In addition, authorities that see the importance of bush protection are indeci-
sive: they say “No”, but they do not do anything to counteract encroachment. To them as well,
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151 He indeed refers to this rule when talking about the gradual disappearance of the bush.
152 He is one of the biggest cattle owners of the region. In addition, as the chief of the land and with almost as
high a position as the Mindif lamido, he receives payments of nomads to safeguard their interests in the bush.
State laws are not totally clear153.
Thus, settlers turn to those authorities that give them permission to invade the bush. The
lawan of Kobo, for example, does not oppose new settlements. Although he stresses the impor-
tance of grazing lands for both nomadic and sedentary cattle owners, he declares that “nobody
is able to stop Tupuri from creating new settlements. Not the sub-prefect, not the police, not
even the prefect, so why should I try?” An increase in numbers of Kobo citizens means a high-
er (tax) income and a better position for him in relation to other authorities154. In addition, he
is personally interested in clearing the bush, because he shifts his fields the moment they
become infertile. He himself started new fields at the entrance to Kobo village (former project
land) three years ago. In addition to that he has approximately one ha at each of four new set-
tlements in the bush. 
Yet another social reason plays a role in bush settlement. Some settlers did not come in the
first place because of the fields. They had social problems in their village of origin, had quar-
relled with village chiefs and were sometimes accused of witchcraft. In a new surrounding,
with people from different origins, old stories have no meaning so they preferred to start a new
life in the remote bush.
5.5 Assertion of rights: Box 3
As we have seen above, reasons to invade the bush area are sometimes at the same time claims
to the bush. Tupuri refer to their customary rights155, to the emptiness of the bush in general
and to State law and historical rights related to that in particular. Without an official categori-
sation of bush land (that is ‘national land’) to be forest land, for example, the official State law
declares that the user rights of national land fall to those that develop it. In addition, new
Tupuri settlers do not donate legitimacy to the land master title of the lawan of Kolara.
According to their customary laws, the master of the land is he who starts clearing an ‘empty’
space and founds a settlement. In addition, the ‘land master’ according to the State law is the
nearest sub-prefect. So, at best and when he backs them156 Tupuri refer to him. Last but not
least, they reinforce their claim by not acknowledging the presence of other users (and thus
denying them their rights).
In general, the Diamaré pulls at migrating Tupuri because of the nearness of the area. This also
underlines their claim. There is no “non-Tupuri land” between their region of origin and this
“empty space”: it is the next step in the moving frontier. What is more, it is not the next step
but rather a step already taken. They perceive this region as ‘their’ land, from which the Fulbe
have driven them. “The [Tupuri] have controlled a much larger area than their current space,
stretching out from the current Massa territory along the Logone, via the current district of
Guidiguis, to the Mundang region of Lara in the West.” (Boulet 1984: 140). Feckoua (2002:
153 The higher level (regional) authorities gain financially by a continuation of the conflict, because conflicting
parties have to buy their involvement every year.
154 See Fisiy (1995). 
155 Customary law should have its place in the whole legal system, according to Cameroonian laws (see ch. 4).
156 As in the cases of the three study settlements that get their authorisation from the sub-prefect of the involved
sub-department (Moulvoudaye).
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3) also includes Kolara, Horlong and Daram in “the traditional Tupuri land”. Indeed, many
Tupuri clan and family members have already preceded the settlers in the direction described.
When the French colonial masters had succeeded pacifying the centre of the Far North
Province around 1930-1935, Tupuri again started to come to this area. In short, Tupuri do not
perceive their shift to the Kolara and Kobo bush as an invasion of other people’s ‘niche’. Even
those that do not refer to age-old rights highlight the right to clear fields in the “empty” bush.
This corresponds perfectly with their customary rules. Moreover, after the year-long Pilot
Project Mindif-Moulvoudaye, nobody is using the described area. 
“I have been watching the bush for years, but was not allowed to use it. Now I am going to use it
like my ancestors did before me. When somebody clears a forest that is nobody’s, afterwards the
land is his. Do you see any signs of habitation here? So it is clear, isn’t it?”157
Apart from expressing their claim to the members of their own ethnic group, to outsiders and
to encountered cattle keepers, the settling Tupuri voice it to authorities.  In the complex
Cameroonian situation of different chiefs, they choose the parties that are, or have to be, on
their side, and they ignore the chiefs and civil servants that may come up with counter argu-
ments. Referring to the Cameroonian land laws they not only claim their rights to the bush in
talks with the sub-prefect, they also claim that it is his duty to protect their lifes, homes and
fields there.
And they succeeded with this strategy. Although the sub-prefect of the region declared to
the herders that he did not want any new settlements in the bush158, he did not do anything to
implement this decision. On the contrary, he allowed new settlers to come in, he allocated
chieftaincies for new settlements and, last but not least, it turned out he himself obtained fields
in the newly cleared areas159. 
5.6 Counter-assertion and conflict: Box 3
When Tupuri settle in the bush area and claim it to be their right, there would be no problem
if other users would withdraw and acknowledge this right straight away (or if there weren’t
any other users at all). From the explanation above (section 4 and 5), we can conclude that the
invading Tupuri themselves do not have the intention to withdraw again (except perhaps some
individuals who cannot cope with the water shortage). They even do not have the idea that they
invaded somebody else’s area160. 
However, they did (and do) invade someone else’s area. The pasture is already in use by
several others. With the onset of the rainy season cattle keepers in the Yaéré floodplain escape
the incoming water and the accompanying flies and search the higher and dryer lands of the
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157 This is a free medley of citations from several respondents in the settlements of Domo and Yameda. With such
remarks they deny the existence of nomad camps in the bush.
158 When some of the herders came to him in 1995 to complain about the occupation of their campsites, he
stated that the cultivators could stay until after the harvest (otherwise it would be a loss of effort and seed),
but that afterwards they had to leave.
159 See also Van der Ploeg (2001: 40).
160 With that this situation is slightly different from that suggested in the VoE diagram, but it only makes the case
more clear. With their perception of ownership of the bush, their claim of rights becomes stronger.
Diamaré between Mindif, Guidiguis and Moulvoudaye161. Most of these ‘other’ users do not
withdraw either. On the contrary, the moment other users spot the new settlers, they also start
to claim the bush as theirs. Then, when both (or more) parties continue to underline their
access, use or even ownership rights to the same piece of land, a conflict situation arises (Box
3 of the VoE diagram). Thus, to make it possible to define the situation as a conflict situation,
more has to be known of the counter-party’s perceptions, options and actions. 
In this case, the ‘other users’ are made up by a wide range of cattle herders. They fall into
three sub-groups. Using ownership of the herd as a denominator, the first group consists of cat-
tle owners of the Diamaré villages. These can be called ‘local cattle owners’. The second group
consists of all the different cattle nomads who use the Diamaré as a rainy season resort. Most,
if not all, of them find their dry season grazing lands in the Yaéré floodplain of the Logone.
The third group consists of rich cattle owners in town (for the Diamaré this is mostly Maroua
or Kaélé), who send their cattle with paid herders into the grazing lands. Most of these paid
herders are the sons of village cattle owners or of nomads.
5.6.1 History of the pasture lands
Before 1978, the whole region was occupied by an extended bush in which cattle keepers
(nomadic and settled) could herd their livestock and in which new cultivators could start fields.
Many people claim that in former times the Diamaré plains of Mindif could be used for cattle
grazing all year round. Whether or not that is true (after all, water availability is a problem), it
was big enough to combine different types of use. 
When the project ‘Mindif-Moulvoudaye’ began (see Box 5.2), agriculture was prohibited in
a large part of the area for. From 1978 to 1993 (or longer) the ‘Kolara grazing bloc’ was exclu-
sively used for cattle grazing, with the exclusion of cattle of nomads. The number of cattle did
increase, however, because “[the project] has encouraged local herdsmen to herd the cattle of
large owners from Mindif and Maroua” and “cattle owners [from a large surrounding region]
lead their large herds towards the project zone.” (Van den Berg 1997: 90-91).
These years of pasture scarcity as far as the nomads were concerned did not result in any
more clashes between nomadic cattle keepers and agriculturalists on the lands that were not in
use as project area, such as the territory of Guidiguis, Horlong - a village just south of (and
more or less surrounded by) Kolara162 -, or Gadjia, the adjacent village to the west, that were
used as a resort163. There were also no real attempts by nomads or cultivators to invade the proj-
ect areas, although control by official officers would have been difficult. Because the rules
were clear (set by project administration together with government and Fulbe authorities and
also backed by the project structure and the government) it seems that nobody had the need to
question them. Several chiefs - Fulbe cattle owners themselves - in surrounding villages tried
to implement the same rules, as these were profitable for local cattle owners.
161 According to Van der Ploeg (2001: 52) the number of nomad household heads in the research area is 250 dur-
ing the rainy season (based on his interviews and information of the veterinary services).
162 See Figures 5.2 and 5.5.
163 Between 1977 and 1981, the time of onset of the Mindif-Moulvoudaye project, sixteen (28 %) of the 58
respondents changed campsites to Horlong, Gadjia or Guidiguis and eight (14 %) to other places. Between
1977 and 1990, a total of twenty-five respondents (43%) changed to the three territories mentioned. They did
not all come from the grazing blocs of the project and some of them changed their campsite again before the
end of the project.
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As soon as the project ended, nomads again started to come to the area. They were still
aware of the stories of their fathers and grandfathers (or sometimes remembered their own
experiences) of the good and undisturbed pastures “in the Mindif bush”. They wanted to use
their age-old rainy season pastures and camps. At the same time the scouts of the new groups
discovered the region, attracted by information that was spreading concerning an area that had
remained untouched for over a decade and by their own observations there. The different trans-
humance groups that roam the Diamaré plains are mostly of Fulbe descent, together with some
Choa Arabs and certain herders of other ethnic groups164. Most of these Fulbe are categorised
as belonging to the “Fulbe nomads” lineage in general (e.g. sub-group Fulbe Woïla, Fulbe
Mare, Alidjam or Adanko’en), others are part of different ancestor groups, such as the Fulbe
Bagaarmi (sub-group Kesou165), the Fulbe Yirlaa’be (sub-group Yillaga) or Fulbe Wolaarbe
(sub-group Ba’a)166.   
Agriculturalists also rediscovered the bush. Soon some cultivators from surrounding vil-
lages began to clear a small area of fields. These were easily avoidable at first, as large parts
of the bush still remained usable for grazing and for cattle tracks, but gradually the numbers
of farmers increased, later to be followed by actual settlements.
5.6.2 Environmental domain
Physical basis
The Diamaré bush with its savannah shrubs and trees grows on the badly permeable Planosol-
like soils, the clayey-sandy Cambisols and the remaining Vertisols and colluvial soils that have
not (yet) been cultivated by human populations. Vegetation differs with the soil composition
and can change quickly over a short distance. On the more sandy surfaces, tree vegetation is
dominated by several Acacia species, Faidherbia albida and Tamarindus indica (De
Steenhuijsen Piters 1995: 42), and Anogeissus leiocarpus, Sclerocarya birrea and Guiera sene-
galensis (Boutrais 1984: 53). Where clay is more important especially Acacia seyal and
Balanites aegyptica can be found (id). Fotius (2000: 31-32) mentions the presence of
Piliostigma reticulata, and in the herbaceae sphere: Pennisetum pedicellatum, Echinochloa
obtusiflora, and several Andropogon and Chloris species. The broad diversity offers rich nour-
ishment for livestock.  
In principle, this area is fully equipped for grazing and foraging, with its natural abundance of
herbs, shrubs and trees. However, because of over-use, the quality of the vegetation is not as good
as it should be. Even in the 1970s several extension workers noticed the degradation. For that
reason the Mindif-Moulvoudaye Pilot Project was started (see Box 5.2). During the project peri-
od, grazing blocs were able to recover but the pressure on other parts of the bush increased. There
are places where all perennial grasses are replaced by annual ones which generate fodder of a
lower quality. After the end of the Project, a difference in quality could indeed be observed
between the former grazing blocs and the rest of the Diamaré. Twenty percent of the respondents
explicitly state that they came (back) to the grazing blocs because of the good bush quality167.
186
164 During the research in the bush we encountered representatives of thirteen different Fulbe sub-groups (some
of these again sub-divided according to their own classification) and herders from four other ethnic groups. 
165 According to Seignobos (2000c) the Kesou Fulbe have more or less taken over Arab customs.
166 For an extended genealogical tree of the Fulbe groups in North Cameroon, see Seignobos (2000c).
167 See also Ligthart (1993) about the perception of over-grazing in the Diamaré.
With regard to the hydrology of the area, people declare that it is less secure than in the past.
The unpredictability of rains is increasing (or so people say)168. Since the 1970 and 1980
droughts, old rainfall patterns have not been restored. The year total of precipitation has not
reached the 1960s levels and nomads have to stay further south than they used to (Zborowski
1996). Also the length of the rainy season is less predictable169. This means that the herds can-
not arrive in the Diamaré the moment their herders would like (and have planned), because no
re-growth has yet taken place. In 2001, for example, after an early start of the rains in April,
they stopped again up until the second half of July. The nomads who came from the Yaéré,
where the dry season pastures were exhausted, got stuck on their way. Failing rainfall causes
a decrease in bush vegetation and the quality thereof. According to Gaston (1996) the protein
content and the digestibility of the fodder particularly decreases. Indeed, ten percent of respon-
dents point out that the amount of grass and the quality thereof is far lower than is necessary,
both inside and outside the former grazing blocs170.
Another problem of the diminishing rains, mentioned by the herders, is the speed with
which water for drinking purposes for humans and livestock runs out. In the course of the dry
season, they have to leave the area earlier because of a lack of drenching water, although the
number of water holes is higher than before the project activities started171. In the rainy season
of 2001 (July – October) thirty-three percent of respondents indicated a lack of water points
for their cattle.
Trying to maintain or increase the quality of cattle food by investing in the quality of the
bush and the production or purchase of fodder is something the nomads never considered.
Their way of life was to move with the rains. Nowadays, several young men talk about range
cattle keeping. They have heard of the methods of “the white” and of their kinsmen in the
North Province and Adamawa, who fence in their pastures and treat them with fertilisers or
sow grass seeds. The fences are used to ensure that no more TLU are allowed than the carry-
ing capacity of the land.
Density of cattle and people
Indeed, the number of cattle seems to constitute a problem in the region. Part of the cause is
the southern drift of nomads because of the generally low precipitation. Another reason for the
increase in cattle density in the southern Diamaré is the increase of rich town people who
invest in herds and send them into the bush with a paid herder172. Present nomads complain
about an increase in number of cattle in comparison to the past. On the one hand they also refer
to the new herds of town or village-based owners while, on the other hand, they explain that
the numbers of cattle per person are increasing as well. Table 5.6.1 shows the percentages of
respondents with a certain interpretation of the origin of increase (or decrease) of cattle num-
bers in the bush.
168 See also Njomaha (2004).
169 See chapter 4. 
170 But it applies more outside since the former grazing blocs are still preferred as pasture.
171 One of the goals of the project was the construction of water-wells and artificial lakes, to cover the whole area.
Part of this plan has indeed been implemented.
172 Personal communication by the Provincial Head of the Veterinary Service in Maroua, January 2003. See also
Van den Berg (1997: 90-91).
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Table 5.6.1 Percentage of respondents (n = 58) that thinks the change of cattle numbers in the bush is due
to certain categories of owners.
The same cattle increase is perhaps causing the increase in the number and size of hardés that
is mentioned by ten percent of the nomadic respondents.
The increase in cattle number owned by nomads is partly due to an increase in the number
of nomads themselves. Forty percent of the respondents agree with the idea that the total num-
ber of nomads is rising. The increase in numbers of cattle nomads is made up of members of
ethnic groups and clans that have already visited the region for ages as well as of members of
ethnic groups that are new to the area. For example, 17 % of respondents referred to an
increase in the number of nomads from Nigeria173 during the last few years174.
Land availability
The increase in cattle herders and their herds leads to a reduction in the amount of surface avail-
able per user. Until recently, the bush was regarded as enormous and ‘never ending’. Nowadays,
only five percent of respondents state that one has to move in the event of problems: “The bush
is big enough”. It has to be said that the percentages of respondents with an interpretation of
declining bush availability differs according to the approach taken when discussing the (prob-
ability of) decline175. Also the percentages that give a certain reason for the decline differ. Table
5.6.2 gives a sort of aggregate percentage per category of causes.
Table 5.6.2 Percentage of respondents with a certain idea about the reason of bush surface decline
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173 The Awalme and the Sou-en groups (Source: interviews in Diamaré bush, July-November 2001).
174 Also the numbers of Shoa Arabs in the Diamaré are increasing. They form the majority in the uppermost part
of the province, where they have settled to cultivate and to fish. However, more and more cattle keepers among
them come to the south during the rainy season.
175 For example, discussing the opportunities of children results in other percentages that consider the bush as not
being limitless as regards time: in a general talk about the problems of life as a nomad, three quarters of the
respondents explain that the bush is already too small these days, but only 64 % think that their children will
be confronted with the limits of the bush. In addition to this, 32 % think there will never be a bush shortage
for their own herd and 24 % are of the same opinion for all herds in general.
Cattle increase Cattle decrease
Cattle Cattle Cattle Cattle Cattle Cattle Cattle Cattle 
in of town of of of in of of
general based village in- respon- nomads general respon- other
owners habitants dents in general dents owners
% of respondents 60 64 24 17 52 22 10 0
Too much Too much Too much Fields on Fields too Too much
cattle new fields in camp sites dispersed cultivators
settlements general
% of respondents 24 12 28 22 5 36
Of all the respondents, 22 percent have already encountered crop damage problems with cul-
tivators. 42 % indicated that they have changed the site of their rainy season camp because of
fields or settlements on the spot or too nearby, as a result of which damage could occur too
easily. 
The quantity of land for grazing is diminishing in the whole of the Far North Province because,
due to general population growth, more land is being used for compounds and settlements and
more and more cultivators are using former grazing lands for fields. The Diamaré south-east
of Maroua is a kind of last resort for cattle grazing during the dry season. Thus, as has been
already mentioned, even if the number of cattle per person had stayed the same (which is not
the case), the amount of land per cattle keeper and per cattle in the Diamaré would have
declined.
The amount of grazing land for a certain person or group can be maintained by safeguard-
ing the access to (and use of) land. Theoretically this can be done through the creation of
ranges (as in the Adamawa region) or by making agreements with authorities and/or other
users about the delimitation of pasture areas and trekking routes to and from those areas and
to and from water points. 
Some village cattle keepers have taken State law as a departure and ‘developed’ a certain
piece of land because this enables them to obtain ‘ownership rights’176 (see below: land allo-
cation rules). This development is very moderate: a simple delineation, cutting of some trees,
administering of a bit of fertiliser and (more interestingly for their cattle) the start of the dig-
ging of a water well.
It is also possible to search for more secure territory in other places. This means the VoE
diagram would re-start at box 2, but in another area. In a way this is indeed what happens:
several owners send (part of) their herd to the south, where more grazing space seems to be
present, now that tsetse flies have been eradicated or are at least being kept in check (by open-
ing up the bushy habitats of these flies for agriculture and using more and more chemical anti-
parasitics177). Another possible destination is the grass fields of Chad in the east, now that the
civil war there has ended and security has increased. On the other hand, a southward move of
herds has also been taking place in Chad since the early 1970s together with the absence of
proper rainfall recovery. As a result, also there cattle density in the useable areas is increasing
(De Bruijn and Van Dijk, pers. comm. 2003).
Calorific needs and availability
Table 6.4.1 (see below) shows the number of cattle per respondent. This provides a basis for
the calculation of available calories versus what is needed. According to Dietz et al (2001:
198) to subsist on milk and meat of a herd 3 TLU (= four zebu) is needed per capita. In the
Diamaré the mean nomadic household of 2.1 adults and 4.7 children needs slightly more than
27 cattle. Because the average number of cattle per herder is 118, this means that, on average,
the calorific needs of a household can be met by the herds.
176 This was a tactic used by several Fulbe cattle owners, especially in Gadjia, in the Daram territory which is
adjacent to the study area.
177 See Boutrais (1999).
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However, there is a difference in the situations of owners, herders who herd for their fathers
(or wider family) and those that herd more commercially. Off-take to meet calorific needs is
normal for the first two categories. The third category has to explain all losses to their bosses.
The normal yearly off-take to maintain the herd (older animals etc) cannot automatically be
used by the herder. Everything depends on the conditions of his contract. Thus, it is difficult
to say anything about the calorific supply of the last group in relation to meat consumption.
On the other hand, all of the herders herd more than three times the number of animals they
need in calorific terms (most even herd in excess of ten times more). This number of cattle pro-
vides enough calories even when only the milk is used178.  
5.6.3 Human domain
Health
Access to hospital facilities is difficult for people deep in the bush, like the cattle nomads. On
the other hand, these people are used to travelling and covering large distances in a short time.
If they have cattle, they also have (access to) money to pay bills. However, most of them are
not used to these modern facilities. They prefer the possibilities that the bush offers with regard
to traditional medicine: they know what they need, they know where to find the different ingre-
dients and they know how to administer them (both for themselves and for their cattle). 
The general health situation (amount of illnesses and precocious deaths, for example) is no
different than for other groups of the population in the Far North. The mean age of respon-
dents, as well as the upper range thereof is approximately the same as for the Fulbe and Tupuri
of the Diamaré villages179. Also the number of surviving children per household is approxi-
mately the same as for the village-based Fulbe180.
The only problem the bush nomads encounter is access to drinking water. During their stay
in the Diamaré they depend on the rivers and pools that develop because of the precipitation.
In the Yaéré, during the dry season, the situation is more difficult: no running rivers and no
closed wells, although some wells have been constructed there for the cattle keepers. This lack
of hygienic water constitutes a threat to the health of the nomads.
Education
In general, the nomadic cattle keepers had not attended school. Neither the respondents them-
selves, nor their sons, daughters nor wives have had any formal education. Some of them have
been schooled in the Koran and try to make their children acquire the same proficiency.
However, when young boys have to look after the herd all day, it is difficult for them to acquire
an education. Even Koran schooling is less than that of sedentarised Fulbe.
Household heads try to enhance formal education levels of sons or ‘selfs’ to make it at
least possible to bargain with higher level authorities about their interests. They also hope to
become more familiar with access routes to necessary information. Young men perceive their
lack of formal education as a setback compared to other Cameroonian citizens. They dis-
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178 Even those respondents who do not own cattle, but herd for family members have enough cattle at their dis-
posal to live from the milk.
179 The mean age of the nomad respondents is 46 years; the range is 19 -75.
180 In both cases, the household size is 6.8 (own observation June-July 2001). See also Van der Ploeg (2001: 71)
about household size.
cover that they have no access to higher positions which are occupied by the sons of agri-
culturalists. Moreover, young men try to keep up with ‘modern’ life, contacting other young
men and asking for information wherever they can. However, the time spent on improving
knowledge about ‘modern life’ is taken from time spent to learn typical cattle keeping capac-
ities. Because of their situation between two cultures, they do not reach the level of profes-
sionalism of days gone by, nor do they learn enough to make a profound impact on the other
world. 
Some nomads try to send (some of) their children to school. This is usually only a success-
ful approach if they have relatives settled in the neighbourhood of a school where those chil-
dren can be housed. For ‘local cattle keepers’ and city based owners, all sorts of investments
and especially that of schooling are far easier than for those that ‘roam the wild lands’. 
5.6.4 Economic domain
Farm animals
Although in the Diamaré bush some nomad-groups can be found who are specialised in sheep
herding181, they are rare and, as a result, all the respondents in this study (n = 58) are cattle
herders. Twenty-eight of them (48 %) are not owners, but guard somebody else’s cattle182.
Those that herd on a commercial basis (not for family) gain a calf every 5 months. In the mean-
time they use the milk produced by the cows. Most of the time necessities, such as cereals or
cloths, or saltlicks and medicines for the animals, are paid for by the owner.
Table 5.6.3 Ruminant numbers per respondent (n = 58)
a = n = 3
b = none of these respondents (n = 6) has cattle further south
c = three respondents have less than 10 cattle to herd (two times owners, one time just a herder); 12 respondents
have more than 200 cattle (nine times owners and three times herders)
The numbers of cattle owned and the sizes of herds in the care of herders or owners can differ
enormously. Most of the time small ruminants are also kept. See Table 5.6.3 for an insight into
animal numbers.
181 For example, certain Arab Choa groups; Fulbe Uudaa’en and Fulbe Baali (baali means sheep in Fulfulde).
182 Forty-two percent of non-owners herd the cattle of family (mostly fathers); fourteen percent that of Kolara vil-
lagers and forty-four percent of town-based owners.
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Cattle Goats Sheep
Numbers Herds Numbers Numbers
Place of keeping Mean / Range Mean Range Mean Range No of Mean / Range No of
in rainy season respon- over no / over per over keepers resp. keepers
dent resp. resp. resp. resp. resp.
Diamaré 118 5 - 500c 3.6 1 - 6 5.7 1 - 66 20 16 2 - 60 40
Other places Chada 42 3 - 100 1 0 - 2 n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av.
Cameroonb 50 8 - 100 1 0 - 2
As more than 60 % of respondents explain, prices of cattle, meat and milk are very unstable.
Prices change throughout the year in line with the ebb and flow of the abundant and meagre
seasons. In addition these prices change over the years as the macro situation (partly defined
by climatic parameters) determines the de facto supply in cities and towns and thus demands
in specific areas of the country. According to Van den Berg (1997: 82-83) the rich village-
based cattle keepers use the money from the sale of cattle at a profitable moment to increase
their agricultural production, after which they can increase their herd size again183. For nomadic
cattle keepers, such selling and repurchasing of cattle to invest in agriculture in the meantime
is not an option. In general they do not want to sell, but they have to in order to buy necessi-
ties such as cereals184. Some of them try to speculate a bit with their cattle (see Table 5.6.4),
although mostly out of need due, for example, to illness in the family. If possible, they buy
back later: “You have to buy when you have sold, and if you have money”. 
Table 5.6.4 Percentage of respondents that sold or bought cattle in 2000 and 2001 and the number thereof
per person that bought or sold.
As the Table shows, almost all the people who bought cattle had first sold cattle in the same
year. Normally cattle herds increase thanks to the arrival of new-born calves.
For all cattle keepers the biggest risk to their jobs is the loss of cattle. This can be due to
diseases or accidents. Even the police can pose a threat, because they can confiscate cattle if
owners are accused of a criminal act or of damaging fields. One of the other problems experi-
enced during the last couple of years is the increase in cattle theft. Most of the time this occurs
during the dry season in the Yaéré, but it influences the total strategies of cattle keepers. In
answer to those thefts, herders have to operate in larger groups (see ‘social domain’) and even
have to carry weapons. “Without them you are too vulnerable”, they say.
The cattle keepers complain about the difficulty of maintaining the health of their animals. In
June and July 2001, all the herders referred to the poor health status of their herds. “Don’t you
see how thin they are?” This is partly a temporary phenomenon which occurs each year at the
end of the dry season and which was aggravated in 2001 by the prolonged drought period. But
it is partly due to the improper veterinary situation, they say. A better health status would help
to enhance the efficiency co-efficient of the herd and thus decrease the pressure on the graz-
ing lands. However, the herders do not see any possibilities for achieving this.
192
183 With that the difference between rich and poor village inhabitants increases.
184 Moritz (2003) stated that commoditisation of cattle by Fulbe cattle-keepers is a century old phenomenon.
Cattle sold Cattle bought % of
respondents
% of Mean Range of % of Mean Range of that
respon- cattle cattle respon- cattle cattle bought and
dents sold per sold / dents bought / bought / sold in the
‘seller’ ‘seller’ that bought ‘buyer’ ‘buyer’ same year
2000 86 5.9 1 - 20 31 1.7 1 - 5 29
2001 93 6.2 1 - 20 39 4.5 1 - 10 38
Veterinary services and medicines are expensive and not easily accessible185. People com-
plain that vaccination prices are too high. And, as mentioned before, vaccination is used as a
way of taxing the owners because they have to pay per head of cattle186. 
In addition, herders say they also have to pay for the right to use the pastures. At least half
of the respondents paid 10,000 Fcfa per herd to the community in whose territory they arrived
(mostly Moulvoudaye). Some pay to the lamido of Mindif or the lawan of the region (mostly
Kolara). Some people even pay several times, for example every time they pass the boundary
of a sub-district. There are differences in the price to be paid per herder, per region and some-
times per receiving person187. Only three of the respondents have (once) refused to pay, and for
one of them that resulted in imprisonment. Sixteen percent even explain that it is impossible
not to pay, although they can only imagine the repercussions188. On the whole, the herders have
no clear idea about the financial obligations.
Table 5.6.5 Cattle loss in 2000 and 2001: reasons and numbers (n cattle = 6856; n respondents = 58)
a = different diseases are mentioned; often (also) milk-production is decreased
b = one owner lost 85 cattle; the rest lost a maximum of 10 cattle
c = five cattle of one owner were taken by the police; seven cattle of five owners/herders died after, for example,
they fell into a hole.
Non-agricultural 
Non-pastoral types of jobs or income are hard to imagine for the nomadic cattle keepers. The
cattle are their life and their whole culture is based on the cycle of the trekking to and from dry
season grazing lands and the production of calves and milk. There may be rich ‘el Hadji’s’
(Muslims who made the holy pilgrimage to Mecca), who are also big traders, but the mer-
chandise is, again, cattle. 
For the rich town-based cattle owners cattle are an economic investment. They earn their
money with other activities, such as big trade or high governmental positions. They do not
guard their herds themselves, but always hire young men with some experience with cattle to
herd them in the bush.
185 Too far away and if you arrive at a post more often than not the personnel is not there, they say.
186 It would help if tax per head of cattle was abolished to make more people immunize all their cattle without fear
of a high tax bill.
187 Some respondents say they did not pay because the lawan of Kolara said it was not necessary, while others
mention their payment to the same lawan in addition to another amount of money in the Yaéré. It was not pos-
sible to sort out whether they mixed up (state-based) tax payments with the different payments which existed
in the past that together made up a kind of  ‘protection fees’ (see Moritz et al 2002). In the past, each camp
site had to pay for ‘over-night permission’ (mostly to the regional lawan or lamido as the ‘owner of the land’).
In addition, the zakat, the Islamic tax to help the poor, had to be paid, mostly to the lawan.
188 They do not know others who refused and therefore have no experience with what will happen.
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Diseases Thiefs Other reasons
Respon- Cattle Resp. with Cattle Range Respon- Cattle Resp. Cattle
dents with ill dead dead dead cattl / dents stolen involved involved
ill cattle cattle resp. struck
Numbers 28 245a 22 211 0 - 85b 7 16 6 12c
The settled Fulbe (in the villages) with a large herd have a kind of in-between position,
because they not only want the cattle for economic purposes (as a banking system), but also
for sentimental reasons. To them cattle are a status symbol and part of their culture as well. For
both town-based as well as village-based owners, the cattle are not their lives. They send
herders on transhumance with them when necessary, but stay at home themselves. When the
herds have to resort to (dry season) areas further away, the owners visit such locations to check
the herd and the herders, but even then they still only spend a minimum amount of time in the
bush. Of course it is convenient to have the cattle as close by as possible. For them the ques-
tion is, therefore, is another banking system possible or is an (other) nearby and secure graz-
ing area possible. The answer to the last question is ‘no’. Apart from several small bush patch-
es spread throughout the region, the bush area in the Mindif-Moulvoudaye-Guidiguis triangle
is one of the last big savannah forests left in Cameroon, where herds can roam around without
disturbing too many agricultural fields.
5.6.5 Social domain
For both the improvement of pasture quality and quantity as well as for the economic position
of the herd, social linkages have to be built. Only when a group is strong enough can it per-
suade important government agencies or influence the market. However, at such moments, the
differences between the different individuals may cause problems. For example, decisions
about which path of actions to follow meet with discords between the generations. It turns out
to be impossible to develop one straightforward strategy. At that point the social fabric breaks
down. As a result, different investments are in conflict with each other.  
Family and friends
Normally in the nomadic cattle keepers’ tradition, sons remain within the social group of their
fathers, including after marriage, and herds are kept together as long as the number of cattle
allows shared grazing. Mostly, these sons guard the whole herd. If the father has more than
one group of cattle, more sons or (if these are not available) nephews or even paid herders
have to be charged with the job. The decreasing reliability of pastures means herds have to
be divided more quickly189 and then sons move away from their fathers at an earlier age. As a
result, distances between the generations grow. In the Yaéré and on the road from there to the
Diamaré, herds are clustered to increase security against bandits and ad hoc thieves. On the
other hand, later on in the dry season, herds have to be divided to find enough fodder for the
animals.
Although nomads are thought to spend all their time in the bush, in reality the household
heads (family fathers of a quite extended family of wives, children, and married sons and their
wives and children) spend their days at meeting places in villages and markets to keep up the
ties with other nomads of the same group. At the same time they keep informed about rainfall
patterns in the rest of the Province, growth and quality of grasses elsewhere, prevalent cattle
diseases, cattle prices, new rules and threats and rumours related to their communities. Here
they can maintain their social networks. While sons and grandsons look after the herd, the fam-
ily heads travel around and weave together the social fabric. Interviews in the bush had to be
done before they left to go to local centres not because, as they said, they had to buy some-
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189 See also Gaston (1996).
thing there (although they often did buy salt190, tea or sugar) but because they had to meet
somebody or anybody.
Political
Although the family heads spend all their time building and maintaining the social capital,
most nomadic cattle keepers do not dispose of strong ties with important higher level politi-
cians or civil servants. As a group they are not represented within the important institutions
that have a say in the management of the bush. It is worse than it used to be. The increase of
bush encroachment by cultivators is connected to a decrease in their support for local author-
ities. Apart from the decline in the legitimacy of Fulbe authorities versus agricultural groups,
the number of Fulbe authorities is now generally declining. Social linkages with higher level
authorities are diminishing now that several of these civil servants’ positions have changed
from Fulbe (thus cattle-minded people) to Kirdi persons. These two facts are having a nega-
tive effect on the security of access and use of pasture areas.
Land allocation
According to the nomads the bush belongs to nobody191 and is free to use. They cannot stop
newcomers from roaming freely with their cattle. 83 % of respondents declare that all herders
are equal and that there are no rules governing use of the bush by cattle keepers. The only
unofficial rule is that you should herd your cattle in a way that they do not mix with those of
others. Two or three individuals refer to some owners or a special ethnic group that invented
the rule that it was not allowed to pass right along the edge of the camp192. 
Table 5.6.6 Percentage of respondents that indicate a certain type of authority that has the power to decide
about bush-use or water-use.
a = half of these refer to artificial water points
b = mostly the ‘Project’ or the ‘whites’ are mentioned
c = most of the time this refers to rain water pools and rivers
On the other hand, when asked about persons who have the authority to decide about the use
of the bush, 76 % of respondents referred to a specific person or authority193. There is no con-
nection between the ethnic group and the person indicated, nor between the person indicated
and the institute or person that is mentioned as the one to whom they have to pay for the use
190 The Mindif-Moulvoudaye bush area does not have a natural saltlick, so the cattle-keepers supply their herds
with salt they have bought.
191 Except for two respondents (3 %) who think that “the lawan” is the owner.
192 In one case, several years ago, this was heavily contested by the other nomads. The violence only stopped
through the intervention of the authorities. A year later, herders were camped at other places.
193 Other options mentioned for decision power are: nobody, everybody, the own group or an older brother.
Sixteen percent of respondents just do not understand the question.
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Village ‘Higher' Own Nomads Others Nobody No idea
Lawan authority chiefs in general
% of respondents About bush-use 31 17 26 5 2 2 16
About water-use 31a 0 2 3 12b 17c 35
of the pasture. Only the ‘own chiefs’ that are mentioned are not referred to by members of
other groups194. Sometimes the authority of the ‘own’ chief depends on the place: another
campsite and the area around it is managed by another chief. Table 5.6.6 gives the percentage
of respondents that indicate a certain type of authority that has the power to decide about the
use of the bush. Because the right to decide about water use can also be connected with land
allocation, the table also includes information about the ideas of respondents as to who is able
to take decisions on the use of water.
Although thirty-three percent of the respondents indicate somebody who has decision power
over water-use, 84 % mention the absence of rules (sic!). The only rules that are discussed195
are those based on friendliness and mutual use: you should take care that others can reach and
use the water points like yourself.
5.6.6 Discords and claims
In general, the discords are more recognisable than the claims. An increasing number of cattle
keepers have had problems with cultivators in the bush due to damage caused by cattle.
Although fewer than half of the respondents were actually involved in crop damage during the
years 2000 and 2001, almost everybody expressed his concern about the increase of these inci-
dents. The same counts for the occupation of camp sites. Almost the whole nomadic popula-
tion (90%) has encountered that problem. It has to be said, though, that half of the time the
occupation was performed by other (new) cattle keepers. But then, it was mostly solved peace-
fully: “It is shameful to fight with other nomads or to chase them away.”196 From time to time
the encounters between cultivators and nomads result in quarrels and rows and sometimes
even the gendarmes have to intervene.
Claiming the area is an important sub-strategy within the strategy of holding onto a certain
area for grazing. For the nomadic cattle keepers in the Diamaré it is mostly an opportunistic,
ad hoc strategy, a reaction to individual invaders. Next to that, claiming is an expression of
age-old rights that, until now, nobody has questioned. Within the claim, users refer to rules and
laws, namely their own rules and laws, although even those are not clear and are at least
changeable, as we have seen197. Nevertheless, the Cameroonian legal system recognises the
rights of communities to manage their land according to customary law198. For a lot of the cat-
tle keepers this means that the local chief, for example the lawan of Kolara is the ‘master of
the land’199 when the bush falls within his territory and he decides what should be done with it. 
In practice, the cattle keepers of the Diamaré bush claim two different things. First, they
assert a general, communal right as a (diffuse) group to the whole bush. As has been stated
above, they say that everybody has the right to come to the bush and uses it as a pasture for
his herds. They sometimes refer to the period and rules of the Pilot Project to stress their claim
196
194 For example, village lawans are mentioned by members of a diversity of all interviewed groups, except
Adanko-en; ‘own chiefs’ are not mentioned by Yillaga, Houdda, Alidjam or Adanko-en.
195 Only 7 % of respondents mention these rules spontaneously. Then, from time to time, others agree, but with
an air of “this is so normal and obvious, why bother to mention it”. 
196 This or a variation on this remark was heard more than ten times.
197 The different groups of cattle keepers also have different rules and customs according to their ethnicity.
198 See chapter 4.
199 As he is called by 22 % of respondents.
that the bush is grazing land. Surprisingly, the fact that the nomads were excluded during that
period does not seem to make them refrain from this argument. It is the continuity of the area
as grazing land that they want to stress. They cannot afford to exclude the project period from
their overview of ‘pastoral use for ages’.  All former generations of nomadic pastoralists used
this bush, they are using it now and their children will use it in the future. Even those whose
family came here for the first time only a couple of years ago, refer to the general nomadic
inheritance.
The second claim is that about their camp sites. The nomadic cattle keepers plead for a kind
of ownership of camp sites. Here the same type of rules are applied that can be found in the
ownership rules over agricultural land, namely that he who uses first (‘develops’) becomes the
owner. 
Both claims are fiercely expressed to outsiders. Researcher, interpreters, extension workers,
politicians … whoever talks with the nomads is told the story over and over again. “My fathers’
father already used this bush, this spot. He paid the lamido of Mindif to have access and pro-
tection here. This is specially meant to be pasture, especially for cattle …It is OUR bush.” 
The claim about camp sites is made against cultivators who are found at the spot.
Sometimes the claim is made beforehand. The nomads know that (nowadays) they risk com-
ing home from the Yaéré to find their places occupied. Therefore some of them tell the lawan
that a certain campsite is theirs and ask him (whether or not underlined with money) to protect
that area against intruders. Some others protect their possession with magic by putting a spell
on the spot that would deter newcomers.
When the cattle keepers find cultivators at their camp sites, they complain to the lawan or
another authority. Like the Tupuri they choose the person who they are pretty sure will back
them. The start of the Badadji neighbourhood between Daram and Kobo is a good example of
the opportunistic choice of authorities to be involved200. After the Tupuri settlers had asked for
permission from the lawan of Kobo, who was certainly sympathetic (and indeed gave his per-
mission), the nomads complained to the lawan of Daram, who was against the settlement and
stated that it was on his territory. Both lawans involved a higher authority: Kobo asked the sub-
prefect of Moulvoudaye, and Daram asked the lamido of Mindif. Their opinion was clear
beforehand. When all the parties had finally descended to the spot to investigate boundaries
and the original campsite, etc., the cultivators were already firmly settled and the sub-prefect,
being the highest authority, decided they could stay: a “fait accompli”201.
Nevertheless, the nomadic pastoralists of the Diamaré region do not express their claim
openly and publicly. They have not (as yet) organised a ‘pressure’ group to stress their claim
at a higher level. This they leave, as is their custom, to their representatives and the ones they
consider to be their (and the bush’s) chiefs, like the lawan of Kolara. Most probably he is a
good representative because he has his own interests in keeping the bush, namely because he
has a lot of cattle and he earns from the incoming nomads. He can be regularly found at the
administration office in Moulvoudaye, where he tries to safeguard the interests of cattle keep-
200 Based on own interviews and information from Van der Ploeg (2001).
201 In fact he first said that the cultivators had to leave after the harvest. He explained that the Cameroonian gov-
ernment (“Biya”, he said) did not allow the chasing of people from their fields after they had already sown. A
year later, however, he did not do anything (in time) to chase away the cultivators before they had sown. So
he gave them de facto permission to stay. The nomads were even more frustrated because they had trusted the
decision he took in the first year.
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ers of the Diamaré bush and, more specifically, those of his own territory. He uses the same
arguments as they do to claim the bush as a pasture zone, but he adds strategic arguments that
are related to the broader, even national, economy.
In short, both cultivators and (some of the) cattle keepers perceive the area as theirs and come
to assert rights to the area. These assertions can easily clash.
5.7 Violence: Box 4
Only when (one of) the parties use forceful contending do actors arrive in the last box of the
VoE diagram: Box 4, Violence (see Figure 5.1). The influence of third parties therein can be
substantial. It is not yet possible to conclude that local elites or richer cattle keepers try to
mobilise the ‘common’ users to stand up for their rights and thus trigger revolts and violence.
It seems as if they only trigger the controversy with their indecisiveness and corruption (and
because they win by it). Each party can choose the authorities that back them to stress their
point. This widens existing divisions. On the other hand it is a risky undertaking because a year
later the opinion of that authority may have changed (whether or not influenced by ‘gifts’).
5.7.1 The use of force
Contending: the use of threats
Contending means trying to get your own wishes implemented without any regard to the wish-
es and needs of others. For the Tupuri cultivators this means that they want the cattle keepers
to continue using the bush only in those areas where they cannot disturb the settlements and
fields of the cultivators202. They are not bothered by how these cattle keepers earn their living,
where they have to herd their animals or where they have to live during the rainy season. As
far as the nomadic cattle keepers are concerned, contending would mean that Tupuri stop set-
tling and cultivating in the Diamaré bush. In theory both can be achieved by persuasion, threats
or straightforward violence, that is by beating or shooting to get rid of the others.
The route to violence starts with threats. These are frequently used to avoid violence, but
then only when the other party does not know the hidden agenda of the one that poses a threat:
that he is not going to use violence. In general, threats that are repeated but never brought into
action become meaningless. To give a threat more weight, from time to time you have to show
your strength and make the other feel his vulnerability. Unfortunately, a person or a group that
experiences his weakness is inclined to invest in gaining strength and even in striking first
because that is reported as generating an advantage. 
A cattle keeper who threatens to attack a new settlement has to be sure that he appears to
have enough allies and that it is likely that the government cannot and will not interfere.
Persuading the authorities goes hand in hand with such threats. In a broader sense, as well, the
cattle keeper has to do some ‘homework’ before he threatens. Image building and spreading
rumours of strength are part of the game. For the Choa Arab nomads, for example, the home-
work consisted of yearlong image building. Now everybody in the region is convinced that
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202 Agriculturalists are happy to see cattle in the bush because they spread dung. However, if there are too many
cattle, they cannot avoid the fields, cause damage to the crops and may lead to disputes with cattle-owners.
they are the strongest and most powerful cattle keepers in the bush. People think that this can
partly be traced back to magic capacities.
During the field work I did not encounter anybody who actually had or was threatened with
physical attacks to or by the other party. The only direct threats I came across were what can
be called “counter-threats”. These are the kind of threats expressed as a “If they…, then I…”
Mostly these remarks were uttered by cultivators while fully engaged in the clearing of a bush
parcel and (thus) during the time the pastoralists were far away. But on the other hand, these
threats were accompanied by strategic details like: “I have already asked the five household
heads on this side of the bush whether they would help me in case of…” and, “We can reach
each other easily by yelling or with the big drum next to the djaoro’s house and when we are
needed, we will come instantly with our machetes and spears to help our neighbours.”
The pastoralists also uttered threats against cultivators and settlers to the researcher in their
absence. Indeed, only four nomad respondents (7 %) made threatening remarks regarding their
adversaries’ person. “When I find those farmers on my camp site, we will put a spell against
them203” and “Then we will kill them or wage war against them”.
Other types of threats occurred regularly, and these were also often personally expressed to
the adversary. These were aimed at property or territory of the other party. “If I see those cat-
tle again in my field I will get hold of them and eat them.” Or, “Then I will follow the herder
and at night I will return, take his best cattle and bring them to my place.” Most of the settlers
who had some cattle damage in their fields (20 %) made similar statements – and not only to
me, as became clear in the encounters with the pastoralists. The cattle keepers reminded me
again and again of this aggressive stance of the cultivators204.
The pastoralists’ threats focused mostly on chasing away new settlers once they had dis-
covered that these had founded their hamlets on rainy season camp sites. Especially those that
had already moved several times - because of the project, new fields or new villages - (34 %
of respondents) expressed their annoyance at the new settlements. 
In addition to the chasing threat, they spoke of letting cattle into fields, but mostly this was
not so much a threat as a warning. The difference is that the second one is an expression of
concern:  “We are willing to avoid the fields, but if there are too many we can’t. We explain
beforehand that, while trekking with our cattle from one grazing area to another, we have to
pass through the fields.” A warning belongs to the persuasion stage, but is less aggressive than
the threat. It therefore keeps the option of mutual problem solving wider open, and it does not
raise (or scarcely raises) the risk of counter-threats and (pre-emptive) attacks. In contacts with
the authorities it can help to underline your positive intentions and in the event of lawsuits
about crop damage it can help to minimise the penalty (reimbursement) to be paid.
Threats which refer to support from authorities is also a frequently used strategy. “If you
put up your houses here, I will call the police and they will imprison you.” Of course this is
only possible when the other party knows (or thinks) that the police are really on the side of
the ‘enemy’. Threatening the authorities is also possible.  In case of a conflict over new set-
tlements, wherein the authorities are not yet clear about what to do, it will help when the set-
203 They talk about “a gri-gri” in general or “the elephants”, what means that they will change themselves into
these giants and destroy the farmers’ fields (see also Van der Ploeg (2001).
204 Because most cultivators explained that there were no signs of former cattle camps or cattle in the vicinity of
their new settlements, they could not and did not express threats to cattle owners that disturbed them in their
new hamlets.
199
tlers express their decision to stay and “only go away dead.” This can make the authorities
refrain from actions to chase the cultivators away, because then they are responsible for
casualties.
Contending: the use of violence
The use of violence can fall into the category of threat. Then it is short-term, non-responsive
violence. Indiscriminate cattle raids by cultivators to show that “this is not a sound place to
herd your animals”205 or the beating up of a lonely agriculturalist by young pastoralists to show
the reverse are clear examples. Unfortunately, these actions can be the start of more violence:
revenge, counter revenge etc. Although over the last few years, violent encounters have
occurred in the Diamaré plain between some young pastoralists and new settlers206, most of
these are certainly more of an age old tradition connected to initiation rites of the pastoralists
than related to the increase of bush encroachment207.
The most extreme of the contending strategies is the use of offensive violence. Yet, using
this type of force (violence) also needs strategic action before hand. Now it is not enough to
suggest that all different aspects mentioned in a threat are at hand. If violence is to be used,
these things actually have to be at hand. Weapons, allies and a thorough knowledge of the
enemy’s position and strength, as well as a willingness to either win or give in, are indispen-
sable. Making sure government troops are either on your side, not willing to interfere, or so far
away that you have already gone by the time the police show up, is also necessary. Deciding
on all this depends on social networks, information and personal insight and calculation capa-
bilities. In principle, weapons have to be purchased, so money is also needed. However, in
practice simple weapons, such as knifes and spears, are always available. Even the construc-
tion of simple guns is an easy task (as we can see from the poachers in the nature parks: see
Bauer 2003).
The threats already point towards possible moments of aggression. For agriculturalists the
moment at which to resort to violence can be an ongoing intrusion of herds into their fields and
the risk of yield loss without compensation. The costs and benefits of an attack are weighed up
again within a very short time span. One issue that is examined is whether all the preparatory
actions, as described above, have been properly implemented. The history of former yield loss-
es caused by cattle and the reactions of cattle owners or authorities (and implementation of offi-
cial decisions regarding reimbursements) play an important role208. The numbers of the other par-
ties at the spot and the chance of escalation (that is: how quickly can their reinforcements be
there, how many people from how far away will feel involved) are estimated, as well as the pres-
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205 This can also be related to cultural habits of ‘stealing cattle from the Fulbe enemies’. In Tupuri society, this
kind of practice is still talked about as a heroic deed, although less openly in the case of current thefts.
206 In 1998, a small band of pastoralists rode with their horses into the village of Badadji and tried to get hold of
“stolen donkeys”. The settlers defended themselves fiercely. This resulted in some casualties. Asked about why
they resisted the violence, the pioneers explained that on the one hand it was an instinctive reaction of defend-
ing their property and, on the other hand, “if you let those youngsters get away just like that, it would invite
them to more such actions” (see also Van der Ploeg 2001: 114 -115).
207 Several of the elder pastoralist household heads (“pères de famille”) as well as one of their chiefs explained in
detail the ‘macho’ habits of and mutual provocations between their sons. 
208 Both cultivators and pastoralists point out the differences between the different lawans. Some (like the lawan
of Kolara) have a heart for cattle keepers and will try to solve problems while keeping an eye on the interests
of nomads. Others, like the lawan of Kobo, favour the cultivators.
ence of allies, etc. Another factor is the position of a threshold for the use of violence209. The age-
old controversies between Tupuri and Fulbe could be expected to have engendered a low vio-
lence threshold when dealing with the Fulbe. However, I did not notice a difference in the ways
the Fulbe or the other nomadic cattle keepers were met. Fear for one’s family or possessions can
also trigger the use of force. For example, one pastoralist reported being shot at by a cultivator
the moment he arrived at his former camp site that happened to be occupied by this farmer210. 
For pastoralists the turning point is perhaps reached when they again find their rainy sea-
son camp sites occupied, their paths to the pastures blocked and cultivators forcing them to pay
reimbursements to crop damage. Some are already in the Yaeré (that is even before they start
their seasonal trek to the Diamaré) so hyped up that they are thinking only about those camp
sites and those settlers. On the other hand, within the pastoralist community, older family or
group leaders are still the ones that decide on family strategies. This may lead to a diminution
of outright violence. More straightforward aggression will flare up when made promises are
not met. For example, when authorities suggest that they protect the bush but fail to do so.
When pastoralists’ expectations are broken too frequently, they will start to rely on their own
force, with the idea that they are implementing governmental wishes.
5.7.2 Escapes: can violence be avoided?
Contending: the use of persuasion
Persuasion can be done directly. That means that one of the parties explains his standpoint to
the other and makes it understood, at least to a level that the other party gives in to the argu-
ments. In this case both parties do not seem to be open enough for persuasion. On the contrary,
no party is trying to persuade his adversary. 
Next to the direct way, persuasion can also take an indirect form such as persuading enough
authorities (and to a sufficient level) so that responsibility for handling the conflict becomes
theirs. For example, if the Tupuri settlers were to succeed in convincing the formal authorities
that it is their right to clear the bush and set up villages, then (in theory) they can rely on those
authorities to defend those rights. If the other party were to start attacks to chase them away,
they would simply have to inform authorities at higher levels and sit back and watch the gov-
ernment use force against their ‘enemies’. In reality this is an insecure strategy as authorities
appear to be unreliable and, on top of that, the bush is far away from the police headquarters.
An attack may have already caused irrevocable disaster before outside help turns up. Although
settlers, especially the chief of Yameda, point out the responsibilities of the authorities, at the
same time they explain that they would never rely on them. “They acknowledge my position
here, so they should protect me against attacks. But they are so far away …, that is why we
started here with at least four men. You are too vulnerable when you are alone”.211
Of course, persuading the authorities can also be used later in threats or even to generate
more legitimacy to use violence yourself. On the other hand some sorts of threats can be used
to underline the persuasion (see above).
209 Culturally speaking the Tupuri society is not a specifically violent or violence-rewarding one. Although they
have the reputation of being a fierce group, this is only the case when they have to defend themselves.
210 Of course this can also be an example of a (rather violent) threat.
211 It should be said, though, that this remark referred to bandits and cattle theft and not to organised attacks by
pastoralists with a view to asserting their rights.
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Yielding
Although herders did not want to state too clearly that they could easily yield, to me they quite
often explained that they still had other possibilities near the old camps and that relocating is
the nomads’ way of life. Their chiefs are annoyed by the situation, especially when they have
already had to move a number of times. However, as they say themselves, “We nomads are
used to moving. We are always searching for the best spot for our cattle. If it is not here, then
we will go away.”
This means they perceive the bush area not (yet) as terribly scarce. There is still pasture to
be found.  Of course they were afraid that such remarks would make their position weaker. On
the other hand, they not only referred to other campsites nearby but also explained that they
could go to Chad or Adamawa with their herds. Van der Ploeg (2001) mentions several Fulbe
group leaders who first made a row about the occupation of their camp site, but afterwards
withdrew to another spot. The lawan of Kolara has already started a process of changing the
location of his herd from the Diamaré-Logone region to the grazing lands of Ngaoundéré, by
buying cattle there and selling them in the current location.
Problem solving
The last possibility would be to try to solve the problem. Solving the problem means finding
a way to use the bush to both parties’ satisfaction or at least in such a way that both parties can
live with it, perhaps in the form of a compromise. This may be based on mutual consensus or
involve an outside arbiter who just imposes his decision. Everybody says that the sub-prefect
or prefect should be the one to decide because it is he who represents “our father” - president
Biya. In addition, this civil servant can bring in armed police if he wants to implement the
delimitation of a certain area or protect settlers from incoming bands of herders. However, he
does not seem to be neutral and has his own interests in the conflicts. Apart from that, the offi-
cial policy is not clear. State law seems to be controversial in itself. On the one hand it sup-
ports customary law (although it is not clear whether this means the law of the pastoralists or
of the cultivators) while, on the other hand, it supports the clearing of bush lands and thus new
settlements by cultivators.
As long as authorities do not play a role as arbiters or, in a more positive way, mediators,
parties have to resort to other methods. Consensus can also be reached with or without the help
of others212. To reach a consensus, meetings should fulfil several conditions. Most of the time
some help from outsiders is indispensable in order to start and maintain the process or to sup-
port an internal initiative. A consensus building process which has not been honestly organ-
ised, which raises false expectations or which cannot meet theoretically feasible expectations
can as such be the trigger for aggression. A temporary solution like ‘you may cultivate this
bush parcel until you have harvested’ overlooks reality and is bound to favour cultivators while
giving pastoralists the impression they can rely on the authorities for their continuing use of
the bush. Such moves destroy the trust of the parties involved in all sorts of authorities. 
Social bonds are necessary within the two parties, as well as with surrounding ‘mediators’.
Relations between negotiators and the rest of the two parties should be clear and honest. A
(perhaps only very minimal) linkage between the two parties will help, as will a good infor-
mation gathering and distribution system, etc. The consensus building process in the Diamaré
202
212 These ‘others’ need not necessarily be official authorities.
bush has reached only a very preliminary phase. As one of the settlers in Yameda explained,
a meeting between cattle keepers and agriculturalists took place a year ago following an ini-
tiative by one of the regional NGOs. However, so far this has not resulted in anything con-
structive. In general, agriculturalists and pastoralists say they are willing to participate in a
“bush platform”.
Thus, a growing - but not yet overt - scarcity of land is causing irritations to grow. In the absence
of proper management, the parties are trying to bend reality to suit their different purposes.
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Baba Deli: moving borders, moving opinions
“You see these riverbeds?  These used to be the boundaries of the grazing area. You see the
millet field on the pasture side of these riverbeds? Its position asks for crop damage by cattle,
don’t you think? And you see these poles that indicate the new boundaries? Can you see how
they have ruined them and tried to pull them out?” Yes I can see it all and I can see the differ-
ent ways in which different users here try to claim rights to the land. 
The vast territory of Dzambou, a Kapsiki village on the plateau in the middle range Mandara
Mountains of the Far North of Cameroon (see Figure 6.1), has always been used for two differ-
ent purposes, namely agriculture and cattle grazing. Apart from the fallow lands between the
fields being used for cattle, a specific area was more or less set aside as a pasture reserve. For
approximately ten years, however, several agriculturalists have been cutting trees and bushes in
this zone to make space for new fields. Another group of Dzambou inhabitants are contesting
this invasion heavily and are trying to formalise the status of the grazing lands. Decisions by the
authorities regarding the boundaries of the pasture reserve and on the related user rights have
met with resistance. Nevertheless, the Dzambou agriculturalists do not see the authorities as their
adversaries. Instead they blame their pro-pasture co-inhabitants for manipulating the circum-
stances in their favour while disregarding the farmers’ interests. More than once, pro-pasture
Dzambou villagers and pro-field inhabitants have clashed with each other over crop damage, the
crossing of boundaries or the delineation of these boundaries as such. Feelings are running high-
er and higher and somewhere in the future a real conflict can be expected.
In this chapter I focus on the analysis of this conflict by explaining the behaviour of Kapsiki in
reaction to insecurities and (perceived) options in the studied region. The description will fol-
low the steps of the VoE diagram in chapter 2 (see Figure 6.2). Thus, after an historical overview
that is important to understand some of the influencing factors, I start an investigation into the
insecurities facing the agriculturalists. In the third section I explore their different options for
improving their situation. Thereafter I will focus on the specific investment described in Box 2
of the schema, namely intrusion into another niche, in this case intrusion into the former pas-
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ture area. The fifth section describes the claims of the cultivators to this new area. Subsequently,
in order to pinpoint the conflict (Box 3 of the schema), the focus will be on the opposing party.
Their insecurities, their options for overcoming these, and their claims are described in section
6.6. I end this chapter with a description of options and motivations of both parties to resort to,
or refrain from, violence (box 4 of the VoE model).
Figure 6.1 Mandara Mountains and plateau
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Figure 6.2 VoE diagram
6.1 Background: history of the region
Dzambou is a rural village on the plateau of the middle range Mandara Mountains of the Far
North of Cameroon (see figure 6.2). It is inhabited by one ethnic group: the Kapsiki. According
to Van Beek (1981) the oral history of the Kapsiki distinguishes two different areas of origin.
One is the Nigerian village Babere, more than 200 km to the South-West. The other is the area
of Gudur, in the East, between Mokolo and Maroua1. This eastern area of origin corresponds
with the findings of Boulet (1984: 138) regarding their descent from the Mofu who came from
the east (although further away). Generally speaking, the more northern Kapsiki, like those of
Mogodé, Vité and Rhumzu, can trace their origins back to the Gudur area2. The more southern
ones, like those of Rhumsiki and Sir, say they arrived from the west. Van Beek (1981: 118) con-
cludes that the majority of Kapsiki villages certainly existed before the 19th century, and the
most important migrations most probably took place before the start of the 18th century.  This
1 The Kapsiki society is divided into two castes: the blacksmiths (who also have an ‘undertaker’ role) and the
rest. Origin stories of the two groups differ. The Kapsiki blacksmith are most probably all of Sukuru origin, in
the north because that is where the centre of the iron operation was. Sukuru-founders are said to originate in
the east (Gudur); see Van Beek (1981).
2 Van Beek (1981) points out that the Northern Kapsiki may mention Gudur as an origin area because of the
important religious role Gudur plays in the Kapsiki culture (like the Mecque of the Islam, the people
explain).He is therefore more sure about the truth of the origin stories of the blacksmiths of the Kapsiki, than
of non-blacksmiths.
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corresponds with the migration time of the “course of the seventeenth century” mentioned by
Boulet (1984: 138). Arriving in the Mandara Mountains, newcomers mingled with the
autochthonous population to form their present ethnic group, long before the Fulbe conquered
the region.
Because discords developed in the study area between two groups from the same village
and the same ethnic group, it is not so much the settlement history of the whole district and the
relation with other incoming groups that have to be clarified. I therefore focus on the history
of the village itself. 
The settlement’s origins can be traced back over several generations, when Kapsiki peo-
ple started to descend from the hilltops in the south, where they had sought shelter from the
slave-raiding Fulbe conquerors (see chapter 4). First, in a period that was still dangerous, they
only started to cultivate the fertile soils of the plateau. Depending on the energy and bravery
of the men involved, more or less extended areas were cleared and set aside for future off-
spring.
Figure 6.3 Settlement pattern and neigbourhoods of Dzambou
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When the general security situation improved because of the colonial control, the first bush-
clearers brought their wives and children from the overcrowded origin area of Sir, a rocky hill-
top, to the plateau and started to live in their fields. Later, whole groups of families descend-
ed, following the example of the first clearers, and they also established fields and houses on
the plateau.
The genesis of the village neighbourhoods more or less followed a pattern of radial expan-
sion northwards, in steps corresponding with semi-circles. Some individuals came down to the
most northern part (Tchibi) first and moved back to the in-between area only later (see Fig.
6.3). The result of this expansion pattern is that the inhabitants of the outer area feel more
brothership ties with the inhabitants of the corresponding (radial) part of the inner area than
with other neighbouring ‘pie-pieces’. The fact that the most eastward part of the inner circle,
Oudava, belonged until recently to the village of origin, Sir, and is now an independent village
means that bonds between people cut across these village boundaries. 
Today Dzambou consists of one small neighbourhood (Tchibi, in the far north and separa-
ted from the rest by an extended bush area) and three big ones (see Fig. 6.3): Dzambou Centre,
close to Sir, Dzambou Tndmou a bit to the north and Baba Deli, still further north and extend-
ing to the east where its southern part lines up with the northern boundary of the newly inde-
pendent Oudava village. The Baba Deli territory is divided into two: one part is an extended
zone composed of houses, fields and fallow land (as the rest of Dzambou) and the other is a
big ‘empty’ bush area with, in a corner, a small settlement of mainly Islamic Kapsiki. This last
hamlet is adjacent to the rest of the inhabited zone. 
The so-called empty bush has been used as pasture for at least two generations now. All
Dzambou inhabitants agree about the place of the boundaries of this area when it was first des-
ignated for (temporary) use as pasture. In addition, parts of it were and are used as fields
because forefathers cleared large parts of the original forest3. Villagers claim that they cleared
‘all’ the parts. 
Four years ago, the government-based organisation for the Mandara Mountains (MIDIMA4)
declared the Baba Deli bush area, with a surface of ca 190 ha5, to be an official forest and pas-
ture reserve. For some years now, MIDIMA has been working on the reservation of forest areas
in the Mountains in co-operation with the ministries of environment, agriculture and animal
husbandry. For this purpose they mostly choose areas that are already forested. In this case
they started to inform the population at the end of 1999. But, after they informed the popula-
tion again at the beginning of 2000, it took some time before the next step was taken. Finally,
in spring 2002, MIDIMA officials and the regional authorities again arranged some village
meetings to inform the inhabitants about the plans. There was no option to say “no” to the
whole project of ‘instalment of a forest-pasture reserve’, but the villagers were able to voice
209
3 Several of the inhabitants refer to their fathers’ histories of extended forests that covered the plateau when they
and their fathers came down from Sir for the first time to cut the trees. “When you climbed up the mountain
(i.e. the inselberg, see photo 6.1, RN) and looked down, you could only see trees, from here to the mountains
ridge in the east and all the way north”, they say.
4 Mission de Développement Intégré des Monts Mandara, based in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Program
Formation and Management of State Territory. This organisation has to organise the economic development of
the region in general and to decide about what has to be done whit all the land that is not (yet) occupied. As a
State institute it is strongly attached to official rules and laws.
5 MIDIMA’s calculation (September 2003).
opinions on where and how. The boundaries were agreed upon during one of the meetings in
Mogodé (the district and sub-departmental capital, see Fig. 6.2) with both sub-department and
district authorities as well as village representatives. 
However, two months later, a village meeting at the spot, in Dzambou, resulted in a clash
between two groups of inhabitants. They had gathered to start the implementation of the delin-
eation of the forest-pasture reserve. The moment the representatives of the authorities arrived
with pots of paint and pointed out the trees and rocks that had to be marked as a boundary sign,
some people took the paintbrushes and set to work while others refused to cooperate. Angry
scenes ensued and there was a lot of yelling and pushing and pulling and fighting with fists as
both groups tried to implement what they thought to be the right action. The anger was trig-
gered by the observation that the proposed boundary did not correspond with the one that had
been decided upon during the Mogodé meeting. As perceived by the villagers, this new bound-
ary favoured a group of inhabitants that had settled within the reserve and who could now go
on living and cultivating there on the very fertile soil (see the place of the “Fulbe hamlet” in
Fig 6.3). Of course, those were the ones who finally put up the boundary signs on the instruc-
tions of the authorities.
6.2 Insecurities: Box 1 and onwards
This section starts on the left-hand side of the VoE diagram (Fig. 6.1) with a description of Box
1, the diminishing environmental space (scarcity) for Kapsiki. The step from Box 1 to Box 2
is not only caused by environmental insecurities. It is a complex of personal, socio-political,
economic and environmental factors and insecurities (see Chapter 3) that shape the strategies
of Kapsiki. These are the influencing factors, mentioned in the VoE diagram, that decide
whether or not the actors will enter into Box 2 or use an ‘escape’ route.
After a description of the environmental situation, I then deal with the other (possible) inse-
curities of Kapsiki, in human, economic and social domains.
6.2.1 Environmental insecurities (see chapter three for information on the five indicators used)
Physical basis
Soils
Like on the rest of the plateau, the soils of Dzambou rest on the volcanic basement of the
Mandara Mountains, with its gneiss, anatexite and granite. The grounds are skeletal with many
small stones. They have sparse inclusions of deep soils, dispersed in the areas where rocks
appear in mountainous terrains. Local intrinsic fertility can differ tremendously due to differ-
ences in local conditions of pedogenesis and alteration products. The majority of the Dzambou
soils are regosolic6 with washed faces. The pedoclimate is dry, especially in the ‘furrowed’
zones. These soils have a very shallow usable level and deficiencies in their physical charac-
teristics. In addition, there is a high risk of erosion. The amount of sand and small stones
varies. In the East and North (the direction of Baba Deli) the soils contain less iron and are less
fertile. According to Brabant and Gavaud (1985), the soils of the plateau are only suitable for
210
6 A regosol is a type of azonal (with insufficient horizon development) soil consisting of shallow, medium to
fine textured, unconsolidated parent material derived from freshly deposited alluvium or sands.
mountain agriculture and the production of subsistence crops. In reality, groundnut and some
cotton production is possible.
Further to the east a small band of very sandy soils, with rough texture and again a dry
pedoclimate can be found. However, although they also exhibit deficiencies in their physical
properties and have high erosion risks, they are deep and thus less vulnerable than the more
western soils. These soils have a colluvial origin7. With their marginal water reserves they are
thought to be only marginally suitable for rain-fed agriculture, and for forest and pastures
(Brabant & Gavaud 1985: Cartes des Terres). 
The same properties and suitability can be found in the soils of Sir, the origin village, where
many respondents still have family fields. There, the soils abruptly change from the regosolic
soils in the North to two types of soils that merge here, one dominantly lithosols and one con-
sisting of almost no developed soils. A very limited number of areas have an alluvial origin. 
In the whole region, the soils along the riverbeds are of alluvial origin and are richer and
suitable for more water dependent crops such as potatoes, rice and fruit trees. The general data
about soil fertility does not give enough information about individual situations. Nor does it
provide us with an insight into the perception of farmers of their own fields. However, this gen-
eral data shows that a dry period will seriously affect the production possibilities of the farm-
ers, because of the low water capacity of the soils. 
The vulnerability of the soils to drought and erosion, and thus to loss of production capac-
ity, is enhanced by the hilly aspect of the region. The area does not have really steep slopes
(except for some inselbergs with foot slopes of 45 percent and cones that arise more or less
vertically (Photo 6.1: see the centre pages of this book), but at least half of it extends over low
hills. Most of the land has a slope that does not exceed four percent, but some slopes can be
as steep as ten percent. 
Without special measures, here the soil is washed away quickly when the natural cover has
gone. According to extension workers and certain more educated villagers, over the genera-
tions terrace-building knowledge and capacities have declined, so now even low degree slopes
suffer from erosion. The nutrients are transported to low lying parts in the terrain where they
are carried off by streams or lay unused because of the risk of flooding when rainfall should
be higher then usual.  
Climate
As explained in Chapter 4 (and also in Chapter 7) the Mandara Mountains receive a higher pre-
cipitation, have lower temperatures and lower temperature extremes than are expected at this
latitude. Nevertheless, differences in precipitation per locality are as great as in the rest of the
Sahel-Sudan zone. Data from the two nearest pluviometric stations - those of Sir and Mogodé
- concerning the second half of the 1990s8 show that Mogodé, which is only 8 km to the north
and 13 km to the west (see Fig. 6.2) and is at a slightly higher altitude9, has totally different 
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7 CPCS and FAO call this ‘washed tropical soils of colluvial origin’ and ‘ferruginous’ or ‘white luvisol’ (see
Brabant and Gavaud 1985).
8 This period is considered as a time that ‘normal’ precipitation was finally restored in the Sahel and Sahel-
Sudan zone after the drought years of the 1970s and 1980s. In this big region, 1997 and 1998 are even con-
sidered as relatively wet, as also reflected by the data in table 6.2.1.
9 Sir lies at an altitude of 920 m and Mogodé at 850 m.
precipitation rates to Sir. The precipitation is higher or lower without any significant pattern,
although in Mogodé the rainfall generally seems to be less (See Table 6.2.1).
Table 6.2.1 Precipitation in Sir and Mogodé and differences over the years 1995 – 2002 (the minus sign in
the ‘difference’ row means that Sir precipitation was less than that of Mogodé; no sign means
the reverse).10
The yearly mean fluctuates around the 1000 mm (see also Table 7.2.1), but over the years, dur-
ing the years and throughout the region, precipitation differs enormously and unpredictably
(see Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4 Mobile average precipitation over 5 years in Sir and years with poor spread of rainfall (black
dots).
According to the inhabitants of Dzambou, rainfall has diminished over the years. “Apart from
occasional outbursts, like the one we had seven years ago, that washed away many houses and
crops, the amount of rain is far less than what we were used to in the past, when I was
young.”11, several respondents remarked. The younger ones refer to the stories of their fathers
and grandfathers about the abundance of rain and year-round river water. This goes as far as
“Then they could fish in this river12 until April.” Most probably they were referring to a longer
rainy season and therefore greater infiltration.
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10 Source: Beauvillain (1995) and data from the agricultural service Mogodé and Catholic Mission Sir.
11 “Seven years ago” refers to 1995.
12 In January 2003 “this river”, the one that (between other things) forms the boundary between Oudava and Baba
Deli, was already no more than a dry bed.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 mean
Sir 896 794 1287 1133 1066 1282 1286 935 1085
Mogodé 991 830 1182 1068 735 820 1049 1039 964
difference -95 -36 105 65 331 462 237 -104 121
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Indeed, the precipitation pattern before the 1970s seemed to have been satisfactory.
Nevertheless, even at the end of the 1950s the North of Cameroon suffered from a drought (see
Figure 4.3).
At the same time, the farmers explain that not only the amount of rain or the number of
months is important. In the whole of Dzambou, farmers refer to the year 2002 as a dry year
(“The water in the rivers will disappear earlier this year, and perhaps even the deep-dug water
wells will run dry before the new rains”), but for agriculture it was good enough, because the
rain fell evenly divided over the days. “Each time the crops needed water, it came down”. But,
as they realise fairly well, the reverse can also be the case. Table 6.2.6 shows the absence of a
correlation between total year precipitation and production (when precipitation is within the
normal range). The two years with the highest precipitation have the lowest grain production.
In general the flow of surface water of Mogodé sub-department is to the south-east although
on a lower scale level, water may flow in another direction due to the position of slopes. The
groundwater flow is south-east as well. This means that part of the water availability depends on
run-off from the north. Unfortunately the precipitation in the north is less than in the area itself.
In short, soil types and the location of soils, the high erosion risk as well as the variability of
the precipitation and water availability makes the area an insecure one as far as agriculture is
concerned.
Population density
Although the sub-department of Mogodé was only created after 1991, the chieftaincy (lami-
dat) of the same name can be used as a reference to trace back population growth because the
two have the same territory. Table 6.2.2 shows the population densities in the study area over
the years. Differences in population density in the Mogodé sub-department are considerable13:
from vast areas with almost no inhabitants at all to local zones with more than 150 inhabitants
per km2. Apart from the sub-departmental capital, Mogodé proper, one of these last is the ter-
ritory of Sir. ‘Empty’ zones are the areas which, up until now, have been dedicated to pastoral
use.
Two or three generations ago the whole of Dzambou region, but especially the northern parts,
could be considered as empty. In Dzambou Centre some houses must have been present at the
end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century because that was the period dur-
ing which the first babies were born there. Based on the birthplaces of respondents, their
fathers and grandfathers, over the years a minimal number of houses per area can be deduced14.
Although this amount has obviously increased, even today the population density is not very
high (Table 6.2.2).
According to calculations of Dietz et al (2001), in the Sahel-Sudan zone a farmer can sub-
sist on 0.25 ha of arable land per person. Dependant on soil type, to maintain field fertility
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13 As in the whole department: the plateaux as a whole are relatively sparsely inhabited, while the steep northern
Mandara Mountains have a high population density (see Van Andel (1998) or Zuiderwijk (1998)).
14 In 1945, only one house was constructed in the Baba Deli area and in the Tndmou area. More to the south at
least nine houses had already been constructed. In the two northern areas the number of houses had grown to
five by the end of the 1950s. Dzambou centre increased to approximately 12 households in 1959.
when no chemical fertilisers are available, at least 0.5 ha should be added for fallow rotation15.
Even then, in the Dzambou region, each family should be able to do more than feed itself, hav-
ing (on average) 3 ha to use per person.
Table 6.2.2 Development of population densities in the study region compared to the Province and moun
tains as a whole (sources: Beauvillain (1989: 590) and Djonwé (2001) and own survey 2002-
2003).
a = In 1945, in addition to the existence of some houses (11), many fields had already been cleared and were in
use in the Dzambou area: 76 % of respondents’ grandfathers were born in Sir. Most of them created fields on
the plateau next to that hilltop when they had grown up
b = In 2002, Dzambou village comprised 184 households with approximately 7.8 persons per household (a total
of 1435 persons)
c = Estimations (the last country population survey dates from 1987)
However, the Kapsiki plateau, although not a real mountain area, does have  mountainous
aspects. Some parts are too stony or too steep for cultivation, some parts are wide riverbeds or
low-lying, wetland-type lands in normal precipitation years. Based on observations in the field,
the surface not suitable for agriculture is estimated at 10 % of the total16. Most of the steep and
stony parts are suitable for grazing, especially for small ruminants, although nothing grows on
the stones themselves. Thus, 40 km2 remains available for use which is still 2.7 ha per person.
Land availability
The whole of Dzambou territory extends over 44 km2 (see Table 6.2.2). In 2002, 2020 ha
thereof were used for agriculture17. Apart from a small proportion that is too steep (far less than
10 %: see above) the rest, being 1980 ha, is available for animal grazing. This seems to be a
situation of abundance.
Yet, the growing population means the land available per person is diminishing. In addi-
tion, land is not evenly divided over the families. Some households dispose of extended fields
that have to be shared with only a small number of people while others own only a small area.
Moreover, the location and spread of fields over the total area differs per family. This influ-
ences production possibilities as the fertility of the soils varies greatly and “far-away” fields
are less easily maintained and cropped, or protected from wild or grazing farm animals. 
Some farmers do not use their bush fields, either because they are too far away, or because
they are situated within the forest-pasture boundaries. They sometimes prefer to rent land.
Sometimes this is only temporarily. Once a fallow period has restored the fertility levels of
their own fields they use them again. Table 6.2.3 shows the ownership of land among respon-
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15 Rough estimate, based on the mean rotation scheme noticed in the village.
16 Own observations, February 2000 – February 2003.
17 Data of the Agricultural service of Mogodé.
Surface 1945 1959 1976 1995 2002 
(km2) Inhab/km2 Inhab/km2 Inhab/km2 Inhab/km2 Inhab/km2
Dzambou 44 2a 5 n.av. n.av. 33b
Mogodé 736 21 33 42 70 90c
Mandara 7,660 n.av 44 72 101 115c
Far North Province 48,125 n.av. 23 41 67 80c
dents (almost all household-heads) and their forefathers, as well as used and fallow lands.
Because families, and therefore respondents, used to judge their property in terms of fields
instead of in hectares these figures can only be used to compare the current situation with that
of the past, not to compare property with the actual surface area.
6.2.3 Surface (in fields and ha) and ways of acquiring land per category of respondents, their father or grand
father, and within or across village boundaries. NB the numbers of fields shown should not be added to 
the given ha because respondents indicated the areas they had acquired in one of the two ways18. 
a = These three columns refer to privately owned fields
b = ‘Shared’ means fields are collectively shared with other family members
c = The number of respondents who cleared fields themselves is 35 (19%); all of them performed this work when
they were young. They are now more or less over 50 years of age, except for two young Fulbe men from the
‘Fulbe settlement’ in the Baba Deli neighbourhood (40 and 27 years19). Because the men aged 50 started their
clearing exercises when very young (at 15 or so), one can deduce that new clearing was possible up until the
mid 1960s
The table shows that field clearing was done by fathers and grandfathers. Later, all the land had
been already opened up and the current generation of farmers had to rely on other methods to
increase the size of their property. At the same time, the table shows a kind of concentration
towards Dzambou territory over the generations. The fact that most grandfathers started their
agricultural life in Sir (that is outside Dzambou) and certainly cleared fields there is clearly
shown.
Although people bought or inherited fields to enhance their arable surface, these transac-
tions diminished the surface of other persons and families. Most of the time, purchasing turns
out not to result in a more evenly division of fields among the inhabitants since only the rich
could (and can) afford to buy. There are several families who started letting fields, gained a lot
of money by doing so and then added to their already sufficient surface by buying more. They
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18 Surface of fields can differ tremendously from respondent to respondent, but not over the generations within
one family. Field surface can range from 1 ha to more than 5 ha.
19 These two are cattle keepers who started cultivating when grown up. They do not know the difference between
primary and secondary forest and they assumed that they cleared their plots as first clearers. However, Kapsiki
cultivators tell me that their fields were already cleared from vegetation in the past. One of them was given a
plot in the direction of Sir by the lawan of the Fulbe settlements. This field was originally in the possession of
the lawan himself, having been cleared by his father.
Place of Boughta Inheriteda Cleareda Sharedb
fields
Surface Number Surface Surface Number Surface Number Surface
(ha) of fields ((ha) of fields ha) of fields (ha) of fields
Respondents Dzambou 68.3 26 69.5 43 41.3c 41c 146 503
(n = 180) Outside 0 0 0 31 1.8c 27c 36.5 369
Dzambou
Fathers Dzambou 31.5 17 15.8 27 132.8 271.5 80 258
(n = 166) Outside 0.25 2 0 50 27 124 17.3 396
Dzambou
Grand-fathers Dzambou 0 1 0 8 87.8 309 0.8 22
(n = 143) Outside 0 1 0 95 16.5 511 0 13
Dzambou
were also able to benefit from long fallow periods and the subsequently high production of
crops that could be sold at the market.
Table 6.2.4 Surface of arable land per class of obtaining over three generations (n of respondents = 180, but
15 of them do not know at all; 14 times they do not know about their fathers and 37 times not 
about their grandfathers); surface in ha and fields (f).
a = Information about renting or borrowing by former generations is only sporadically available (mostly only about
compound fields of fathers). For that reason I left it out of this table
b = The number of fields indicated here by respondents reflects only the short-term fallow periods that respondents
think of when asked. They do not think of long-term, more family-field related fallow.
The number and surface of shared fields in the generation of the respondents and that of their
fathers seems to be approximately the same (Table 6.2.4), but the number of people sharing
differs over these two generations because the total number of persons has increased. On aver-
age fathers had to share their fields with 3.4 brothers, respondents with 3.5 brothers plus all
the 3.5 sons of their 3.4 uncles and the current generation will have to share with, again, 2.7
brothers and the off-spring of uncles etc.20. So, what was used by only one household-head in
the time of grandfathers now has to be shared with 12 household-heads. In the future this will
simply rise to 32 or more.
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Mean Range No of Mean No of Mean No of Mean
surface of persons surface persons surface persons surface
surface that bought that inherited that cleared
bought inherited cleared
Respondents 4.5 ha +4.4 f 0.5 - 48 1.4 ha + 0.5 f 37 1.9 ha + 2 f 35 1.2 ha + 1.9 f
(privately 13.8 ha +
owned fields) 1-10 f
Respondents  1.5 ha + 7.4 f 0.8 - n.a. n.a. 118 1.5 ha + 7.4 f n.a. n.a.
(shared fields) 18 ha +
1-32 f
Respondents 0.9 ha 0.13 - 2 ha n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(rented or borr. 
fields)n = 62
Fathers 3.6 ha + 8.5 f 0.5 24 1.3 ha + 0.8 f. 17 0.9 ha + 4.5 f 123 1.3 ha + 3.2 f
(owned fields) 18 ha +
- 1-15 f
Fathers 1.0 ha + 6.9 f 0.8 - n.a. n.a. 95 1.0 ha + 6.9 f n.a n.a.
(shared fields) 11.8 ha +
1-50 f
Grandfathers 0.8 ha + 18.6 f 0.8 2 0 + 1 f. 9 0 qu + 11.4 f 133 0.8 ha + 6.2 f
(owned fields) 11.8 ha+
-1-50 f
Grandfathers 0.13 ha + 5.8 f 0.01- n.a. n.a. 6 0.13 ha + 5.8 f n.a. n.a.
(shared fields) 0.8 ha +
2-10 f
Respondents 1.8 ha 0.13 - 6.5 ha n.a. n.a. n.a.. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(cropped fields).
Respondents 0.5 ha 0 - 6 ha n.a. n.a. n.a.. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(fallow fields)b
20 This number is somewhat lower because this generation is not yet complete, with 48 % of households heads
under 50 years of age.
Commoditisation of land
Although buying occurs more often than in the past, prices do not reflect a land market as such
(see section 3.1.2, Table 6.3.3). The idea of quickly rising prices is a perception of the culti-
vators that increases their feeling of insecurity with regard to access to land.
The fact that more land is demanded than is available can be seen from the rapid rise in the
position of land as a commodity. Tables 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 show that land sales started two gen-
erations ago, but only gained in importance over the years. In general, the insecurities of espe-
cially the poorer families with regard to access to land are increasing. The rise in the value of
land due to a greater number of sales means the practice of lending land for free is diminish-
ing. In the past, renting cost at most two chickens and a jar of beer per year. Nowadays rent
prices have increased to between 10,000 and 40,000 Fcfa/ha. Nevertheless, it is still possible
to borrow at what was called a renting price in the past. Some field owners (and renters) con-
sider compound fields to have more value and ask (or pay) more for them. For example, one
respondent expressed his willingness to pay twice as much for a compound field as for a field
in the bush of the same surface and fertility. 
Calorific needs and production
Amount of production
The production figures for Dzambou are based on 2 different sources: one is the production as
recorded by the researcher according to the respondents (that is, based on memory and esti-
mation). Most of the farmers can only recall the production of last year and the year before
(see Table 6.2.5). The second source, recorded in Table 6.2.6, is the production figures of the
village over the years recorded by the sub-departmental agricultural service (in Mogodé21).
Apart from maize the agricultural production is lower than the North Cameroon mean yield for
1988-1989, and there is no downward trend in production per ha (see Table 6.2.6). The sorghum
production is especially low. This can be due to the mixed cropping system used by Kapsiki,
which spreads risks and is environmentally sounder. The farmers claim that the production of
beans and groundnuts make up for a low grain production in ‘bad’ years, because in such years
these products can grow better, while the grain plants do not provide that much shadow. Table
6.2.6 confirms this expectation for beans in exceptionally bad years, such as in 2000. However,
the data given by the respondents themselves over that year is strikingly different from that of
the agricultural service and do not even confirm that 2000 was a bad year22.
Another (or added) reason for the lower sorghum production can be that the overall (North
Cameroon) mean is high because of the high production in some preferable areas, such as parts
of the Diamaré, south of Maroua23. In spite of the relatively stable outputs, the farmers encounter
insecurities with regard to production. On an individual or group level incidental causes, such
217
21 Although Sir region officially has a regional representative from the agricultural service, during the last two
years this civil servant was out of office due to training.
22 If we assume that the figures of the agricultural service are true, the higher data given by the respondents would
indicate that the inhabitants ‘forget’ difficult years. However, it is more probable that the service data are some-
what unreal, because they are based on extrapolations of a restricted amount of measurements.
23 According to De Steenhuijsen Piters (1995) sorghum yield in the Diamaré (Gaban) was 1600-2500 kg/ha. On
the other hand Chapter 5 showed that the rain-fed sorghum production in Kolara in 2000 was 856 kg/ha (and
in 1999: 959 kg/ha); only slightly higher than on the plateau.
as monkeys in the neighbourhood of the inselbergs, can cause a crop failure. In the year 2000,
caterpillars devastated the young sorghum plants of more than one cultivator. Table 6.2.6 also
shows the absence of a correlation between total year precipitation and production. 
Table 6.2.5 Production and surface used by respondents’ households (n = 180) over two years.
a = These figures are most probably underestimated. Bambara groundnut is a typical women’s crop, but mostly
recorded here by male household heads. Although checked where possible by asking the wives, several pro-
duction figures are only guesses or are not known at all
b = These figures only show the fallow periods of fields the respondent feels (s)he left fallow (herself) himself.
That is, fields shared with extended family and over which the respondent has no power to decide are often
forgotten. The data not included are the ten times that respondents explained “the rest” to be fallow in 2001
and the five times they did so in 2000
Table 6.2.6 Production per surface area (kg/ha) of four main crops in Dzambou (over the last 5 years and
with the average of North Cameroon as a comparison) set against yearly precipitation.(Source:
the Agricultural Service of Mogodé district, not published, and Ali et al (1997) for the mean 
production24).
a = Between brackets the production as it is given by the respondents (see Table 6.2.5)
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1998 1999 2000a 2001a 2002 Mean North
Cameroon
prod. 
(88/89)
Sorghum 725 1,030 470 (790) 650 (618) 700 1,130
Maize 1,275 2,050 800 (1386) 1,100 (1176) 1,300 740
Groundnuts 600 600 500 (720) 790 (728) 925 820
Beans 600 850 1,010 (651) 675 (439) 650 670
Year precipitation 1,133 1,066 1,282 1,286 935 n.a.
Production in 2000 Production in 2001
Mean/ house- Mean/ house- Prod/surf. Mean/ house- Mean/ house- Prod/surf.
hold (in kg) hold (in ha) in kg/ha hold (in kg) hold (in ha) in kg/ha
Sorghum 465.2 0.6 789.6 436.4 0.7 618.4
Maize 391 0.3 1386.3 394.2 0.3 1175.9
Rice 34.7 0.03 1285.4 42.6 0.05 882.6
Groundnuts 200.8 0.3 719.8 284.9 0.4 728.1
Beans 78.0 0.1 650.7 102.1 0.2 438.8
Bamb nutsa 14.0 0.01 806.5 11.7 0.05 223.4
Total 1183.7 1.3 913.2 1271.9 1.7 720.4
Fallowb n.a. 0.08 n.a. n.a. 0.5 n.a.
cereals 891.0 0.9 993.3 873.2 1.05 801.7
24 The figures of Ali, Peters and Fozein (1997) are those for 1988-1989, published in the regional analysis (1995)
of SNV (a Dutch development NGO that works in Cameroon). FAO statistics has counted a mean production for
the whole of Cameroon during the 1990s of 869 kg/ha for sorghum, 1745 kg/ha for maize, 407 kg/ha for ground-
nuts and 838 kg/ha for beans. During the first years of the new century productions were higher with means over
2000 – 2003 being: sorghum 1201 kg/ha, maize 2404 kg/ha, groundnuts 1076 kg/ha and beans 848 kg/ha.
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Figure 4.4 Main geographical relief forms (see page 95)
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Photo 5.1 New settlement Yameda (see page 168)
Photo 6.1 Cattle on their way to the river pass the Dzambou inselberg (see page 211)
Photo 7.1 Bana showing the original boundary between Oudda and Kila (see page 320)
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Two other important crops for Kapsiki are potatoes and sweet potatoes (see Table 6.2.7). These
are produced for people’s own consumption. Only on very rare occasions (mostly in case of a
sudden surplus) do farmers try to sell them. They are insecure crops that need a specific
amount of water in the soil during growth. In general only low-lying fields or those adjacent
to river(bed)s are suitable. When the rains turn out to be abundant, these fields can easily
become too wet.  In addition, during storage these crops can suffer from too much humidity in
the soil, while they are stored in a hole in the ground covered by soil. This makes them also
vulnerable to insects and termites.
Table 6.2.7 Production of potatoes and sweet potatoes.
a = In 2000 seven respondents cultivated both potatoes and sweet potatoes. In 2001 this number was eight.
In addition, these crops are vulnerable to pests in the soil during growth. To avoid the build up
of, for example, potato eels, the production can only be continued on the same spot for two or
three years at a time. If there is no suitable surface, either the farmer has to choose, before-
hand, for a lack of these additional calories25 or (s)he has to take the risk of producing too often
on the same spot. 
In the village a diversity of other products is cultivated, but in very small quantities and
these are very different per household. According to the Agricultural Service of Mogodé, the
whole village produced two tons of manioc and 1.7 tons of taro in 2002, but almost none of
the people interviewed mentioned these products. They mention melon or other vegetables,
like aubergine or onions, when they cultivate them, but none of these really add up to calorie
consumption. Soybeans could help (also to add protein), but up until now these have only been
produced by three or four inhabitants26. 
Needs
Because Kapsiki consider only cereals to be a real meal, they express their needs in bags of
cereals. Table 6.2.8 compares the amount of cereal kgs needed per household according to the
respondents with what is produced and with what the FAO has calculated as sufficient, if only
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25 Potatoes and sweet potatoes contain 700 - 950 cal/kg. The hundred or two hundred kg per producer can there-
fore add a substantial amount of calories. And they are rich in protein.
26 Data from the Agricultural Service mentions the absence of soybeans production until 2002:  0.4 ton compared
to 0.6 ha. See also section 3.1.1. below.
2000 2001
Total Used surface Number of Total Used surface Number of
production (in ha) cultivators production (in ha) cultivators
(in kg) (in kg)
Potatoes 1,125 1 11 3,560 1.7 18
Sweet potatoes 6,910 4.25 46 10,285 5.7 62
Totala 8,035 5.25 57 13,845 7.4 80
cereals are eaten27. The mean production per household is more than the household heads indi-
cate they need, except for Baba Deli in 2001 (but that followed a surplus in 2000).
Table 6.2.8 Needs and production of cereals per average household (in kg), according to the personal per
ception of the respondents and the calculation of the FAO.
If there is a shortage, this can be made up for by buying a bag of sorghum at the market. For
the richer inhabitants this does not cause any problems. It is the poorer villagers who encounter
difficulties and it is this group especially that suffers a shortage of grains (see also Table
6.2.10). In addition, this group does not have enough fields to counter-play the shortage by
means of a high groundnut or bean yield which they can sell. Or, if they have a surplus, they
have no time to wait until the best period to sell it and buy what they need. Once again, they
do not have (small) animals to serve as a safety net. 
The problem is that prices of surplus products decrease while those with a low yield
increase. When cereals production is low, farmers try to sell more groundnuts and (or) beans.
Sometimes (as can be seen in Table 6.2.6) the yields of these crops are also low. Then the price
is good, but the sale per household remains low. In other years the production of these crops
is good. Then everybody tries to sell and the price goes down. Thus, buying additional cereals
with the help of money gained with beans and groundnuts is an insecure and not very prof-
itable undertaking.
Table 6.2.9 Comparison of calorific needs (according to FAO-norms) and calorific production per (mean)
household per year
On the other hand calorific needs can also be provided for by the cultivated beans, ground-
nuts and tuberous plants. As can be seen in the production tables 6.2.6 and 6.2.7, Kapsiki pro-
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27 With a mean household composition of 3.6 adults and 3.6 children the calorific need per household according
to the FAO norms is 15,012 kcal/day (calorific need is 2500 kcal/adult (2300/woman and 2800/man) and 1670
kcal/per child per day; 1 kg cereals contains 3342 kcal (3000-3600 kcal).
Baba Deli Rest Dzambou
Household Needed Produced Household Needed Produced
members members
Adult Kid 2000 2001 Adult Kid 2000 2001
According to 3.7 3.5 908 1,059 897 3.4 3.7 913 914 922
respondents
According to n.a. n.a. 1,647 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,472 n.a. n.a.
FAO
Kcal needed Kcal produced 2000 Kcal produced 2001
Baba Deli 5,435,246 5,390,303 5,101,233
Dzambou rest 4,856,687 4,762,912 4,990,604
Total village 5,145,966 5,076,608 5,045,919
duce a lot more than only cereals. Table 6.2.9 is an overview of calorific needs and total
calorific production in agriculture.
As has already been mentioned, all sorts of animal products (eggs, meat and milk of own ani-
mals or bought at the market, as well as fish from the market) can add to the diet, but mostly
those people with a lack of agricultural production are not the ones with a substantial herd of
farm animals. The consumption of wild products is not restricted to only poor or rich inhabi-
tants. It depends more on the household composition: children between 8 and 15 consider the
gathering to be a game. Such families dispose of high quality food with high protein content
(but mostly not very much in calorific terms) especially when insects (termites or grasshop-
pers) or animals (mice) can be caught. 
With the calorific needs already almost met by the crop production and with an additional
calorie supply from other sources, Dzambou village as a whole did not encounter any calorif-
ic difficulties over the last two years. In Baba Deli the situation is worse, especially because
the shortage has hit the neighbourhood for two consecutive years. But within the village a high
percentage of households faced a shortage of calories; sometimes even severe shortages (see
Table 6.2.10). Of those that had two consecutive years of shortage of produced calories, only
four percent28 had enough farm animals to make up the shortage with calories from milk and/or
meat while two percent could make up for missing calories with milk or meat in only one of
the two years29.
Table 6.2.10 Percentage of households without enough cereals or calories from agricultural production.
a = People’s perception of need measured against production
b = FAO based calculation of need measured against production
One of the households at risk is that of Teri of Baba Deli. At an age of 38 he has two wives
and seven children, six of which are under school age. The household owns 2.5 ha and
therefore meets the required 0.25 ha per person. However, in the two years under study Teri
and his wives did not produce enough calories to feed the family, although they dispose of
a plough and a donkey to increase the cultivated surface and sow at the right time. In 2000
in particular the deficit was considerable, being almost half of what was needed. Teri says
he can supply food by selling some of his goats, but he cannot supply enough calories by
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28 Percentages of whole population.
29 The range of the number of calories lacking was broad: from less than 60,000 kcal to more than 5,000,000
kcal. The importance thereof depends on the size of the involved family. A bigger family can stand a bigger
shortage because the per capita shortage is less. However, the number of persons who are undernourished is
then bigger.
Not enough cerealsa Not enough caloriesb
2000 2001 Both years 2000 2001 Both years
Baba Deli 37 52 25 49 51 39
Dzambou rest 54 49 40 65 51 44 
Total 46 51 33 57 51 42
normal off-take. As a result, the shortage he experienced during these two years meant his
flock decreased. In addition, he lost three sheep because of diseases and one sheep and a
donkey due to theft (see also Table 6.2.11). He fears for his future and that of his children,
but has no solution for the problem.
In short, the general land availability and the mean production may give rise to the idea that
Dzambou does not suffer from a shortage in either of these respects. However, differences
between different families and households are substantial. A poor production year or a reduc-
tion in the arable surface area may push those who are already on the margin over the edge.
6.2.2 Human domain insecurities
Health insecurities
Especially in the two northern neighbourhoods of Dzambou (Baba Deli and Tndmou) people
complain about the lack of a medical post. The nearest hospital – of the Catholic Mission - is
in Sir, which for them is ten or more km away across hilly terrain. In the rainy season the
majority of these neighbourhoods are isolated from the south by big rivers. Also the alterna-
tive hospital in Mogodé is not reachable in the rainy season. The rest of the village has rea-
sonable access to the hospital in Sir. Prices are not that high and the staff are well educated.
Even patients from Mogodé sometimes undertake the long journey to receive better help for
lower prices. Nevertheless, for more complicated illnesses and surgery the nearest hospital is
in Mokolo, more then 30 km away.
Hygienic drinking water, in the form of a closed pump, is only available in Dzambou
Centre, south of the inselberg. However, even there people complain about a lack of water
wells. Many households depend on open wells or rivers. During the second half of the dry sea-
son, the distances people have to walk to watering locations increase, sometimes to more than
1 hour’s walk. Several of the most important diseases are water related. Almost all open wells
are contaminated by amoebas and small worms. The women in the most northern part of Baba
Deli filter the well-water with cloth, but still, many inhabitants suffer from diarrhoea and
stomach ache.
In the past, some of the wells were guarded against misuse (for example by children) by
elders30 living nearby. Nowadays, however, this community task has disappeared. With this, the
level of insecurity regarding water has increased. The construction of new wells is a difficult
process. Digging in the rocky underground is only possible using heavy machinery. One of the
Mandara Mountains development organisations (PDRM31) or the Catholic Mission are willing
to help, but only after a preliminary effort by the population itself. They have to start digging
the first (easy) layers (with borrowed PDRM utensils) and gather a reasonable amount of
money to invest in the work and building material needed. Up until now the social fabric or
motivation of the neighbourhoods involved does not seem to be strong enough (see Social
Insecurities).
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30 In Dzambou Centre there was even a lock and set opening hours.
31 Projet du Développement Rurale des Monts Mandara, the institute responsible for, among other things, the
water supply in the Mandara Mountains which was partly financed by the European Union.
Educational insecurities
Both in the whole country and in the Far North province Kapsiki are considered to be one of
the most backward groups as far as formal education is concerned32. In the whole village only
28 % of the household heads have ever received some form of education which sometimes
means only a couple of months of the first years of school or some adult literacy courses. In
Dzambou many young adult Kapsiki constantly mention this fact, while stressing the need for
more and more accessible schools. North of the bigger rivers there is only one primary school,
but this does not offer a full curriculum. Up until 2001 the rest of the village or the children
that wanted to continue lessons up to the last primary school classes depended on the mission
school in Sir. From the northern part of Baba Deli this means a two hour walk twice a day.
What is more, in the rainy season the road is blocked by the rivers. Some of the parents in the
northern Tndmou neighbourhood choose to send their children to primary school in Viti33 , but
doing so isolates them a bit from the rest of the villagers. 
Sir also provides some secondary school education, but in order to prepare for the first offi-
cial exams and diplomas (after three years) the children have to go to Mogodé, which is even
further away and more expensive. To gain a real baccalaureate, pupils have to apply to schools
in Mokolo or Bourah where they will have to board. Because this is expensive and unsafe for
girls, most parents do not consider this as an option. Sending away adolescent boys means
sending away a labour force despite household costs increasing.
Several of the men who attended school for less than 2 years now regret leaving school pre-
maturely. In some cases it was even their own fault since their parents wanted to invest in their
education, but they themselves did not want to go. They feel less secure in these modern times
without any knowledge of French (the official language and thus the language by which to
communicate with authorities or in court) and without the ability to read and write. “We do not
know our rights. We do not know what the authorities are talking about, or what they want, so
we cannot resist them. For example, now they have taken my lands! And without any reim-
bursement!” 
There are various reasons why some members of the population did not send their children
to school at all. In most cases it is because, when these children were young, schools had not
yet been built in the region. Only a small proportion explains that they lacked money.
However, this did influence schooling levels as in many families only the education of a part
of the children could be paid. And more often than not, for those that did attend the payment
of school fees stopped short after some years of education and they had to leave. 
In general Kapsiki feel deprived of information. They complain that the only agricultural or
health-related information they get comes from the extensionists of the Catholic Mission. This
church demands strict Catholic lifestyles of their employees, so when one of them divorces or
marries a second wife his contract with the Mission is ended. This not only diminishes his
income and his own knowledge, but the amount of new information for his fellow inhabitants
as well.
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32 Iyébi-Mandjek (2000: 139) mentions a level of education of Mayo Tsanaga department of between 20 and 40
% in 1987. Attendance by girls is again the lowest of the Far North Province (2.8 % of pupils being girls as
opposed to 6 % for the whole Province).
33 Viti is a village to the north-west. From Tndmou it is reachable by way of a small bush road along the west-
ern boundary of the pasture reserve. From the main (north-south) road turning eastward one can reach it by a
reasonably good road.
The Baba Deli neighbourhood in particular, that is even more isolated than the other
Dzambou neighbourhoods, is almost never visited by workers of the several organisations that
are trying to help develop the Mandara Mountains.
6.2.3 Economic insecurities
Cash crop
The Kapsiki plateau is a specific groundnut producing area. Indeed, men and women all pro-
duce at least some groundnuts, not only for personal use, but mostly for the market. Like the
Bana further to the south (see Chapter 7), Kapsiki are the victims of a tremendously variable
groundnut price. Over the years and over the months prices have ranged from 10,000 Fcfa to
20,000 Fcfa per bag of 100 kg. The farmers do not benefit from high world market prices.
According to Pasquet and Fotso (2000: 92) the groundnut variant produced by Kapsiki is sold
mainly in Douala and other southern towns for use as groundnut oil or in snacks. When indi-
vidual Dzambou inhabitants try to sell in the south themselves, they are worse off because they
do not know their way around and are easily swindled.
Some of the more water-retaining soils are very suitable for fruit trees and several families
in fact possess tree gardens. However, most guavas, grapefruits and lemons are eaten by chil-
dren because of the lack of an all-season road that connects the Dzambou region with the out-
side world. At best some off-take can be sold at the weekly market34 in Sir. However, this mar-
ket is very restricted and only serves a small region. In addition, the products have to be car-
ried there by the farmers themselves or by donkeys. Potato cultivation is hampered for the
same reason. To make it possible to sell potatoes from the Baba Deli or Tndmou neighbour-
hoods a long track through bush and fields has to be cleared of overgrowth every year. The
same applies to onions, garlic and egg-plants, produced in small gardens around the house or
along the river. It may add to household consumption diversification, but it does not help to
improve the economic position.
Farm animals
In 2002, Dzambou accommodated 763.7 Tropical Livestock Units (TLU), excluding poultry
and pigs. Although there are major differences between cattle and small stock as regards what
they eat (graze or browse35), one can generalise by saying that this amount of TLU needs 916.4
ha, provided that all feed produced by the pasture lands is available throughout the year36 and
that it has a sufficient protein content. When counted using the calculation of Gaston (1996)
the surface of grazing land needed is 3 ha/TLU (0.33 TLU/ha). That would mean a total
requirement of 2,291 ha. The ha left for animal grazing in 1980 should have been enough
(namely: 0.39 TLU/ha) in the first case but were not quite sufficient according to Gaston.
However, now crop residues (stubbles and stalks) are added to the diet, I assume that there is
enough surface area. Although, during the rainy season, the pasture zone is also visited by cat-
tle from other villages in the region and perhaps from even further away, there are also cattle
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34 For example, in December – January, when the fruits are ripe, a grapefruit on the Sir market costs 50 Fcfa,
compared to double that price in Maroua, the provincial capital.
35 Total edible forage production depends on the ratio between herbaceous and woody cover. On the other hand,
the potential usable forage depends on what type of TLU use the area. 
36 The most optimistic calculation of Breman (1975) is a carrying capacity in the 1000 mm rain belt of 1.2
TLU/ha (see chapter 4.2.1).
owners from the village who herd their flock in one of the pasture areas outside the village to
escape problems related to field damage. The increase in numbers during the rainy season may
exceed Gaston’s 0.33 TLU/ha that is the limit on a yearly basis, but not the 1.2 TLU/ha of the
optimistic calculation. During the dry season, which is the main limiting period for cattle37, the
total number of TLU decreases even below the 0.33 TLU/ha due to some out-transhumance.
This number can easily live off the remaining dry matter even when, as Boudet (1975: 2)
stated, “approximately half of the biomass produced at the end of the growth period vanishes
[…] during the dry season” when preserved from grazing38. In short: there is no overstocking
of the vegetation-for-fodder resources in this area39, although the situation is not one of
extreme abundance.
There is, however, a problem with water availability in the dry season. No artificial water-
point has been constructed throughout the ‘pasture’ area of Baba Deli. When natural rivers run
dry, herds have to depend on the one well that has been dug for animals in the middle of the
hamlet, far away. The owners of small stock say it is impossible to walk so far with their ani-
mals each day.
Due to the combination of heat stress and a lack of water, which both also lead to
decreased immunity against contagious diseases, the loss of small ruminants in the second
half of the dry season is high. This adds up to diseases prevalent in the rainy season (see Table
6.2.11). 
Table 6.2.11 Percentage of respondents with animal losses over the last five years. (Data on diseases preva
lent among ruminants, donkeys, horses and poultry; theft of ruminants, donkeys, and poultry)
Another insecurity problem is formed by the high risk of livestock theft in the three isolated
bush areas of Dzambou: the Baba Deli pasture, the bush dividing Baba Deli from Tchibi (adja-
cent to the pasture area and Baba Deli settlement) and the bush area just north of the Tndmou
settlements (just south of the pasture area). Sometimes animals are even stolen from within the
settled areas. Several households suffered from theft more than once. In a two month period at
the end of 2001 at least five cases of theft of cattle, donkeys, goats or sheep were reported.
Over the years almost everybody has suffered from this type of loss (see Table 6.2.11).
People who do have animals do not generally succeed in increasing their herds in a way that
makes real trade possible. In order to trade cattle a high basic investment is necessary for each
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37 According to Breman (1975) and Boudet (1975).
38 See (e.g. in Chapter 4.2) De Leeuw and Tothill (1990: 2) about the loss of biomass during the dry season. In
the presence of grazers, however, the part over which this ‘climatic’ decline takes place is smaller because the
animals have already eaten part of that biomass.
39 According to Breman (1975: 6) to “avoid the risk of destroying the grassland beyond repair during relatively
dry years”, 0.7 TLU/ha is more realistic in the 1000 mm belt and this is still more than the amount in Dzambou.
Diseases dry Diseases rainy Diseases Theft Theft > 5
season season whole years ago
Baba Deli 33 39 70 54 20
Dzambou rest 52 34 86 50 11
Whole village 42 36 78 52 16
animal40 and most inhabitants do not have the means or are afraid of losing too much if their
animals die or are stolen. 
In fact, the percentage of people with cattle or with connections to cattle decreases. Several
more fathers and grandfathers than current respondents were the owners of cattle. 
Insecurities in non-agricultural activities
Off-farm activities
Given the low education level in the village, there are few off-farm possibilities in terms of
paid jobs, whether with the government or other organisations. In the past some Dzambou
youngsters used to go to Nigeria in search of jobs but the increasingly unsafe situation there
means this is not an option either. 
Kapsiki are not very used to labour migration, but some are realising that they should per-
haps start considering this now. But, they do not know where to begin and are therefore in a
disadvantaged position compared to other Far North ethnic groups.
Each village needs a butcher, a tailor, an undertaker. However, these are only job options
for a very small number of inhabitants. The growing outside market, that seems to open up
possibilities for outsiders and not for villagers, means that more and more cloth and meat is
imported. Such a market should have provided opportunities for trade, but the larger market
demands larger investments and villagers seem to lack the funds to make the initial step.
Several of them complain about the stop on small credit possibilities. One generation ago, it
was still possible to borrow government money in Mogodé without having to provide real
collateral. However, those who counted on this option are these days very disappointed.
Animal banking and trade is also insecure due to the various diseases and thefts that affect
the region.
On-farm activities
Several farmers and their wives are active in the production of household utensils from
raw materials that are available in the direct vicinity. However, the products are mostly for
own use because, once again, transport to regional markets is almost impossible. Even when
people make the effort to construct traditional products and transport them to the market, they
are outnumbered by cheap plastic products from Nigeria that are imported on a bigger scale
each year.
Wives can earn with bilbil (local sorghum beer) production or bean-flour fritters, sold at
household gatherings or the local markets. However, the increasingly popular Islamic faith
and the Lutheran church forbid the drinking of alcohol. 
In short, modern economic possibilities are not very abundant, while traditional sales are, at
the same time, diminishing.
6.2.4 Social insecurities
Family and group insecurities
Within the Kapsiki culture the extended family in both the patrilineal as well as matrilineal line
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40 A year-old calf costs 60,000 – 80,000 Fcfa. Fully grown cattle can fetch a price of 150,000 with big bulls some-
times costing 300,000 Fcfa.
is important. As we have seen, the patrilineage offers access to fields and other economic
inheritance. However, for care and social security one has to rely on the matrilineal family
members41. In particular, brothers and sisters of the same mother have a strong bond. At the
same time the level of insecurity is high for those children that lose their mother at a young
age. When they are still very young, they are claimed by their maternal family. Indeed, they
have to live with a maternal grandmother or mother’s brother, because co-wives do not often
take care of their husband’s other off-spring. Such children can only stay within the household
if the father’s mother lives in the same house.
However, this phenomenon does not increase insecurities because all Kapsiki are used to it.
If a wife temporarily (or permanently) leaves her husband’s compound, her children have to
be looked after by the husband himself. Especially when there was only one wife in the com-
pound, this puts a burden on the man’s (and household’s) security, because he cannot take care
of his children, cook the meals and cultivate at the same time. The increase of Christianity with
its one wife policy is adding to the difficulties.
In the past, village chiefs could oblige women to return to households with very young kids
to enhance survival chances, but nowadays even the lamido does not want to interfere in such
domestic problems. Several complaints submitted at district court level (= lamido’s court) by
fathers who have been left by their wives are deliberated on year after year without any solu-
tion being found for the stricken household. Sometimes the father’s mother lives in the same
compound and she will then look after motherless children, but this is only possible for one
(the oldest) son.
With the increased expectations of modernity, expectations between family members, and
especially between family in law, have risen to a level that can only lead to disappointments.
Postponed bride price payments for the sake of giving the young couple the opportunity to
acquire some wealth42 only lead to quarrels because the expected wealth does not arrive and
the groom cannot pay his father-in-law later on. Sometimes the discords even result in physi-
cal aggression between spouses and sometimes between brothers and brothers-in-law.
Naturally, the bonds between the families deteriorate.
Political insecurities
With the increase in democratisation, people feel they should have more influence over their
lives. In the past they were forgotten by the authorities, but now they believe they can choose
a party which knows about their existence and which is able to implement change.
Unfortunately, this has turned out not to be true. Because they were not satisfied with what the
incumbent mayor had done for them and with the things the ruling party in general had done
for the region, they tried to elect another mayor in the community and another party in parlia-
ment. As far as electing a new mayor was concerned they succeeded although, as they say, it
remains to be seen whether he will do more for the village or more for himself. Most respon-
dents say that they have not seen any positive changes in the six months since he has been in
office. 
At country level President Biya and high-level party members made their own decision.
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41 In case of the beating up of a wife by her husband, neighbouring half-brothers of ‘only’ the same father will
not interfere, as I had the misfortune to experience during my stay in the village in January 2004.
42 This habit seems to increase, and so does the number of quarrels.
Although a substantial part of the Kapsiki chose a representative of the non-governing party,
the UNDP43, this man has not become member of the new parliament. In fact, the number of
RDPC seats in parliament has increased to more than 82 % and the UNDP is only represented
by one seat. The elections in the Kapsiki sub-department were labelled fraudulent. The result
is that the sub-department is not represented at all. Now the Dzambou inhabitants have not
only been forgotten, they do not even have a voice.
Conflict mediation
In Dzambou, as regards problems concerning private matters such as profound quarrels
between spouses, when two grown-up brothers have been engaged in a fight, or when a farmer
suspects his neighbour of stealing from his granary, the village or neighbourhood chief has to
act as arbiter. When necessary he is assisted by wise men.
In addition, in the case of discords between two village inhabitants about the ownership of a
piece of land, parties go to the village chief with their witnesses and explain their claims. Apart
from hearing the story of the complainers and the testimony of the witnesses, the chief consults
with his counsellors and other wise men to establish the history of the piece of land involved.
The increase in bribing means the reliability of witnesses has decreased. If the accused or com-
plainant does not pay enough to his witness (or did not pay enough in the time of the transac-
tion) this witness will not back him up. In other cases threats are issued to witnesses to prevent
them from testifying or to make them testify in favour of the person who threats. Women seem
not to have any significant role as a witness, although they can explain their point of view. When
they are themselves parties in a case they have to rely on the testimonies of male relatives. Thus,
money and social contacts influence someone’s position in a case. But money is gaining in
importance and with that the position of poor people is becoming less secure.
Even the village chief himself can be a witness (for example in a land transaction that is con-
tested later on by the offspring of the seller). He will not act differently from his subjects if he
thinks the (previously) received witness fee is insufficient44. In such a case the parties will try to
resolve the problem between them or they will decide to appeal to people “higher up”. The vil-
lage chief (or even the neighbourhood chief) is also the first to be consulted in the case of crim-
inal offences (theft or personal violence). He will decide whether or not he is entitled to handle
the problem himself or should inform the higher level authorities. In the event of crop damage
by animals belonging to the village chief and his family, the injured party is powerless. Of course,
the village chief then handles the problem himself and decides in favour of the animal owner45. 
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43 Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès.
44 This happened in a conflict over land, situated on the territory of Sir. The land was sold a couple of years ago
by a woman living in Mokolo to lawan Yaya of Baba Deli in the presence of, among others, the high chief of
Sir. Yaya had an ownership paper but that appeared to be useless. The woman wanted to have her land back
because she wanted to sell it to a friend of her own family in Sir. She tried first to say that Yaya did not pay
the real price and then arranged for relatives (men) to claim that she could not have sold it, being a woman,
and finally she asked the Sir chief to be her witness. This man, being fully aware of the sum paid and the fact
that that sum was given in accordance with the asking price, gave testimony in favour of the woman. One of
the reasons could be that the land was now back in the hands of an inhabitant of Sir. However, the chief admit-
ted freely that he did not want to back Yaya because he had given him nothing for being a witness when the
deal was made.
45 In 2000, this happened to the neighbour of the Dzambou village chief when she saw the pigs of the chief’s
wife enter her fields. Even asking to guard them did not help.
The first person of a higher rank who people can appeal to is the traditional district chief -
the lamido - the highest placed ‘non-official’ administrator. He will handle the problem in the
same way as the village chief, although with more authority (and will accept a ‘salary’). For
more official prosecutions or settlements by judges people can appeal to the sub-department
chief who will ask for official reports from the police (the ‘gendarmerie’). If the sub-depart-
ment chief cannot solve the problem, the parties can go to court and thereafter, to the court of
appeal if necessary. Authorities themselves can charge subjects with criminal behaviour, in
which case the police will interrogate them and draw up an official report. Again, this report
can serve as testimony before the judge of the criminal court. 
As regards combating banditry, the central government set up a semi-military anti-gang (see
Chapter 4). This organisation has been accused by human rights watchers of arbitrary execu-
tions and arrests. Moreover, several people in Dzambou have told stories about arbitrarily
arrested brothers or sons. People complained about an increase in personal insecurity because
of the anti-gang rather than a reduction thereof. “Animal thefts have not diminished. It is still
very dangerous in the bush and now you even have the risk of being arrested by those anti-
gang bandits.” 
In the case of crop damage by livestock, the best route is (apart from settling it between the
involved parties themselves) to report to the agriculture line officer in Sir or Mogodé, who
sends somebody to assess the damage and calls together the special committee responsible for
this type of problem (see Chapter 4). The animal husbandry line officer, the police chief and
the agriculture line officer sit on the committee and the sub-department chief acts as its presi-
dent. The committee consults the official lists to establish the compensation that corresponds
to the damage done, and considers special circumstances for the case at hand that may give
rise to a deviation from the standard reimbursement. However, this route entails a high risk of
losing more money than you gain because of the corruption of the parties involved. 
All cases at a level higher than village level have to be paid for by the plaintiff and the
accused. That means that, as was the custom, people pay a fixed sum to the lamido for his gen-
erous intervention. At present, this payment is higher, more arbitrary and more influential on
the outcome than in the past. Farmers say, “If you have cattle, you can always pay enough to
make the lamido choose your side.” In addition, the judging authority keeps a portion of the
settled (reimbursement) fee. Thus, asserting your rights is an expensive practice. However, it
can be used strategically to ruin your adversary.
Another problem may arise when land ownership is not contested between co-villagers, but
with the State. In other words, when the State wants a piece of land that, in the perception of
the users, is their property. Because, according to law, all land is State land as long as it is not
registered otherwise, and because there are not many cultivators that have registered their
properties (registration was (and is) an extremely difficult undertaking46), the chance of win-
ning such a case is small. 
Land allocation and insecurities
According to customary law, once land has been cleared it remains the property of the family
of the first cultivator, even if this farmer did not actually grow any crops on the field in ques-
tion. In reality Kapsiki established the habit of lending out land for free to whoever needed or
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46 See Fisiy (1992), Goheen (1989a) and Van den Berg (1997).
wanted it (Van Beek 1978). When the French colonial power arrived, the plateaux became
safer and the first clearers built houses there for their families. Also new settlers arrived from
the same region of origin, called Sir (see Figure 6.3). 
According to their system, access to fields should be easy and their use cheap. However,
growing population numbers and increasing distances between lines of off-spring that live far
from each other, cause customs to harden. More and more people ask for money for fields
that were lent out in the past, or try to sell them for high prices. Some families are even chased
from their compounds, where they have lived for generations, because the owner of the land
decided to sell (whether he lived nearby, in the same village or even far away). On the other
hand, many farmers that now live in Dzambou have lost the fields of their ancestors in Sir.
They complain that they have no place to go “when, for example, locusts arrive in the vil-
lage”47
Conflicts over field-boundaries or field-ownership are becoming increasingly common.
Even the testimony of former witnesses cannot be trusted anymore. It seems as if the tradi-
tional territorial rules are changing into “might is right”. However, what this might is based on,
or what it consists of is unclear, even to the Dzambou people.
Cultural insecurities
Social insecurities based in the cultural domain can be seen when people are no longer able to
rely on the rules, norms and values prescribed by religion, beliefs and other traditional systems
that cover this realm. As long as no shared, new systems have replaced the old ones, and
specifically when the different new ones clash with each other and with the old ones, bonds
and linkages become vague and perhaps even develop into something which is the reverse. 
With the increase of new religions (Christianity and Islam), bonds offered by the tradition-
al religion disappear. In 2002, the majority of Dzambou still belonged to the traditional reli-
gion (61 %), but 23 % were Christian48 and 14 % Muslim. Kapsiki encountered the same break-
down of traditional binding ceremonies as the Bana of Oudda (see Chapter 7). Here again the
Protestant church as well as Islam prohibits the use of alcohol that plays a role in the season-
al festivities49. Instead of a shared ceremony of all villagers to celebrate the beginning of the
growing season, Muslims give priority to their Ramadan and sheep festival and Christians to
Christmas and Easter. In this way, a divide is created within the community. 
The new religions can be the source of heavy controversies, leading to fights and casual-
ties, as can be seen in neighbouring Nigeria. New bonds within new groups can lead to the
breakdown of bonds and linkages between the groups. In such instances the social cohesion of
the total village and even of the whole Kapsiki community (of Mogodé) may disappear.
Indeed, the religious leaders that each form their congregation in Dzambou come from outside
the village. They seem to have no intention to hold the Kapsiki together. On the other hand,
they are not busy trying to turn the villagers of their own religious persuasion against those of
the other religions. They preach a life of tolerance and peace. This is only logical given that
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47 Interviews with seven different household heads in Dzambou Centre, Tndmou and Baba Deli, October 2001 –
January 2003.
48 15 % of the population was Catholic and 9 % Protestant, divided into 6 % Adventists (who mostly live in their
own settlement adjacent to that of Baba Deli Fulbe) and 3 % Lutheran Brethrens. 
49 See Van Beek 1978, 1981, 1987.
Kapsiki themselves are very tolerant and say that people should believe what they want and
make such statements as “In fact we all believe in one and the same god”.
Thus, in general, it seems as if social insecurities are only slightly bigger than in the past.
However, they are increasing. Major violent outbreaks against neighbouring villages may be
less common than two generations ago but the number of smaller internal discords is growing.
Wise old men fear for the breakdown of the social fabric of the village, because of a lack of a
common enemy.  Fair conflict resolution is becoming rare. In addition, the links with higher
level institutions with a view to enhancing development in general is becoming a real problem.
6.3 Investments: going to Box 2
As is depicted in the “insecurity complex” in Chapter 3, when people experience insecurities
in a mutually influencing complex of domains, they search for strategies to overcome these. In
the “VoE diagram” it is during the step from Box 1 to Box 2 that actors perceive the different
possibilities (Figure 6.2). To understand the step to Box 2 of the VoE diagram the diversity of
options that lead to certain strategies and the choice for specific options have to be explored.
With a variety of capitals at hand (see Chapter 2) the different Kapsiki invest in the social rela-
tionships, economic goods, personal capabilities or environmental circumstances they meet to
improve their future and that of their kids. Sometimes persons do not really invest in some-
thing, but just ‘muddle through’, perhaps only hoping that their positions will improve in the
future. The investments are shaped by the combined effect of each of the four categories of the
Actor-in-Context model, as formulated by De Groot and Kamminga (1995; See Chapter 2):
implementability of options, objectified motivations, interpretations and the autonomy towards
implementation per actor. I will describe the factors that influence these options and make peo-
ple chose ‘escape routes’ (downward arrows from the central part of the “VoE diagram”, see
Figure 6.2) or make them follow the way to the invasion of a new niche.
6.3.1 Environmental investments
Investments in the quality of land 
Dependent on the basic fertility of the soil, the owner (or user) has to maintain or improve this
soil. To improve the quality of land, and via that the agricultural production, a natural fertili-
sation process, the adding of fertilisers, extra labour input or more technological equipment
can be used. The natural fertilisation process means leaving the field fallow for as long as it
takes to build up fertility levels again. Added fertilisers can be natural or chemical. The latter
can be bought at the market, from agricultural extension organisations or via friends. Natural
fertilisers consist of animal dung, household waste, leaves or stems from harvest left-overs, or
several types of ‘wild’ organic matter, like leaves of trees.
Table 6.3.1 shows details on different uses of fertility ameliorating techniques. The most
important in Dzambou is the use of fallow rotation. In these hills and plateaux the cycle can
be very long. Mostly, fields around houses are used for longer and are left fallow for shorter
periods. This is (partly) possible because of the use of household waste and it is done for con-
venience. Most actors reported that they use a field further away for three to five years and that
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the fallow period should last at least ten years. But this is not always possible. Everything
depends on the basic fertility of the location and the possibility for maintaining it with animal
dung (the only option in the past for actively improving fertility) and, of course, of the other
surface area available. Two of the three bush areas (that of Baba Deli and the smaller one in
the direction of Tchibi) have not been used for over thirty years, as can be seen by the height
of the trees.
Because Kapsiki are used to mixed cropping (mostly even three crops: cereals, beans and
groundnuts), the leguminous beans can increase the fertility of the fields slightly which makes
it possible for the grains to grow better. It is doubtful whether this is a deliberate choice, but
the effect is the same. When the leaves of both groundnuts and beans are left on the field this
increases the fertility even further.
As far as Kapsiki are concerned it is difficult to use chemical fertilisers because these are
not sold in the village. Those farmers that have money to purchase them (13.9 % of respon-
dents) depend on the occasional arrival of a truck from some chemical company or other at the
regional market in Sir. However, they complained that the supplies always arrive too late in
the season. The effect on the field is then far smaller than it could be.
Table 6.3.1 Fertility improving measures (in numbers and % of respondents. n= 180. Some 
actors use several measures at the same time)
Other ways of improving the fields is to use measures to curb surface run-off, measures to
combat flooding when necessary (see Table 6.3.2) and measures to protect against pest infes-
tation. Examples are: Striga hermonthica that attack millet roots50 or potato bacterial diseases
and nematodes. Farmers can use crop rotation to combat the latter. When potato seeds are
bought they are mostly treated with chemical bactericides. But when farmers produce their
own seeds, by cultivating the crop twice a year (the second time during the dry season with the
help of irrigation), seeds and soils can become heavily infected and agronomists recommend
the use of pesticides. In the whole village, only two or three farmers try to produce a com-
mercial amount of potatoes51. Then they also try to lay their hands on appropriate pesticides. 
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50 In Dzambou a large number of fields are infested with Striga plants. According to Raemaekers (2001: 54)
“Striga seeds can remain viable in the soil for as long as 20 years”, they “germinate in response to a stimulant
produced by the host roots” and “Low soil fertility and low rainfall favour Striga infestation”. Thus, after long
fallow periods the parasite may still be present. Possible ways of controlling the parasite are to increase the
soil fertility or to pull out the plants by hand as soon as they become visible.
51 Potato is a relatively new crop for the region and in 2000 nobody produced enough to sell on a large scale. In
2001, only one farmer in Baba Deli neighbourhood produced 40 bags (20 kg) while in 2002 two farmers had
sown a substantial surface area and hoped to sell more than 30 bags each after harvest.
Fallow Animal Animal House- Natural Chem. fert. Nothing
rotation manure manure hold waste fert. 
(own animals) (other's animals) (non-animals)
Numbers of 70 84 28 74 8 25 18
respondents
Percentage of 38.9 46.7 15.6 41.1 4.4 13.9 10
respondents
Table 6.3.2 Other field improving measures.
a = These canals ensure the quicker run-off of water in cases where there is a risk of pool-formation on the fields
b = The necessity of measures is mentioned by the respondents themselves
The terraces built by Kapsiki living on the mountain plateau cannot be compared with the
highly developed terraces of the Mafa and Mada (for example) in the steep mountains further
north52. On the plateau the terraces are lower, at best (depending on the sloop53) half a metre,
and even that is very rare. The majority of terraces are not higher than 10 to 20 centimetres.
Most of the time they are constructed by piling stones to form the wall, with a little bit of earth
between them to make them stick together. The bank (the horizontal part used as field) is most-
ly left to form in the course of time: the run-off carries earth-particles that are blocked by the
wall, and fill up the angle between the slope and the wall. The general aspect of the banks is
not, as within Mafa territory, horizontal or even inclined towards the slope. Although less
steep, it still follows the course of the slope. In short, most ‘terraces’, as they are called by the
respondents, look like glorified stone ridges. The lack of proper building techniques and main-
tenance is partly due to the fact that terrace building is relearned by the current generation after
the former one has neglected this traditional method of soil conservation. Knowledge is there-
fore not transferred effectively. Now the extension workers and their local assistants are rein-
troducing the techniques.
Doing nothing to combat run-off, even when this is regarded as necessary, may be due to a
lack of stones in the field to build the terraces or the ridges, an inability to perform the job per-
sonally and (or) a lack of money to get others to do the work for you. Building terraces and
laying out stone rows is a man’s job. Of all the respondents, only three have paid labourers to
construct terraces54. This is a type of investment that will be recouped in the long run.
Investments of quantity of land
Not only field quality, but also field quantity is increased by terrace building. Sometimes, an
area that was unsuitable before can be used after terracing. Even dividing a used slope into hor-
izontal plots increases the quantity. 
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52 For the use of different soil and water conserving techniques in the northern (steep) Mandara Mountains see,
for example, Van Andel (1998); Zuiderwijk (1998) and Ndoum Mbeyo’o (2001).
53 The slope also defines the number of terraces necessary. On hillsides, the number of walls can increase to one for
every 5 metres. On average no more than one terrace wall is built every 200 metres because on the flat plain-like
parts of the village no terraces are built at all. The length of each terrace wall depends on the width of the fields.
54 The wages for labourers to construct terraces depend on the number and height of the ‘walls’ to be made. For
example, one older farmer paid 8,000 Fcfa (in 1999) to some labourers to construct two 20 cm high terrace
walls of approximately 30 m length. Another paid 60,000 Fcfa to labourers who constructed three 50 cm high
terrace walls of 10 m length in 1998
Terraces Stone Ridges Small Nothing, Nothing
ridges of stems canalsa although (not
necessaryb necessary)
Numbers of 126 15 3 3 13 24
respondents
Percentage of 70 8.3 1.7 1.7 7.2 13.3
respond.
In the past, land quantity was increased by borrowing land, but this habit is disappearing.
Many residents acknowledge the reduction in the available lands due to the growing popula-
tion. But the family planning program of the State has not (yet) reached the area. Almost
nobody does anything to decrease the number of children born. 
Investment activities to improve land surface security can be separated into two main classes.
Those with many family fields activate their ownership claims. Fields that they did not use, but
were used by other villagers (sometimes without asking or even without knowledge of the own-
ing family) are claimed. This means that users are evicted or forced to pay rent. The latter can
still be a symbolic amount of money or a non-monetary act to demonstrate who the owner is. 
On the other hand, actors decide to buy fields to safeguard the position of their off-spring.
At the moment, 28 % of respondents have already bought fields. However, many potential
buyers first have to save money. Their investment strategy is therefore to perform other activ-
ities in order to acquire capital. Up until now, nobody has considered looking for credit to facil-
itate land purchases.
As yet, land prices are not fixed. According to respondents there are some criteria, such as
proximity, the general position of the field, fertility and measure. However, on the whole, prices
are established between seller and buyer in a quite arbitrary manner (see Table 6.3.3). As has
been said before, a real land market does not exist (yet). Although Table 6.3.3 does not show a
difference in prices for different types of fields, compound fields are regarded as having a
greater value. Nevertheless, there are users who do not want to pay the requested (high) price.
Up until now they can take the risk of refusing because they can continue living at the location
during the negotiations (which can last for years). The feeling that prices are rising rapidly
(which has also not been demonstrated to be a fact in the table) makes people eager to buy now.  
Table 6.3.3 Land prices (in Fcfa x 103 /ha) over the years (based on personal information of interviewees,
October 2002 – February 2003).
One can say that the real price is decreased because the prices stayed more or less the same
despite the value of the Fcfa decreasing enormously55, 56!
To circumvent future problems with regard to the proof of ownership, and based on rumours
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55 From before independence, the Fcfa was always linked to the French Franc. The economic crisis meant a con-
siderable rise in inflation and in 1994 the Fcfa was devaluated by 50%. In 2002, 1,000 Fcfa was worth 1.5 Euro.
56 Indeed, one respondent declared that he knows of a land sale 40 years ago of 2 ha for the price of a car!
57 Adult education tries to teach people their rights and obligations. One of these is the right to land and the fact
that the registration of land is a necessity.
1960-1980 1981-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2002
Mean land price 75 52 83 62 85 82 73
range 50 -100 35 - 80 50 - 110 17 - 128 50 -128 30 - 240 31 -133
Price of com- No data 35 95 62.5 109.5 83 91
pound-field
(mean)
Number of sold 2 4 6 15 5 16 17
fields
about the necessity of registration of land57, sales are more often carried out now on the basis
of the production of transaction and ownership papers58.
6.3.2 Human domain investments
Health investments
In the more isolated parts of the village, like the Baba Deli neighbourhood, the importance of
preventive health care is acknowledged. Groups are formed to build a hut to serve as a surgery
for visiting nurses and to spread information about both the hours of such visits and about new
home health measures. Some village residents take on the task of lecturing about the necessity
of vaccinations and of helping vaccination teams to reach all children in the village. Sometimes
this work is connected to outside projects organised by the church or a foreign NGO that has
engaged the help of villagers. In those cases the ‘informers’ will probably have more informa-
tion at their disposal and may sometimes even have learned useful methods of communications.
In addition, several neighbourhoods try to collect money and to engender a ‘willingness to
dig’ more water wells. In the beginning of 2002, the village chief, together with representatives
of each neighbourhood, visited each compound personally to explain the authorities’ intention
to construct an artificial water well and to ask for financial support from his subjects to ensure
the authorities indeed implemented the plan.
Educational investments
Today’s parents are more motivated to send their children to school than in the past. The num-
ber of parents who send their children to school has more than doubled. These days, it is even
considered a good investment to send daughters to school. Only five fathers out of a total of
180 do not want to invest in their daughters. But others mention the possibilities offered by
highly educated girls who bring home rich husbands and accompanying goods59. Of the 43 %
of the population that does not send their children, the most important reason is that they are
going to send them in the future when the children are old enough, if there is still enough
money to do so. Parents dream of high-up administrative for their children, or even that they
will one day become governor60 or presidential assistant. On the other hand, general knowledge
of French and the juridical system are considered to be a good return on educational invest-
ments. More information, for example about land rights and ownership papers, about identity
card fees or taxation levels, makes them more secure against authorities and fraudulent civil
servants, the respondents say.
The most obvious reason for the former generation to keep the children at home, namely
that they are needed there to fetch water or herd the goats, is only mentioned by four current
fathers among all the 180 respondents. This is a real sign that schools are deemed very impor-
tant, at least for the boys. Several girls are considered (more by their mothers than their fathers)
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58 Most, if not all, of these papers have no formal legal status because the law prescribes special procedures and
signatures of specific officials. Even those papers that have been signed by the mayor or his representative do
not fulfil these prescriptions, despite the fact that the new owners have paid for them (15,000 Fcfa for exam-
ple). The papers are, however, useful at local level and reduce people’s dependency on witnesses.
59 “Then she can come by car and take me for a ride and even give me some extras from Maroua”, one of the
proud fathers said, or: “When she has a good job, she will not bother to have children too young and then she
can save a bit and look after her old father,” said another.
60 Highest administrative post at provincial level.
to be needed at home during the labour intensive rainy season and post rainy season harvest
period. However, these same mothers or grandmothers are willing to pay for lessons for them
in the dry season. At the adult education lessons and the literacy courses they meet several of
those grown up men and women that regret their former truancy or lack of possibilities and are
now trying to make up for the loss.
To give the current generation more options, the population in Dzambou Centre started a
primary school during the course of 2000. They paid one of their inhabitants, with some sec-
ondary education experience himself, to act as a teacher and they borrowed the small chapel
of the Catholic Church in which to give the lessons. To the satisfaction of the Dzambou Centre
inhabitants, the new mayor invested community money to ensure that the teacher received reg-
ular salary payments61. Subsequently, the male population started debating how to construct a
real school building. They invested time and money in discussions of the site, the levelling of
the ground, the manufacture of the bricks and the inviting of experts from neighbouring vil-
lages who had gone through the whole process before and who could help with advice. As far
as the other Dzambou neighbourhoods were concerned, the community investment was a sign
of an unequal distribution of resources. They are not really against it, but they underlined the
increased necessity of also investing in some other schools62.
The whole process of social action to obtain a school has taken many years. It shows that
the village has enough social fabric to carry out collective action, but it was (and is) a difficult
road, paved with many quarrels63.
6.3.3 Economic investments
Cash crop investments
The two most important cash crops as far as Kapsiki are concerned are groundnuts and beans.
Beans are a century-old crop that originates in Africa itself. People are therefore used to pro-
ducing it although, until recently, it was mainly used for consumption purposes. Groundnuts
were introduced by the colonial powers. This crop served to bring the Mountain plateau inhab-
itants into the cash economy. From the 1920s onwards more and more Kapsiki became dedi-
cated to the production of groundnuts as a cash crop. Thus, in 2002 - although every house-
hold still used beans in the vegetable sauce that goes with sorghum paste, and groundnuts in
other dishes64- the bulk of these two crops was produced for the market. 
Some villagers buy up small amounts from different farmers and bring the collected bags
to the regional market in Sir. Regional traders – one of them living in Oudava; locally well-
known as a rich man - drive here in trucks built to pass the rocky, difficult road from Mogodé.
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61 This is a strategy often applied in order to convince the State authorities of the necessity of and eagerness of
the population for a school. Sometimes it works and the school expenses are (officially) paid for by the State.
62 In the beginning of the school year 2003-2004, the Catholic primary school in Baba Deli (three years course)
indeed changed into a public school. However, this did not lead to an improvement: the lack of school equip-
ment is still as acute and the teacher’s salary, which was paid punctually each month by the Catholic Church
until June 2003 , has not even been paid once since (in January 2004). Equally, the Dzambou Centre teacher
was not paid his salary either now that school is no longer a community matter but also a State matter.
63 Comparing the final result with the deep-down autonomy of Kapsiki households as described by Van Beek
(1978; 1987), one can say that the social capital towards collective action has grown.
64 Groundnut paste is seen as indispensable for a good ‘ngari’, the sweet flour (and rice, if available) drink. It is
a nourishing drinkable meal consumed particularly as the first meal on Christmas morning or of the evening
during Ramadan and given to hungry travellers and visitors to market ‘cafés’ or people’s homes.
They buy a load of groundnuts to be sold in Douala. Some of the groundnuts are exported to
Nigeria and some to other areas of the world, although most of the crop is intended for the
Cameroonian market itself. Nevertheless, the price is influenced by that on the world-market
and this can differ tremendously. The risk, however, is taken by the bigger traders, not by the
villagers themselves. They have fewer investments, earn less but are more secure.
Beans can also be transported as far as Douala, albeit in smaller quantities (approximately
one-third of the groundnut quantity). The majority of beans are sold in Maroua. Because more
and more Islamic people use beans in their daily dishes, the internal market is also growing.
Women produce Bambara groundnuts. Mostly they do so mixed with other crops or in a
small corner that would otherwise not be used. They use them to feed the children between
meals and to sell. Most of the time husbands are not aware of the amounts produced.
Sometimes they may have helped out a bit and have at least some knowledge, but Bambara
groundnut production is really a woman’s domain.
Fruit production is a good option because the area along riverbeds and on more humid
slopes is suitable for the cultivation of fruit trees. Several families have so-called tree gardens
where their ancestors planted mango, guava, grapefruit and lemon trees. People who own com-
pound fields often plant trees, like papaya, around their houses. In spite of the fact that trans-
port to the bigger markets is difficult and the villagers depend on regional markets only for
sales, more then 20 % of young men65 explain that they would like to have more trees.
Everybody is expecting there to be better roads in the future. Then fruit could be sold in
Maroua or even further away. Until then only handfuls of grapefruits and guavas reach the Sir
market or the different village and neighbourhood markets and the income generated only
serves to buy salt or sugar for household consumption, or pens and notebooks for school-
children. The rest of the fruit enhances the vitamin uptake of the village children.
For several years the production of potatoes and soybeans has been on the increase.
However, production is still in a kind of experimental phase and transportation presents the
same problems as for all other products. Nevertheless, some farmers with suitable fields do
think these crops are good alternatives. Diversification means the risks are spread. Those who
produced soybeans over the last two or three years66 are happy with the price and with the eas-
iness of production. 
In the Fulbe settlement of Baba Deli one of the young men is trying to generate an addi-
tional income from potatoes and he is investing heavily in order to make transport to bigger
markets possible. Every year after the harvest, he clears the herbs and bushes of the small rural
road from his hamlet to the main road by hand using a machete! By doing so he opens the 10
km long track for a small truck that is then able to reach his stock67. Although it costs him a lot
of energy (and thus the need for more consumable calories) it does not interfere with labour
demand elsewhere.
As far as he and other villagers are concerned, it is worthwhile asking repeatedly for a gov-
ernmental investment in an all-weather road. However, nobody knows what else to do than to
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65 I did not encounter any woman with property rights to fruit trees.
66 Although the Agricultural Service data only gives production figures for 2002, in earlier years some people
did produce soybeans, but at too low a level to be officially recorded.
67 I was very grateful for his effort because it enabled me to reach the Fulbe quarter by car: very convenient when
one has to stay there for more than six weeks.
ask the village chief to ask the regional or sub-departmental chief, or perhaps the mayor. This is
the price that has to be paid for the poor connections between village and those at higher levels.’
Farm animals
Like in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa animals are used as a banking system. People start by
buying chicken, collect enough to buy a sheep or goat and later on purchase cattle if at all pos-
sible. This can partly be seen as an economic investment. The invested money can be returned
with interest when the animals procreate. However, the real animal husbandry for profit is only
carried out by a small number of village inhabitants. Although Kapsiki are known as the breed-
ers of a special breed of cattle (Bos taurus, Kapsiki race68) and they were used to cattle, it was
more often than not the case that they owned cattle purely to maintain their cultural system of
having a bull fattened in the house in order to be slaughtered on specific ‘holy’ occasions (see
Van Beek 1978). This was no animal husbandry aimed at amassing a herd in order to live on
the meat and milk or to sell the surplus to become rich. 
Today, of all respondents (n = 180), only 49 have cattle (26 in Baba Deli (30%) and 23 in the
rest of Dzambou (24 %) and the mean number of cattle per owner is 18 (22 for Baba Deli, range
1 – 175 and 14, range 2 – 50, for the rest of Dzambou). Several different activities connected to
farm animals are carried out as can be seen in Table 6.3.4. Most of the people that herd their
own cattle (or have their children do the job) keep their cattle in the vicinity of their compounds,
or at least in the settlement area of their compound. For example, Tndmou cattle owners take
their herd no further than the Tndmou bush area just south of the Baba Deli pasture.
Table 6.3.4 Cattle related activities of household heads (n = 180)
a 
= In two instances the children herd the cattle in turn with their father
b = This mean the structural buying and selling of cattle, not the incidental sale of cattle because of crisis
c = On eight occasions this ‘other’ is a brother and on one occasion a son
d = These people are also included in column 5 and 6
NBThe first three columns describe cattle owners that cultivate crops as their main income-generating activity.
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68 For an overview of categorisation and history of introduction of the Kapsiki sub-type of the Savanna shorthorn
Bos taurus, see Rege et al (1994).
Own In herd Use Herding own cattle Herding patron's cattle Trade in cattleb
child other paid
herdera pers. herders With With With With Herd With With
crops crops as crops crops as own crops crops as
as major addi- as major addi- cattle as major as
income tional income. tional as income addi-
income income welld tional
income
Cattle owners 4 11c 9 12 7 1 6 5 3 0
(n= 49)
Non-cattle n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4 0 n.a 1 0
owners
There are several livestock traders in the village, but only a few of them buy and sell substan-
tial numbers. Some of them combine their animal trade with being a butcher at local markets,
buying animals to be slaughtered soon afterwards.
To counter the insecurity of theft in the extended bush areas, people herd their cattle on the
fallow surface between the fields. Now small flocks are guarded more than in the past and
always in the vicinity of the houses. Zero grazing even takes place from time to time, espe-
cially during the rainy season and directly thereafter, when the risk of crop damage is sub-
stantial. Good products that can be used as fodder are the leaves and stems of beans and
groundnuts.
At least five respondents had invested time and effort in the herding of someone’s cattle
when they were younger. However, only some of them had actually earned enough (or did not
lose their calves again) to pay for wives or to build up a (small) herd.
Non-agricultural options
Off-farm activities
Some of the Dzambou men try to earn an additional income from small-scale trade. Products
like sugar, salt, matches, soap and batteries are always in demand in the villages. They buy
their merchandise in Mogodé, then travel from one local market to the other with just a box at
the back of a bicycle and sell at slightly higher prices than they paid themselves. Profit is low
per transaction, but especially in the dry season it is almost the only way to earn something. 
There are some individuals who can increase their income by being a butcher (buying a goat
or sheep and slaughtering it at a local market), a tailor (also possible for women), or such inci-
dental professions as photographer or assistant to an official. The latter profession is an hon-
ourable but, with regard to income, highly insecure activity that may take up a lot of time. For
example, the forest guardian, who is assistant to the head of the sub-departmental “Forest and
Environment” bureau, has never been paid.
During my field visit I did not encounter people who engaged in migration labour. Some sons
leave temporarily during their adolescence, but they return when it is time to marry. From then
on they stay in the village. Some go as far away as Douala to seek their fortune while others
choose Lagdo where they, for example, work as fish carriers at the lake’s shores. Most of them
go to Garoua to see something of the world. There they work as street vendors, become
guardians for richer Cameroonians and some of them even end up as robbers. The money they
earn comes in handy to pay for a bride price or household utensils. One returned adventurer
had bought a generator and a television and now he is able to watch programmes if all goes
well and he continues to have enough money to buy petrol69.
There are (young) men who structurally do off-farm labour for others, but within the vil-
lage or at best in Sir or Mogodé. 5.5 % of the inhabitants earn an additional income from herd-
ing the cattle of rich villagers or owners from, for example, Mogodé. Some of those herders
look after their own cattle at the same time. Boys can start looking after cattle at a very young
age as a way of learning the job. However, most owners with more cattle, and specifically
when such an owner lives further away, want a more trustworthy and responsible herder.
Looking after a herd day and night, taking the animals into isolated places to look for grazing
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69 He complains, though, about the lack of possibilities in the village to gain money. “I could build up for the
future when I was in Garoua, now I become poorer every year”, he says.
and avoiding crop damage, protecting them from theft, diseases, and thirst is a heavy task. But
it is well paid: every five months the herder earns a grown calf. All the herder’s expenses while
performing the work, including meals, have to be paid by the herd owner, while he also pays
for medicines, salt licks and other things the cattle need.
An unusual way of earning money is by performing for tourists. The Mogodé area, with its
typical rock formations and inselbergs, attracts several hundreds of tourists per year. They are
interested in the Kapsiki traditions, like the ‘crab reading’ that is used to prophecy or find
remedies in the case of illnesses. In addition, Kapsiki are famous for their dances. So several
young men can and do form a group and hire themselves out to dance for tourists70.
On-farm activities
When overall production is sufficient, women have enough millet and bean yield to use for bil-
bil production and the preparation of fritters. Thanks to there being a market in each neigh-
bourhood every week and thanks to the possibility to visit markets in neighbourhoods close by,
women still have the possibility to earn some money. Sometimes this is enough to pay the
school fees of (some of) their children. Lutheran or Islamic women prepare fermented millet
drinks, without alcohol, to sell at markets to people of the same faith. 
The grasses that grow abundantly on the fallow fields between the compounds are used to
make mats, roofs and especially granaries. Those who still know the ancient art can earn a sub-
stantial income from other villagers. Although people try to save for brick houses with tin roofs
because that means an increased status and less frequent repairs, such houses are too expen-
sive for most inhabitants. Granaries are still all made according to traditional methods. 
6.3.4 Social investments
Investments in family and friends
Even between brothers and sisters of different beliefs, the exchange of gifts is normal and in
times of crises they help each other. For example, my Lutheran host in Dzambou Centre looked
after the small stock of his Islamic sister, who is married and lives in Baba Deli Fulbe hamlet.
When she needed some cash he sold one of his own goats, instead of one of hers. At the same
time, the dung of these goats could be used to fertilise his fields. Although this can be regard-
ed as normal behaviour, in a way these are also investment activities, because the good rela-
tionship with his sister, and thus with her husband and his group, serve as a safety valve in
times of hardship.
The fact that religion also does not cause deep divides between non-relatives is shown by
this same man’s social network. He invests a lot of time and effort in maintaining or even
enlarging this network. His best friends are two Muslims, one a (second) brother-in-law. They
were invited to attend the Christmas celebrations and the man himself was invited in return for
the festivities marking the end of Ramadan. He discusses with them how to resolve problems
concerning his own parents-in-law. In addition, he sends his son to the Catholic mission school
in Sir and (without payment) works for the Catholic priests  when they want information to be
distributed around the village. At the same time he is active in his own church. He helped put
up a church building and organises services and a field which is worked collectively by church
members in the more isolated Tndmou area. It does not seem to be a conscious investments
strategy to maintain relationships with members of different religions. Based on the general
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tolerance of Kapsiki regarding religious beliefs, he simply chooses a wide range of different
people to diversify his network.
At the same time, he is an example of the young men who heavily invest in being a good
Protestant. He attended all the services, read the bible, prayed at home and became a catechist.
When he married his first wife, who was also a Lutheran, he hoped to be able to build a dif-
ferent, more prosperous life with her. When she left him, as is one of the customs of Kapsiki,
he was enormously disappointed and it took many years for him to get over this. 
A good strategy for both mothers of grown up sons and for the sons themselves is for the
mother to live in her son’s compound. She can then help with different tasks and thereby
reduce the tension that can arise between spouses. The mother herself gains a more secure
place to live than between the co-wives in her husbands’ compound. Living apart from a hus-
band but in a son’s compound is not regarded as divorce, so the mother can continue to use her
husband’s fields. In many instances, the (first) son will live near his father’s house to make this
arrangement possible. The only investment required is to visit the husband’s/father’s com-
pound now and again to help with minor tasks and to deliver little gifts. By residing in her
son’s compound the mother is also investing in her future security. She helps the household
with cooking (for example for visitors), cleaning and the production of crops, she looks after
‘lonely’ children, she acts as a counsellor to her son when he does not want to ask his wives
for advice. With her active presence she acquires a place to live in her old age, either with the
same son or with one of the grandchildren.
In Table 6.3.5 social cohesion is measured with the help of percentages of people who loan
out ploughs and draught animals. It has to be said that, on the whole, not many households in
Dzambou own ploughs. That means that the percentages of people who can loan out ploughs
are not very high either. 
Table 6.3.5 Percentages of people who owned or borrowed and loaned out ploughs and draught animals.
The ownership of ploughs and draught animals in the rest of Dzambou in particular, is very
low (7 % is three people). As a result, no conclusions can be drawn from the fact that 100 %
of owners loan out. This same high percentage colours the Dzambou total numbers. The only
conclusion that can be drawn is that there is no difference between Baba Deli and Tndmou.
Political investments
According to tradition, the first clearer and settler in a certain area becomes the chief and his
offspring inherit the position. Such a position is an honourable one that brings with it some
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Percentages of n Percentages of owners
n Own plough Borrowed Own Borrowed Loan out Loan out 
plough draught draught plough draught 
animal animal animal
Baba Deli 86 26 6 29 3 23 12
Dzambou Tndmou 50 26 6 28 6 23 11
Dzambou rest 44 7 7 7 7 100 100
Dzambou total 180 20 5 21 5 49 41
privileges (such as free beer at household gatherings), but mostly it is also a burden. It asks
time and effort to settle disputes between the other settlers and, in modern times, it makes you
the unpaid authority representative. You have to collect taxes, distribute information and voice
villagers’ wishes. When higher authorities do not respond to these, it is the chief who has to
deal with the angry reactions within the village and who gets the blame.
Happily enough there are still men who have the ambition to be village chief. Some even
try to buy the position these days71, because of the status that goes with it. This is possible
because nowadays a village chief has to be approved by the district and sub-departmental
authorities. If the authorities appoint a chief who is not a member of the royal line72, his legit-
imacy within the village is questioned. However, in cases in which the higher authorities are
involved, the village adapts itself opportunistically. Then a village chief with good connections
at higher levels is handy. Villagers try to use such networks to make higher authorities aware
of village needs. In short, village inhabitants do not invest in the choice of their local chief.
None of the Dzambou inhabitants deliberately tried to influence the appointment of the chief
with the aim of becoming better represented at the higher level and of thereby ensuring better
governance of village affairs. Dzambou people talk a lot about the appointment of chiefs once
it has happened, but in the end they take things as they come and make the best of it. 
The same situation exists at national level. Within the democratic system of Cameroon, cit-
izens can (theoretically) be politically active and support a certain party that they think will look
after their needs more effectively. However, in Dzambou I did not encounter more than two men
who were (slightly) engaged in this process. In the whole Sir region the most active person with
regard to general politics lived in Oudava73. But because he is on his own he is very vulnerable.
The villagers do not seem to be aware that they can gain more clout vis-à-vis the State author-
ities if they give more secure support to people like him. The loss of a deputyship during the
last elections made people decide to vote for the RDPC at the next elections. They are not going
to invest in a more secure democratic process. This is partly due to the illiteracy of the region:
many voters do not know what they are doing. They put a voting card of a certain colour in the
box arbitrarily (or following the advice of a neighbour or son), without even knowing for which
party that colour stands, let alone what the party’s manifesto contains74.
Conflict mediation
As is depicted in section 2.4, conflict mediation is changed in a ‘might is right’ situation. This
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70 The current village chief of Oudava earned a lot of money in this way when he was young. He used it to amass
a cattle herd and finally even managed to buy the position of chief.
71 The new Oudava village, a neighbouring village of Dzambou and Sir, acquired this independent position thanks
to the current chief who bought his chieftaincy in Mogodé. Both the Sir and the Dzambou chiefs very much
regret this development:  “brothers should stay in the same village”, they say, but what they mean is that the
one lost a substantial part of his territory and the other had hoped to incorporate that same territory into his own.
72 For information about the different lineages, and the royal (Mazeu) lineage in particular, see Van Beek (1978).  
73 Being the representative of the municipality, he used to be a member of the RDPC, but when he noticed the
fraudulent behaviour of the administration and other RDPC members with certain power positions, he changed
to the UNDP and that decision caused him a lot of hardship.
74 During the 1997 parliamentary and municipality elections, at least a third of the men that went down to the vot-
ing stations did not know that they had to vote for two different things. Several of them, while being very
unhappy with the incumbent mayor, nevertheless voted for him because they did not realise that the second box
was meant to put in the votes for a new mayor, and that the chosen colour represented the incumbent mayor. 
means that a general investment in the conflict resolution realm should aim at the improvement
of the hierarchical position within the village. Then, internal conflicts will be judged by co-vil-
lagers in favour of the person of higher order. In the case of conflicts outside the village
(whether with the authorities or with inhabitants of other villages) the lower placed co-vil-
lagers will make a bigger effort to support the higher-placed person, in an effort to gain a bet-
ter position themselves. When the better position cannot be reached by way of wealth ranking
or relationship with chiefs, other methods have to be used. One of these can be creating a name
in wisdom, claiming longer term ancestry of one’s family and royalty thereof, or by demon-
strating a good relationship with the higher authorities. The latter seems to resemble circle rea-
soning, but it is feasible, as is shown by two inhabitants who regularly visit Mogodé to help
out at the lamido’s or sub-prefect’s house or court/bureau75.
In addition to the general position within the village, the overall importance of one’s social
network is a major factor. On the one hand this influences the hierarchical position as such
(many important friends make you important too). On the other hand, if the ties between the
members of one social group are strong enough, it also makes a lower placed person stronger
by way of numbers. For example, if witnesses are required, really good friends are indispen-
sable. Even if they do not serve as witnesses, their insistence in a difficult matter makes judges
side with them more quickly76.
In a more ad hoc sense, people nowadays tend to invest more effort and money in conflict
resolution by involving the police more quickly. They do not trust village conflict resolution
systems and resort directly to the higher authorities, despite them knowing that this will cost
them a lot of money. They say that they prefer to pay more if it gives them more security as
regards punishment of the offender. More often than not this is related to general feelings of
(in)justice. There are inhabitants that are involved in year-long court sessions because they do
not want their adversary to go free. Whether or not this can be seen as a long-term investment
in the sense of “you can’t escape him, so do not do anything bad to him” remains to be inves-
tigated; especially when the amount of money lost is very high77.
Investment in the solution of conflicts with the State is more difficult. Of course this is
directly related to the political security of the whole village and the village inhabitants sepa-
rately. But here again, the social network within the village or region plays an important role
(see the end of this section and note 74).
The need to have more security against arbitrary actions from State officials related to accu-
sations of criminal offences makes people again seek a better social position within the village.
Next to that, they try not to upset the authorities in general, although their autonomous char-
acter defends them from being too docile. Another important domain of conflicts between cit-
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75 That this is a risky undertaking is shown by the son of one of the respondents, who visited the lamido so often
that he got annoyed and forebode him to come to his court ever again.
76 A good example is the case of the field sold between Dzambou and Oudava (January 2003) in which the buyer
(a sub-neighbourhood chief) was objectively in the right. However, the seller was able to claim more money,
even two years after the deal, because he had more family and friends around him during the hearings at the
market and they kept on coming back several days in a row to insist again and again on a re-judgement.
77 Some people simply referred to honesty and justice and sometimes, but not always, referred to Christian
norms. For them it seems to be an issue related to morals and not economics or investments. Of course defend-
ing moral codes has a community function (with a very long-term effect) and this could be the motivation of
certain individuals, especially when they speak of “I do not want to live in a village with so many liars.” 
izens and the State is the tenure of land. These days adult education teachers tell the inhabi-
tants of the importance of land tenure titles and this means more and more people are starting
to register their territories. However, because legitimate registration is very difficult, within the
context of village reality people organise written proofs of traditional ownership rights and
their sale. Unfortunately, such registration between farmers does not have a legitimate status
for the State.
In the case of a conflict between the State and farmers over land that the State wants to cat-
egorise as forest, former owners (according to local traditional customs) do not have many
rights if their property is not officially registered. Consequently, the people involved look for
other options to safeguard their interests. One of these is Act 94/01 of 1994 on the regime of
forests, wildlife and fishery78. In Articles 26 and 27 it states that, when a certain forest is clas-
sified as protected, the autochthonous population can go on with its ‘normal use’. If such rights
become limited (or denied outright) the population should be given compensation (according
to rules laid down in an up-to-date decree). The classification can only take place when all the
people that have made investments in the land concerned are compensated79. 
When, in the current case, some of the villagers heard of this right, they started to inform oth-
ers to make sure that enough people register as owners. They thought this investment would
increase the possibility of payment. Indeed, several users of pasture fields willingly subscribed
to the list of ‘field owners’ that the sub-prefect made during the first information meeting with
the villagers. They thought it a good, or at least feasible, way of resolving the problem. The def-
inition of ownership of the sub-prefect, however, did not correspond with that of the Kapsiki of
Dzambou. For him, and according to the 1994 Act, only those users that improved their fields
would be eligible for compensation. Nevertheless, up until now, although the border poles have
already been placed, these registered persons did not receive anything in cash or kind. 
On the contrary, those Dzambou farmers who indeed registered now regret their investment
in the ownership list. Meanwhile they have become afraid that the list of names will be used
against them. The sub-prefect has already accused one of the persons, who expressed to be
against the installation of the pasture reserve, of insurgency80. 
Cultural investments
In Kapsiki culture seasonal highlights are celebrated throughout the year together with other
Kapsiki. This has a bonding (within the village) and a binding (between the villages) function.
An example of such an occasion is the “Lah festivities” that celebrate the harvest and the new
marriages of the last year. In a festival cycle, the different Kapsiki villages of the Mogodé dis-
trict take turns to slaughter animals, brew beer and make music and dance while eating and
drinking together for a number of days. Most Kapsiki do not visit (all) neighbouring villages
during their festival days to join in the celebrations, but some of them do and some of the peo-
ple from Dzambou at least go to Mogodé when it is that village’s turn. Apart from going from
compound to compound to drink the millet beer and to eat the special groundnut-with-ashes
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78 For an extensive discussion of the 1994 Forestry Law see Nguiffo (1994).
79 See also Chapter 4.
80 This was the representative of Sir Municipality, living in Oudava. It was only at the departmental court in
Mokolo that a judge dared to declare this accusation false and only after the hearing of many witnesses/co-vil-
lagers (again a sign of the importance of social bonds in the village) and when the sub-prefect himself did not
appear at the court session.
paste, the festival days are used to confirm marriages. During the year, when all harvest activ-
ities have been completed (the end of January until March), marriages are consummated by the
bride residing at her new husband’s home for a period of one month. After that, she returns to
her father’s house to await the Lah festival and to gather utensils and belongings for her new
home. On the first day of the village festival, relatives and friends (especially women) arrive
at her father’s home to give her presents and to accompany her subsequently to her new house.
The long procession of singing women lead their ‘victim’ first to a trustworthy neighbour of
the groom who has to take over the father’s role from the bride’s father. This connects the
bride’s neighbourhood to that of her new husband and makes sure she is protected now her
own father is so far away. It also gives the groom the advantage of a more secure marriage and
protects him against hasty divorces.
Kapsiki acknowledge the greater psychological distance between members of different vil-
lages and those within villages. To strengthen bonds between the villages in the event of cross-
border marriages, special attention is paid during the festival dances by the newly wed men to
their ‘outsider’ wives81.
Even Muslim and Christian villagers visit the dances (although perhaps only as spectators),
to demonstrate their connectedness with their village and the Kapsiki as a whole. This also
reflects the fact that, although the different religious groups invest in their churches, these same
religions do not (so far) pose a threat to the cohesion of the village. Between Christians and
Muslims a kind of feeling of togetherness exists because of the idea that they adhere to a mod-
ern religion. On the other hand, Catholics and traditional believers are happy to drink beer
together. This binds Lutherans and Muslims, because they can look down on those ‘alcoholics’. 
In general, Kapsiki like an interesting chat and a good laugh. The habit of telling jokes with
double meanings, using (and inventing) verbs with double meanings and singing “scabrous
youth songs” (Van Beek, 2004, pers. comm.) diminishes internal conflicts and binds them
together. Also the bragging and laughing about violence (for example, about the taking – not
‘stealing’ – of somebody’s property, or about a ‘strong wife’ standing up to her husband and,
of course, about the attacks by ancestors on neighbouring villages or the Fulbe82) are binding
elements. In day-to-day reality, however, violence is not intended to escalate. At village level,
plenty of very nasty stories of the past are told on this subject which serve as sufficient warn-
ing. In addition, at household level, spouses are not meant to beat each other up.
The general livelihood situation as well as the insecurities that exist in the village, together
with people’s investments as described in section 3 are summarised in Table 6.3.6.
In short, the bulk of insecurities does not concern the natural domain of the village, but rather
the other three domains. The environment has a moderately safe status and population pres-
sure is not very high. However, as regards the worst off third of the population, they suffer
from a lack of land availability and a resulting shortage of food production. In addition, specif-
ically investments in the natural domain are difficult, thus, future environmental insecurities
may be feared.
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81 See also Van Beek (1989: 631), about villages “celebrating its new members”.
82 Based on personal observations and on the personal comments of Van Beek (2004).
Table 6.3.6 Summary of current level of insecurities and investments in the domains of the ‘insecurity com
plex’, based on ‘capitals’83 of the village as a whole (- = bad; o = moderate, + = good; in the 
investment column: - = no investment; o = a bit investment; + = a lot of investments)
6.4 Intrusion of other niche: Box 2
In combination with, or apart from, all the investment options described, some farmers choose
to enter the designated pasture area (see Figure 6.2, Box 2). For decades it has been used sole-
ly as grazing land, combined with some extraction of construction wood and minor ‘wild’
products. Only a small group of Islamic ‘cattle keepers’ (called such by the rest of the village)
founded a tiny settlement just inside the boundaries, almost at the start of the period of pas-
toral use. Initially they started they built only simple compounds, but in the course of time they
cleared fields around their houses and built a water well to provide for their drinking water
needs. Nowadays this settlement is called the “Fulbe neighbourhood”. 
Thus, the original grazing land was more or less divided into two parts: the empty bush and
the “Fulbe settlement”84. When, ten years ago, the first cultivators passed the boundaries of the
so-called ‘empty pasture’, as agreed upon a generation before, and started to cut down trees to
prepare fields for agriculture, hardly anyone was bothered. However, other people quickly fol-
lowed the example of these pioneers and soon a whole segment of the pasture area had become
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83 See Chapter 2.
84 The name ‘Fulbe settlement’ is derived from the fact that it used to be inhabited by Fulbe, alongside Kapsiki
converts, and because the Kapsiki tend to denominate all Islamic persons “Fulbe”, being the name of the eth-
nic group that originally brought the Islam to these regions of North Cameroon (see Van Santen 1993, Schilder
1994, and Chapter 4 of this thesis). This adoption of the Fulbe name gives Islamisation an additional ethnic
quality.
Average Situation Security Invest- Investments details
level of of worst (= ex- ments
village off third pected level 
of pop in future)
Physical basis o o o n.a. n.a.
Population density + + - - No real family planning
Land availability + - - o+ Various qualitative methods by small 
number of persons; invasion of pasture
Commod. of land - - o o Rising: more safeguarding by owners
Food pro-duction versus needs + - o + Crop diversification; ploughs; etc.
Health o o o o Rising
Education - - o o Rising
Cash crops o - o o Everybody, but low scale; no sales deve
lopment
Livestock o -- o o Everybody tries, not really successful
Non-agricul-tural possibilities - - - o Low scale; low technology
Socio-cultural o o o o Loss of old systems, but some increase 
of new ones
Political - - - - Almost not
Land allocation - -- - - 'o' when regarding pasture lands, but 
quick retreat
Conflict resolution - -- - - Ad hoc muddling through
cultivated land. After a number of years, a second wave of farmers had arrived and then a
third85 and each time the boundary of the pasture was redefined (see Figure 6.5). To an ever
increasing degree, the pasture area was at risk of being totally invaded. 
Of the twenty-three users in 2001, eight started using the pasture fields one or two years ago
while five others did so three or four years ago. Another seven respondents mentioned that they
have used their pasture fields “a couple of years now”. That means that at least thirteen people
started to use the pasture fields after the announcement by the authorities that a reserve was to
be created and there may have been more. Only three of the 2001 users certainly started earlier. 
The reasons and motivations of farmers for choosing this invasion option will be analysed
in the following sections. Additional reasons will also be sought to explain the difference
between farmers that left the area and those that continued. After the authorities had declared
that the area was to become official forest pasture land, some people relocated their agricul-
tural activities to ‘outside’ fields. Others, however, continued inside the delineated boundaries.
Confronted with these cultivators and the fact that most of them had already prepared their
field and even sowed it, the sub-prefect gave extended permission for the land to be used for
one more production season. 
6.4.1 Reasons for intrusion in the environmental domain
The surface of Dzambou seems to be vast and there does not seem to be a general scarcity of
land. There is not even any evidence of an overall decline in production. There are, however,
individuals and families who are experiencing increased pressure on their fields. It is the quali-
ty or quantity of fields outside the pasture area that may influence farmers’ options. Some culti-
vators do not have much land available, or their land is infertile. To them the scarcity is obvious.
Those whose ancestors cleared fields in the pasture area may want to use those fields. Others in
the same position, but without traditional ownership of territory in the pasture area, may want to
hire or borrow from owners because of the vast quantity or good quality of the pasture fields and
because the owners are interested in loaning or renting out for a variety of reasons.
In order to determine the influence of position, quantity and quality of fields on the use of
pasture fields, Table 6.4.1 shows the field position of fields owned, divided among owners and
non-owners of pasture areas, and users and non-users thereof. In other words, those who cul-
tivate or not within the pasture boundaries as they were delineated by the authorities’ 2002
boundary markings. In this table, ownership of fields is defined according to Kapsiki tradition,
that is on the basis of whether the fields had been cleared in the past by the actor or one of his
ancestors and whether they were still family (or personal) property (not sold or given away).
The position of fields can be three-fold (or a combination thereof): 1) fields can lie within the
pasture boundaries that are delimited by the authorities in 2002 (excluding the Fulbe neigh-
bourhood from the pasture); 2) they can lie within the traditional boundaries, but outside the
delimited area (that means in the Fulbe neighbourhood) or 3) totally outside the pasture zone. 
From table 6.4.1 it can be concluded that there are no households that depend totally on the
pasture for their fields. Yet, there are four households that depend on the fields in the Fulbe
settlement area. They run the risk of losing their fields should the authorities change the
implemented delineation and resort to former boundaries in order to avoid havoc (see below).
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85 Most of those invading farmers came from Dzambou, but some of them originate in Viti in the North-West.
Table 6.4.1 Number of users and non-users of pasture fields and the position of owned fields (shared or private).
a = a ‘user of a pasture field’ is somebody who cultivated a field situated within the official 2002 boundary, at
least until the moment of delineation.
There were some inhabitants of the Fulbe settlement (four households) that used fields within
the pasture boundaries, although they are very much in favour of the pasture and think the
clearing of trees within the area a real waste. This strategy may be based on the feeling that
leads to the tragedy of open access: when nobody regulates the pasture, not using it is a per-
sonal loss, because at the same time, others acquire a (short-term) gain. The long-term loss is
going to occur anyhow. The moment that the sub-prefect forbade the agriculture within the
pasture zone (April 2002), they stopped cultivating there. These people were very happy with
the intervention of the authorities.
There is only one owner-user who lives outside the Fulbe settlement and who stopped
straightaway, but he declares that he did not know the authorities would grant another year of
use, otherwise he would have continued. Thus, in total 12 owner-users continued cultivating
during 2002 and they all want to continue afterwards86.
Intrusion of pasture fields is not motivated by absolute necessity based on field position.
Table 6.4.2 shows necessity based on the fertility of other fields.
Table 6.4.2 Number of users, non-users and owners of pasture fields with a certain soil fertility of fields 
outside the pasture (n = 180, but respondents can give different types of fertility for differ
ent fields, so the total number is more than 180.)
This table shows that pasture field users have bad or good fields to cultivate outside the pas-
ture equally often. Moreover, as far as owners are concerned, the division of fields is spread
Users of pasture fieldsa Non-users of pasture fields
Owning Not owning Owning Not owning
pasture fields pasture fields pasture fields pasture fields
In pasture only 0 n.a. 0 n.a.
In past + outside 13 n.a. 16 n.a.
In past + Fulbe corner 0 n.a. 0 n.a.
In past + Fulbe corner + outside 3 n.a. 2 n.a.
In Fulbe corner only n.a. 0 n.a. 4
In Fulbe corner + outside n.a. 1 n.a. 7
Outside only n.a. 6 n.a. 130
good Good + moderate Moderate + bad Good + Good +
moderate bad bad bad +
moderate
Users 7 2 3 3 7 1 0
Non-users 64 18 44 2 29 20 1
owners 9 1 10 3 10 0 1
86 Of the six user-non-owners only two continued cultivating in the pasture after the delineation.
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over good, bad and moderate. It seems as if the state of fields outside the pasture has not influ-
enced the choice to use pasture fields or leave them alone87. Those users with good fields else-
where either had quite a number of family fields and/or private lands acquired by purchasing
or clearing. The worst position related to surface area was occupied by two household heads
from the same extended family who have to share 3 ha with four male (extended) family mem-
bers (household size five and four persons, meaning access to 0.2 ha and 0.15 ha per person)88. 
The last reason in the natural domain that can play a role in starting cultivation in the pasture
area is related to distance. Although, in general, only those farmers that live within reasonable dis-
tance to the pasture use the fields therein89, this does not offer any explanation as to why they start
using those fields now. Moreover, the farmers the closest to the pasture, those of the Fulbe settle-
ment of Baba Deli, all refrain (now) from using pasture fields, except for those fields that surround
their compounds and lie within the traditional boundaries only. They explain that specifically “the
inhabitants of ‘Dzambou’and not those of Baba Deli started cultivating in the pasture”90. For them
this is all the more amazing, because they think Dzambou is so much further away.
That this idea of “only those farmers from Dzambou invade the pasture” is based on false
perceptions is shown by the data: of all the 22 users, 9 live in Baba Deli neighbourhood. Again
this shows the general social distance felt between Baba Deli inhabitants and the rest of
Dzambou. It has to be added, though, that eight of those nine farmers stopped cultivating after
the delineation and only two of them are against the official delineation of the pasture. This is
the reverse of the figures of Dzambou Centre and Tndmou users91.
6.4.2 Reasons for intrusion in the human domain
The persons that start(ed) using their fields in the reserve and mention that they are against the
installation of the pasture are slightly different from the rest of the Dzambou inhabitants with
regard to their health or their investments in health. They see to the vaccination of their chil-
dren, in the event of illnesses they visit the health post more quickly even if they have no
money92 and all their wives visit the antenatal consultations at the hospital. Of course they are
mostly young and healthy men (mean 35 year, with a range from 27 to 43), but that is because
the pasture is far from the compounds and the trees to be cut to clear a field are high. Old or
ill people are not able to perform one of these tasks, whether they want to or not.
In the field of education, pasture ‘invaders’ who do not want to quit are more educated than
the village mean: 70 % have had some primary school education and 80 % send their children
to school.
Thus, they are younger men with higher capacities (own education and information), more
motivation to achieve a better position in life (see for example the number that send their chil-
252
87 Of course, those individuals without good fields went into the pasture because of the lack of fertile fields else-
where, but this cannot be used as a general, and therefore clarifying, tendency. 
88 These are members of a relatively well-educated family with their compounds in the north of Tndmou, adjacent
to the pasture. Anger about the restrictions on using the pasture fields is high within this extended family.
89 Namely either in Baba Deli or in Dzambou Tndmou (except for only two users): see Figure 6.3.
90 As has been explained before, inhabitants of Baba Deli, although officially part of the whole Dzambou village,
consider themselves as a separate entity, more related to Oudava (see Fig. 6.3).
91 Eight out of thirteen users are against the pasture. On two occasions the respondent’s opinion was unknown.
92 They explain that they count on credit possibilities, “The nurse won’t send you away if she sees that you are
really suffering. You can always pay afterwards.”
dren to school) and less timid with regard to the authorities. Contrary to former generations,
they know that Cameroonian citizens have rights and they referred repeatedly to these during
the interviews and talks.
6.4.3 Reasons for intrusion in the economic domain
The human capital profile outlined leads to a different way of looking at economic possibili-
ties. These young men have learned about the possibility of commoditisation of land, they
‘see’ (and discuss between them and with the interviewer) the future value of land (if they are
not yet already perceiving a high economic value) and do not want to lose such land just like
that. They are more oriented towards modern life and know about the existence of television93
and higher production systems. They are not geared towards traditional productions or pro-
duction systems, but want to have enough fields to use modern systems or even to escape vil-
lage life altogether.
Some of them, who acknowledge that they are not able themselves to cultivate their entire
surface area, want to have income from rent, especially from the fertile pasture lands. When
they do aim to acquire more farm animals, they do not foresee any shortage in grazing possi-
bilities saying, “there is so much fallow land between the fields now”94. For them the installa-
tion of a pasture reserve is not necessary. On the contrary, it would mean that the needs of (sev-
eral) Dzambou farmers are denied.
6.4.4 Reasons for intrusion in the social domain
Although, as stated in the Chapter 4, Cameroon is a hotchpotch of different ethnicities, in this
case the whole village consists of only Kapsiki inhabitants (except for two Fulbe families in
the ‘Fulbe settlement’). Although villagers in general and Fulbe settlement inhabitants in par-
ticular, use the name “Fulbe” for Muslims, they still make a difference between the “real”
Fulbe and “We Kapsiki”. Many jokes are made by the Fulbe about the length of Kapsiki noses,
to which Kapsiki reply with jokes about the relatively recent arrival of those “whites”95.
Consequently, one can conclude that, at least in this case of discord, ethnicity plays no role.
The situation may be different when religion is involved. All types of religion are repre-
sented within Dzambou. As has been mentioned earlier, most of the villagers adhere to the
traditional Kapsiki religion96, but several of them are Christians that belong to the Catholic,
Adventist or Lutheran churches and some are Muslims. Different religions can even be
found within one family, sometimes even in one household and tolerance with respect to
religion is high. Because it turned out that mainly inhabitants of the Islamic Fulbe settlement
helped the authorities with the placing of border poles around the pasture reserve, the ques-
tion rises as to whether it is religion as such that makes people choose the side of cattle keep-
ers (as if in memory of the original occupation of those that brought Islam, and their cattle,
to the country). 
Users and owners of pasture fields do not, however, specifically belong to one of the three
93 At least seven of them asked me about, or explained, the possibilities for obtaining and watching a television
in the village or in their own compound.
94 Personal interviews and group discussions with village inhabitants, October 2002 – January 2003.
95 In general, the Fulbe have a lighter skin than the non-Fulbe and an ‘Arabic’ nose, while the Kapsiki have
broader, short noses. However, inter-marriages have evened out a lot of these external differences.
96 For an explanation of that religion see Van Beek (1978 and 1987).
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religions or their churches97. Neither are they specifically restricted to one of the Dzambou
neighbourhoods. In some neighbourhoods more pasture field users can be found (like in the
northern half of Tndmou), but this is due more to the fact that family members used to build
their compounds in the vicinity of fathers’ house. As a result, some sub-neighbourhoods con-
sist of extended families that together (again like in the northern Tndmou case) own a specif-
ic part of the area. Their forefathers normally cleared fields that were situated adjacent to each
other in the same region.
Of course, these extended families that experience the same problems are strong alliances
designed to withstand other users or even the authorities. Even when a nephew or uncle is able
to survive without a pasture field, the lack of fertile lands available to his family members and
the perceived injustices perpetrated against his relatives makes him angry enough to be a
potential ally in future fights.
In the political domain it seems as if the thirteen (and perhaps seven others98) that started
using the pasture fields after the announcement of the reserve installation, chose to use their
pasture fields as a deliberate strategy to counter the State’s plans. Perhaps they counted on the
State law that obliges the buying out of traditional users in the case of forest reserve categori-
sation. Whether or not this is true cannot be concluded, because none of the respondents gave
a positive answer to this type of question. It can be assumed that at least some of these users
did not know of the existence of such a law beforehand and that, if they did know, could not
have known of the difference the State authorities make between actual users and owners
according to traditional custom (see below).
6.5 Assertion of rights to fields: Box 3
The conflict situation, as depicted in Box 3 (see Fig 6.2), only arises when two (or more) par-
ties are opposing each other. Both continue to stress their access, use or even ownership rights
to the same piece of land. At the same time it is clear that mutual use is not possible. Because
conflict asks for two parties that ascertain their rights, here I will first depict the claims of the
cultivators.
It is not only farmers that own, use or want to use fields in the pasture area, who claim rights
there. Also other inhabitants of Dzambou, and even outside Dzambou, do have an opinion
about the legitimacy of the installation of the pasture reserve.
6.5.1 About the borders
Everyone agrees about the limits of Ardo’s zone: originally it was far bigger than at the
moment (see Figure 6.5). Yet, after 20 years of strict pasture use, the reserve started to dimin-
ish due to invading cultivators from all directions - sometimes up to the centre of the area - and
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97 Four of the users are Islamic, seven adhere to a traditional religion and nine are Christian. The numbers among
the  owners are: 5 Islam, 17 traditional and 11 Christian.
98 Most probably some of these seven did not want to oppose the State with their pasture cultivation (even if they
did start after the announcement), because they belong to the group very much in favour of the pasture. They
stopped their cultivation activities in the pasture zone directly after the instalment of the boundaries.
due to the settlement of ‘Islamic cattle keepers’ on the east side. First, these cattle owners only
built their houses there, so it did not really disturb the pasture. But later on they started to cul-
Figure 6.5 Boundaries of Baba Deli pasture reserve over time
tivate around these houses and, as a result, the pasture area lost a considerable part of its sur-
face area. As soon as the authorities decided to establish the pasture area officially to counter
agricultural invasions, discords arose between the villagers over which boundaries should be
used and where. Some of the cultivators that do not live in the “Fulbe settlement” of Baba Deli
stick to the original boundaries from the Elhadji Ardo time. “Why should the Fulbe be
favoured?  When we are not allowed to cultivate in the pasture reserve, they should not be
allowed either. They are no different to us!”
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In the whole village, 22 household heads (12 %) are against the pasture as it is delineated
by the authorities, because of the inequality that it causes (see Table 6.5.1, third column). They
express their willingness to assist field owners in their resistance of both authorities and (what
they call) cattle owners. They agree with pasture field users when they continue to use those
fields despite the official delineation.
6.5.2 Pasture or arable land
The bush area of Baba Deli is denominated as pasture reserve and has, indeed, been used as
such for decades. Today’s inhabitants of Dzambou agree about the existence of this grazing
area in the past. Unfortunately, they do not agree about the current status of this zone. Some
40 years ago a rich cattle-owner, Elhadji Ardo, who roamed the bush with his herd, started an
area specially set aside for cattle and which was not used for agriculture. According to today’s
cultivators it was an agreement between him and the first cultivators, as a ‘win-win’ arrange-
ment. Because there was enough space to cultivate elsewhere, the grandfathers and fathers of
today’s respondents consented to leaving this part of the recently cleared forest to cattle. “But”,
many of the farmers say today, “only for the time being!” According to the respondents the
deal was that, when necessary because of increasing infertility of the fields used, the cultiva-
tors would return and the cattle keepers would switch to the exhausted fields. Thus, the invad-
ing farmers are motivated to do so because they think it is their right and because it is in line
with the former agreement and their customs. The offspring of the original clearers should now
inherit the land. 
Table 6.5.1 Division of opinions about the pasture99 in Baba Deli, Tndmou and rest of Dzambou and of 
owners and intruders (=users) (n =172; 21 x double opinion, 2 x three opinions; intruders: 2 x
double opinion). 
a = 8 users are from Baba Deli in total
b = 5 x inhabitants of the Fulbe neighbourhood
For today’s farmers, whose fields seem to be loosing their fertility, the time has come to ful-
fil that agreement. Even those without fields in the pasture area, but with diminishing field-
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Against, Against, Against, Total Pro No Total
no need unequal no land against pasture opinion
Baba Deli 7 10 4 21 64 5 90
Tndmou 19 6 5 30 19 6 55
Dzambou-rest 24 6 2 32 16 5 53
Total village 50 22 11 83 99 16 198
intrudersa 5 6 2 11 10 3 23
Intruders that stopped 2 0 1 n.a. 6 2 n.a.
Owners of past. field 7 5 7 17 19b 2 33
99 ‘No need’ means, that the respondents think the pasture is unnecessary because of an abundance of grazing
land or a lack of cattle. ‘Unequal’ refers to the idea that inhabitants’ rights should be the same: everybody or
nobody can use the pasture lands for cultivation. ‘No land’ means that the respondent is against the creation
of pasture because (s)he needs the fields there because (s)he lacks other fields. ‘Pro pasture’ can mean the
respondent is for the creation of pasture land without restriction or is for it but with slightly different bound-
aries. Most people who are both for and against want a pasture zone, but not in Baba Deli.
fertility, can see the logic of this reasoning. All claim the fields within the pasture boundaries
for themselves or their co-villagers. And they expect cattle keepers to carry on using the other
part of the village territory. The majority of those farmers do not see the need for pasture in the
first place (see Table 6.5.1, second column). There is plenty of fallow and bush between the
fields and around the compounds that can be used by cattle all year round, they say. “There is
more grazing land than cattle, and that will continue to be the case for a very long time”. 
In addition, there are some farmers who do not have enough land themselves, as explained
above, and have no alternative than to start fields in the pasture, but this is a small minority. In
general, the farmers that claim that there is not enough land left all have several other fields at
their disposal and these also have a moderate to good fertility status. The discrepancy between
their claim of a lack of land and their factual information about their fields’ situation can be
explained by the tangible feeling that the land area and level of fertility are diminishing, pop-
ulations are increasing and by the wish to modernise, a wish to enter the new way of life.
There is a remarkable distribution throughout the village of farmers who claim the pasture to
be arable land that should also be used as such. It is “the rest of Dzambou” that hosts a sig-
nificant majority of claimants. Although Tndmou neighbourhood, and especially Dzambou
Centre, are further away from the pasture than Baba Deli, from the northern part of Tndmou
where a big amount of contestants live, it does not take that long to walk to a pasture field. 
The same applies to the herding of cattle there. Nevertheless, Dzambou cattle owners now
prefer to herd their cattle in the vicinity of their compounds so that more manure is produced
on the fields close to their homes and where there is more security against theft. The denomi-
nation of a pasture area would sooner or later make cattle owners retreat to that zone. This
would be a loss for those with only fields outside the pasture. They would then be faced by the
problem of where to acquire manure. Thus, for some of them, the sooner the pasture is desig-
nated as arable land and the fallow between the houses as grazing land, the better . If the pas-
ture fields could indeed be used for agriculture, the risk of crop damage would not be very big
because wide enough corridors from one fallow field to the other would remain open.
Table 6.5.2 Number of village inhabitants with a certain field position and their opinions about the pasture
reserve (n = 172; 21 x double opinion; 2 x three opinions; 1x no fields at all)
a : outside = fields are situated outside the pasture reserve as well as outside the Fulbe (F-) settlement.
Although there is a difference in opinion about the pasture between the two Dzambou regions,
the division of opinions for or against the pasture seem not to depend on the position of the
Totally Agreed Nno Against, Against, Against, Total Total
agreed diff. form opinion no need inequality no land for against
In reserve only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In reserve + outsidea 11 7 1 9 7 6 18 22
In reserve + F-settlem. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In F-settlem. 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In F-settlem. + outside 5 1 1 1 2 1 6 4
In F-settlem.+ reserve 4 0 0 0 0 1 4 1
+ outside
Outside 33 34 14 40 13 1 66 55
257
fields (see Table 6.5.2). The opinions of all persons with some fields in the pasture are evenly
divided between those for and against (22 versus 23). Of all the Dzambou inhabitants who
have only fields outside the contested area, a small majority of 66 versus 55 is for the creation
of pasture land.
An opinion on the pasture can, however, be shaped by the perception of the field-owner of the
usefulness of his fields and the possibility of getting a sufficient yield from them (see Table
6.5.3). Indeed, although the correlation can only be seen when bad and moderate fields are
taken together, and is then still not significant, field infertility seems to make people aware of
the necessity of the use of the pasture fields.
Table 6.5.3 shows that a majority (112 persons out of 198) consider (some of) their fields
to be properly fertile, although they are sometimes complemented with moderate or even poor
fields. This underlines the remark about the general scarcity position of the total village (see
above). On the other hand, one can say that the better the fields, the higher the ratio between the
pro and the contra pasture opinion: this ratio is 62 : 41 for people with good fields and 33 : 34
for people with moderate fields. A calculation of the significance for a pro or contra pasture
opinion of a certain field composition shows that x
2 remains far below the threshold (x
2 = 7.09;
test statistic 21.0). People with only moderate and/or poor fields divide their opinions about
the pasture according to the ratio: 37 in favour and 42 against. For the division of the opinion
of these people against the opinions of all those with at least some good fields, x
2 = 3.48
(against a test statistic of 5.99). Even inhabitants with only poor fields are not significantly
more against the pasture than all the other inhabitants x
2 = 1.03; test statistic = 5.99). Thus, it
is not possible to conclude that when people have less production opportunities and perceive
the field-situation as more pressing they are more opposed to the reserve. Most probably this
effect can only be seen in the case of those who actually go into the pasture area to cultivate
(see earlier sections).
Table 6.5.3 Perception of soil fertility of used fields versus opinion on pasture (n = 172; 21 x double opinion,
2 x three opinions), sometimes different fields of one user are categorised differently (e.g. one per
son uses a good field as well as a moderate field). 
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Totally Agreed, No Against, Against, Against, Total Total Total
agreed dif. form opinion no need unequal no other for contra
land
Good 24 17 5 16 6 3 71 41 25
Good and mo- 6 5 1 4 2 1 19 11 7
derate
Moderate 10 9 3 15 6 3 46 19 24
Moderate and 1 1 0 0 1 1 4 2 2
poor
Poor 10 6 4 12 4 0 36 16 16
Good and poor 5 4 3 3 3 2 20 9 8
Good, moderate, 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1
poor
Total 57 42 16 50 22 11 198 99 83
In fact, anger about the creation of the pasture area is evident among both young and older
men. The latter consider the authorities’ activities as leading to the loss of past investments,
made by people from the same generation as they themselves. They fear a disappearance of
traditional norms and rules. For them personally it gives rise to a feeling of insecurity in gen-
eral, but also with regard to their own efforts in the past. They do not know when the author-
ities will come and take their land and designate it pasture or something else they deem nec-
essary. In such a situation they are even more fiercely opposed to the delineation and believe
that, if there were any justice, the process would be reversed. 
6.6 Counter-assertion and conflict: Box 3
When Kapsiki started cultivating in the contested pasture area of Baba Deli, they claimed it to
be their right. “These are our fields”. There would have been no problem if the other users had
acknowledged this right straight away and had withdrawn. However, that was not the case. Part
of the contested area is used as settlement area and houses have been built there. The Fulbe-
Kapsiki have cleared some ‘home fields’ around these compounds, but for the rest they want
the area to be strictly set aside for grazing. They also have historical arguments to underpin
their claim.
In fact, the whole neighbourhood closest to the pasture has the highest amount of inhabi-
tants supporting the idea of a specific grazing area (Table 6.5.1). Even when all the household
heads of the Fulbe settlement are not considered, Baba Deli is pro-pasture! With these two
opposing assertions the conflict of Box 3 is a fact (see Figure 6.2). 
6.6.1 Environmental domain
Physical basis
In general there is no difference between the soil types or climatic circumstances of those who
claim the pasture to be for cultivation and those who want it to be grazing land. We have seen
that there is also no significant difference in field disposition of the different claimants. But,
those who support the creation of the reserve experience another type of land scarcity. This
concerns cattle owners who do not have enough room for their cattle because their herds are
too big and the corridors between the fields are too small, or farmers who foresee such a prob-
lem in the future. “If people go on producing a lot of crops, they will grow rich. Then they will
buy cattle - everybody does – and where must they graze without disturbing the fields if there
is no pasture area?” 
According to the departmental head of the animal husbandry service (Djonwè 2001), the
number of cattle decreased between 1985 and 2000 from 125,407 to 71,766, and continued to
decrease in the last two years (Djonwé, pers. communication, January 2003) due to out-migra-
tion to the North Province100 and Nigeria of big cattle owners and the sale of cattle by those
who stayed in the region. Djonwè attributes these two phenomena to the decrease of pasture
surface, because of the growing population and the need for more agricultural fields. 
100 The North Province used to be infested with Tse-Tse flies and trypanosomiasis, but with chemical pesticides
being more readily available and thanks to zoo-technical measures to decrease the infestation, this area is now
a good cattle grazing region (see Boutrais 1999).
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As we have seen, the region of Dzambou does not suffer from an excessive population den-
sity. One may even state that in the situation of moderate to small population density combined
with an out-migration of cattle, the abundance of pasture land is even more obvious. But the
pressure felt by cattle owners in the past, that made them leave the area, can still be perceived
today by current cattle-owning inhabitants. Thus, was it indeed an attempt by cattle owners (or
those who want to have cattle) to safeguard a perceived last resort of pasture, that made them
ask for the delineation of the Baba Deli reserve? Most of them have experienced a decrease in
personal (or familial) cattle herds and numbers of cattle during their lives. Table 6.6.1 shows
the opinions on pasture in connection with cattle ownership.
Table 6.6.1: Number of people with a certain number of cattle and their opinions about the pasture reserve
(n = 172; 21 x double opinions, 2 x three opinions). 
Table 6.6.1 shows that a very small majority of the big cattle owners favour the pasture.
Surprisingly, among the non-cattle owners a small majority of those who do have an opinion
are also pro-pasture area (78 versus 67). It is among the owners with a moderate number of
cattle that we see the clearest support for the pasture (9 persons for versus 5 against), although
the numbers are small. The conclusion has to be that the variable ‘cattle ownership’ does not
differentiate the pro-pasture inhabitants from those who are contra. A slightly more convinc-
ing relationship can be found for the more extended cattle-related variable “cattle feeling”, that
covers things such as “used to cattle” or “love cattle”, as can be seen from the following Table
6.6.2. Therein ‘cattle-related’ means: owning cattle, herding cattle, having herded cattle in the
past, ownership of cattle in the past (self or family) and even being a butcher (seven times)
because butchers have to be very easy-going with and knowledgeable about cattle. They need
cattle and therefore cattle grazing space.
Table 6.6.2 Cattle relations versus opinion about pasture (n = 172; 21 x double opinions, 2 x three opinions).
The ratios show a slight influence of ‘cattle feeling’ in the direction of promotion of the pasture:
40 people with ‘cattle feeling’ support the pasture with 28 against (ratio is 1.5). On the other hand,
non cattle-related people generate a lower ratio of 57:55 (= 1.1), although the relationship is not
significant (x
2 = 0.8 with a test statistic of 3.84). Some hint of an explanation of the conflict may
be in evidence here, but only in a very general sense. Cattle feeling may create certain tendencies
to assume positions, but obviously that alone does not explain why people resort to violence.
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Totally Agreed, No Against, Against, Against, Total Total
agreed diff. form opinion no need inequality no land for against
> 9 cattle 8 4 2 6 5 0 12 11
3-9 cattle 6 3 2 4 1 0 9 5
< 3 cattle 43 35 12 40 16 11 78 67
Totally Agreed, No Against, Against, Against, Total Total
agreed diff. form opinion no need inequality no land for against
Cattle-related 24 16 5 14 12 2 40 28
Rest 33 26 11 36 10 9 57 55
Population density
The whole village of Dzambou has a low population density. Certain sub-neighbourhoods may
have a higher number of inhabitants, and others more extended fallow fields around the com-
pounds, but because everybody can leave the surface of his direct living neighbourhood to cul-
tivate or herd elsewhere, population densities per neighbourhood are irrelevant. Indeed, the
inhabitants of the Fulbe settlement live closer to each other than those of Tndmou, but they
have the same possibilities to rent fields in Dzambou Centre or even in Oudava, to fall back
on forefathers’ fields in Sir or buy land outside the traditional pasture boundaries.
There are even inhabitants that express their doubts about a population increase. Some areas
of the village have experienced a decline. People mention the high death rate of both children
and grown-ups and point to the remains of houses that have become empty. For them these are
not signs of households moving from one place to another, but of the disappearance of whole
families. However, among those that notice such reductions in the number of inhabitants there
is no difference between those who are for or against the pasture area. On the one hand, peo-
ple do not see any need for pasture land in view of the existing abundance of land on which to
graze cattle. On the other hand, they highlight the necessity of the existence of big trees. “If
you change the pasture forest area every now and again, trees never have the chance to grow.
And big trees attract rain!” some say.
6.6.2 Human domain
Health
No specific health characteristics are evident among those who decided that pasture is nec-
essary. Even those who actively promote the pasture area, those who have done so over the
last years and those who are involved in the protection thereof (almost all inhabitants of the
Fulbe-settlement) are no more healthier, younger or older than the average Dzambou inhab-
itant. Apart from the water well in the Fulbe neighbourhood, that was dug almost a genera-
tion ago, this neighbourhood does not and has not invested more (or less) in the health of its
inhabitants.
Education
Taking account of all the pasture proponents, the level of education is more or less the same
as the Dzambou mean. Also the number of people that send their children to school does not
differ from the rest of Dzambou. However, the level of education of the Fulbe settlement
inhabitants is below village mean (only four people attended primary school for some years).
Moreover, the number of school-going children is lower there not only because of the fact that
Islamic children in rural areas of Cameroon are generally less literate (they attend their Koran
schools in the settlements), but also because the settlement is really a long way from every
primary school in the region. In short, the Fulbe settlement inhabitants exhibit the general
Fulbe habits with regard to education (see further section 6.6.4).
6.6.3 Economic domain
There is some difference between those people from Dzambou who (more or less) active-
ly promote the pasture, those who are not against it (but only expressed being supportive
when asked) and those who oppose it. Some of the Fulbe neighbourhood inhabitants culti-
vate so many cash crops (or a cereals-surplus) that they can acquire a good additional
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income by selling101. The option to gain money through activities other than agricultural ones
is evenly divided over the groups. Of the people that actively promote the pasture reserve
some work as miller, some as small scale trader and some as a cattle trader or butcher. 
The wealth situation is diverse, with differences between the different groups if one exam-
ines the TLU, ploughs and other utensils such as bicycles, generators, motor bicycles, etc. (see
Table 6.6.3). In particular, the active promoters seem to be wealthier than the rest of the vil-
lage members. For the largest part, this wealth is in the hands of three persons. Two of them
are Fulbe, who are real cattle keepers like their ancestors and the third is a Kapsiki cattle
owner, who is also interested in agriculture and therefore also owns a plough. However, even
if the Fulbe, as strict cattle keepers, are not counted, the mean TLU of this group is high. It is
possible to say that at least for this group the interest in the pasture reserve has grown due to
their wealth and their access to livestock.
Table 6.6.3 Wealth position of groups of inhabitants with a certain opinion (activity) vis-à-vis the creation
of the pasture reserve
a = If the two big Fulbe cattle keepers are not counted, the mean TLU diminishes to 5.9
b = Wanting a pasture-reserve, but not in Baba Deli
6.6.4 Social domain
Family and friends
Not only the Fulbe settlement is inhabited by brothers and sons of only several families (and
thus has a high internal link), but also the rest of the Baba Deli neighbourhood consists of the
offspring of certain forefathers (although relatively more forefathers than in the Fulbe area).
They experience stronger ties with the co-inhabitants of their neighbourhood than with the rest
of Dzambou and even feel closely related to Oudava, the neighbouring village. For that reason
they are inclined to let go quicker of their own wishes to support their “own” Fulbe, and to
oppose “those people from Dzambou Centre”102. 
Political factors
Connections with higher authorities may be felt more strongly by the Islamic inhabitants of
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101 Other residents of Dzambou explain that this is obviously due to the high fertility of the Fulbe-neighbourhood
fields. This gives rise to the jealousy and the feeling of unequal possibilities.
102 When I announced that I wanted to stay in the other neighbourhood to improve my research possibilities, Baba
Deli inhabitants even warned me that the Dzambou-ers (as they call them) would not be as co-operative as they
themselves had been.
Owner-ship Active Non-active, Pro-pasture, Active pro- No Both pro- Contra
promotion unrestricted with some motion with opinion and contra pasture
of pasture pro-pasture restrictions restrictions pastureb
(non-active)
N 18 34 27 12 16 10 63
Ploughs 35 15 18 75 8 60 18
(% of group)
TLU (mean) 10a 4.8 2.3 2.2 2.0 3.1 3.4
Other utensils 6 9 8 1 9 11 10
(% of group)
Dzambou because of the Islamic faith of the district chief. In land matters the lamido is per-
haps more important than the sub-prefect. In addition, sub-prefects tend to disappear every
now and again because they are regularly transferred to other departments. Building per-
sonal linkages with such officials is more difficult and less rewarding. Thus, in spite of the
fact that the sub-prefect is a Christian, Christians do not feel more linked to him than to other
officials.
In general the claim of the pro-pasture villagers corresponds with the viewpoint of the State.
The pasture proponents indeed use this argument to underpin their interests. They refer to the
importance of creating the pasture area using the same arguments as the State representatives
while at the same time showing their ‘good citizenship’.
Conflict mediation
As in all villages of Kapsiki, the neighbourhood chief is the first to intervene when problems
between inhabitants arise. This is also the case in the Fulbe hamlet. When, however, discords
with other neighbourhoods occur, lawan Yaya is not the first to be involved, nor is the gener-
al Dzambou village chief trusted by the Fulbe settlement inhabitants. For example, in case of
damage to fields by cattle owned by inhabitants of another neighbourhood, farmers and cattle
keepers find a solution themselves or they approach higher authorities. Mostly they refer to the
line officials of the agricultural or animal husbandry services. As regards cattle keepers, it is
important to claim that the ‘pasture’ area is indeed pasture area (and to have that claim
acknowledged) because all fields that lie in a ‘grazing only area’ are cultivated subject to the
risk of crop damage by cattle being solely for the cultivator. The owner of the trespassing cat-
tle has no responsibility and no obligation to reimburse the damage. The fact is that the cattle
are not trespassing, but rather the cultivator. The officials are then left to declare that the field
concerned lies inside or outside the boundaries of the reserve. This is one of the important rea-
sons why people are for or against the delineation of the pasture. Cattle keepers or herders
want to have clear boundaries, so they need not negotiate the position of damaged fields over
and over again.
Land allocation
On the whole, the proponents of the pasture are subject to the same rules as all other inhabi-
tants of Dzambou as far as land allocation is concerned. However, the Fulbe neighbourhood
acts a bit differently within their settlement boundaries. Apart from denying everyone, includ-
ing themselves, the right to use fields in the (newly delineated) pasture, they themselves man-
age the Fulbe pasture corner. The first clearer rules do not apply here. Other Baba Deli farm-
ers, who claim to have rights because of their forefathers’ activities, are ignored. At best the
settlers declare that they do not know who the owner is, or that the State owns everything. They
use the fields surrounding their compounds and when new settlers arrive it is the lawan, Yaya,
who decides over the location of the compound and fields. 
He was not the first to arrive and to build his house, but he was the last of a first group.
Moreover, he managed to persuade the district and sub-department authorities decades ago to
appoint him neighbourhood chief. His father cleared a lot of fields in the region (from Tchibi
to Oudava), including fields within the pasture area. As a result and because of his connection
with the original cattle keepers (Elhadji Ardo and his fellow-men) and because Yaya himself
was imprisoned once for only looking at the ruins of his fathers house in the middle of the pas-
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ture area, he is adamant that the pasture area should be used as grazing land. He considers him-
self to be the person who has legitimacy to allocate fields in the ‘Fulbe’ Baba Deli region, and
to guard the pasture against intruders103.
Cultural factors
To decide whether pro-pasture opinions are related to cultural characteristics such as religion,
in Table 6.6.4 a comparison is made between people’s different religions and their places of
residence versus their opinions concerning the pasture. The group ‘some Muslims in neigh-
bouring villages’ has been added as a correction for the very small number of Muslims in the
rest of the village of Dzambou. Neighbouring villages, such as Oudava (see Figure 6.3) are
heavily involved in the pasture discussion. Their inhabitants have or use fields there or own
cattle which they (may) herd there.
Table 6.6.4 Numbers of Muslims, animists and Christians living within or outside the “Fulbe settlement” 
and their opinions about the pasture reserve (n = 180; there are 21 x double-opinion, 2 x three
opinions) 
Table 6.6.4 shows that opinions are evenly divided between the adherents of non-Muslim reli-
gions (pro : contra = 77 : 78). On the other hand, counting all the Muslims together seems to
reveal that the Islamic religion is a strong factor that makes people opt to support the reserve
idea (26 out of 37 people: x
2 = 4.8, significant)104. However, dividing the data according to
place of residence shows that (almost) all Muslims from within the Fulbe-settlement think pos-
itively concerning the grazing zone (15 out of 16 persons). The opinions of Muslims outside
that settlement are more or less evenly divided between pro and contra, as with the other reli-
gions. Thus, the fact that the Muslims of the Fulbe settlement are in favour of the pasture area
cannot be fully traced back to their religion. When calculating the influence of religion in gen-
eral, on a pro or contra opinion, it seems as if it has more to do with a combination of religion
and the place of residence.
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103 With his invalid foot and with his increasing age, he has now delegated this last task to some of his subjects
(“with the approval of the authorities”, the ‘Fulbe’ claim).
104 Calculating the influence of animism or Christianity versus all other religions shows no significance (the x
2
being 0.09 and 2.8 respectively; test statistic is 3.84). However, the influence of religion in general on the opin-
ions for or against the pasture reserve is significant (x
2 = 6.04 with a test statistic of 5.99): the Muslim effect.
Totally Agreed No Against, Against, Against, Total Total
agreed diff. form opinion no need inequality no land for contra
Muslims in F-corner 13 2 0 0 1 0 15 1
Muslims outside F-corner 3 5 1 2 2 0 8 4
Muslims in neigh-bouring 2 1 2 3 2 1 3 6
villages
Animists within F-corner 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
Animists outside F-corner 28 27 12 29 14 6 55 49
Christians outside F-corner 13 8 2 18 5 4 21 27
No religion 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
total 59 43 18 53 24 12 102 89
An explanation for the ‘place-of-residence’ influence can be sought in the ideas and per-
ceptions of the inhabitants, and are grounded in social capital considerations. Perhaps they
have realised that behaving as a protagonist of cattle-keeping and pastures, not only by
expressing pro-pasture feelings but also by behaving as guardians over it, together with their
belonging to the Islamic community, will make them allies of the powerful lamido of the dis-
trict105 who is himself a Muslim and cattle keeper. In fact the few original Fulbe that live in the
village have their compounds in the Fulbe settlement. The oldest Muslim Kapsiki of that
neighbourhood started to live there in the time that the big Fulbe cattle keepers, such as Elhadji
Ardo, herded their cattle there and sometimes even had a small house in the same corner. The
bonds of the inhabitants of the Fulbe settlement with the Islam and the Fulbe perhaps make
them seek to strengthen the link with the Islamic authorities. Those Muslims of Baba Deli
(four households heads), who do not live in the Fulbe settlement, strongly oppose the reserve
due to inequality reasons. They do not have linkages with the Fulbe lamido of the district by
way of an appointed lawan, like the Fulbe neighbourhood has.
On the other hand, those non-Muslim farmers of Baba Deli that agree with the pasture do
not do that based on an kind of ethnic feeling of “we Muslims”, as is suggested applies to the
Fulbe neighbourhood inhabitants. The region of residence and direction of origin (see Fig 6.3)
seem to be more important.
Discords and claims
According to those Dzambou residents that support the creation of the pasture zone, the agree-
ment between Elhadji Ardo (and his fellow herders) and the then farmers of the Baba Deli
grazing zone was meant to be ‘forever’. They say that he confirmed this agreement with the
authorities the moment some discords broke out between the herders and a farmer. Ardo paid
the department authorities for the pasture and with that made it ‘his’ ‘forever’106.
The inhabitants from the Fulbe neighbourhood started to acknowledge the risk of a disap-
pearance of the bush during the increase in bush encroachment by farmers some ten years ago.
They started to tell new cultivators to stay away from this area to safeguard the possibilities to
graze cattle. When the cultivators continued clearing the fields that their ancestors had first
cleared 80 to 60 years ago, the cattle owners of the Fulbe settlement tried to mobilise the
authorities, asking for a re-establishment of old limits. Indeed, reacting to the then status quo,
some eight years ago a former sub-department chief pointed out certain small roads or
riverbeds as the boundaries that should not be crossed in order to cultivate. But also at that time
the Fulbe neighbourhood was left in peace (see Fig 6.5). Yet, the pasture was not fully pro-
tected. Although the agricultural population did not openly resist the decision or attack the cat-
tle owners, in their perceived role as instigators of the (then) new delineation, they still felled
the trees, cleared parts of this bush and started fields. Every now and again, disputes arose
between the two different users of the area. 
105 See Chapter 4 about regional ‘traditional’ chiefs (lamibe). The lamido of Mogodé, although Islamic, is not a
Fulbe in the strict sense because he is of Kapsiki descent. Being from the noblemen’s lineage (see Van Beek
1978; 1987), he acquired his position with the help of a wealthy brother, after the former lamido died.
106 Some respondents claim that he paid a considerable amount of money to the prefect of the department. One
respondent says that he claimed back his “forty cattle” because “he would leave the area” only then.
265
On the basis of the current delineation, the dispute about the boundaries flared up again.
However, the inhabitants of the Fulbe neighbourhood, who are being threatened, renounce the
accusations. In addition, they claim not to understand their fellow villagers’ complaints about
a diminishing of the pasture area now Ardo’s boundaries are not adhered to in the Fulbe neigh-
bourhood. With the current delineation of the pasture, they say, the surface of the reserve is
now not smaller than it was in Ardo’s time. Although the authorities left the Fulbe neighbour-
hood in peace (“What else could they do? Where else could we live?”), on the other side of the
pasture they took several fields out of production and added that area to the reserve. They
explain that by doing so the authorities extended the reserve on the north-west side beyond the
original boundaries that applied in Ardo’s time (see Fig. 6.5). 
The Fulbe-Kapsiki claim that they started to live in their corner with Ardo’s consent. Some
of them first had houses in the middle of the pasture, or at least on the inner sides of large
boundary rivers, but they retreated according to Ardo’s wishes. This is how they explain the
legitimacy of their settlement. 
The fact that the inhabitants of the Fulbe settlement are not opposed to the pasture can be
explained by the fact that their fields are not situated in the current pasture reserve or, if they
are, that they have other possibilities at their disposal both in the hamlet and in the rest of the
village. Table 6.6.5 shows the relationship between their opinions about the pasture and the
location of the fields.
Table 6.6.5 Opinion of Inhabitants of Fulbe settlement related to the position of their fields (n = 18; 2 non-
Muslim)
Four Muslim households of the Fulbe settlement depend for their agricultural fields on the
original pasture area, that is, the zone of their settlement. They took a big risk when they asked
the authorities to delineate. The decision of those in charge to leave the Fulbe settlement out
of the new pasture must have been a huge relief. Also for those with other fields losing their
fields in the settlement area would have been a major loss because this former pasture area is
very fertile. In that respect, accusations by some village inhabitants referring to bribery, i.e.
paying the authorities to leave the Fulbe settlement out of the reserve, are understandable.
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Totally Agreed, No Against, Against, Against, no Total
agreed diff. form opinion no need inequality other land
In reserve only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In reserve. + outside past. 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
In Fulbe corner only 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
In Fulbe-corner + reserve 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In Fulbe-corner + outside past. 3 1 1 0 0 0 5
Fulbe-corner + reserve + outside past. 5 0 0 0 0 0 5
Outside  pasture 1 1 0 0 1 0 3
Total 13 2 1 0 1 1 18
6.7 Violence: Box 4
The future development of the conflict depends on the reactions of the two parties. Yet, in this
specific case, in addition to the different groups of Kapsiki, the State is also party to the con-
flict. However, as yet, the threat of violence does not exist between Kapsiki and the State. Even
though some of the Kapsiki feel angry towards the State, they voice their anger against their
co-villagers whom they accuse of instigating the whole problem.
6.7.1 The use of force
Contending: the use of threats
To achieve their aims without any eye for the interests of the other party, the people who are
against the pasture may opt for some kind of action to reverse its existence. They threaten with
three possible courses of action concerning the invasion of the area and the continuation of
agriculture. The first involves approving that others carry out the invasion (most people with
this idea think the pasture is unnecessary). The second is to invade oneself and the third is to
organise a group invasion to prevent a possible arrest by the police. Furthermore, the organi-
sation of a group can serve to convince the authorities to change their decision (whether or not
with the aid of bribes). Next, it can serve the aim of co-operation against the Fulbe hamlet
inhabitants. The continuation of cultivation in the pasture area can also be performed person-
ally but understandably with less success. Personal or group-based invasion of the pasture is
considered by those who regard the pasture as a violation of the rights of cultivators because
of the unequal treatment of different farmers and because some do not have enough fertile soil
elsewhere. 
During the year of the delineation they still had permission to finish their production
because they had already started (says the sub-prefect)107. Rumours about this permission dif-
fer. According to some cultivators, the only reason was a political one. During that election
year, the RDPC authorities tried to win enough votes in this UNDP stronghold and bought
votes by promising to grant permission to cultivate. Some say they even promised permission
that cultivation could be continued into the next year. Others say they never heard anything
about voting for the RDPC, saying that they received this permission because they could not
possibly go to other fields that they had not prepared thoroughly. According to the sub-prefect,
use was limited to those who had prepared the soil and had no other options and they were to
prevent cattle damage in their fields by making fences (using prickly bushes). If such damage
were to occur, nonetheless, reimbursement would not be obligatory. 
Contending: the use of violence
During the delineation meeting in Baba Deli another option came to light,  namely the use of
violence. When talking about the fight afterwards and comparing the members of the two
fighting groups with the different opinions concerning the pasture, those that confess that they
used violence mostly expressed that they were upset by the unequal treatment of inhabitants.
In the whole village, 22 people support this opinion. From the tables in the rest of this chap-
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107 The first meeting to announce the coming delineation was held in mid March. Apart from the felling of trees
(sometimes already done years ago), the production season could not possibly have been started then.
ter, one can deduce that of all the people who contest the pasture because they feel it is an
injustice, most have no cattle (17 people out of 22) and only one third (7 people) have fields
in the pasture108. These seven people in particular feel the injustice most. Only eleven people
in the whole village stated that they have no fertile land at all. Eight of them have fields in the
pasture and declared that their other fields are not fertile. None of them have cattle. 
The personal combination of ‘having thought of action’ with ‘feeling injustice or a lack of
fertile land’ can clearly lead to violence in the future. The trigger will therefore not be an activ-
ity by the authorities, such as the placing of border poles, but rather controversies in the pasture
itself such as when pro-pasture adherents (especially those who appointed themselves as pas-
ture guards) catch other people red-handed, when they are busy destroying boundary poles, or
when crop damage is caused by herds in the grazing reserve, where now no compensation is
due. This latter possibility is especially dangerous in the event of group action. The formation
of groups can even have the goal of scaring away cattle owners. All these actions depend on the
judgement of readiness of the authorities to intervene. At the moment, like the presence of
authorities in the case of cattle theft, this readiness is thought to be low. The pro-pasture inhab-
itants of the Fulbe hamlet, in particular, are trying to involve the authorities more (see section
6.6). The other important parameter is the possibility of finding allies in the group formation.
6.7.2 Escapes: can violence be avoided?
Yielding
Yielding means that farmers who want to use fields in the pasture area do not stick to their
wishes. They give in to the authorities and to their pro-pasture fellow villagers. More specifi-
cally, they leave the Fulbe Kapsiki of Baba Deli neighbourhood in peace. They allow them not
only to live in the pasture corner, which they believe should have been forbidden, but also
allow them to cultivate the fields there.
Under pressure from the authorities, and especially the police force, there is a considerable
chance that Dzambou villagers will yield and agree to the pasture area as such. In addition, no-
one wants a repeat of the violence experienced in the past. Although Kapsiki are not afraid of
expressing their disagreements with a lot of yelling, threats and mutual pushing, the small fight
at the boundary meeting has already gone further than the physical expression of discords
which is normally allowed109. However, the inequality of the situation continues to be a prob-
lem and as long as that is not solved the risk of irritations (even over other issues) and violence
will grow.
Problem solving
With an eye on all parties’ interests, something impossible has to be achieved. The problem is
not only a pasture versus fields conflict but also, as far as authorities are concerned, the preser-
vation of a forest zone. The proposed pasture rotation, as was agreed between farmers and for-
mer cattle keepers (according to some villagers), would serve the goals of both user groups,
but not that of the State. For the farmers this would have been an ideal solution. They would
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108 Of a total of eleven people with fields in the pasture.
109 My experience is that, in a tense situation, other people present (also or even especially women) intervene
quickly and keep aggressors physically away from each other, trying to calm down the dispute in the mean-
time.
have had access to the most fertile fields in the region and at the same time their exhausted
fields would have been rendered more fertile with new manure. According to them, the cattle
keepers should have been satisfied with this construction. The rest of the village offers enough
fallow to serve as grazing land for the small amount of cattle owned by the villagers and for
visiting herds. In addition, the current field area is closer to water wells than the pasture zone
itself. The plans to build a new dam somewhere between Dzambou Centre and Oudava should
have made the fallow fields even more attractive. 
On the other hand, a fixed pasture reserve, which is at the same time forest, would serve
State and cattle keepers’ aims well as long as the number of cattle is restricted to the carrying
capacity of the region. This is a condition that could certainly be met for the time being, given
the relatively small number of cattle. However, the implementation of such a plan would be
detrimental to the farmers who lack fertile fields. They would have to be compensated in cash
or otherwise. Cash would mean that they are able to buy cattle themselves or chemical fer-
tilisers to enhance the fertility of their current fields. Some other compensation would mean
the same, if this was also in the form of cattle or fertilisers. Cash compensation would also give
them the possibility to choose other options, like trade, in order to reduce their dependence on
their fields. In the longer run this would be preferable.
The compensation prescribed by law should be paid without delay and without restrictions.
The traditional Kapsiki rule of ‘owners are those who cleared or inherited cleared fields’ is a
better starting point to help families overcome field infertility and insecurity, and thus to pre-
vent the build up of frustration and aggression.
Some farmers have said that they would accept the pasture if the cattle keepers were more
willing to share their cattle’s manure with field owners in the rest of the village. Whether or
not this is possible to organise and implement remains to be seen, but it is certainly something
worth talking about.
The problem of perceived inequality has to be addressed immediately. As long as people
think that some are allowed to cultivate in the pasture area, they will do the same. This will
definitely lead to clashes between the users or with the police and the conflict will escalate as
a result. The Fulbe-Kapsiki of Baba Deli are now benefiting in two ways. Firstly, they have
their pasture reserve and secondly, they have their fertile pasture fields (in their corner). Some
of them have indicated that they are willing to move, if there is a place to go to. The problem
could be solved with help from the authorities with a view to organising that or with a view to
organising the communal use of the now privately used pasture corner. It should be remem-
bered, though, that the Fulbe settlement corner is not big enough to provide fields for all fam-
ilies that lose pasture fields now. Therefore, without measures to improve the fertility of the
rest of the fields, several families will continue to suffer from a decline in production.
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Kubadje or Jiksa: contesting names, contesting claims
While climbing the hill to reach a point from which he can show me the natural boundaries of
the grazing area of his clan, the Fulbe Prince encounters yelling and cursing bush-clearers who
swear at him (and me). “You and your filthy fellow-Fulbe will not make it here any longer!
Go away! This white woman that you brought will not make any difference. This is our land,
and we will use it. If you do not go voluntarily, we will chase you away. We are stronger than
you and have many arms!”
Since the mid 1980s, the small bush region on the border between the villages of Kila and
Oudda which are, respectively, in the two sub-departments of Mogodé and Bourah (see Figure
7.2) has been a contested area. Until then, the savannah forest was used by a group of seden-
tary cattle-owners to graze their herds. The men of this Fulbe group leave their ‘Kubadje’ area
in the dry season when the water wells for their animals run dry and fodder becomes scarce.
Currently, a second group wants to make use of the land, namely Bana agriculturalists from
surrounding villages who invade the area and start clearing fields in what they call ‘Jiksa’.
Unfortunately, these fields coincide in time and space with the cattle pastures within the small
region itself and with the corridors to the larger adjacent bush land of Modélé. This means that
direct confrontation between the two user groups cannot be avoided and that the conflict is
growing. Some small clashes have already taken place and the risk of violence on a larger scale
is increasing.
In this chapter I focus on the explanation of this conflict, following the VoE model of Chapter
2 (Figure 7.1). Thus, after some historical information, which is important to understand the
influencing factors later, I start by investigating insecurities in the agricultural village. In the
third section I explore the different options of the invading group as regards improving their
situation. Thereafter I focus on the specific investment described in Box 2 of the diagram: the
intrusion into another niche. The fifth section describes the claims of the Bana to the new area.
Subsequently, in order to pinpoint the conflict (Box 3 of the diagram) the focus is on the oppos-
ing party. Their insecurities, their options for overcoming these, and their claims are described
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in section 7.6. I end this chapter with a description of options and motivations of both parties
to resort to, or abstain from, violence (Box 4 of the VoE model).
Figure 7.1 VoE diagram
7.1 Background: History of the region
The middle ranges of the Mandara Mountains of Mayo Tsanaga department are inhabited by
the Kapsiki and the Bana. These two ethnic groups are more or less related. For example, lin-
guists point out the similarities of their languages (Lebeuf 1961; Wente-Lukas 1978)1. Their
cultures also show many similarities. Both the Kapsiki and Bana societies are divided into two
classes, namely the blacksmiths who, because of their role as undertakers (with both ritual and
practical functions), form the lowest class and the so called ‘normal people’ who may be arti-
sans, peasants (mostly) or even small traders. The blacksmiths are involved in the making of
iron tools, like knives and heels, in (ritual) music making, medical care and medicine produc-
tion and in divination ceremonies, of which the ‘reading of the crab’ is the most important.
Blacksmiths’ wives have a special role in the production of pottery2. Originally the Kapsiki
and Bana were ‘animists’. They believe that each thing, animal and person ‘has’ a kind of 
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1 Wente-Lukas (1978, Abstract): “…Juengste sprachlicheUntersuchungen haben gezeigt das die Bana mit
einer anderen, groesseren Gruppe, den Kapsiki, historisch verwant sind. Ohne Zweifel ist die dem Bana –
und wohl auch benachbarten Sprachen wie dem Kapsiki und Higi – eigentumliche Ausdrucksweise der
spezifischen Umwelt angepasst, in der es fuer die Bana zu leben und mit der es fertig zu werden gilt …” 
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2 Source: Report of eldest woman in Oudda-Baliwol, Dzagni, about 106 years of age at the moment of her
interview with Moussa, August 1997 (College of Education-thesis of Moussa, one of the voluntary teachers
in Oudda: “L’Histoire de la vie de nos vieux racontée.”); For the Kapsiki: see Van Beek (1978 and 1987).
godly creature in it, being more or less a   personalised form of the one and only god, which
they say is the same as the god of the Christians and Muslims. Nowadays, lots of people of
both ethnic groups have converted to one of these religions.
Next to that, the bride-price customs are more or less the same, with a diminishing amount
of payment over the years. Divorce is practised frequently in both societies. More than one per-
son has been married over 10 times. Far more women leave their husbands to live with anoth-
er man than vice-versa and they then leave their children with their fathers.
According to Boulet (1984: 138), both ethnic groups are descendents of the Mofu that
migrated into the area in the 17th century from the Diamaré plain or even further away, such
as the Logone3. They mixed with the then autochthonous population to form several new
groups. Although the Bana admit that they arrived in the Mandara Mountains after the Kapsiki,
they claim to have been the first to arrive in the current Oudda territory, including the now con-
tested small bush area in the north. They also state that they arrived during the course of the
seventeenth century and they, like Boulet, talk about origin places in the east. But according
to them their place of origin was even further east, namely in the Sudan. They arrived in the
Rhumsiki area after having relocated a number of times in the Mandara Mountains, partly due
to locust plagues and partly due to violent encounters with other populations (for example on
the current Nigerian border, the river Madagali). There they succeeded in reaching an agree-
ment with the Kapsiki4 already present. The Kapsiki were to stay on the adjacent plateau and
the Bana were to occupy the neighbouring area of the mountains to the south that is now called
the district of Guili.
One of the origin myths of the Bana states that Oudda itself was established by three dif-
ferent Bana men who, during the time of the arrivals5, came to the region and settled on three
different mountain tops. At night they saw each other’s fire and, when meeting, decided to set
up a village together. Over the course of several years, a real crowd of people from Rhumsiki
arrived to join them. They built their houses and most of their fields on the mountain tops and
slopes for safety6, although from the beginning they had fields in the plains too. From the
1930s until well after independence, governments stimulated mountain people to descend and
build their compounds in the more accessible plains. However, the hill-tops are where their
common history is. The remains of houses and fields can be seen there and there are still bur-
ial places on the slopes. 
Coming down from the slopes, people started to build their compounds in more or less con-
centrated settlements7. They wanted to be among others, to feel safe and to be able to guard
against attacks by humans (sometimes thieves) and ravaging wild animals. After such a “plain-
hamlet” had been founded, now and again they moved on to use fields further away. Only a
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3 See also chapter 6.
4 In general the more northern peoples arrived before the more southern ones (those in the sub-department of
Bourah). In other words, the constant pressure from the northern Islamic empires made northern populations
move to the south, in turn putting pressure on the autochthonous groups to move on.
5 Meaning during the second half of the seventeenth century.
6 Although not totally safe, the steep hills gave at least some protection against the slave raids of the sur-
rounding Muslim empires, like that of Bornu and of Mandara between the 13th and 18th century, and of the
Fulbe of Sokoto after the jihad of Ousman Dan Folio, in the 18th and 19th century.
7 In this, they differ from the Kapsiki who live further away from each other. The Bana have only very small
fields in the direct vicinity of their compounds, so they can live closer to each other.
few daring people set up new homes in remote bush areas, sometimes as far north as what is
now Jiksa area. Because of this settlement pattern Oudda is now spread over a wide area and
consists of different neighbourhoods and sub-neighbourhoods (see Fig. 7.3)8.
It was only several decades after the foundation of Oudda by the Bana that the Kapsiki
started a settlement in the southern ranges of their plateau territory, north of where now the
contested pasture is situated. According to Van Beek (1981:114-115) these Kapsiki did not
move southward from the plateau. He sketches an origin somewhere to the south-west, in
Nigeria. In line with Kapsiki customs this village, which is called Kila, stretches over a wide
area and is divided into different, widely dispersed neighbourhoods, each with their own
chiefs. Nowadays, one of these neighbourhoods is formed by the Fulbe area of “Kubadje”9, the
pasture area studied.
As explained in Chapter 4 the Fulbe arrived in the north of Cameroon at the beginning of the
eighteenth century. At first they came with peaceful intentions, only in search of good pastures.
Later, in the wake of their holy war, they antagonised the autochthonous population with their
(accompanying) slave and harvest raids. In the Mandara Mountains the inhabitants fled to
higher regions in an attempt to escape these raids. In those days the Fulbe did not settle in the
mountains. Their elite, living in urban centres such as Mokolo, only invaded these areas from
time to time to take slaves. Some lower classes rambled with their herds through plains and
foothills and became settlers themselves. Others performed transhumance and lived in semi-
permanent hamlets during the rainy season. One of the concentration areas of such Fulbe set-
tlements could be found from Yola10 to Garoua (see Fig. 4.1, Chapter 4).
For these Fulbe the Cameroon-Nigerian boundary did not mean anything. They were used
to travelling to and fro between Garoua and Yola or from Maiduguri via Mokolo to Guider.
The (semi-)settled Fulbe of Kubadje originated, several generations ago, from these surround-
ings of Garoua. The neighbourhood chief in charge during the research, Elhadji Ngoura, left
that area when he was a young man and moved to the west, that is to Nigeria, where he mar-
ried. But “when the Nigerian president expelled all foreigners”11, he and his fellow Garoua-
Fulbe and their families sought the neighbourhood of the regional Fulbe lawan of the study
area, who at that time was settled in Modélé (see Fig. 7.2). Because of the population increase 
in Modélé, some of the Fulbe group - 6 family heads and their families - moved to the bush-
land area of what is now called Kubadje. There they built their houses with the help of some
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8 The neighbourhoods are (going from Guili along the road, further and further into the bush): Baliwol, with
its sub-quarter Glke; Bariki (also called “centre”) with its sub-quarters Relas and Guiki; Hlaka (with a high
and a low lying sub-quarter); and Waza (a very small and very remote neighbourhood in the north-western
direction). 
9 The word ‘Kubadje’ is the Fulbe word for the shrub Isoberlinea Doka that can be found in abundance in the
studied pasture area. In general this shrub denotes a degradation of pasture quality (Mvondo Awono et al
(2001). Cattle do not eat the shiny, non-digestible leaves, but it is useful for fuel wood.
10 A kind of district (emirate) of the Fulbe Sokoto Caliphate, in what is now Nigeria.
11 Elhadji Ngoura refers to the Nigerian president Elhadji Shagari, who reigned from 1978-1983. It is difficult
to define the period during which he expelled all foreigners from Nigeria. However, Ngoura seems to have
arrived in Cameroon earlier than that. Perhaps he mixed different events and also refered to the political
struggles connected to Nigerian independence and the preferred type of State in the 1950s. In that same period
the emirs in the Northern region tried to purify their territory from foreign (for them meaning ‘southern’),
non-Muslim influences.
Figure 7.3 Oudda-Kila boundary: old and new visions
Kapsiki who were asked by the Kila village chief, Koye, to provide assistance. Ngoura him-
self arrived a bit later than the others in 195812, after a period spent in Modélé. Thus, he only
became the leader of the settlement (‘lawan’) some years after the foundation at the request of
the inhabitants of the time. He constructed his house – now a very big compound incorporat-
ing all his grown up and married sons and their families, as well as a sister, an adult nephew
etc. -   separate from the neighbourhood centre. Today these first settlers and their descendants
stress the emptiness of the area on arrival: “only pasture land, no persons or houses.” 
7.2 Insecurities: Box 1 and onwards
This section starts on the left-hand side of the VoE diagram (Figure 7.1) with a description of
Box 1, the diminishing environmental space (scarcity) for the Bana. The step from Box 1 to
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12 Report of forest and hunting-chief of Mogodé, (Chef de Poste Forestier et de Chasse 2000) which corre-
sponds with the life history of Ngoura himself (interview November 2000).
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Box 2 is not only caused by environmental insecurities. It is a complex of personal, socio-polit-
ical, economic and environmental factors and insecurities (see Chapter 3, Insecurity Complex)
that shape the strategies of the Bana. These are the influencing factors, mentioned in the dia-
gram, that decide whether or not the actors will enter into Box 2 or use an ‘escape’ route.
So, after a description of the environmental situation, I will examine the other (possible)
insecurities of the Bana, in the human, economic and social domains. 
7.2.1 Environmental insecurities
Physical basis
Soils
Because the Mandara Mountains form a volcanic range with soils consisting of partly weath-
ered volcanic deposits (lithosols) one would think that the soils are fertile. However, this is not
the case everywhere. The mountain plateau of the Kapsiki, for example, is less fertile than the
eastern plains of the Diamaré and the area around Kaélé. On the other hand, the Bana have set-
tled on pedologically better land than their northern neighbours, the Kapsiki (Mohammaddou
1984: 147).
The whole Mandara range has a basis of gneiss, anatexite and granite. This means rocks
with a medium texture and a biotite and amphibole13 varying content. Because of differences
in local conditions of pedogenesis, alteration products, and thus intrinsic fertility parameters,
differ per locality. In addition, simple rocks with a rough texture can be found that contain only
a small amount of ferro-magnetic minerals. These soils weather into a very rough quartzite
over time and that is not the best agricultural basis. The whole region is dominated by sandy
soils, interspersed locally with some argilic soils or those which have planosolic properties
(not very suitable for agriculture, because of water-impermeability), or which contain high lev-
els of carbonates.
In Oudda, the extended village of the agriculturalists, the soil is skeletal with a lot of small
stones and a large variation in the sandy fraction. The land consists mostly of régosolic14 soils
with washed aspects. The useable layers are not very deep and have deficient physical proper-
ties. The pedoclimate is dry, especially in eroded and furrowed regions. This type of soil has a
high risk of erosion. According to Brabant and Gavaud (1985: Carte des Terres) these lands
are only suitable for the maintenance of mountain agriculture and the production of subsis-
tence crops. 
In addition, soils of alluvial and colluvial origin, locally hydromorph, can be found that
offer better agricultural possibilities. However, more to the south the soils contain increasing-
ly less iron. Kila to the north has the same type of soils, although supplemented locally with
soils with vertic properties which constitute good agricultural land. 
Between Oudda and Kila, the area of the contested pasture, there is a wide pocket of very
sandy soils which are deep and have a rough texture but which also have a dry pedoclimat.
Water reserves in the soil are marginal. Like the other predominant soil type, these soils have
a high erosion risk and deficient physical properties. Brabant and Gavaud (1985) consider
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13 Biotite consists of an ion-rich mixture of, among others, potassium, magnesium, aluminium, Amphiboles
are magnesium-ion silicates with traces of many other elements. 
14 A regosol is a type of azonal (with insufficient horizon development) soil consisting of shallow, medium- to
fine-textured, unconsolidated parent material derived from freshly deposited alluvium or sands.
these soils suitable for forest and pastures, but only marginally suitable for other rain-fed agri-
culture15. 
In short, the soils of the Mandara Plateau are less fertile than might be expected. Where
sand dominates, the production of sorghum becomes difficult. The large quantity of stones hin-
ders cultivation and the high level of vulnerability to erosion and water shortage makes agri-
culture here a risky undertaking.
Climate
As explained in Chapter 4, their high altitude means the Mandara Mountains form a pocket of
different temperature and precipitation conditions than their latitudinal position would suggest.
A comparison between the two research areas situated at the same latitude (from approxi-
mately 10°15 to 10°25) reveals a 200 mm/year difference in rainfall. In the Bana district of
Guili rainfall exceeded an average of 1000 mm/year over the last 50 years, compared to 800
mm in the Diamaré plain described in Chapter 5. The temperatures here are lower than in the
plain: maximum temperatures are two degrees lower than in the study area of Chapter 5, while
mean minimum temperatures are one degree less. In addition, diurnal temperature differences
are higher outside the mountains. Despite the higher rainfall and lower temperatures, annual
potential evaporation is still higher than precipitation. 
Table 7.2.1 Average annual rainfall per period (in mm)
a = Data based on L’Hôte (2000). 1944 – 1969 data from Mogodé is not available because the Mogodé pluvio
metric station only came into existence in 1970
b = Data based on Beauvillain (1995)
c = Data based on archives of pluviometric stations (copied January 2001)
d = Annual data is not available. L’Hôte (2000: 19) only gives a 25 year annual mean of 1030 mm
The actual rainfall patterns for the middle range of the Mandara Mountains are recorded in the
lists of the different pluviometric stations in the region, as shown in Table 7.2.1. The monitoring
centres of Bourah in the South, and Mogodé and Sir further north are the closest to the Oudda
and Kila areas. It has to be underlined, however, that the real numbers in the study area may dif-
fer because of substantial differences in rainfall per locality, both in amount and over time.
Although many uncertainties exist with regard to the rainfall figures16, and different authors
give different numbers, in general it can be stated (and read from the Table) that precipitation
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15 CPCS calls this ‘washed tropical soils with colluvial contributions, ferruginous’, and FAO speaks of ‘white
and sandy luvisols’ (Brabant and Gavaud 1985).
16 For example Beauvillain (1995) notes a total lack of data for 1965, 1969, 1970 and 1972, and a lack of the
August data in 1971 at the Bourah station. For Sir data are lacking for several months of 1960, 1967, 1968,
1973 and 1991.
1944 - 1960 - 1965 - 1970 - 1975 - 1980 - 1985 - 1990 - 1996 -
1969a 1964b 1969b 1974b 1979b 1984b 1989b 1994b 2000c
Mokolo 1035 1078.4 1080.1 962.1 1099.9 888.4 956.5 1112.8 n.av.
Mogodé n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av.d n.av.d n.av.d n.av.d n.av.d 926
Sir 1085 1054.2 1186.3 863.2 1138.1 1035.7 836.5 972.7 1113
Bourah 960 1092.1 1153.8 976.6 945.0 612.7 826.4 1061.7 1084
diminished during the 1970s and 1980s due to droughts in the early years of these decades. In
this period the decline in rain was especially concentrated in the two early months and the end
months of the rainy season. That means that not only total precipitation diminished, but also
that the cultivation period decreased, especially in the more important months of ploughing
and sewing. Although this phenomenon was more obvious further north, Hallaire (1991: 20)
states that several southern Mandara Mountains inhabitants changed their agricultural systems
because of this precipitation insecurity. Indeed, several of my interviewees also stated that they
had adopted the quicker maturing red sorghum species in stead of the white varieties that can
only be harvested in December. 
From the beginning of the ‘90s onwards the amount of rain increased. The five year mean
from 1995 to 2000 was good in both the Bourah as well as the Mogodé districts, according to
their pluviometric stations (see Table 7.2.1; and Table 1 and 2 in the Appendix ). 
However, insecurities did not disappear totally. The length of the rainy season in particular
showed considerable variations. For the Kila-Oudda area, extrapolating from the data of the plu-
viometric stations north and south of it, most of the years in this period cannot be called ‘secure’.
In 1996, total rainfall stayed far below normal. 1999 and 1997 both revealed a shortening of the
agricultural season because of a zero precipitation in April. In 1997 this cessation of rainfall came
after a good start in March, so many of the farmers lost their first seeds. It is still very difficult
for cultivators to anticipate the best moment to farm and to choose the best crop.
Figure 7.4 4: Mobile average precipitation over 5 years in Sir (10° 34’ N; 13° 40’ E; 920m) and in 
Bourah (10° 15’ N; 13° 31’ E; 775m); plus years with bad spreading of rain for agriculture (a
dot means that in that year the rainy season was shorter than 5 months and/or there were 
fewer than 4 consecutive months with more than 100 mm of rain) (Source: Beauvillain 
(1995) and archives pluviometric station Bourah and Sir)
During the period between 1945 and 1955 - which is interesting for the cases studied - no data
is available from the regional stations of Sir, Mogodé and Bourah. However, Beauvillain
(1995: 74 and 72) shows that the Far North suffered lower long-term means precipitation dur-
ing the 1940s and 1980s (Mokolo and Maroua data) and at the end of the 1950s, albeit a less
dramatical one (see Figure 4.3). 
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In general the surface run-off of the region (from north of Mogodé) is southwards17, which
means that the rainfall pattern more to the north is important for the off-stream in the riverbeds
of the research area (Olivry and Naah, 2000). The same applies to the filling of the aquifers in
this Atlantic basin, although Detay (2000) stresses the fact that many aquifers in the southern
Mandara Mountains are discontinuous. 
In the Sudan-Sahel zone primary production figures, and the number of people that can live
off the land in an area, are directly related to the availability of water. Those who depend on
this harsh climate are fully aware of the dangers of a lack of water. Thus, apart from official
precipitation figures and sub-surface water-content, the perception of actors of water avail-
ability is an important factor in their decisions.
Both the Bana and the Fulbe of Kila use the presence of the others in the studied neigh-
bourhood as a reason to blame these people for the reduction in surface water, both as regards
extent and duration of the flow. In the past the rivers were bigger, both groups claim. There
were more small rivers and they lasted longer, namely until April while nowadays the water
supplies have sometimes already run dry in December18. The clearance of the bush, the disap-
pearance of trees and the exposure of bare ground to unlimited sunlight and wind causes more
water evaporation and thus the drying up of more little streams and this all takes place earlier
in the year than used to be the case when the bush was used only for pastoral activities, the
herders say. On the other hand, the farmers highlight the influence of cattle. The trampling by
the cattle and their eating of every little piece of grass means the soil cannot take up all the rain
and the water runs off and disappears quickly. Both accusations are given meaning by the
research of tropical culture technicians and environmentalists19. Also blame for the late-season
bush fires, which damage either crops or pasture herbs, is placed by each of the parties on the
other and is regarded as being devastating for the water availability. 
The Fulbe from Oudda village also complain about the lack of water in the area: “When I
was a boy we could stay all year round in this area, but nowadays the rivers run dry well before
the end of the dry season.”, a 60 year old herder from the Guiki sub-neighbourhood of Oudda
explained. They do not refer to the increase in the number of agricultural fields as a cause.
They hope that the government will implement initiatives for the construction of dams in the
two bigger rivers to make up for the water need, so that they no longer have to make the dan-
gerous journey to Nigeria in the second half of the dry season.
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17 For example, the river Louti, starting just north-west of Mokolo heads south till it reaches the Bénoue in
the North Province. The first small currents of a river can be directed east or west, depending on the slopes
of the mountains, but the bigger streams of this part of the Mandara Mountains are southward bound.
18 It has to be stressed that there are some older Bana who explain the shorter duration of surface water in
the area with a wider streambed of the rivers, due to water-erosion itself, and thus a quicker off-stream.
Extension workers of the hydrology department try to encourage residents to build small dams in the
streambeds to diminish the velocity of the current during the rainy season and to give the water more time
to penetrate the soil and fill up the groundwater table (see also Hiol Hiol 1999).
19 If the infiltration of water after a downpour is hampered by soil degradation and the disappearance of veg-
etation causes the rain to reach the ground more easily, the peak-flow in the rivers increases. The run-off
in small rivers can take place so quickly that it seems as if those small rivers do not exist anymore. On the
other hand, tree clearing and the exposure of bare soil and puddles to direct sunlight can cause more evap-
oration. Then the total amount of water in general and of water that can infiltrate the soil diminishes.
In short: the physical basis of the area consists of vulnerable, intrinsically not very fertile soils
with a poor humidity regime. On the one hand, the amount of rain offers better opportunities
than could be expected at this latitude of the Sudan-Sahel zone, but on the other hand rainfall
patterns and water availability throughout the year are very variable and insecurity thereof has
increased since the 1970s.
Population densities
The actual numbers and the growth of the population of Oudda can be estimated using various
sources20. Counted against the (probable) surface of the area, this will result in population den-
sity figures, as shown in table 7.2.4.
Table 7.2.4 Surface and number of inhabitants over the years of Oudda and its neighbourhoods 
a = figures are based on the data of two recent surveys, both held in 2000 (see note 20)
b = figures are based on the information of Beauvillain (1989: 590, 598)
c = figures are based on the Guili data of Beauvillain (see b), but extrapolated
22
d = figures from “Données de Base de Programme Nationale de Vulgarisation (2000)”
e = figures are estimated, based on field visits and interviews December 2000, January 2001
f = 1987 (national) survey result, second number is estimated for 1996 (source: computer data of MIDIMA, 
January 2003)
From the table it can be seen that the population density of Oudda has risen from 13.6 people
per km2 in the 1940s to 26.3 people in the year 2000. Or, using the figures of Beauvillain
(1989): from 11.6 people per km2 in 1940 to 22.5 people23 in the 1970s. That is an increase of
around 100 %. However, there are big differences between the different neighbourhoods:
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20 Délegué Zootechnique et Vétérinair de Guili, “Données de Base de Programme Nationale de Vulgarisation”,
(2000); Délegué d’Agriculture de Bourah , “Données de base de la zone Oudda”, (2000); Beauvillain (1989);
interviews with informants of Oudda and Kila (Kubadje).
21 The number of 3,110 people in 2000 suggests a decrease in the number of inhabitants since the end of the
1970s. Although this is possible, there are no obvious reasons in the history of the region to suspect such a
decline, apart from stagnation in the 1980s as reported by Beauvillain. Therefore, it is more likely that the
higher numbers of the Délegué d'Agriculture of Bourah are correct.
22 The calculation of the Guili data has been made on the basis of a ratio of 3.5, although the surface ratio
between Guili and Oudda is 2.7. The higher ratio is chosen because Guili is a town and we expect a higher
population density there than in the village of Oudda.
1940 1961-62 1970 1976 2000 Surface
(in km2)
Oudda(recently)a 2000 not available 2700 n.av. a: 3,110 a: 116
b: 3,86321 b: 147
(210 Fulbe)
Guilib(Beauvillain) 5,933 8,932 n.av. 11,648 15,499f or 316
(+ 35 Fulbe) (+ 320 Fulbe) 15,656
Ouddac(calculated) 1,695 2,460 n.av. 3,185 n.av. n.av.
(+ 10 Fulbe) (+ 91 Fulbe)
Baliwold n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. 1,799 35
Barikid n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av 1,026 22
Wazae n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. 145 31
Hlakad n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. 893 25
Baliwol, Bariki and Hlaka have a higher population density (28.4; 27.8 and 28.7) than Waza
(3.7). Moreover, it is not only the strict population density of a specific neighbourhood that
shows the pressure on the land of that same neighbourhood. Oudda is perceived as one village
and people also use the lands of that village in other neighbourhoods than the one they live in.
The distribution is therefore uneven. The amount of surface used by people from one neigh-
bourhood in the territory of another differs.
If we compare the densities of the two neighbourhoods nearest to the contested pasture area
(Hlaka and Waza) with that of the rest of Oudda, it turns out that these two neighbourhoods
that have the most and the fiercely expressed claims in the Kubadje-Jiksa area, have the low-
est population density (see Table 7.2.5).
Table 7.2.5 Comparison of population densities in Oudda neighbourhoods
a = a Bana household comprises, on average, 3 adults and 3.2 children; a Fulbe household (in Guiki almost all
inhabitants are Fulbe, plus a few Bana wives) consists of slightly less people (five on average)
Although population densities may constitute a source of insecurity for parts of Oudda, this is
certainly not the case for the two ‘outer-neighbourhoods’, Hlaka and Waza.
Land availability
The availability of land to use for cultivation is diminishing. Whether or not the fields that for-
mer generations made available for agriculture are divided between the offspring or are still in
the collective governance of the whole extended family, the fact is that these fields were once
the property of just one person, to be used by him and his wife(s). But today they are used by
two or more generations of offspring24.   While the grandfathers’ generation had an average of
3.8 sons that reached adulthood and the fathers’ generations had an average of 4.5 sons that
reached adulthood, this means that the fields cleared by the (great-)grandfathers nowadays
have to be shared with 17.1 male family members (or their offspring). With a current mean
number of wives per household head of 1.1, roughly the same number of women have to make
use of these fields, compared with at best 2 in grandfather’s time25. In short, the surface of
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23 The number of Fulbe in Oudda in 1976 is very roughly estimated as being 120 people (a sophisticated guess
based on a figure somewhere between the numbers of 1961 and the actual numbers). According to Beauvillain
(1989), in the Bourah department the population growth was 1 to 1.4 % between 1940 and 1976.
24 Nine out of the 82 grandfathers not only cleared the bush but also (or only) inherited fields. In all the other
cases the grandfathers were the ones who started to clear the bush in the Oudda territory (see section 7.2.4
“Land allocation”). In thirty-six cases, the respondents could not state the exact amount of ha their grandfa-
thers had cleared. They only knew that it was “a lot” or “big fields”.
25 The number of wives that grandfathers had is not known. The number of wives of the father’s generation is
slightly higher than of the respondents’ generation (mean 1.5). I therefore again assume a slightly higher
mean for the grandfather’s generation and estimate there to have been 2 wives per household head. 
Surface (km2) Inhabitants People /km2 No. of householdsa
Oudda total 147 3,863 26.3 651
Hlaka-Waza 56 833 14.9 139
Bariki total 22 1,026 46.7 181
Guiki 10 210 21 42
Baliwol 35 1,799 51.3 299
fields used by 3 people two generations ago has to be shared by at least 35.9 people today26.
Furthermore, today’s household heads point out that this number is set to grow again. Although
most families are not yet complete (72 % of household heads-respondents is younger than 50
year), the mean number of sons is already more than one: namely 2.8.
Nevertheless, the Oudda territory is large. If all the land were to be usable, each person
would have access to 3.8 ha (that is 22.8 ha per household with (a mean of) 6 people). This is
far more than what is needed according to Dietz et al (2001: 198)27. However, because the area
is a mountainous one, part of the Oudda surface is not available for agriculture and several
areas are not even suitable for pasture. An estimation based on personal observation of these
unusable areas, whose slopes are too steep, which are too rocky or which consists of a
riverbed, excludes roughly 10 % of the area. That means that 3.4 ha are available per person
or 20.5 ha per household. In 1940, this was still 6.6 ha and in 1970 4.9 ha per person.
Table 7.2.6 Mean per person surface area of arable land (in 2000)
over three generations; (as private property (‘owned’), the available surface area of the total 
that is shared with the extended family, cropped and left fallow). All male respondents are 
household heads; females are mostly spouses, only 4 times household heads.
a = (n = 24) 14 respondents had only fields in private property; 10 respondents had cleared fields themselves (mean
1 ha) and thus in private property, in addition to a shared inheritance. The rest of the respondents (57 %) only
share their fields with (male) family members
b = in total 79 % of respondents share fields with family members. Of those the Table gives an estimated mean of
the available surface per household head. This estimation is based on the surface area stated for the extended
family (mostly only explained as “a lot”, with a vague indication of how many “a lot” is) divided by the num-
ber of people (male) that have to share the inherited fields
c = n = 30 (included 8 x ‘many’, counted as 5 ha each, and 1 x 11 big fields, counted as 2 ha each). 14 times these
fathers had cleared and inherited, and twice they only cleared and did not inherit.
d = n = 43 (included 29 x ‘many’, counted as 5 ha each; 5 x several number of ‘fields’ counted as 1.25 ha each; 2 x
‘8 big fields’, counted as 32 ha together). Three times these grandfathers cleared while also inheriting; once they
bought land and 6 times they only inherited. The field surface area of the other 39 grandfathers is not known
e = the first number is for 1999; the second number for 2000
f = in 1999 three of the female respondents rented fields
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26 This rough calculation is uncertain in two ways. One is the fact that some of the clearances were carried out
by great-grandfathers. The number of generations using those fields is therefore higher and thus the number
of offspring is also higher. The other uncertainty has to do with the fact that 20 % of fathers cleared fields as
well. In those cases, the number of offspring is correct but the number of fields to be shared is higher. These
two effects are considered here as eliminating each other.
27 Dietz et al (2001) calculate a basic need of 0.25 ha per person for subsistence agriculture in the Sahel-Soudan
zone. It has to be said, however, that such a figure heavily depends on the type of soil, the climate, etc.
Ha per Number of  Number of  Ha per Number of Number of
man men men woman women women
(n = 82) that bought that rented (n = 43) that bought that rented
Respondent('owned') 3.6a 4 n.a. 0 0 n.a.
Respondent, part of sharedb 2.3 n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. n.a.
Father (owned) 5.7c 3 0 0 0 n.a.
Fatherpart of shared 3.2 n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. n.a.
Grandfather(owned) 9.2d 1 0 0 0 n.a.
Respondent(cropped)e 3.2 - 4.5 n.a. 2 1.7 - 2.1 n.a. 1f
Respondent(fallow)e 4.6 - 4.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The rough estimations of the inhabitants themselves also show a decline in land availability.
This is shown in Table 7.2.6 which is based on figures the respondents have come up with. The
data on ownership are facts (except for some contested fields, but these represent only a very
small proportion of the total area). Data on shared fields has been guessed by respondents and
the same applies to data on fallow. Because guesses have been made within the same range for
both the current generation as well as for the former generation, the data is useful to compare
the different generations and the perception of respondents on their field position. It is remark-
able that respondents seem to ignore a large part of the Oudda surface. It may be assumed that
fallow lands are underestimated, especially when they are shared with an extended family28.
Together with the data in Table 7.2.7 it can be stated that long(er) term fallow is not counted as
such29. Although land availability is diminishing, if one counts the amount of fallow together
with the amount of land cropped, land availability per person can still be regarded as high, also
in the mind of the respondents.
All calculations made here give a picture of mean land availability. Although this general
picture is not that bad, the reality for several individuals was very different. As in other vil-
lages, there are considerable land inequalities in Oudda (see Table 7.2.7). As mentioned before,
women do not own land and have to search for land to rent or borrow.
Table 7.2.7 Range of available land surface area (for male household heads; n = 82) in quarts
The six people in the first column have access to land of less than what Dietz et al (2001) con-
sider to be the minimum for subsistence of one person. The second column describes a field
surface area which is still too small for a family of six people. In the not so fertile area of
Oudda, and with the risk of too dry years in an area of low soil humidity also the people in the
third column can be regarded as having a vulnerable position. So, extrapolating from respon-
dents to the whole of Oudda, the land inequality in Oudda puts at least 39 %, but perhaps even
56 %, of households in danger.
When asked about the fertility of their fields only two people with less than 5.9 quart of land
at their disposal mentioned having only fields with poor fertility. Of those with 6 to 14.9
quarts, two people mentioned having only poor fields (see Table 7.2.8). All the rest have good
or a combination of good, bad and/or intermediate fields. Five people do not have personal
fields at all and describe the fields they use as ‘sufficiently fertile’. Thus, with regard to land
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Available quarts 0 - 0.9 1 - 5.9 6.0 - 9.9 10 - 14.9 15 - 19.9 20 - 29.9 30 - 39.9 40 - 99.9 > 100 ?
Number of male 6 26 14 9 2 8 8 4 2 3
household heads
28 Counter-questioning on this issue during follow-up interviews in 2003 indeed revealed an underestimation
of fallow land, partly because former fields situated on the slopes of formerly inhabited hills are not consid-
ered as ‘again useful’. Respondents explained that they are “Too steep and too much wild animals up there,
nowadays”.
29 This mis-calculation can be due to a language problem (for example, different words for long term and short
term fallow) but, when discussing the issue with some interpreters, I could not distinguish any linguistic
problems regarding the concept of ‘fallow’.
quality, only four households have real problems. Two of those are no part of the 39 % of peo-
ple without enough surface area. 
Table 7.2.8 Land availability versus land quality (n = 82, but 38 people have more than one type of land)
Commoditisation of land
As can be seen in Table 7.2.6 commoditisation of land in Oudda is not that developed (as yet).
Only four men of the current generation have bought some of their fields. Although respon-
dents indicate that the price of fields has increased over the years (for example a five time
increase for a normal size field in the plain from 40,000 Fcfa twenty years ago to 100,000 Fcfa
now), they also say that arable surface is still ‘payable’. Of course the price depends on the
location (far or near the settlements, on slopes, etc.) and the soil quality, but that was no dif-
ferent in the past. It has to be added, however, that a price increase of just more than two times
over the last twenty years, means a de facto decrease, because of inflation and the early 1990s
Fcfa devaluation (see chapter 4).
The number of people that spend money in order to rent land has also not increased marked-
ly. Over the years these numbers have changed slightly but over the generations there has been
no net increase.
Thus, the commoditisation of land does not reflect a (felt) scarcity of land.
Calorific needs and production
Amount of production
Production figures of Oudda are based on 2 different sources: one is the production recorded
by the researcher according to the respondents (that is based on memory and estimation).
Most of the farmers can only recall the production of last year and the year before (see Table
7.2.9). The second source is the production figures of the village over the years recorded by
the sub-departmental agricultural service (settled in Bourah, but with both a district and a vil-
lage representative).
The production figures per ha, as given by the respondents in Table 7.2.9, are different
from those of the agricultural services in Bourah over the same years (see table 7.2.10). This
difference may be due to an under-estimation in the interviews (respondents tend to mention
a lower production to hide their wealth and to appear poorer because that may lead to assis-
tance being provided). On the other hand, the method of the Agricultural Services for meas-
uring village production is based on household samples and extrapolation. Depending on
which area is used as a sample source, production figures can differ greatly. The interviews
for this study were mainly held in the more outlying neighbourhoods of Oudda where it is,
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Available quarts 0 - 0.9 1 - 5.9 6.0 - 9.9 10 - 14.9 15 - 19.9 20 - 29.9 30 - 39.9 40 - 99.9 > 100 ?
Good 1 23 10 7 2 2 7 2 2 4
Moderate 0 2 4 3 1 4 3 2 1 0
Bad 0 13 4 2 1 2 3 0 2 4
No opinion 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
for example, more difficult to use chemical fertilisers 30 and where production may therefore
be lower31. 
According to the respondents in the interviews, in the year 2000 the millet yield was espe-
cially disappointing due to a lack of rain at the end of the rainy season. Groundnuts produced
reasonably well (although still with a lower per ha production than the year before). However,
the surplus, which was due to an increase in cultivated surface area, caused the price on the
market to drop. The Bana did not earn enough from the sale of beans and groundnuts to buy
sufficient cereals. 
Bambara groundnuts, which seem to generate a good additional income, are a risky crop.
From time to time, for reasons which are not apparent, a field stops producing this crop. The
Bana themselves explain this on the basis of ‘the spell of the rainbow’. This means that,
according to them, a rainbow stood above this field and from then on the field refuses Bambara
groundnuts.
Table 7.2.9 Production and surface area used by respondents in 1999 and 2000
n = 125 (82 men and 43 women); most of the respondents live in the ‘outer’ neighbourhoods 
of Oudda and have their fields there or even further in the bush.
a = for all cereals the mean is given for only men (n = 82), as women do not cultivate these crops (only on very
rare occasions) 
b = measured only for men, as women do not own land. The estimates of fallow land are very rough. Only those
fields that have been used recently or are to be used in the near future seem to have been counted32
The ‘per ha’ production data of the Agricultural Service over the years does not show a down-
ward trend. Even a climatic influence is difficult to discern. It seems as if, in general, used
fields are fertile enough to keep up production.
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30 During the rainy season, Oudda-Bariki and neighbourhoods further down the road are no longer accessible
because of running rivers.
31 That the Agricultural Service data is faulty can be seen from the fact that the total production surface area of
all of Oudda suddenly diminished from more than 4500 ha in 1997 and 1998 to less than 1500 ha in 1999 (in
2001 it increased again to nearly 2000 ha). The line officer in charge in 2002 could not explain this shift.
32 Why the fallow surface in 2000 seems to be half as big as in 1999 cannot be explained. Apparently respon-
dents have only counted those fields as fallow that they have been using the year before. Long(er) term fal-
low is not counted at all.
1999 2000
Mean prod. / Mean surf. / Prod. / surf. Mean prod / Mean surf / Prod. /surf.
resp. (kg) resp. (ha) (kg / ha) resp. (kg) resp. (ha) (kg / ha)
Red sorghuma 373 0.8 484 348 1.0 344
White sorghum 196 0.5 438 141 0.7 201
Maize 404 0.33 1244 360 0.42 858
Rice 18 0.05 382 20 0.07 308
Peanut 273 0.67 411 429 1.08 399
Beans 97 0.36 271 121 0.47 256
Bamb.nuts 147 0.53 275 162 0.68 237
Total 1,174 3.24 449 1,259 4.42 342
Fallowb n.a. 3.23 n.a. n.a. 1.59 n.a.
Cereals 993 1.68 637 869 2.2 395
Table 7.2.10 Production per ha (kg and kcal) based on Agricultural Service data and interview data.
Needs
When only counting cereals, an average household (consisting of 3.0 adults and 3.2 children,
and thus with a need of 1424 kg of cereals) generally had a shortage of 299 kg of cereals in
1999 and 389 kg in 2000 (see Table 7.2.11). Of the household heads interviewed33, 58 % did
not produce the amount of cereals needed according to FAO standards34 to meet the energy
requirements of their compound members and themselves (both in 1999 and in 2000).
Nevertheless, 16 % of respondents claim that they are very happy in Oudda because of the
abundance of food.   Moreover, almost all respondents said they were satisfied with the 1999
production. On average, the cereal production is sufficient to meet the needs of a household,
according to respondents’ own ideas. 
Table 7.2.11 Cereals needs and production per mean household in Oudda per year (in kg), according to 
the own perception of the respondents and the FAO calculation.
The discrepancy may be due to the fact that the Bana do not get their calories from cereals
alone. Although beans and groundnuts are cultivated for the market, it does not mean that they
do not eat these crops as well. Everybody nibbles groundnuts while peeling them and those
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33 82 household heads were interviewed, but 10 of them did not know their production.
34 The FAO (FAO/WHO/UNU 1985) norm for calorific need is 2500 kcal/adult (2300/woman and 2800/man)
and 1670 kcal/per child per day (my own summation from different age-group figures); 1 kg cereals contains
3342 kcal (3000-3600 kcal).
1997 1998 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001
(Agric.serv) (Agric.serv) (Agric.serv) (Interviews) (Agric.serv) (Interviews) (Agric.serv)
Mais (kg/ha) 1,610 1,920 1,600 1,244 1,100 858 1,200
Mais (kcal/ha) 5,115.9 6,101.0 5,084.3 3,952.9 3,495.4 2,726.4 3,813.1
Sorghum (kg/ha) 900 850 870 461 910 273 800
Sorghum (kcal/ha) 2,781.9 2,627.4 2,689.2 1,424.9 2,812.8 1,894.9 2,472.8
Rice (kg/ha) 1,490 1,600 1,530 382 1,300 308 1,200
Rice (kcal/ha) 5,478.4 5,882.9 5,625.5 1,404.5 4,779.8 1,132.5 4,412.2
Peanuts (kg/ha) 600 1,290 1,300 411 1,390 399 990
Peanuts (kcal/ha) 3,163.3 6,801.1 6,853.9 2,166.9 7,328.4 2,103.6 5,219.5
Beans (kg/ha) 680 450 490 271 600 256 700
Beans (kcal/ha) 2,325.3 1,538.8 1,675.6 926.7 2,051.7 875.4 2,393.7
Bamb.nuts (kg/ha) 1,210 1,020 1,180 275 1,300 237 1,110
Bamb.nuts (kcal/ha) 4,137.6 3,487.9 4,,035.0 940.4 4,445.4 810.4 3,795.7
Needed Produced
1999 2000
According to respondents 820 1,125 1,035
Acc. to FAO calculations 1,424 n.a. n.a.
groundnuts that have a lesser quality are used in the sauce together with a certain proportion
of the good quality groundnuts. Beans are used in the sauce and also in fritters, made to be sold
at the local markets and partly for household consumption. Some households also produce
potato and sweet potato, manioc and mostly also Bambara groundnuts. Table 7.2.12 shows the
total agricultural calorific production.
Table 7.2.12 Comparison of calorific needs and calorific production per (mean) household per year
The table shows that the village produces enough calories. Yet, poorer families do not meet
their requirements (see Table 7.2.13). Discrepancies in the village are considerable with 15 of
the families (20%) who have a surplus, producing two to four times what they need in one or
both years. Sometimes this could make up for an enormous shortage in the other year. In other
cases the overproduction was structural. On the other hand, shortages could also be enor-
mous. Thirty-two (43 %) of the households had to manage with a   production in calories in
one or both years of less than half of what was needed, sometimes35 even with no production
at all.
Table 7.2.13 Percentage of households without enough cereals or calories
a = people’s perception of need measured against production
b = FAO’s figures of need measured against total agricultural calorific production
c = this means half of what is needed or less
From time to time, for example when guests are visiting or on festival days, people eat meat
(mostly from their own small ruminants or chicken, or meat bought at the market). More often,
spare money is used to buy some dried fish on the market to put into the sauce. Those fami-
lies with cows can drink milk, but they can not and do not consume that much.
Next to these agricultural products, people can eat gathered wild products. The bush area in
between the fields and surrounding the village offers several opportunities to find wild veg-
etables and starchy roots, as well as small animals, like mouse, birds, sometimes even a mon-
key. Although according to Cameroonian law it is forbidden to eat these last, villagers do enjoy
the meat when they are able to catch one.
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35 In 1999, seventeen households did not produce anything, according to their testimony (= 23 %).
Kcal needed Kcal produced 1999 Kcal produced 2000
Oudda 4,820,341 6,269,719 6,959,578
Not enough cerealsa Not enough caloriesb
1999 2000 Both years 1999 2000 Both years
General shortage 35 38 19 43 30 20
Grave shortagec 32 15 7 38 15 12
Cereals 993 1.68 637 869 2.2 395
7.2.2 Human domain insecurities
Health insecurities
Every inhabitant of Oudda complains about the lack of a medical post in the village. During
the dry season medical care can be obtained in the hospital of Guili, 8 km down the sandy road.
From Baliwol, public transport in the form of motorcycles can be used, but most inhabitants
do not have enough money to do so. Otherwise a donkey or a bicycle has to be used to trans-
port ill people. But, again, there are not many inhabitants of Oudda who have one of these, so
in emergencies they have to borrow some form of transport. And, antenatal and postnatal care
is only provided at the hospital of Guili, except for some mid-wife type of assistance in the vil-
lage based on the practical experience of older women. Unfortunately, in the rainy season (3
to 4 months) the road to Guili is blocked by at least two big rivers. Inhabitants of all Oudda
neighbourhoods highlight the related death toll. Typical tropical diseases, such as malaria and
tuberculosis, as well as the drinking water related amoebas and various intestinal pathological
bacteria and worms are threats to people’s health. However, there is no money to purchase
modern medicines. 
All Oudda neighbourhoods have one or more water wells, but because these are open and
because people use loose ropes and buckets to draw the water, they become easily contami-
nated. This adds to the number of intestinal diseases. When working in far-off fields (some-
times more than one hour’s walk), people drink water from streams and pools. Later in the year
these are heavily contaminated as they are also used by cattle, for bathing, etc.
Fortunately, traditional health systems are still in place. These are mostly more accessible
to villagers as they are more embedded in the physical and social fabric of the community and
such services do not (always) have to be paid for in cash. Abundant bush areas means the gath-
ering of ingredients for traditional medicines is not a problem. However, some of the tradi-
tional doctors complain about a diminishing of certain species, both plants and animals, whose
leaves or skin particles are, for example, indispensable. Younger ‘doctors’ explain that they try
to work together with their ‘western’ colleagues: “each has his precise task”36.
Educational insecurities 
As described in Chapter 4 and in the case of the Diamaré and Tupuri regions in Chapter 5, edu-
cational possibilities diminished compared to the early Eighties of the last century. With the
economic crisis and the following Structural Adjustment Programmes of the World Bank and
IMF, the right of Cameroonian citizens to have free education has become more a written than
an executed right. A decrease in the number of training places and thus a lack of properly edu-
cated teachers has reduced the quality of education and increased the class sizes. In Oudda
there are sometimes more than 100 pupils per class. As is the case elsewhere, the primary
school in Oudda, located in the centre of the village, is run by an educated, government-paid
director, assisted by several so-called ‘parent teachers’. The latter are young men with at least
some years of secondary school education themselves who are paid by the parents of children
attending the school. Sending children to school therefore means the payment of a school fee.
The director does not live in Oudda, but in Guili, so when the rivers are swollen (in and direct-
ly after the rainy season), he cannot reach his pupils. In the case of the outer neighbourhood
of Waza, the centre of the village is still two hours away. Parents who want to send their chil-
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36 Interview with Hamadou, 32 years old, Oudda Bariki, January 2001.
dren to school complain about the distance. They state that it is too far for the little ones and
there are too many possibilities for the elder ones to detour on the way. “We do not have any
control as to whether they reach the school or not. The teacher never comes by this way to
inform us about whether our children have been playing truant.”37
In order to attend secondary school, pupils have to leave the area. Apart from the school
fees and the books, notebooks and school uniforms, they need money to find lodgings. Several
of them try to stay with relatives in town but even then cash or some other reimbursement has
to be given. For girls, the fact that they have to be ‘away from home’ and the necessity of stay-
ing in boarding houses diminishes their chances of higher education. Parents are hesitant about
whether they should send their daughters away or not because they fear a lack of protection.
They fear that the loose moral codes in the ‘big city’ will culminate in a dishonouring of their
daughters. They therefore prefer not to let them go. 
In addition, most parents, especially those that have attended secondary school themselves,
are perfectly aware of the lack of options for using this education. They all came back to the
village to become a farmer, although in their schooldays they dreamt of careers in govern-
mental offices. Even church-based support for learning more about agricultural modernisation
seems to be diminishing.
7.2.3 Economic insecurities
Cash Crop insecurities
Several elder cultivators pointed out that cotton used to be produced in the area, mostly for
personal use by weavers for traditional cloth and ‘ganduras’38. The rise of commercial cotton
cultivation in the rest of the Far North province meant it almost totally disappeared from the
mountains. Instead, the groundnut production for the market has gained a big footing in the
region. More than 90 % of the Bana with some acres of land at their disposal produce ground-
nuts (at least from time to time). Unfortunately, the groundnut price changes enormously over
the year and between the years. Large-scale merchants buy the groundnuts directly after the
harvest (November-December) at the regional markets like Guili, when the local producers
have had the time to peel them. They calculate on the basis of information from various
sources (rumours from Douala, the international export centre, about harvests in other
groundnut producing countries; direct information about production in the rest of Cameroon
itself and from, for example, Nigeria) and build a security margin into their purchasing prices.
Nevertheless, variations are big enough to entice people to cultivate groundnuts the year after
a year of good prices. During this second year (with normal precipitation), production
increases in such a way that the price falls. The fact that people have chosen to cultivate more
groundnuts and less grain leads to a relative lack of cereals. That, in turn, increases market
prices in a time that earnings from groundnuts are lower than expected. Thus, although
groundnuts are a cash crop related to the international market, local producers are confront-
ed by a local ‘pig cycle’. The world market price determines benefit or loss only in the case
of the bigger traders. 
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37 Interview with Kapoua, Oudda Waza, January 2001.
38 The big cotton dress from shoulders to almost the ground, in accord with Fulbe fashion, worn by men.
Farm animals and insecurities
With regard to animal husbandry the situation in the Oudda territory is unclear. As explained
in Chapter 4, counting the number of animals present is a difficult undertaking. However, sev-
eral organisations have tried to measure and estimate both cattle and small ruminants.
In most parts of the Sahel-Sudan zone, cattle numbers decreased during the two drought peri-
ods at the end of the last century. In contrast, and according to Seignobos (2000e: 119) the num-
ber of cattle in Mayo Tsanaga department doubled between 1960 and 1980, mostly due to incom-
ing Fulbe who, in these dry years, were attracted by the watering places in the dry season and the
harvest residues on which to feed their cattle. In 1980, the Mogodé and Guili districts had 25 –
50 cattle/km2 (0.5 – 1 per person). The increase in the department continued up till 198639, fol-
lowed by a steady decrease until, in 1995, the lowest total number of 73,250 was reached (two
years later than the provincial lowest amount). From then on, cattle numbers increased again. 
Table 7.2.14 Numbers of cattle over the years for the department and 2 sub-departments
a = numbers of 1986 – 1995 could not be obtained because Mogodé sub-department was only installed in 1996;
before that it was part of sub-department Mokolo.
The Bana themselves never were a cattle-keeping group. However, the rich used to have some
cows (mostly of the Kapsiki type40). As is the habit in Sub-Saharan Africa, a surplus of money
is invested in cattle as a bank deposit. These days, in the whole mountain range, a shift to zebu
cattle is taking place to the detriment of the Kapsiki cattle. Unfortunately this shift also means
a higher risk to the health status of the cattle, as the Kapsiki race is more hardy, more used to
the mountain environment and more Trypanosomiasis resistant (important for future raising
programmes). 
The Bana explain their current preference for Zebu by highlighting the longer growth peri-
od of this race. Kapsiki cattle are relatively small and reach their adult height quicker. They do
not grow like Zebu and therefore you gain less from your investment. For this same reason even
the value of young Zebu is higher on the market. The shift means bigger cattle, with a higher
slaughter weight, and a higher fodder intake versus growth ratio. At the regional animal market
in Guili, slaughter animals are more expensive than animals bought for labour or for enlarge-
ment of one’s herd. The price of a young adult bull for slaughter, seemingly in good condition,
can reach 120,000 Fcfa. Zebu calves which are approximately six months old and which are in
good shape can cost 40 to 60,000 Fcfa. However, a lot of cattle trading takes place at home
where Nigerian ‘smugglers’ pay more and police do not interfere by demanding taxes41.
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39 Seignobos (2000e) mentions a decrease of cattle in Mayo Tsanaga from 1980 to 1988, except for Bourah
sub-department (increase of up to 25 %).
40 The small Bos taurus race, see chapters 4 and 6.
41 During my stay no Kapsiki cattle were sold and none of the owners could tell me the usual price. They only
thought “probably I can get the same for a 6 month old calve as for a good sheep”, but this was not proven. I
could not find potential or even imaginary buyers with whom to discuss prices.
1986 1992 1995 2000
Mayo Tsanaga 125,407 n.av. 73,250 167,786
Mogodéa n.av. n.av. n.av. 15,875
Bourah 13,705 13,164 10,675 11,448
For the Bana the high number of incoming cattle in the dry years made their position as cat-
tle keepers weaker because of the competition over fodder. With the decline of incoming Fulbe
cattle, the Bana took up more cattle keeping than was their custom. This is partly due to the
increase in draught animals. One generation ago almost nobody used a plough. There were, of
course, some donkeys for transport, but oxen for labour were rare. In 2000, 33 % of the pop-
ulation already owned either donkeys or cattle for draught. To work with the plough a farmer
needs two animals, as the soils are considered to be heavy42. Thus, the step to purchasing a
plough and accompanying animals is a big one because a lot of money is involved.
Actual cattle numbers in Oudda (see Table 7.2.15) show that Oudda experiences more or
less the same trend of increase as the rest of the department. Although the whole village is not
yet at the 1980 densities, Fulbe cattle keepers seem to be reaching former cattle numbers.
Table 7.2.15 Number and density of cattle in 2000
a = This data is based on the vaccination campaign of May 2000 carried out by Gailaye Yata, the local veterinary
officer of Guili. It is very likely that at the time of vaccination the majority of the cattle were on their dry sea-
son transhumance to Nigeria and elsewhere43
b = In the case of Kubadje the vaccination that generated the numbers was performed in November 2000, a time
at which the herds had not yet left the area
c = This number is calculated on the basis of the assumption that the Fulbe of Oudda graze their cattle solely in
the neighbouring Boubakary Nené reserve (see Figure 7.3). The actual density will be lower because they also
use other bush-forest land in the vicinity
d = This number is based on the assumption that the Kubadje Fulbe graze their cattle solely in their own reserve.
However, they not only use the harvest stubbles on Kila fields as well, but also the more extended pasture area
of Modélé
For the Bana an ‘owner’ means a (male) household head. It is very rare for a woman to pos-
sess cattle. When they do, they are always added to a brother’s or uncle’s herd. In the case of
the Fulbe the situation is different. Women inherit cattle from fathers and mothers, receive cat-
tle as gifts, etc44. Because all the cattle of an extended family (that is of a father and his sons,
together with the cattle of sisters) are herded in one herd, here an ‘owner’ means the head of a
group of households who manages the herd.
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42 This does not correspond with the information on soil properties as given by soil scientists (Brabant and
Gavaud 1985): according to them the majority of the soils consist of a high sand fraction (see section 7.2.1).
Normally sand is easy to till. Perhaps it has to do with the stones in the fields.
43 According to the veterinary service (animal husbandry line-office) of Bourah that also serves Oudda, cattle
numbers increased between 1998 and 2002 from 1468 to 1829. Again, these numbers are claimed to be based
on vaccinated cattle. The discrepancy between the numbers of the Guili veterinarian and the administration in
the sub-departmental headquarter Bourah remains a mystery.
44 See, for example, De Bruijn and Van Dijk (1995) or Moritz (2003).
Vaccinated Number Mean cattle Cattle 
cattle of owners per owner (+range) per km2
Oudda totala 2,587 106 24.4 (2 - 320) 17.5
Oudda Bana 1,540 95 16 (2 - 135) n.av.
Oudda Fulbe 1,047 11 95 (4 - 320) 42c
Kubadje Fulbeb 650 17 38 (8 - 90) 325d
Table 7.2.16. Division of cattle over the households (numbers of cattle based on vaccination numbers in 
2000)45
In the whole of Oudda the number of Bana households is approximately 609. There are also
42 Fulbe households. Of the Bana households 95 possess cattle: that is 16 %, but the range of
cattle per household is considerable (see table 7.2.16)46. Moreover, the further into the bush
(away from Guili) you go the lower the percentage of cattle owners, except in the case of the
Fulbe neighbourhood. 
Table 7.2.17 Numbers of small ruminants. (Department, 2 sub-departments, village)
a = Figures for 1986 – 1995 are based on the year reports of the departmental animal husbandry service
b = Figures for 2000 are based on data of the provincial animal husbandry service, except for Oudda itself which
are based on the sub-departmental animal husbandry service, Bourah
c = One may wonder whether this figure is correct because normally the number of goats is higher than that of
sheep. In 1986, this was indeed the case in the other sub-departments of Mayo Tsanaga.
d = The fact that the numbers of goats for Bourah and Mogodé are exactly the same makes one wonder whether
these figures are true
e = The steady decline in numbers was already noticeable earlier than 1986
Establishing numbers of small ruminants is more difficult still. In general, though, these num-
bers show the same trend as those of cattle. In 1980, the Western half of the Mandara Mountains
in the Kapsiki and Bana region had a small ruminant density of 75 – 100 animals /km2. Further
to the east, where the human population density is lower, these numbers were 25 – 50 sheep and
goats per km2. The decrease in ruminant numbers in Bourah started later in the case of small
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45 The fact that cattle numbers are very vague and unreliable can be illustrated by the difference between the
vaccination numbers and the numbers mentioned during interviews. Of the 82 male respondents, 21 men-
tioned that they possess cattle (with 26 % a higher than village level counted during vaccination). Most of
those have more cattle vaccinated than they say they possess. A possible explanation may be that small own-
ers have added their cattle to the herd of a bigger owner for the purpose of vaccination.
46 Both the percentage of households with cattle and the mean number of cattle per household is much lower
than in Dzambou (27 % owners and 18 cattle per owner) if the Fulbe are not counted.
Inhabitants Households Cattle Number of owners Cattle per 
owner 
(+range)
Baliwol 1,799 300 764 55 14 (2 - 70)
Bariki (without Guiki) 816 136 175 22 8 (2 - 25)
Waza-Hlaka 1,038 173 547 23 24 (4 - 135)
Guiki (= Fulbe) 210 42 1,101 11 100 (4 - 320)
1986 1992 1995a 2000b
goat sheep goat sheep goat sheep goat sheep
Bourah 9,353c 14,290 23,429 15,446 14,600 9,599 21,398 12,126
Oudda n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. 4,325 3,650
Mogodé n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. 21,398d 12,338
MayoTsanaga 213,048e 201,094e 190,185 122,581 127,732 107,719 213,983 121,259
ruminants than in the case of cattle and also later than at departmental level, although it was in
the same order. The departmental decline and the sub-departmental increase contradicts Seig-
nobos’ claim that there was a stable number of small ruminants in the whole province from 1985
to 1990 (Seignobos 2000e: 119). The growth of the numbers of both groups of animals restart-
ed in the same 1995-1996 period. Contrary to cattle numbers for the whole department, but in
accordance with those of Bourah sub-department, the numbers of small ruminants in 2000 had
not yet been not totally restored to the 1986 levels (see Table 7.2.17).
In Oudda itself, according to the animal husbandry service in Bourah, small ruminant numbers
increased from 1999 to 2002. Officially, 5,217 sheep and 5,107 goats were counted at that
time. This already means 70 animals per km2 and therefore almost a return to 1980 levels. But
the same service data reveals high extremes over these 4 years. For example there were only
1,013 goats in 1999 and only 1,722 sheep in 2001, after a high of 4,800 sheep in 1999. These
fluctuations can generally be attributed to epidemics, the employees of the service explain. But
they do not have any idea as to which diseases take these tolls, let alone how to eradicate them.
The keeping, breeding, diseases and deaths of small animals is a personal affair. These num-
bers reveal the vulnerability of the ‘normal’ Bana and their insecurity with regard to the so-
called ‘poor men’s cows’.
Also those people who try to raise chicken are confronted by contagious diseases every
year. More than half of the chicken owners complain about chicken deaths over the last year,
sometimes affecting all their birds. Agricultural extension workers have started vaccination
programmes to counter the huge numbers of deaths, but farmers are not used to vaccinating
poultry. If vaccination takes place in an already contaminated environment, the chickens will
not be protected and owners think it is due to the vaccination that the birds die.
The insecurity of the Fulbe of Oudda has other causes. An increase in the number of cattle
means an increased risk of the spread of diseases. According to them their herds are not grow-
ing but instead the total number of cattle in the region is increasing because the Bana and
Kapsiki have started cattle grazing47. They complain about the diminishing access to harvest
remains and the rising competition for fodder. The Fulbe estimate that 22 herds of 50 head (=
1100 head) stay in their Boubakary Néné reserve - with a surface area of approximately 25 km2
- during the rainy season (see Figure 7.3). This is in addition to quite a lot of herds that trespass
on their way to or from Maroua district. The report by the head of the departmental animal hus-
bandry service (Djonwé 2002) speaks of 713 cattle from the Diamaré in the mountains and 630
cattle trespassing from Hina to the north. Not all these cattle pass through Oudda and Kila, but
some do. That means that in the rainy season the number of TLU per ha surpasses the 0.3.
Although the Fulbe claim that more and more Bana are keeping cattle, Table 7.2.15 and
7.2.16 together with the population numbers depicted in Table 7.2.4 show that, although quite
a number of farmers have cattle these days, it are still mainly Fulbe who contribute to the vast
number of cattle in the region. 
Households (six household members) with the possibility of slaughtering 21 cattle per year
may subsist on meat. This means they need a herd of at least 175 cattle (see Dietz et al 2001:
197-198). In Oudda there are only two Fulbe household heads who possess more than that
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47 Two surveys of the CZV of Mogodé in 1999 and 2000 show a slight decrease of cattle numbers in the whole
of Mogodé canton: 6520 head in 1999 and 5870 in 2000 (Tchamaya, 2000).
number, but they have to share with more than 6 family members. To live off the meat of small
ruminants, a six person household needs to slaughter around 140 goats a year. Given that there
are 8,000 small ruminants in Oudda, on average a household can dispose of 12.3 small rumi-
nants (two per person). If all stay alive and the off-take is 25 % per year, a household can
slaughter three animals per year. This gives them a small amount of added energy and protein.
But it is not much and it hardly ever occurs that all the animals survive the harsh conditions.
For the Bana individually, an increasing number of animals is a sign of prosperity and
reduces insecurities. For the agriculturalists in general, more ruminants are good for improv-
ing the fertility of the soils. On the other hand, too many ruminants can put excessive pressure
on the available bush land48. The issue is how to find a balance. The head of the departmental
animal husbandry service states that the mountains can still cope with an increase in cattle
without being overstocked (Djonwè 2002). With a stocking rate of 0.17 TLU/ha, Oudda indeed
still seems to have room enough. Of course, this is a general statement that has to be adjusted
for each area. The activities of the State as regards improving cattle-keeping opportunities,
such as the instalment of grazing reserves throughout the mountain range, mostly appear to be
a threat to the agricultural community49.
Thus, keeping cattle or small ruminants and even chicken is a risky undertaking because the
Bana do not have special knowledge to keep these animals healthy. It is almost impossible to
access such knowledge. Especially during the dangerous rainy season veterinary aid cannot be
reached, as the nearest post is in Guili on the other side of at least two big (seasonal) rivers.
Even the market at which medicines can be bought is in that town. In addition, official aid is
expensive. Vaccination programs do not reach most small ruminant owners or chicken own-
ers50. Individual owners of all types of farm animals have to face regular losses because of dis-
eases that cannot be treated. In the eastern part of Oudda (the region where the interviews were
held) 33 % of the households suffered from the loss of one or more herbivores over 1999 and
2000 due to disease. To that can be added losses due to theft of which 8 % of the respondents
complained.
In short, for some families the cattle (or small ruminants) they possess help them to meet their
energy and protein needs or form a safety valve in times of hardship. However, the veterinary
status and risks, together with the lack of knowledge and possibilities to care for the livestock,
make livestock keeping an insecure activity. In addition, the vast majority of people in the vil-
lage do not possess any cattle at all and even small ruminants are not owned by every house-
hold. Those without even a goat or sheep do not have anything in reserve.
Non-agricultural activities and insecurities
Off-farm activities
The economic crisis of the early 1990s meant a decrease in the possibilities for earning money
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48 The carrying capacity of the 1,000 mm rain mountain belt lies between 1.2 and 0.33 TLU/ha, under favourite
conditions (Breman (1975) and Gaston (1996) respectively. See chapter 4.2.1).
49 In addition, some of the existing pasture reserves seem to be already overstocked (see Mvondo Awono et al
(2001).
50 Vaccination of chickens is something new and most people (women, as chicken owners) are not used to it. In
addition, one bottle contains doses for 50 chickens. It is very difficult to organise a vaccination session with
enough owners to participate at the same time so as not to waste doses (and thus increasing the price).
outside the own farm. There are no State jobs available in Oudda at all. Becoming a teacher at
the local primary school is no option as only a few teachers are required, there are no vacancies
and the present parents cannot pay for more. Outside Oudda, State jobs can only be acquired by
those with higher education or the relevant qualifications, in combination with having ‘friends’
in the State offices. The Bana do not have such a network (see section ‘social insecurities’). 
Because of the closeness of Nigeria, trade used to offer the more daring men an income, but
nowadays the trans-border controls have been increased and a lot of money has to be paid
(under the table) to escape import restrictions. 
The use of crops which mature more quickly has generated possibilities related to agricul-
tural labour migration. After the harvest at home, some people may move on to help harvest
crops that mature later elsewhere. These are once again usually more adventurous young men
who travel to Nigeria or to the surroundings of Maroua to help with the muskuaari (transplant-
sorghum) harvest. Unfortunately, in the years that this addition in income is most needed – the
dryer years with a lower yield –the muskuaari harvest is often disappointing and less labour is
needed to harvest it.
On-farm activities
The possibilities for working from the home depend on the availability of raw materials in the
form of ‘wild’ or cultivated products. With the abundance of bush area, such raw materials can
easily be gathered. However, a rise in ‘modernisation ideas’ and the proximity of Nigeria with
its cheap (plastic) products means a decrease in demand for traditional storing utensils or mats,
etc. every year. Thus, production of these traditional products does not result in the same prof-
its as in the past.
7.2.4 Social insecurities
Family and clan insecurities
Most of the Bana feel strong ties with their fathers and brothers, mothers and sisters and even
with the more extended family of (patrilineal) uncles and nephews. It is only very occasionally
that families experience a kind of breakdown of the social fabric, as a result of which sons or old
age parents have to look after themselves. This is then regarded with disapproval by neighbours.
Bana do not have a cultural taboo of marrying in the own clan, so many wives also come from
the Oudda territory. This means the family-in-law is close by. Payment of bride-prices is (still)
a common habit that binds young families firmly to the wife’s clan. Adult girls explain that they
want a bride price to be paid when somebody wants to marry them. “Otherwise people may think
you are worthless.” Paradoxically, another bonding factor is the habit wives have of divorcing
quickly. Some women have divorced more than 10 times, especially during their younger years.
Most of the time they give as a reason that their husbands did not give them enough land, cloth
or other materials, or they say he was violent or they quarrelled too much. Although they lose
the lands they cultivated when they divorce, the threat of going is one of the women’s security
measures51. For the men it is a source of insecurity. More than one husband explained that he
would do anything for his wife and give her as much as she wanted to make her stay (and there-
fore look after the children). But even then “she went away”, one of them said.
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51 See also Van den Berg (1997) about the apparent paradox between land security and divorce, in her study
about the Giziga women of Far North Province of Cameroon.
Sometimes, however, the divorce custom is a source of insecurity for the women them-
selves. It is not always their own decision to divorce. Sometimes it is the decision of the father,
who forces his daughter to move on to another husband, one who gives a higher bride price or
who has a higher status in the community or a position that fits in more with that of the woman.
For example, after marrying his daughter to a young neighbour, one of the fathers took her
back under the pretext that she should not be involved in a blacksmith’s family.
The Bana, as a very small ethnic group (only around 16,000 Bana were recorded officially
in 1996 which is 2 % of the Mandara population52), are very attached to each other. However,
this does not prevent them from soon becoming distrustful of each other. If somebody is sud-
denly successful (with his crops or merchandise) someone of his fellow-villagers is sure to
accuse him of witchcraft or an attempt to steal his wife. This means a judging session at the
village or regional chief’s court, which is mostly an expensive gathering. Thus, rising above
the mean can be a dangerous practice.
A broader social insecurity is based on the fact that the Bana are not really represented at
levels higher than regional ones. While all different ethnic groups have contacts with deputies
and politicians both in Maroua and in Yaoundé, the Bana, with their small population, are
unable to do the same. 
Political insecurities
For the Bana of Oudda, party politics is not an issue. Their interpretation of the whole power
situation is as follows: generally speaking, president Biya is considered the leader. He comes
(and did come) to power by way of his RDPC party. So, all power lies with the RDPC, some-
where in Yaoundé. Yaoundé is far away. Down there, they do not know anything about the
Mandara Mountains, let alone Oudda and the Bana. When you want something to be done
here, to develop the region, Yaoundé has to decide. In the past they did help the whole North
by abolishing intertribal feuds, but nowadays they have forgotten the region. If the village
decides something for its own good, nowadays it cannot proceed with implementation because
permission is always needed from Yaoundé, or at least from some authority that lives far away
from Oudda. Thus, apart from reduced intertribal war and violence, the current position of
Oudda is more difficult than in the past.
Conflict mediation
As in the other two case studies, the people of Oudda tend to choose the forum at which they
prefer to settle their disputes. In cases of crop damage caused by livestock, both mutual agree-
ments and the involvement of line agencies, local chiefs or the lamido may occur. The distance
from Oudda to the sub-prefect in Bourah is too great to go there very often, although some
inhabitants do make the effort to take caught animals to the mayor in order to ensure that the
owner pays for his neglect.
More social conflicts, without economic repercussions are generally settled by the village
and neighbourhood chiefs, often with the help of a ‘conseiller’: one or two elderly men, espe-
cially appointed for this task. If they are unable to deal with the case, the lamido’s court and
judges are next in line. A judge hears the parties in the conflict and several witnesses and sends
(when deemed necessary) some of his helpers to the area of the dispute. Then he decides what
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52 Only two or three other groups, in the South of sub-department Bourah, are smaller.
is best. Afterwards he informs his boss, the lamido, who most of the time agrees but can also
call for a re-opening of the case. 
Land allocation and insecurities
In the Bana culture there are no land masters or other traditional chiefs who have the authori-
ty to decide about land allocation. Land that has been bush area for as long as everybody
knows can be cleared of trees and bushes and therewith become the property of the person that
cut that vegetation for the first time. Subsequently, the use, management and expropriation of
arable land is a personal affair involving the owner or his offspring and is, at best, subject to
decisions by male family elders in cases in which the fields of ancestors are not divided into
small properties per offspring. When, according to the wishes of the first clearer of the land,
the surface remains the property of the whole (extended) family, all male family members are
entitled to use the fields they want. In the event of conflicts concerning the fields between such
members, the oldest family members function as arbiters. They also have the power to make
decisions on sales. Yet, in most of these big families other adult male members can have their
say and (most of the time) their arguments have almost the same weight as those of the elders.
It is not important whether the oldest person in the patri-line is present in Oudda or not. He
still has to be contacted when decisions about the land have to be taken. 
If the first clearer has not expressed the wish that his land be kept as a united property, the
offspring can decide to divide the surface into portions and have these inherited by the sons.
As a rule these portions are equal in size and, most of the time, equal in quality as well as
regards the soil fertility and the distance from the compounds. In these cases the inheritors are
real owners and have all the rights that pertain to such a status. Of the 82 household heads that
were interviewed, only 18 had full ownership rights over (part of, for example the part they
bought or cleared themselves) their land.
Women do not have the right to possess land. Unofficially they are not even entitled to buy.
Although respondents do agree that it is officially possible, they point out that it has never hap-
pened and never will happen. Women have user rights via their husbands. When a Bana man
has only one wife, they mostly cultivate together. The wife helps her husband with the plough-
ing and weeding of the cereals fields (sorghum, maize and rice are specific men’s crops53), they
have shared groundnuts and bean fields, but she also cultivates her ‘personal’ fields with
Bambara groundnuts, the typical women’s product54.
In the event that the man has several spouses, the husband gives fields to his wives to use
as they like, whether or not with the obligation to pay him back a certain amount of the yield:
“to show that they are his fields”. Divorced women have to rely on fathers or brothers to ask
for land, but this is an insecure solution. To safeguard their access to land they have to be mar-
ried and, thus, marry again quickly after divorce. 
For example Martine (40 years old) quarrelled with her husband and decided to leave him, tak-
ing with her a baby on her back. She went back to her father in a neighbouring village but he has
only one quart to cultivate for him and his remaining children. He told her she had to look for a
new husband quickly. After a period of reflection she went back to her first husband where her
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53 Women household heads can borrow or lend fields and are allowed to cultivate cereals.
54 In Oudda Bariki I discovered one exceptional case of a woman who used fields that her son – now living in
Maroua - had bought for her after his father had died.
other children were living as well. Habiba (32 years) was married to a man in the town of
Bourah. She was able to use her husband’s fields in the vicinity of the town. When they broke
up she came back to Oudda but decided she could not stay with her parents because she had
become a Muslim in the meantime. She now lives in the house of a Muslim family in Bariki, but
they cannot (or will not) offer her a field, so she is trying to rent some land with the profits of
her groundnut production in Bourah. The problem is that Bourah is far away and it is by no
means easy to sell the groundnuts. In addition, even if she did have money, renting land in Oudda
would not be that easy for her.
In line with the fact that fields are inherited from ancestors who cleared the bush, and the fact
that those ancestors started with these clearances when they were still living on the mountain
slopes, fields are scattered over a large area. From the mountain tops all the (great-) grandfa-
thers started to develop the land at the foot of the slope. Thereafter they moved on and con-
tinued clearing in a certain direction further and further into the bush. Depending on health and
perseverance of the farmer, areas of various sizes were cleared and varying distances away.
When people finally descended from the mountains for good they established their first com-
pounds in the vicinity of the first fields. Afterwards they came down a bit further, but they
almost never choose to settle somewhere near their furthest fields, alone in the bush as it were.
Several concentrated settlements were founded that now constitute the different neighbour-
hoods of Oudda (see Fig. 7.3).
Because of that clearance and settlement pattern, the residential neighbourhood is almost
never the only location of someone’s fields. Next to that, the amount of surface area used by
people from one neighbourhood in the territory of another differs as well. Families from Bariki
have spare land in the Waza bush, for example. In Baliwol, the neighbourhood along the road
to Guili, some families do not have any fallow fields left, neither within their neighbourhood
nor elsewhere, because not many of them have land outside this neighbourhood. Most of them
started with less surface area (due to their great-grandfathers having less ‘spirit’ as regards
clearing bush further away), and their family sizes have grown faster. So, nowadays all fields
have to be used permanently. Only a few families in Baliwol possess fields far away in the
bush that can be used alternately. Sometimes, but not often, these are situated in the direction
of Hlaka/Waza. Although not all inhabitants of Baliwol were interviewed, it seems that no fam-
ilies there have fields in the Jiksa region. 
Apart from the family structures and elders that have power to take decisions concerning
land, the only other recognised authority is the traditional regional chief, the lamido of Guili,
himself a Bana. He has the right to allocate certain areas for common purposes such as pas-
ture. In reality he decides that in the territory of a certain neighbourhood an area needs to be
appointed for the goal he has expressed, and the neighbourhood chief or conglomerate-neigh-
bourhood55 chief decides which area it will be, even when that area was already the property
of a certain family or person. Accordingly, the lamido has the right to send his noblemen56 to
see to the implementation of such decisions.
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55 In Oudda some neighbourhoods have a joint chief, while other neighbourhoods have their own. Sometimes a
neighbourhood chief is also a conglomerate-neighbourhood chief at the same time, like the chief of Bariki,
whose chieftaincy is the oldest in the whole of Oudda and even older than the Guili lamidat.
56 Some of a lamido’s noblemen reside almost permanently at his side at the court during the daytime. They
have specific jobs, like judging in minor offence cases, serving as assistants in other cases or they are just on
hand to brighten up the ambiance.
It is on the basis of such appointments that Oudda has a group of settled Fulbe on its terri-
tory. The Fulbe neighbourhood ‘Guiki’, headed by lawan Boubakary, is situated at the eastside
of Oudda centre (Bariki), adjacent to the big north-south flowing river (at least in the rainy sea-
son) that forms more or less the boundary of the biggest pasture area in Oudda57. It was the
father of the current lamido who decided to delineate four of such areas to make sure that cat-
tle had their proper grazing space58. For most of the Bana these reserves have a legitimate sta-
tus. Although some cultivators try to clear fields at the borders of the reserve, they do so at
their own risk and complaints about cattle damage are not allowed. This is contrary to normal
regional habits that place all responsibility for damage on the cattle owner.
In addition, the status of the Boubakary Néné pasture is also confirmed by all sorts of ‘mod-
ern’ authorities, such as the sub-prefect of the sub-department, the sub-departmental heads of
the agricultural and animal husbandry services, the sub-departmental police superintendent,
etc. However, it is still unclear who has the real power to ensure implementation. Even with-
in the Oudda territory, farmers who invade pasture reserves may be warned by the lamido or
one of the modern officials, but punishment or actual removal does not occur.
Cultural insecurities
The increase of new religions (Christianity and Islam) is causing the bonds provided by the
traditional religion to disappear. The Lutheran church as well as Islam, for example, prohibit
alcohol. Social drinking gatherings, that existed before as part of the yearly cycle and were
related to ancestor worship, can only be attended by that section of the population that does
not adhere to the new religious rules. A kind of divide has therefore developed within the
community. On the other hand, the fact that beer drinking is now extended to market days
instead of restricted to traditional religious occasions means that exchanges between the dif-
ferent groups are possible. Although Catholics and followers of the traditional religion drink
their beer together in one corner of the market, they will still go and speak to Muslims or
Protestants in another corner.
Incoming or visiting religious leaders, that try to mobilise feelings for their specific reli-
gion, do not seem to incite hostile feelings or behaviour. Although it would be only natural to
enhance one’s own religion by demonising another one, in the reality of Oudda this does not
happen. People are free to choose the religion (or sect) they want, to change and change back
again, to visit churches and attend mass or pray to Allah whenever or wherever they want.
Within families, a number of members may adhere to different churches and beliefs without
even so much as a dispute. Very occasionally a father and a son may have a conflict about reli-
gion, but mostly this is based on another discord and both parties are soon able to separate the
religious problem from the real inconvenience. 
In short, it seems as if social insecurities are no different from those in the past. The only dif-
ficulty that can become a real problem is the link with higher level institutions.
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57 This pasture reserve is called after the Fulbe lawan “Boubakary Néné” (see Figure 7.3). 
58 The surface area corresponded to the number of cattle present at the moment of creation. The Fulbe leader of
each neighbourhood with such a reserve received an official paper to confirm the existence of the pasture.
Three of the four pasture areas are situated within the Oudda boundaries: one next to the neighbourhood
Waza, one in the direction of Modélé and the third and biggest east of neighbourhood Guiki. This one is
called Boubakary Néné.
7.3 Investments: going to Box 2 
As depicted in the “insecurity complex” in Chapter 3 (Methodology), when people experience
insecurities in a mutually influencing complex of domains, they may search for strategies to
overcome these. In the “VoE”-diagram of Chapter 2 it is the step from Box 1 to Box 2 in which
actors perceive the different possibilities (Figure 7.1). To understand the step to Box 2 of the
diagram the diversity of options that lead to certain strategies and the choice for specific options
have to be explored. With a variety of capitals at hand (see Chapter 2) the Bana as well as the
Fulbe invest in social relationships, economic goods, personal capabilities or environmental cir-
cumstances to improve their future and that of their children. Sometimes people do not really
invest in anything but just ‘muddle through’, perhaps merely hoping that their positions will
improve in the future. The investments are shaped by the combined effect of each of the four
categories of the Actor-in-Context model as formulated by De Groot and Kamminga (1995; See
Chapter 2): feasibility of options, objectified motivations, interpretations and the autonomy
towards implementation per actor. I will describe the factors that influence these options and
make people chose ‘escape routes’ (downward arrows from the central part of the scheme, see
Figure 7.1) or make them decide to take the step towards the invasion of a new niche.
7.3.1 Environmental investments
Investments in the quality of land 
In order to improve the land quality and yields the Bana can use the same techniques and meth-
ods as the Kapsiki (see chapter 6) just north of them. Table 7.3.1 shows the different uses of
field improvement techniques. The most important in Oudda is the use of fallow rotation. In
these mountains, the cycle can be very long. Sometimes respondents indicate that they have
used their fields for at least twenty years now, or that their father or uncles already used it
before they were born. Most actors respond that they use a field for 5 to 7 years and that the
fallow period lasts twice as long. However, that all depends on the basic fertility of the loca-
tion and the possibility of maintaining it with animal dung (the only option available in the past
to improve fertility actively). Some areas have not been used for over 20 years, as can be seen
by the height of the trees.
In Oudda, the use of chemical fertilisers is fraught with difficulties because they are not sold
in the village. Those farmers that have money to purchase fertilisers (19 % of respondents)
depend on the occasional arrival of a truck from some chemical company or other at the
regional market in Guili. But, as is evident from their complaints, such fertilisers always arrive
too late in the season when the effect on the field is far less than it could be.
Table 7.3.1 Fertility improving methods (in % of respondents. Some actors use different methods at the 
same time)
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n Fallow Animal House- Natural fert. Chem. fert. nothing
rotation manure holdwaste from elsewhere for sorghum
Men 82 80 22 5 2 20 6
Women 43 37 5 2 0 19 41
total 125 66 16 4 2 19 18.4
Although 61 % of respondents have farm animals that produce manure, Table 7.3.1 shows that
only a small proportion of the respondents (16 %) use this natural fertiliser to improve the fields.
Table 7.3.2 shows the connection between possession of ruminants and the use of their dung.
The third part of this table shows ‘animals’ as a variable to show a possible connection between,
on the one hand, the number of entities to be brought together to gather their dung and, on the
other hand, the use of dung. Table 7.3.3 depicts the relationship between ownership of TLU and
the use of dung. The ownership of donkeys (35 people out of 125) does not change the numbers
in the third part of Table 7.3.2. Those people who have only donkeys and no other farm animals
do not use their dung to improve their fields. The majority of those who use the droppings of
their animals belong to the richer people in the village who have a lot of animals (or a high
TLU). Gathering animal dung is most probably only worthwhile when people have a certain
number of animals. Cattle can be guarded (in night corrals made out of thorny shrub branches)
on the fields that have to be fertilised, but the manure of small stock has to be gathered and
brought to the field. The construction of a corral is too much effort for only a small number of
cattle. Of those that do not use the natural fertiliser they posses in the form of their animals’ dung,
only seven have more than 10 animals. All these (except for two women) have access to a large
area of land, but in three cases this land has to be shared with quite a number of family members
(the other two times only with two or three people). For all those with only a small number of
animals (43 people) land surface varies, just like the number of people to share it with.
Table 7.3.2 Animal ownership and the use of the dung of those animals. Number of people (men or 
women) who own animals and number thereof that use the dung. Total number of people 
using the dung of their own animals is 15.
a = One owner with 25 cattle and the two owners with more than 100 cattle who use their animals’ dung do not
have any arable fields but improve their pasture area using manure (NB. They are not Bana, but Fulbe).
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1 - 3 cattle 4 - 6 cattle 7 - 10 cattle 11 - 99 cattle More than 100
cattle
Owner- Using Owner- Using Owner- Using Owner- Using Owner- Using
ship dung ship dung ship dung ship dung ship dung
Men 7 0 4 0 3 3 5 5a 2 2a
Women 8 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 - 3 cattle 4 - 6 cattle 7 - 10 cattle 11 - 99 cattle More than 100
ruminants ruminants ruminants ruminants small rum.
Owner- Using Owner- Using Owner- Using Owner- Using Owner- Using
ship dung ship dung ship dung ship dung ship dung
Men 10 4 14 0 7 1 11 7 0 0
Women 9 0 5 0 4 0 1 0 0 0
1 - 3 animals 4 - 6 animals 7 - 10 animals 11 - 99 animals More than 
100 animals
Owner- Using Owner- Using Owner- Using Owner- Using Owner- Using
ship dung ship dung ship dung ship dung ship dung
Men 12 4 15 0 6 1 12 7 2 2
Women 9 0 6 1 4 0 2 0 0 0
Table 7.3.3 Ownership of TLU and the use of animal dung
In short, the use of either chemical or natural fertilisers is not determined by the need of the
fields itself, or the ownership situation of the actor with regard to the fields. Instead, it is lim-
ited to the richer inhabitants of the village (in money or animals respectively) and especially
to higher numbers of cattle. Poorer people just wait and let the soil weather to fertility in a nat-
ural process. The only woman that uses animal dung possesses four cattle that she keeps near
the house. The rest of the women, with small numbers of cattle, have their cattle further away
in the herd of a brother or uncle.
Of course, household waste is only used on fields surrounding the compound, but the high-
er fertility and humidity because of organic matter content is taken advantage of by cultivat-
ing maize which matures more quickly. Most inhabitants have fields around their house as well
as far into the bush. Fields in the bush means that the farmer has to walk distances of up to an
hour. Small numbers of sheep and goats are not herded so far away.
Technological equipment to improve the yield mostly consists of ploughs and animal-trac-
tion weeding equipment. In the year 2000, 34 % of the inhabitants of Oudda owned a plough59.
This proportion increased rapidly as more people tried to buy draught animals and the accom-
panying tools. The long distance from the compound (and compound fields) to the bush fields
is a setback for the use of ploughs. Carrying a plough that far is a heavy job, even on a don-
key’s back.
Labour input can be used in the cultivation season to increase the surface of the fields har-
vested and thus the harvest as such. Some farmers (men and women) hire extra labour to
plough, weed or harvest and pay the people a salary. However, mostly the work is carried out
in mutual working parties where good food and drinks are served (see also ‘social invest-
ments’). The majority of extra labour is used outside the rainy season. First, there are field
owners who try to improve their land by building small stone ridges, just before the rains will
start, to combat water run-off. The majority of such dikes are in the vicinity of Bariki and only
on the steeper parts. Of all the respondents, only three mentioned the fact that they use this
method60. The second and most important labour demand in the off-season is for the preparing
of new fields. Because of the long fallow periods, this requires the cutting of big trees and
dense bushes. As far as women are concerned, new fields mean the hiring of manpower and
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59 Substantially more than in Dzambou (20%; see chapter 6).
60 Only one of these had erected lines of stones on some fields that were not really steep.
TLU owned Number of owners Number of users of dung
0.1 - 0.6 28 3
0.7 - 1.3 18 1
1.4 - 2.0 9 1
2.1 - 2.7 1 0
2.8 - 4.8 7 0
4.9 - 9.9 4 2
10 - 19.9 4 3
20 - 29.9 0 0
30 - 49.9 1 1
50 - 90 2 2
they therefore need to save money beforehand. Sometimes their husbands and (grown-up) sons
help with the cutting of big trees.
Nevertheless, the clearing of such dense forest is a job that people are glad to postpone. A
period of decision-making can be prolonged by the sowing of beans in the less fertile soil.
Beans are less demanding, and what is more, as a leguminous plant that binds air nitrogen at
its roots, it even improves the soil in the meantime. In Oudda nobody cultivates beans in order
to fertilise the soil. Many respondents are not even aware of this property of beans.
Quantity of land investments
Apart from ameliorating the quality of land, a higher production can be achieved by cultivat-
ing more fields. This can be done by borrowing, hiring or buying land. One generation ago
there were only two people that bought land, this generation the amount of buyers has
increased and a lot more people indicate that they want to buy fields to counter a future lack
thereof (see Table 7.3.4). Indeed, 43 % of respondents fear such a shortage of land in the
future61. Some respondents refer to the land market in Oudda as the most important economic
activity at the moment. But land prices vary tremendously depending on location and fertility,
as well as on arbitrary factors that are not retraceable (seeming to be just what people ask or
are prepared to give)62. There are also still people who want to borrow.
Table 7.3.4 Number of respondents who bought, rented or borrowed fields or want to do so. (n = 125). 
The numbers ‘want to’ do not represent those who already implemented the involved category 
(although they want to continue)
a = one woman only wants to add to her fields by asking if she is chased from her actual Jiksa-field
The clearing of old fallow referred to can also be seen as the extension of land quantity. After
decades of fallow rotation in the vicinity of the neighbourhoods, Oudda-ers suddenly decided
to return to the age-old fields of their ancestors which are now secondary forest. As mentioned
above, the reason is the exhaustion of their other fields. 
Another option is to leave the Oudda territory and search for land elsewhere. However, of
the small number of sons who have indeed left Oudda (6 %), none did so to find more and bet-
ter land. The same applies to the previous generation. A handful of brothers of respondents (8
%) have left Oudda, but mostly to live with family in a neighbouring village or to try their luck
in a city such as Maroua or Yaoundé.
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61 49 % of men and 33 % of women; 9 % of men and 7 % of women consider the number of fields sufficient.
62 The rental price of a field can vary between 2,500 and 15,000 Fcfa/ha or a proportion of the yield (from a
small bin with grains up to a whole bag). Purchase prices are between 100,000 and 200,000 Fcfa/ha (or, as
the respondents state: “per field”), while 20 years ago the same type of field cost ‘only’ 40,000 Fcfa (the Fcfa
then was worth more than 2 times its current value), a goat or a large ‘boubou’ (that is a man’s dress).
Bought Rented Borrowed Want to buy Want to rent Want to
borrow
Men 7 6 5 13 2 5
Women 0 2 6 9 0 4a
7.3.2 Human domain investments
Health investments
During the dry season, several neighbourhoods invest in the digging of new water wells. In 2001,
for example, Hlaka organised digging parties at two different locations. One of the reasons is the
distance to the wells dug in the past (situated in the older neighbourhoods). But, a more impor-
tant factor is the dependency on natural pools or rivers that do not guarantee hygienic drinking
water throughout the year. With the help of hydrologists from the PDRM63, the inhabitants deter-
mine the best place for a well and make a schedule for all men to participate in digging to a depth
that hand-digging cannot be employed anymore and machinery has to be used. This same insti-
tute is approached every second year and is asked to disinfect contaminated wells with chlorine.
The conglomerate neighbourhood lawan and his staff co-ordinate this kind of work to make sure
that all wells are treated, albeit separately, so that a well is always at hand64. 
Next to that, several grown-ups try to inform their children as to how to use the wells prop-
erly. They keep cords and buckets separately and do not let their children meddle with the
water jar at home. In addition, Christians and Muslims pay attention to hygiene in relation to
meals (washing of hands before touching the meal) and their bodies. The new religions with-
in Oudda have resulted in the introduction of the custom of tying up the flock within the com-
pound during the night and not letting them roam the house and deposit their droppings
everywhere. This has increased hygiene levels, especially with regard to small children.
A health-related activity that is also organised at community level65 is the vaccination of
children. Parents are highly motivated for this. When the news spreads that nurses are in the
village centre to carry out such vaccinations, mothers and their young children start out on the
journey from the outlying neighbourhoods to the vaccination post. 
If they feel they are suffering from one illness or another, the Oudda inhabitants invest both
in visits to the traditional healers as well as in visits to the regional hospital in Guili. In some
compounds the income of one of the wives is almost totally dedicated to medicines and hos-
pital visits of family members, instead of letting people suffer and die. Time is also invested
in ill family members or friends. Husbands accompany their spouses to the hospital, some-
times for days, even if this interferes with agricultural activities. Fathers and grandfathers as
well as mothers do the same with their children.
For eight years now, the Oudda-ers have been trying to set up a medicine store in the cen-
tre of the village to bridge the rainy season blockade to the Guili hospital. One of the inhabi-
tants knows a little about modern medicines and is willing to act as a pharmacist. However,
the lack of good contacts with higher level authorities appears to be a major hindrance. Official
permission is required for such a store and although the village chiefs ask again and again both
the mayor and the sub-prefect have not granted anything up till now66. 
Educational investments
Most parents try to send their children to school. Both State administrative functions as well as
trade are mentioned as goals to be reached with a more ‘open’ mind as a result of education.
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63 Projet du Developpement Rurale Mont Mandara, see also chapter 6. 
64 A well treated with chlorine has to be covered and left un-used for three days.
65 Instigated by WHO initiatives.
66 After the municipality elections of 2003 hopes declined because the new mayor is no longer a Bana. “Why
should a mayor from Tchévi do what a Bana has neglected?”, the inhabitants of Oudda ask.
The village pays two ‘voluntary’ schoolmasters. That is, in addition to one government-paid
director of the primary school in Oudda Centre, two more classes are led by village-paid teach-
ers who do not always have a real teacher’s education but have at least finished three years of
secondary school. In the case of Oudda, one of them even finished his College of Education.
The number of pupils in a classroom increases to over 100 so the parents complain about the
lack of education quality. All of them are very content with the new College of Education in the
department’s headquarter Mokolo. Today, women choose to use their income to pay for their
children’s school fees. In one case a young woman even spends her household earnings from
beer, fritters and chicken breeding on the education of her husband at the College of Education67. 
The village has already invested in education in the form of the parent teachers. There are
others who want to send their children to school but do not have the possibility to do so.
Sometimes the fee is too high, sometimes the husbands do not agree and sometimes the school
is too far away. Several of them are trying to overcome the problems through ‘lobbying work’.
Women try to persuade their husbands of the importance of such an investment, and sometimes
even offer to pay for the education of their children themselves (sometimes even then husbands
have to be persuaded). People in outlying neighbourhoods have started discussions about the
setting up of a school in their neighbourhood. Some are trying to get the school to accept a
lower fee for those who are very poor, but the parent teachers are already complaining about
their low wages. In December 2000, they even organised a kind of strike for several days to
make their stance68. 
Table 7.3.5 shows that 22 % of the male respondents (n = 82) received some sort of ‘western’
education and only 9 % of the women (n = 43). All the people who themselves attended school
plus some of the non-educated people want their children to attend69. Some of them have indeed
sent their children to school, but in other instances this is not yet possible because the children
are not old enough. Surprisingly, those who sent their children to school are seldom the same
people 70 who said that they consider a school education to be an important asset for future jobs.
Table 7.3.5 School attendance (number of people that visited school or sent (want to send) his/her chil
dren to school)
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67 This strategy of sharing and mutual investment between husband and wife is very exceptional.
68 After a couple of days, they decided to go back to work, because only the children suffered from their action;
parents would not (and could not) pay more, and in this period of the year the teaching did not interfere with
other obligations or possibilities.
69 It is not possible to simply add up the numbers of the men and the women who sent their children to school
to arrive at a total number of children attending because these are sometimes the same children (some of the
interviewed women are married to the men interviewed, but this was not always the case).
70 Only four of the twenty men that sent their children to school mention the importance thereof for a job, and
four of the nine women.
Primary Secondary Tertiary Koran Not available Want For future
school school school schoola thenb to send jobs
Men self 12 6 0 4 6 n.a. 6
Women self 4 0 0 0 0 n.a. 0
Men: kids 16 4 1 2 3 43 25
Women: kids 9 0 0 0 n.a. 25 9
7.3.3 Economic investments
Investments in cash crops 
Groundnuts and beans are typical cash crops, although a small quantity is used in the sauce.
Both men and women cultivate these two crops. It is not surprising that the inhabitants want
the price of groundnuts to be high and that of sorghum to be low. The real price that farmers
get depends on the supply and that itself depends on the rains as well as on the cycle of pro-
duction that seems to exist. This cycle means that during the year in which the price of ground-
nuts is high, people decide to grow groundnuts for the next season, as a result of which the
supply is abundant and the price goes down and vice versa. 
Women can sell their surpluses like the men do at the regional market in Guili or use them
to make local beer or fritters to sell at the local markets or in the neighbourhood centres and
houses71. The women use Bambara groundnuts (Vigna subterranea) as well as ‘souchet’
(Cyperus esculentus) as an added source of income72. Bambara groundnuts bring in approxi-
mately 500 Fcfa per kg. With a mean production per household of 150 kg (see Table 7.2.9), a
person can earn 25,000 Fcfa per year. 
Some farmers earn extras from the cultivation of sugar cane, sweet potatoes and manioc in
gardens surrounded by thorny bush fences. This can mean an extra income of 12,000 to
400,000 Fcfa depending on climatic circumstances and the size of the cultivated area73. The
people who have access to low lying fields try to cultivate rice when the rains are good.
However, the harvest is generally not sold but added to consumption sorghum and used in the
Ramadan flour-drink that is consumed first thing after sundown.
Investments in farm-animals 
As is the habit in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa, animals are used as a bank deposit. A sur-
plus of money is invested in sheep, goats and, when possible, in cattle. There are not many
people in Oudda who deliberately breed animals to earn additional income, except the Fulbe.
But these complain about a lack of pasture. Because of that, they have to sell more animals
than they would have done otherwise. Also because of there being too many cattle (the Bana
keep more cattle now than in the past, the Fulbe say) and thus more frequent outbreaks of dis-
ease, their herds are diminishing, they say. It is nevertheless still their way of life and the only
investment route they know.
Because of the proximity of Nigeria, cattle trading is a profitable activity. Nigerian merchants
visit cattle owners at home, during the evenings, because they want to smuggle the herd over the
border and therefore offer good prices. At the same time, this avoids payment of official taxes on
cattle transactions. The official route via the Guili market is only followed for slaughter animals.
These fetch higher prices: up to 120,000 Fcfa for a healthy looking, young bull.
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71 Most women are saving (in yield or in animals) to pay their sons’ bride price or their daughters’ hope chest.
Women do not have land of their own, but use that of their husband. Thus, in the event of divorce they
depend on their sons or fathers for cultivating or even for having a place to live. Thus, they usually remarry
quickly.
72 Souchet is a very labour intensive product, especially during the harvest, and requires high soil fertility.
Mostly producers add fertiliser to the field. As a result, field owners are very willing to lend out a field for
souchet production for one year.
73 Several people who earn between 20,000 and 100,000 Fcfa (= 30 to 150 Euro) from sugar cane and manioc,
call the surface area used “a small field”.
Despite the losses of chickens due to contagious diseases, every year people try to start
breeding them again. Agricultural extension workers put a lot of effort into persuading the
owners - and enough owners at the same time - to vaccinate their birds. People also keep ducks
and these may be used to add to the household protein supply or to generate income via sales
at home or at the markets.
The village has no real small ruminant market. On the other hand, someone in trouble will
sell his animals (10 % of respondents indicate that they will use their flock for such calami-
ties) and people who have earned money do buy goats or sheep. In 2001, 57 of the 125 respon-
dents possessed small ruminants, mostly goats (with a range of 1 – 36). Almost all transactions
take place at household level. Only a very small number of small ruminants are traded at the
Guili market. Even the week before the ‘sheep festival’ of the Muslim community, a time that
sheep prices in the rest of the Far North have increased sharply, the number of small ruminants
there only increases marginally74. 
One of the main by-products of cattle is their milk. In Bana society, however, this is not a
real economic commodity. Cow owners, mostly the male household heads, decide on what
happens to the milk and usually they give it to the children. During the dry season they allow
only the calves to drink it. If the herd is not in the neighbourhood of the cattle owner’s house,
the actual herder can use the milk for his household. Kapsiki cattle produce less milk than
Zebu, but as regards the latter Dietz et al (2001: 197) mention an average yearly production of
400 litres for human consumption. To fulfil the calorific requirement, an adult has to drink
1140 litre per year. This means that a Bana household can meet its energy needs with 17 zebu
cows or 28 cattle as is the case with twenty Bana households and ten Fulbe households in
Oudda75.
Investments in non-agricultural options
Off-farm investments
The villagers search for possibilities to minimise the dependence of their children to land. As
stated in section 3.2, ‘Human domain investments’, education is a much favoured (although
not widely practised) option for acquiring off-farm jobs. This approach was not very success-
ful for the current generation, however. After the economic crisis at the end of the 1980s the
possibilities for becoming a (well-paid) civil servant diminished tremendously. This does not
stop today’s parents from hoping for such a job for their offspring. Half of the interviewees
(men and women) even wanted their daughters to be highly educated (university education
was even mentioned a couple of times). Everybody knows of a success story of a family mem-
ber or neighbour literally swimming in luxuries in town. On the other hand, youngsters with
at least secondary school education have the experience that they had to return to the village
and start cultivating again due to a lack of State appointments. However, even (or especially)
they want their children to be educated. “This time of hardship cannot last long” and “The gov-
ernment knows that they have to come up with more paid jobs to enhance the development of
Cameroon”, are variations of hopeful phrases heard every day.
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74 At this same market, just after Christmas, the price of a healthy looking, full grown, male sheep is 20,000
Fcfa.
75 Some of those 20 households possess Kapsiki cattle, but then in higher numbers, so the required milk pro-
duction is still reached.
When trade is mentioned as an opportunity to earn money, it is not the small supplementary
commerce with minor products such as a bit of sugar, soap or salt, mostly smuggled from
Nigeria that people have in mind, but the real traffic, like that of the big salesmen that visit the
market in Guili, or even Garoua or like the village chief of Oudda, Ardou Hamadou, who trav-
els back and forth to Maroua with his ‘pagnes’ (cloth) on his bicycle. Nevertheless, the small-
scale trans-border trade can become a stepping stone to something bigger and can offer a plat-
form for some of the young men to start investing.
The Bana are not a very outward moving ethnicity. Although several young men have
attended high school outside their own village, most of them return (especially when they
reach marrying age or when their fathers become widowers and need looking after) and they
do not then leave again. Only a very small number of them are daring enough to become
involved in migration labour in Nigeria where the harvest of white sorghum takes place slight-
ly later than in Oudda, or in the region around Maroua where the harvest of transplanted
sorghum demands some extra labour force at the end of January. 
Some of the young men try their luck in cities, such as Garoua, where they perform small
trade, hire themselves out to rich inhabitants as guards, or become street bandits (this was men-
tioned by two respondents with regard to sons of neighbours or other villagers). However,
most of them return home without any benefit from their investments.
On-farm investments
Some individuals stick to more traditional occupations. Naikwa, a 40 year old farmer with 5
sons, braids grass mats (for the market) and granaries (on demand) and teaches his skill to his
children to avoid problems which may arise due to a lack of fields. “At the moment I could
live from those grass products alone”. A granary costs him four days work including the cut-
ting of the grass and earns him 6 to 8,000 Fcfa. A mat is less work (half a day) and generates
up to 1,500 Fcfa76.
Traditionally, women earn money from processed agricultural products. They make ‘bilbil’
and ‘wine’ out of sorghum and fritters from bean flour, groundnut paste or a mixture of these
with sorghum flour77. All these products are sold at local markets78 in the village or in Guili
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76 Normally the price of a bag of sorghum (100 kg) starts at 5 – 6,000 Fcfa at the moment of harvest,
increasing from 8 or 9,000 Fcfa in December to 14,000 Fcfa in the rainy season when there is increasing
scarcity. At the Guili market, a bag of groundnuts fetched 16,000 Fcfa in December 2000 compared to
30,000 Fcfa the year before. All depends on the results of the last harvest: for example the bad rains of the
end of the rainy season in 2000 caused the price of sorghum to rise to 12,000 Fcfa in December and as
high as 22,000 Fcfa in the beginning of July 2001. The low groundnut price in December was due to a
good harvest and the fact that many farmers had grown more fields with this product than in other years,
because of the extremely good price acquired in 1999. By way of a comparison, in Guili a good quality
pagne (a piece of cloth to make one whole dress) costs 6 – 9,000 Fcfa (Dec. 2000). Because of the coinci-
dence of Christmas and the end of the Ramadan, which both lead to greater demand, this price was higher
than usual.
77 The home-made dough is taken to the market and the fritters are baked at the spot in groundnut oil. 
78 Baliwol II and Bariki have their own weekly markets (on Wednesday and Sunday respectively), but at the
junction in Baliwol I, where the motorbikes and sometimes vans stop for their clients, there is a kind of
very small, roadside day market for sugar cane, fritters etc, next to a small shop with soap, sugar and even
coca-cola.
town79. The benefits are not only used for sons’ bride-price and daughters’ hope chests80 but, as
has been stated above, for school fees as well (if the fathers consent).
7.3.4 Social investments
As mentioned in Chapter 3, to measure the total social capital and investments therein
demands more research time than could be spent during this study. Therefore, I will only pro-
vide some indicators and examples of social bonds and linkages as well as the rules and norms
springing from them that are present or ‘under construction’ in Oudda.
Investments in family and friends
Investment in family networks is a natural course of action in Bana society. Although there are
some young men who escape the social pressure of their fathers and uncles, this is met with
surprise and disapproval by the rest of the community. Most of the time fathers and mothers
help their sons with bride prices, and their daughters with their hope chests. Children are
respectful and help their parents when they are still at home. When married, sons are going to
live in the house or at least the neighbourhood of their father. New wives take turns to prepare
household meals. In a way, you can say that young couples look after parents, especially when
these reach old age. If they live next door, they share a lot of small meals and small labour
tasks. The post-harvest work of groundnut peeling is done in companionship of others, most-
ly neighbours, and thus (also) family. Everybody present helps all the others present. Parents-
in-law are not forgotten either and mutual visits are paid and small gifts exchanged. When old,
both widower fathers and mothers without husbands can live with their married sons. On the
one hand it is a kind of pay-back of the care and help given when the children were young. On
the other hand, this custom makes people expect that their effort in looking after their parents
will be made up for by their children when it is their turn.
Some fathers try to make a real profit out of their daughters by ‘selling them off’ to the high-
est bidder. Occasionally, they even take them back from one husband because another offered
more. But this is an exception and even though daughters are unable to stop that, such fathers
weaken the bonds with their offspring and sons-in-law. They apparently choose a more cash-
based security.
Help in agricultural activities is also mostly organised via kinship ties. So-called working
parties are held with friends and co-wives, but the core of such groups consists of family mem-
bers, like sisters, nieces, aunts, etc. for women, and brothers, nephews and uncles for men. Of
course helping somebody means you can expect him (or her) to help you later on. These par-
ties are a happy event, with good food, drinks (traditional beer) and lots of laughter.
For younger men, the school is also an ideal place to form a group. Especially those that
visited secondary school together stay friends forever. Being away from home and spending
years caring for each other in a strange environment resembles the old initiation rites that
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79 The big market in Guili, every Saturday, attracts people who want to buy and sell their products (groundnuts,
beans, sorghum, clothes, ‘pagnes’ (the cloth to make women’s wear), meat, sorghum beer, etc.). They come
from the surrounding villages as well as from further away. Those from further away are bigger traders who
buy the agricultural products from the region or try to sell luxury goods such as radios and watches. Even
Nigerians join in the sales, but they are taken away by the police if discovered.
80 In Bana culture a man has to pay a dowry to the father of his bride. If possible, his parents try to help him
with that. On the other hand, when a daughter marries, she needs household utensils, like pans, saucers,
mugs. Female relatives, especially the mother, have the duty to give her such useful gifts.
formed the same age groups81. Back in the village, they invest in the continuing of these rela-
tionships. They still look each other up in order to drink a beer and play a game of “ne t’en fais
pas” under the gathering tree in the neighbourhood centre. In these ‘old boys networks’ they
can find assistance during harvest ‘parties’ and in hard times. When one of the younger, more
educated men was successful in trading, he was accused of treachery. The case was submitted
to the lamido during one of my stays in the village, January 2003. His former school friends
helped him out, proving he was not a treacherous person at all.
Each neighbourhood forms a group that provides direct help when needed. Elder people
without the strength to labour are given meals and other material help, as well as assistance
with roofs, etc. When children become orphans it is not necessarily the family that takes them
in. Sometimes neighbours look after them. Moreover, when older boys develop some problems
with their parents at home (mostly based on puberty issues) neighbours can decide to give
them a place in their compound (for the time being). All these investments in mutual aid
strengthen the social fabric of the village and secure the inhabitants of help in times of need.
Indeed, the moment a fire destroyed a hut and the sorghum stock of one of the inhabitants in
the beginning of the year 2001, all neighbours came to rescue what could be rescued and to
help build a new stock and a new hut. When I asked why they did that, the answer was that
“you can have a disaster yourself and nobody will help you when you do not help others”.
To measure social bonds and who invests in which bonds at all, the pattern of hiring and
lending draught animals can help. This pattern is depicted in Table 7.3.6.
Table 7.3.6 Source of plough and draught animals used (in numbers of respondents; n = 125; 82 men and
43 women)
a = 2 times from a brother; 4 times from a boss (e.g. the owner of the grain-mill where the respondent is the
employee); 1 time from the field-owner; 5 times help in exchange
b = 2 times from son
c = 2 times an exchange: the one owns the donkeys or cattle, the other the plough
d = 2 times cattle; 2 times donkeys
e = 2 times only one animal in ownership, the other from husband
f = 2 times donkeys, 1 time an oxen and a horse
g = 1 time donkeys, the other time donkeys or cattle
h = in total 57 times donkeys and 41 times cattle were used
The majority of farmers use their own plough and draught animals or that of their husband. For
men, borrowing (half of the times from family members, half from others) happens three times
as much as hiring. If we do not count the borrowing from husbands, hiring or borrowing by
81 The custom of initiation is slowly disappearing. Men older then 50 still count their age in years after the initi-
ation and have some ties with their age group members. The younger the men, the less they have been sub-
ject to initiation rites.
Own Borrowed Borrowed Borrowed Hired No plough No
of father of husband of another (hand) information
Plough Men 39 7 0 12a 6 10 9
Women 4 0 26 3b 2 4 4
Draught animalh Men 39c 7 0 12 6 n.a. 9
Women 4d, e 0 26 3f 2g n.a. 4
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women occurs just as often. People who hire do not generally have family members or friends
with enough ploughs and draught animals to be used by more people. In general we can con-
clude that most of the Bana are rich enough to possess ploughs and animals for labour and that
commoditisation of these is not (yet) widespread. In addition, those without such equipment
can easily borrow it, either from family or from other villagers82, but that depends on the social
circle one belongs to. Investing in kinship or friendship ties helps to acquire access to such cul-
tivation equipment. Lending out a plough, on the other hand, means investing in those ties and
therefore in future access to help.
Weddings and burials are important moments to strengthen kinship and friendship ties. Each
death has to be commemorated with days of mourning at the house of the closest kin. Both
friends and family, from near and far, visit the compound and bring bilbil or food, consume
drinks and meals and exchange warm feelings and information. At weddings as well, visitors
have to be accommodated, food is shared and a kind of party with music and dance is held83.
Political investments
The socio-political organisation of Oudda rests on different levels of authorities. At the lowest
level each neighbourhood has its own chief who has a role in conflict mediation84 and in the
bringing together of men to discuss village issues and attempts to implement the required meas-
ures. He performs these duties with the help of a special counsellor and other neighbourhood
elders who inform him about ongoing processes and important circumstances. For example, in
the Hlaka neighbourhood, inhabitants decided to dig two more wells in the dry season of 2001.
They came together in the house and at the request of the neighbourhood chief. There they
organised a digging scheme (each in turn) and the chief saw to involvement of the extension
organisation that can measure the water depth and can offer building materials later on. A neigh-
bourhood chief is democratically elected (although mostly he comes from the chief’s lineage)
and he has to provide his fellow villagers material and immaterial goods. The position gives him
a considerable status in the village as well as in the wider region. To make up for the time spent
at the gatherings and on arbitration, chiefs have several privileges, such as first choice when an
animal is slaughtered, free beer on certain occasions, etc.. Moreover, outside the village they
encounter fewer problems with police officers checking their identity papers or the origin of
(smuggled?) merchandise. In the past, village and neighbourhood chiefs could depend on their
subjects being available for free for a certain number of days to work in their fields (or to help
with the clearing of new fields) but that tradition “has disappeared with the democratisation of
Cameroon”, as the brother of the neighbourhood chief of Bariki told me. The presence of a
neighbourhood chief makes the position of the neighbourhood stronger vis-à-vis other neigh-
bourhoods and, especially, higher authorities. He is the official representative. Some neigh-
bourhoods did not have a chief during a certain period and they felt their position weakening.
Quarrels were not solved and disputes with inhabitants of other neighbourhoods were judged in
the favour of those who did have a chief. So, both for the internal organisation of the neigh-
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82 Most of those who work by hand (without a plough) are old or sick and do not want to cultivate more.
83 This is not repeated each time a women remarries. Only the first time is a reason for a real party. Moreover,
dance is not a custom in the Islamic religion, although some Bana Muslims mingle their new habits with the
old ones and do celebrate their wedding in a more traditional way.
84 Gains per case rarely exceed 500 Fcfa.
bourhood as well as for the position of the neighbourhood in a wider context, villagers are will-
ing to invest in small presents and services to their ‘Ardo’ to make him stick to his role.
This same organisation and position is also present one step higher, at the level of a con-
glomerate of certain neighbourhoods. Mostly these chiefs have inherited their position from
their fathers who governed the same territory in a time that it was only one neighbourhood.
They already fulfilled this job when Guili did not have its regional headquarter function and
when, therefore, no lamido resided there. These chiefs are counted on to know the important
issues (for example of the history) of the village and as such can represent the interests of the
village even better than the lowest level chiefs. When the lamido in Guili wants to know some-
thing about the village or wants to consult his subjects of Oudda, he invites the higher level
chiefs. These are free to bring along their advisors, some of which certainly will be the neigh-
bourhood chiefs.
Party politics in the sense of influencing people’s election preferences is no issue in Oudda.
People do not feel attached to a specific ethnically based party that could better represent their
interests at the State government or provincial level. Even a ‘Mandara mountain-based’ politi-
cal party does not exist. The Bana are such a small group, it is better to be seen and to behave
as a Cameroonian. They do not trust official State authorities, but they consider the RDPC is as
good as any other party and perhaps even better because “Biya is in power so long now, he need
not enrich himself any further. With a new president you risk predatory behaviour”, as several
men in Oudda assure me. In addition, they are grateful to Biya because “he abolished intra- and
inter-group violence”. “When I was young I could not go from here to Guili, because of the risk
of being taken as a slave by a neighbouring tribe”, several older villagers explain to me85. 
But that was in the past. Nowadays “it is not possible to understand what those ‘Yaoundé’
people are doing” and “they have forgotten that we exist”. Even the mayor of the municipali-
ty to which Oudda belongs is far away. Until 2002 he was a Bana but, like the sub-prefect of
Bourah, he never visited the Oudda area. During the 2002 municipal elections, a RDPC mem-
ber from Tchevi (a village south of Bourah) was elected mayor and, as a result, Oudda inhab-
itants are even further removed from the authorities. 
Once again, an investment in the relations with the village and regional chiefs is more
important. As far as is necessary, Oudda is ruled by the neighbourhood chiefs and the lamido
in Guili. It is to this latter person that the Oudda-ers pay their taxes86 and to him they pay hom-
age on, for example, Christmas day (although for him as a Muslim this is not a very important
religious occasion). They expect him to stand up for their rights in cases concerning higher lev-
els. With that in mind they are willing to let him decide what is good for the development of
their village, if they consider such a task to be beyond their own reach. Also, it is to him and
his noblemen that they can turn in cases and conflicts in which the local chiefs are powerless.
Nevertheless, some people are active in politics. Some are members of the RDPC women’s
group that promotes women’s consciousness regarding their rights, birth control and other rel-
evant issues. Others sit on the Oudda RDPC board or are just party members. Within the party
they try to influence local governance but do not go beyond the discussion stage. They do not
dream of putting pressure on anybody. They say that their political activities earn them no
85 Interviews December 2000 – January 2001.
86 Collected by the neighbourhood chiefs. In the past the lamido did not offer any money to compensate for the
work, but in 2001 he promised to pay the chief 2-3,000 Fcfa when he brings in the taxes.
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more than a dress (with the RDPC signs or the portrait of Biya on it). However, their involve-
ment does provide them with an extra group to fall back on in times of need and sometimes
(although very rarely) it gives them access to higher level decision-making institutions and
people. Yet, it has to be stressed, that this is not the reason for doing this work. It is more or
less the other way round. If a certain family is involved in the RDPC, you have to be involved
in politics in order to become or stay a full and valued member of that family.  
Conflict mediation
In Bana society the village chief also used to serve as arbiter in the event of disagreements.
These could be arguments about field boundaries, crop damage by animals, fights between
youngsters or (co-)spouses, discords over bride price and the paying thereof, etc. Here again
the region chief, the lamido (or his court) has to help when the lower authorities cannot solve
the dispute. Nowadays, the State has installed agricultural and animal husbandry line officers
and an official commission to deal with quarrels about land and crop damage (see chapter 4).
The first step then, is to inform the agricultural line officer, who visits the field and estimates
the damage (or the boundaries). This will then be converted into an amount of money that the
cattle owner has to pay or into an order to a perpetrating farmer to withdraw from a field.
Discords over this decision are brought before the commission, of which the sub-prefect is the
president87. In Oudda, a village-based representative of the agricultural line officer and a dis-
trict based (in Guili) representative of the animal husbandry line officer have to be addressed.
Inhabitants of Oudda choose their own strategy to respond to crop damage or other conflict
causes. Some of them (and most of them most of the time) only address the perpetrator and do
not contact any authorities at all. They tend to think that the amount of money and gifts that
have to be paid are not proportional to the chances of winning a case. This is even more so, they
think, because the perpetrator of the crop damage can always give cattle and that is worth more
than anything a cultivator can give. Others use the traditional hierarchy of neighbourhood chief,
conglomerate chief and regional chief, but never seek access to the administrative lines, let
alone the official judiciary system. Still others only complain to the Mayor (although he is far
away in Bourah) and bring the captured livestock along as evidence. This strategy means they
are sure of not getting any reimbursement themselves, but it does at least guarantee that the
owner of the animals has to pay for the involvement of this public servant and the costs of keep-
ing the ‘imprisoned’ animals overnight. This, according to actors with this strategy, makes peo-
ple look after their flock more carefully and therefore prevents future damage.
In the event of discords between farmers and Fulbe (or other cattle keepers) within one vil-
lage, apart from village chiefs, the lamido can always act as mediator because both parties
acknowledge his authority. Most of the time he sends one or two of his noblemen to assess the
situation in the field and to decide what has to be done. When the people involved do not agree
with the noblemen’s decision, they can appeal to the lamido personally. In a kind of court ses-
sion (lawsuit), all the parties are heard, wise men can add information and the lamido decides
who is to blame and what has to be paid (both to himself and to the winner of the adjudica-
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87 Other members are the same line officers, the commander of the regional police corps, the regional chief (the
lamido) and, where necessary, the line officer of forest affairs.
88 Interviews with Oudda-Bariki and Waliwol Kordraweshi inhabitants (see figure 7.3) during field observations
of the Boubakary Néné pasture borders in January 2001 (see also note 63 in Chapter 8).
tion). The possibility of involvement of the lamido’s noblemen means it is important to invest
in good relationships with those men and their families. “The lamido always believes his
noblemen, but they can give a report to their chief that does not match the truth. For example
when you have quarrelled with family members of a nobleman, who live in Oudda, next time
when you need an objective statement about the borders of your field, this nobleman will give
an account that favours the person that wants your field.”88
For people vulnerable to village jealousy or over-zealous policemen, it is wise to invest in
a good relationship with the lamido himself. Young men who try to set up (trans-border) trad-
ing need the lamido’s support in the event that they fall foul of the authorities (or co-villagers)
and will visit the lamido’s court now and again to pay him their respects and give him (small)
presents.
Cultural investments
The rise of ‘new’ religions has led to group formation along those lines. The Catholic Church
helps its promising members with educational opportunities. This attracts youngsters to
become active within the church, binding them not only with co-believers in Oudda, but also
with Catholics in Guili, where the church has its centre and where mass is held. In the
Protestant churches (two types of Lutheran Brothers) also activities for the young ones organ-
ised by the adolescents - like a choir, Christmas celebrations with theatre and bible knowledge
quizzes, etc. - strengthen group bonds. Once you have become a member of a church you
remain a member of that group long after you have stopped practising Christianity actively.
Catholic men who marry a second or third wife may be barred from communion, but they con-
tinue to be member of the Catholic group. 
The Islamic community functions at two levels. Men pray together in places delineated as
‘mosques’ and discuss religious and social issues directly afterwards. Bana Muslims form a
group that provides a bit of mutual help in the event of problems. Despite their praying togeth-
er and the performing of the other Islamic duties, they do feel more or less isolated from the
Fulbe Muslims of their village because these “despise us, black men”89. A sign of the differ-
ence between the two groups, for instance, was that in 2000 the end of the Ramadan was cel-
ebrated one day later by the Fulbe than the Bana. For women, being Muslim does not help
them become members of a special group. Women pray alone in a corner of the house. Fulbe
women form a kind of group, but this is more ethnically related than based on religion. As is
the case with the Bana women, their social network mostly consists of family and friends. As
far as Fulbe are concerned, these family members and friends sometimes live far away in
Garoua, Ngaoundéré or Nigeria.
Music is an important part of Bana culture. Both within all different religious meetings as
well as in common free moments (in the evenings, or when visiting markets as a place of social
contacts), ‘professional’ musicians or youngsters who are still learning to play the drums, vio-
lin or guitar, grace the gatherings and attract listeners. This again helps to form and maintain
social bonds within and between groups. In the Christian churches, for example, music and
88 Interviews with Oudda-Bariki and Waliwol Kordraweshi inhabitants (see figure 7.3) during field observations
of the Boubakary Néné pasture borders in January 2001 (see also note 63 in Chapter 8).
89 This sounds dramatic, but in daily life this does not lead to major frustrations or the rejection by the Fulbe of
their religious brothers.
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singing is a lively way to connect people and to attract young members. Each of the two
Lutheran brothers’ groups of Oudda has its adolescent choir, led by a slightly older boy. They
practise every Saturday evening and sing during services. Even young girls and boys from
non-Christian parents want to join these ‘age groups’. Moreover, a young player (son or
nephew of the household head, or a neighbour’s son) will soon be accompanied by others
around the compound-hearth (even in Muslim families) who build friendship ties between
them and with the host family.
In short, in the social domain investments are generally unchanged from what they used to be
in the past. The Bana have a strong social fabric that can help them through difficult times. It
seems as if some modern factors only add to that fabric. Investments with a view to maintain-
ing these social bonds cost time (mostly experienced as ‘good’ time) and the sharing of mate-
rial things. Individuals invest in special capabilities that can serve their community, like lead-
ing a choir, playing a musical instrument, or learning more about modern agricultural methods
to inform fellow farmers. 
Table 7.3.7 Summary of current level, insecurities and investments in the domains of the ‘insecurity com
plex’, based on ‘capitals90 of the village in total (- = bad; o = moderate, + = good; in the 
investment column: - = no investment; o = a bit investment; + = a lot of investments)
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90 See Chapter 2.
Average Situation Security Invest- Investments details
level of of worst (= ex- ments
village off third pected level 
of pop. in future)
Physical basis o o o n.a. n.a.
Population.density + + - - No real family planning
Land availability + - - o+ Various qualitative methods by small
number of people; invasion of Jiksa-
Kubadje
Commod. of land - - + o Rising: more safe guarding by 
owners; inhabitants expect increase
Food production versus needs + - - Crop diversification; ploughs; etc.More 
discrepancy
Health o o o o Rising, esp. when local dispensary 
arrives
Education - - o o Rising; already more than in Dzambou
Cash crops o - o o 'Everybody' a bit; no sales development
Livestock -+ - - o Everybody tries, not really successful 
Fulbe inhabitants
Non-agricultural possibilities - - - - Low scale; low technology; no real 
labour migration
Socio-cultural o to + o to + o to + o to + Some increase of new systems 
(religions)
Political - - - - Almost no linking with higher-up
Land allocation - - - o Fear of loss Jiksa via national 
government decisions
Conflict resolution -o --- -o -o Not with other adm. entities
within the village
In short, the bulk of insecurities does not concern the natural domain of the village, but rather
the other three domains. The environment has a moderately safe status and population pres-
sure is not very high. However, as regards the worst off third of the population, they suffer
from a lack of land availability and a resulting shortage of food production. In addition, specif-
ically investments in the natural domain are difficult, thus, future environmental insecurities
may be feared.
7.4 Intrusion of other niche: Box 2
After descending from the hill tops91 the Bana built their compounds first on the lower slopes
and then moved further into the plains each time and finally some of them into the far bush.
Once the general level of safety had increased, the grandfathers and great grandfathers of cur-
rent inhabitants wanted to live in the middle of their fields to protect their crops against invad-
ing wild animals (monkeys, antelopes, ward hocks etc.). At the same time they did not want to
live totally alone, with only their small family, so in remote areas they settled in small groups.
One of those groups consisted of the clearers of the more hilly Jiksa region and they started to
build houses there somewhere during the 1930s. 
According to the Bana of Oudda, the Jiksa region lies at the same place as the (current)
“Kubadje” neighbourhood of Kila, but with a wider north-south extension. Thus, it stretches
over two km along the Kila-Oudda border from east to west. It covers the whole of Kubadje
from north to south, but southwards it covers another 1 km that lies in official Oudda territo-
ry (see Figure 7.3).
Whether for safety reasons (such a small group of only three family heads formed an easy
target for bandits and predator animals that abounded in those days) or because living condi-
tions deteriorated (the Far North Province suffered from a drought period during the 1940s; see
section 2.1.1 and chapter 4)92, the Jiksa settlers turned back to the more central Oudda neigh-
bourhoods somewhere around 1945. 
After a generation of cultivation in the surroundings of the Baliwol, Bariki and Hlaka neigh-
bourhoods, some farmers started to clear the bush of the Jiksa part anew, starting from around
1985 onwards. Although they did not consider the possibility of building houses, they did want
to cultivate the fertile soil. They did not bother about the Fulbe who had settled there in the
meantime and more and more co-villagers invaded the area in order to create fields. 
7.4.1 Reasons for intrusion in the environmental domain
The most obvious reason to start a field in Jiksa is the fact that the family (or the individual)
possesses land there, at least according to that family’s perception and that of other Oudda
inhabitants. This ownership-perception added to the idea that the soil in Jiksa had to be very
fertile, after decades of being fallow and of being used by cattle. However, not all inhabitants
who own fields in Jiksa actually use those fields. Table 7.4.1 shows where the fields of respon-
91 These hilltops are situated in the centre of Oudda, more or less between Oudda-Baliwol and Oudda-Bariki
(Fig. 7.3).
92 Some older inhabitants, for example the Fulbe chief of Guiki, talked about their more remote homestead
where they lived when they were young and the fact that their fathers withdraw further and further towards
the centre of Oudda because of a lack of water.
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dents are situated and where they use fields. Of the thirty-three owners of fields in Jiksa only
sixteen use (some of) their fields there. 
Table 7.4.1 Number of respondents that owns and/or uses fields at certain places (n = 125) a = in Jiksa; 
b = around the house; c = in rest of bush; d = no fields possessed
Explanation of this table: for example, the second row, third column shows that fifteen men own fields at two dif-
ferent places, being in Jiksa and around the house; the third row shows that of this type of owners no-one uses
only his Jiksa fields (a : o); eleven use their fields around the house only (b: 11) and four use both types of fields
(a + b: 4). The fourth row shows the place women use for cultivation while the third column shows that eight
women use fields in both Jiksa and around the house.
Sometimes the use of the Jiksa area is inevitable. Whether others use it or not is the result of
calculating the different factors (see Table 7.4.2). A lack of money, for example, that prohibits
the purchase of other fields, of chemical fertilisers93 or enough animals for animal manure
obliges actors to search for those (own) fields that have a natural fertility, namely the Jiksa
fields. This approach is weighed against possible disadvantages such as the distance or the fact
that the Fulbe have to be disturbed.
Table 7.4.2 reasons for use or non-use of owned fields in Jiksa (n= 34)
a = These two people do not want to disturb the houses of the Fulbe and/or the place of their fields
b = These five people indicate they are going to use Jiksa fields next year, because two of them have now grown-
up sons, and 3 others have run out of possibilities for leaving land fallow outside Jiksa.
Although for the majority of Jiksa users, the reasons to use Jiksa-fields seem to be straight-
forward and seem to arise from natural circumstances, it remains to be seen whether or not
these actors have other possibilities. Going to Jiksa in fact implies several disadvantages. First
of all, the labour input to clear the fields there is very high. Because the forest has (mostly) had
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93 Apart from money, an important hindrance to the use of chemical fertilisers is the excessively late arrival of
these fertilisers each year.
Place of fields a a + b a + c a + b + c Total b c b+ c d Total
(with fields 
in (use in) 
Jiksa)
Men(ownership) 5 15 3 11 34 (41 %) 4 11 27 6 82
Men (use of 5 a: 0 a: 0 a: 1 16 4 11 b: 6
owned fields) b: 11 c: 1 b: 3 c: 1
a+b: 4 a+c: 2 c: 0 b+c: 20
a+b: 1
b+c: 3
a+b+c: 3
Women (use) 1 8 0 1 10 (23 %) 14 9 6 4 43
No Only Rest Rest Too Disturb. Sons Not necessary 
reason field infertile fertile far Fulbea use in Jiksab
Use 7 5 4 0 0 0 4 0
Non-use 5 0 0 5 2 2 0 5
the chance to grow for more than a generation, and sometimes even more94, trees are big and
cutting them down is hard work. Also the removal of brush requires a lot of work. The actor
needs to be very healthy, or he needs money to hire workers. Indeed, some older farmers leave
the job to their sons (and not only the four that let their sons use the area (see Table 7.4.1 and
7.4.2)).
The second problem in Jiksa is encounters with cattle, donkeys and their owners. The ani-
mals cause damage to crops and the owners are not willing to pay any reimbursements. Thus,
cultivating in the ‘pasture’ area needs to be accompanied by control and defence activities.
Several respondents explain that they have to go down there every day, “even Sundays”95 and
have to stay out a long time to make sure the cattle keepers do not let their animals go into the
fields. 
On the other hand, the fact that more Oudda inhabitants cultivate in Jiksa at the same time
means that they can share the patrols. And, they do not need to be so afraid of Fulbe aggression.
7.4.2 Reasons for intrusion in the Human domain
In general there are no health-related reasons that would cause people to choose for the fields
in Jiksa. At best, health and life-cycle situations can help to overcome the disadvantages of cul-
tivating in Jiksa. For example, those farmers that use or (next year) want to use fields in Jiksa,
are all healthy people. As has been explained, people with poor health are unable to cut trees
and endure the daily walk. Being young certainly helps in this situation. The mean age of users
is 35 (range 22 to 5996), while the mean age of non-users who own fields in Jiksa is 47. This
indeed shows that younger men in particular go to Jiksa to clear and cultivate. 
Education may cause an opening of the mind to future problems and, as such, may direct
people towards certain strategies. However, those young men that use their fields in Jiksa do
not have a higher than average level of education (the percentage that attended school or
schools at a higher level is no higher). So, for them education has not served as a triggering
factor. Instead, more of them than the village mean have sent their children to school and cer-
tainly a higher percentage of them than of the group that owns Jiksa fields but do not use them
(see Table 7.4.3). It therefore looks as if the reverse is true: those people that use Jiksa fields
seem to have an open mind for the modernisation that is incorporated into education.
Table 7.4.3 Number of owners/users and owners/non-users of Jiksa fields sending school-age 
children to school.
a = The percentages shown are percentages of the people with school-age children.
94 Clearing the bush (during the clearing period of the grandfathers) often only meant that in a certain area two
or three trees were cut and then the whole area was delineated as being the property of that person.
95 Sundays are a day of rest for all inhabitants of Oudda, whether Muslim, Christian or followers of the tradi-
tional religion.
96 The two users of over 50 years already cleared parts of the Jiksa bush when they were young.
n With young or With school-age children; With school-age children; 
no children sent to schoola not sent to school
Jiksa field users 16 6 9 (90 %) 1
Non-users 18 8 4 (40 %) 6
Whole village 82 33 32 (66 %) 17
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The Jiksa users not only mention the necessity of other options than land for their children, but
(if possible) they also do something about it. They themselves do not have any extra chances
via education but they obviously do feel the pressures of land shortage and infertility. 
7.4.3 Reasons for intrusion in the Economic domain
The same lack of money that prohibits the use of chemical fertilisers or the purchase of ani-
mals for manure also prevents people from becoming something else than farmers - such as
traders or civil servants. For the purpose of the analysis, wealth will be defined here as the pos-
session of animals and ploughs97. The possession of land is excluded from the calculation
because it would otherwise lead to circle reasoning. Table 7.4.4 shows how many people in the
three categories (users of Jiksa fields, Jiksa-field owners that do not use them and the rest of
respondents) are ‘rich’ according to my definition98. 
Table 7.4.4 division of wealth (n = 81) with category percentages in brackets
The Table shows that significantly more farmers are ‘rich’ that own and use fields in Jiksa than
non-using owners or fellow villagers that do not own fields in Jiksa. Therefore, it does not
seem likely that Jiksa fields are used because of a lack of other possibilities.
7.4.4 Reasons for intrusion in the Social domain
Most of the current users of Jiksa fields started using those fields some five years ago. This
was directly after the lamido of Guili issued a kind of official statement about his territory and
its boundaries. At the same time he granted permission to his subjects in Oudda to cultivate in
the contested area. Although this was counteracted with objections from the official authori-
ties in Mogodé, the farmers involved took the permission seriously because it came from their
one and only chief.
Up until recently, other owners of Jiksa fields continued to look at the area as an insecure
possession because the lamido is far away. It is easy for him to declare that the area be used
because he does not have to deal daily with intrusive cattle keepers and resulting crop damage.
These people doubted whether they should use their fields there. The arrival of the researcher
and the related trips to the area to view the situation - the damage in fields and the position of
the borders - as well as a visit to the Kila village chief and an on-the-spot discussion between
the Kila and Oudda inhabitants caused even more remote Oudda-ers to become aware of the
problem and to become involved in the struggle being fought out by their fellow villagers. As
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97 De Steenhuijsen Piters (1995) used the same indicators to distinguish rich and poor farmers in his study of
the Diamaré production differences.
98 According to my definition somebody is ‘rich’ if he possesses a plough and a pair of draught animals, a
plough accompanied by a combination of 4 other animals (or 3 if a cow is involved) or if he has no plough
but at least 3 cattle or 6 or more smaller stock in combination with a cow, or a combination of 2 cattle with 2
smaller stock.
'Rich' Not 'rich'
User of Jiksa fields 10 (63 %) 6 (37 %)
Owner, non-user of Jiksa 7 (39 %) 11 (61 %)
Other villagers 27 (57 %) 20 (43 %)
a result, the owners emphasised the question of loyalty and made the lawan declare that he was
in agreement with the lamido’s statement. The conglomerate neighbourhood chief of Bariki,
Hlaka and Waza incited his village men to go to Jiksa and start cultivating there. 
In other words, the intrusion turned into a collective action backed up by expressions of
leadership and loyalty by people in Oudda who did not own Jiksa fields.
7.5 Assertion of rights: Box 3
As far as the Bana are concerned, the Jiksa region is theirs because it belongs to the territory
of the Guili district. Thus, it is part of the same district as their own village of Oudda. At the
same time it is theirs because their ancestors cleared the (empty) bush and started to develop
the wilderness after they came down from the hilltops. Their own customary laws and the State
laws declare that this is a basis for ownership rights. Unfortunately, both claims are denied by
their adversaries.
7.5.1 About the boundaries
Apart from the question of who designated the area as a pasture reserve and whether it was
allocated as such at all, the exact position of the boundaries of the area is also subject to dis-
cussion. The least contested are the eastern and western borders, although the Bana deny the
status thereof as they deny the existence of the pasture as such (see below). Nevertheless, fol-
lowing the description by the Kapsiki and the Kila-Fulbe of the reserve status of their land, one
can state that its eastern boundary is formed by the river Ndo, an almost year-round stream
(although it reduces to a couple of separate pools at the end of the dry season) that runs in a
more or less north-south direction at that location. The western boundary is formed by a hill
ridge between the bush area and the territory of Haou, the southern-most village of Mogodé
district along the main road that runs parallel to the border with Nigeria (see Figure 7.3).
The Fulbe and Kapsiki of Kila oppose each other with regard to the northern boundary of
the pasture reserve and agree about the position of its southern boundary. However, as far as
the Bana of Oudda are concerned, there is only one boundary, namely that between their vil-
lage of Oudda and the territory of Kila. Referring to an intertribal war some 50 to 60 years ago
between Oudda and Kila99, that was ceremonially ended with the sacrifice of a dog on the tra-
ditional boundary between the two villages100, they claim the boundary to be more than 500 m
99 The older inhabitants who do remember this war cannot recall the exact date. The village chief of Kila, Takva
Koye, now about 80 years old, participated in the fighting when he was young and when his father was still
chief.
100 The origin of the war lays in the animosities caused by the death of a Kapsiki man who had visited Oudda
just days before his death, to carry a demon from the Oudda premises to Kila in order to use this figure
against one of his fellow Kila. The Oudda people were blamed for this death and when some Kila-people,
who were fishing in an Oudda river, saw some Oudda cultivators on their fields they attacked them with
knifes and machetes, yelling and shouting as they did so. This noise they made attracted the attention of the
other residents of Oudda and, before long, the two villages were engaged in a full-scale war that lasted a
month. Some of the older inhabitants of today fought during that conflict and they know exactly which per-
son was killed first, second, etc.   After a month, they claim, the people from Kila grew tired and withdrew.
Then the Oudda elders asked the Kila authorities for compensation for the dead and requested the ceremony
involving the dog to confirm that the two peoples would never attack each other again and never again pass
the mutual boundary.
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to the north than the Fulbe and Kapsiki declare. 
From several km north of Haou, the boundary between the two districts runs eastwards over
the hilltop of the mountain Tsakatsla101 (see Figure 7.3). Then, east of this mountain, on 
the western side of the Kubadje area, a small riverbed forms the boundary between Mogodé
and Guili. The moment a rocky ridge emerges in east-west direction (Photo 7.1, see the cen-
tre of the book), the boundary follows this fall that gradually changes, first into a hilltop and,
in the end, into a new, shallow riverbed which joins the southernmost of the two east-west
flowing rivers between Kubadje and Kila almost at the point where the Fulbe settlement was
built. From that point onwards, that is in an easterly direction, the boundary is formed by this
river, which lies just north of the Kubadje settlement. Because of the collective ceremony in
the past, the Bana pressurise the Kapsiki to deny this boundary position. They do not commu-
nicate with the inhabitants of the Fulbe settlement on this issue but focus on the party that
should know. 
In a gathering of Kila-Kapsiki and Oudda-Bana to discuss the position of the boundary and
the memories of the ceremony (Kubadje, January 2001), the Kapsiki village chief, Takva
Koye, came up with a neat statement to run with the hare: The fields in this region are the
property of the Oudda people because their ancestors cleared them of bushes and trees, but
the area itself belongs to the dominion of the Kila, and thus the Mogodé authorities. This does
not satisfy the Bana102 who explain the difference between the official and the traditional bor-
der by referring to the fact that after five peaceful Mogodé lamibe, problems about the bound-
aries started with the lamido before last, known as Hama Djouda. He wanted to enlarge his
area and bribed the prefect of Mayo Tsanaga department. Although the prefect made an
appointment with both lamibe, Loumbi of Guili and Hama Djouda of Mogodé, so that they
could show him the original boundary in order to clarify its location once and for all, they
organised it in such a way that Loumbi came too late and Hama Djouda had already given his
opinion. The prefect accepted this without any changes and without giving Loumbi any
opportunity to explain his stance. So it was Hama Djouda that moved the boundary to the hill-
tops and cheated both the prefect and the inhabitants of Oudda. The prefect must have
received gifts (money or cattle) to agree with this proposal103. He made people erect iron sign-
posts along this new boundary, the Kapsiki say, of which the stone foundations can still be
found104. 
According to the Kapsiki (and some of the Fulbe of Kubadje) one of their chiefs, Djaoforo,
illegally removed the signs in order to shift the boundary to the south with the purpose of help-
ing himself and his friend, lamido Issa Tizze of Mogodé, to acquire a larger territory. Of
course, this is sheer speculation on the issue of who removed the signs (if indeed they existed
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101 The two current lamibe of Guili and Mogodé are always quarrelling about the position of the border in the
neighbourhood of Haou along the main road, where the markets, settlements and travelling merchants make
it worthwhile to have a couple of yards more territory. Here again the Bana of Guili position the border far
more to the north than the Kapsiki of Mogodé. They underline their claim by referring to the language spo-
ken in Haou, which is Bana and not Kapsiki. This, they state, also strengthens their claim to the boundary
position in Kubadje-Jiksa.
102 “Have you ever heard of that”, they say, “people owning fields in the territory of another village?”
103 Explanation of several Bana informants (men and women, aged from about 40 years and older), independent
from each other, during the period December 2000-January 2001.
104 This is what the Kapsiki and Fulbe claim. Kila village chief, Takva Koye, tried to find those pedestals, but
this proved to be very difficult if not impossible.
at all). Kapsiki, who visit the Kubadje area, complain about this removing of signposts,
because they can foresee more problems coming out of that105.
To underline the value of the whole story the Bana have a collective explanation of lamido
Hama Djouda’s behaviour. He attempted to change officially the existing boundary, inspired by
the fact that the Fulbe population were subject to the administration of his side of the boundary.
In other words, the Kubadje inhabitants paid (and pay) their taxes to the chief of Mogodé.
According to the Bana this is due to some impertinence on the part of the first Fulbe chief of
Kubadje, Elhadji Djougé. After his arrival he started to give his tribute to the master of the ter-
ritory, lamido Loumbi, but always was reluctant with his delivery. When, one day, Loumbi sent
his noblemen to collect the delayed payment, a kind of quarrel broke out at the end of which
Djougé swore never to pay anything to Loumbi anymore. He turned to Mogodé instead, where
they were very glad to accept the money and the status of Kubadje to be part of Kila. Although
Loumbi ordered Djougé and his kinsmen to leave his territory, when Djougé stayed the Guili
lamido decided not to risk war over the matter106. In that period, the inhabitants of Oudda did
not use their Jiksa fields, because they had left them fallow after 20 years of use107. 
This brings us to the second half of the ownership claim to the region by the Bana. According
to them this area is never meant to be set aside for cattle grazing, and those who are said to
have taken that decision do not have the right to do so.
7.5.2 Pasture or arable land? Rights of settlement, use and decision
The difference between the opinion of the Bana that ‘Jiksa’ is to be cultivated and the opinion
of the Fulbe that ‘Kubadje’ is a pasture reserve (which refers to the same area), is the result of
differences about who has the first rights to the region and which authorities have (and had)
the legitimate right to make decisions on it (this touches on the above-mentioned boundaries
dilemma).
With respect to ‘first rights’, people refer to primordial presence. With that they mean that
those people whose ancestors first lived on (or used) the particular land, have the strongest
rights. As explained in the history section of this Chapter, the Kapsiki won this ‘race’ for the
Mandara Mountains in general, but the Bana were the first in the Oudda territory. While liv-
ing on the hilltops they already started to clear the bush at the foot of the mountains. Three to
four generations ago, they started to develop the surrounding plains with real fervour. Only
after the French encouraged them to descend in the 1930s did they leave their mountain tops
and started to build their dwellings on the plains. All informants in Oudda that now have
claims in Jiksa (n = 32) state that their grandfathers or great-grandfathers started to develop
that bush (clearing the trees and bushes, building small stone lines along the borders of their
105 It is surprising that nobody has so far blamed the Oudda farmers for removing the signposts. When I asked
the Oudda inhabitants themselves they stated that they had nothing to do with the matter. Along the main
road crossing Haou, they say, a signpost demarcating the original location of the border had been removed by
the Mogodé authorities (or inhabitants). The remnants are still visible.
106 Remarkably, Elhadji Ngoura, the Fulbe neighbourhood chief of Kubadje, did mention several times that they
never paid taxes to Guili canton, without the researcher posing any question on the matter. Perhaps he is
aware of the accusations of the Bana towards his former chief, Elhadji Djougé.
107 As stated, the departure from the Jiksa area may have been due to climatologic circumstances: the sandy soil
there is very vulnerable to a lack of water. Up until the first new clearings were created in Jiksa in the 1980s
it appears that the Oudda farmers had enough fertile fields surrounding their settlements.
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fields and starting cultivation) somewhere between 100 and 120 years ago. This means they
did so while they were still living on the hills. Like the respondents who do not have claims in
the contested pasture (n = 91; 43 women), but in other parts of Oudda, they claim that the area
was empty at that time: “There were no others there!”
In the Kubadje-Jiksa case, that is the historical dispute about the boundary and about the
point at which the bush development started, it is not only important to establish who happened
to be the first individual (family or clan) at the location in question, but also who happened to
be the legal authority. 
The Bana claim, referring to their vision of the boundary location, that it is their lamido (the
one residing in Guili) who had and has legal authority over the Jiksa area. Indeed, in the past,
this lamido Loumbi, together with his village chiefs, did change the classification of quite a
large part of his territory from arable land into pasture reserve. He allocated four pasture
reserves to four Fulbe chiefs. The surface area of each reserve depended on the number of cat-
tle present at that moment in time. According to the present day Fulbe chief of Oudda, lawan
Boubakary Néné, lamido Loumbi has given all four chiefs official papers to emphasise the
‘gift’. Although one of these reserves is not situated within the territory of Oudda, the other
three are: one in the north-west region of the Waza neighbourhood, one in the direction of
Modélé and the last one directly east of the Fulbe neighbourhood Guiki (see Figure 7.3). This
one, named after the current sub-neighbourhood and Fulbe lawan, is the biggest. None of the
four coincided with the Jiksa (or Kubadje) area.
According to the Bana, the Fulbe argument about tax payment to the Mogodé lamido as a
proof of belonging is a false claim, although the fact as such is true. It is based only on the
impertinence described (above) of the first Fulbe chief of Kubadje-Jiksa, Elhadji Djougé. It
was and ought to be the Guili lamido to whom the Kubadje settlers have to pay their taxes and
who has authority over the Jiksa region.
The Bana also denounce the claim by the Fulbe that Kubadje-Jiksa was an empty bush area
when they arrived. The fact that they could not see any fields, houses or people does not mean
that it was undisturbed wilderness. In that period, the inhabitants of Oudda did not use their
Kubadje/Jiksa fields because they had left them fallow after 20 years of use. Nevertheless, they
were still their fields.
In order to stress the fact that the Mogodé authorities know perfectly well who the owners
of the area are and who has a say in the matter, several Oudda inhabitants report having met
the lamido of Mogodé or the Kila chief, Takva Koye, at the market in Guili. There these chiefs
asked the Guili and Oudda authorities, like Hamadou Loumbi or Hamadou Ardou, to solve the
issues once and for all, and to declare the Kubadje-Jiksa region a pasture reserve. They would
not have posed such a request, the Bana say, if they had known that they had authority over
the area. Yet, mentioning these encounters and using them to stress again the position of both
lamibe can also be a conscious and purposeful effort by the Bana to strengthen their claim: one
has to realise that such a request by the Mogodé authorities (if really posed) may just have been
a strategic move to try and solve the problem mutually and not by sheer force.
In daily life, the differences of opinion about the boundaries and the classification of the bush
land of Kubadje-Jiksa led to several attempts to invade the pastures and to clashes between dif-
ferent users. 
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7.6 Counter assertion and conflict: Box 3
The conflict situation, as depicted in Box 3 (see fig 7.2), only arises when two (or more) par-
ties oppose each other. Both continue to stress their access, use or even ownership rights to the
same piece of land. At the same time it is clear that mutual use is not possible. 
When Bana start cultivating in the bush area of Jiksa/Kubadje, they claim it to be their
right. “These are our fields”. There would have been no problem if the other users had
acknowledged this right straight away and had withdrawn. This did not occur, however. Part
of the contested area is used as a settlement area on which houses have been built. The pres-
ent Fulbe have cleared some ‘home fields’ around these compounds. They use the rest of the
region for cattle grazing and as tracks to other grazing areas. After the description of the
claims of the Bana in section 5, I will examine the situation and claims of the Fulbe of
Kubadje in more detail.
7.6.1 Environmental domain
Physical basis
The rich pasture areas of the Mandara Mountains plateaux between Mokolo and Bourah are
covered with more than 118 herbaceous species and 67 tree species, of which all grass species
and 15 tree species are eaten by cattle108. In one of the official pasture reserves near Mogodé
(Ploumtou) Mvondo Awono et al (2001: 272) consider the carrying capacity to be between
1.50 and 2.60 TLU/ha, dependant on the phytosociological group present109. Unfortunately
many pastures are degraded (id: 267) and there is an abundance of ‘Kubadje’, the non-palat-
able Isoberlinea doka. Especially in the region just north of the Kubadje neighbourhood these
bushes are everywhere. As stated, this explains the area’s name.
Nevertheless, the pasture area itself has more diverse vegetation. The herders of Kubadje
are proud of the quality of their pasture. They showed me the good herbs110 and explained that
Kubadje is the best pasture area in the far neighbourhood. Indeed, as described in section 2.1
of this chapter, the underlying soil is considered to be perfectly suitable for forest and pastures.
At the same time the Fulbe complain about the lack of herbs in the bush or a diminishing
thereof due to a lack of rain (in 2000, 1999 was a good year) or water in general. They attrib-
ute this last fact to the activities of the Guili-people, such as tree-cutting and exposing the soil
to the wind and sun. Because the grazing possibilities are limited, their herd numbers are not
growing any more. In fact, the number of cattle is even diminishing, they say. For example
Ngoura’s herds shrunk from six to three in ten years. Two others complained about a decrease
in the number of their cattle by two-thirds in five years111.
During the rainy season, the Fulbe herd their cattle into the bush surrounding their settle-
ment. As the dry season develops they withdraw more and more in the direction of the big bush
area of Modélé to the east. Only some cows from small herds are kept behind to provide milk
108 Mvondo Awono et al (2001: 272).
109 For example, Paspalum scrobuculatum groups are estimated to maybe carry 2.64 TLU/ha. NB. This is more
than the carrying capacity estimated by Gaston (1996) or Breman (1975).
110 Among others: Eleusine indica, Dactyloctenium aegyptium and Brachiaria xantholeuca.
111 The decrease in cattle numbers is not only a direct result of diminishing pastures but also an indirect one,
namely for the payments that have to be made for crop damage reimbursements and to ‘buy’ the support of
the authorities cattle have to be sold.
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for the children and because moving them is not worthwhile112. The herders also try to use the
stubbles on the fields of the Kapsiki in Kila, but this is being met by more and more resistance
because the Kapsiki want to use these harvest remains for their own cattle. In the second half
of the dry season, the Fulbe are obliged to seek out the more abundant pastures of Nigeria. This
is something they hate doing because of the security risks it entails for them and their herds.
Some choose to go as far as Mayo Oulo more to the south, to be sure of water in the barrage
lake there.
The younger men who have to grow maize for their small and extended families, reported
a decline in agricultural production between last year and this year. They all complain of insuf-
ficient grain (maize) and that they have to buy grain to feed their families. It has to be added,
however, that the Fulbe have always bought (at least some of) their grain in exchange for meat
and milk. Most often they reported that this year’s yield (2000) is half of last year’s. The
women’s groundnut production is more or less constant over time. Only when new fields have
just been taken into production (every two or three years) is the yield somewhat higher. In gen-
eral, field fertility is good because the Fulbe ensure that their cattle, small ruminants and even
donkeys leave their dung on the fields during the course of several months.
Population density
The Kubadje reserve, with its Fulbe inhabitants and vast stretches of bush land covers rough-
ly 2 to 1 km113. It stretches along the Oudda border. Officially this area belongs to the Kila ter-
ritory. In the 1950s, six young Fulbe family heads arrived with their wives and small children.
In total they counted eighteen grown-ups and twenty-five children. Nowadays, the Fulbe ham-
let consists of more than 300 inhabitants. The population density increased from 22.5 per km2
to 150 people per km2. However, for half of the year the men are on transhumance with the
cattle and do not out any pressure on this area. 
Table 7.6.1 Comparison of population density in 2000, in different areas
a = The household organisation in Kubadje is different from that of Oudda. Each household is made up of both
the wives and unmarried children of a father, together with the married sons and their wives and children and
sometimes even married grandsons with wives and children. Thus, a household can comprise 18 people (the
number used here to calculate) or more, although small households exist as well. 
The population density also increased over the years in the Kapsiki village of Kila. With the
help of maps and oral information, the total surface of Kila can be estimated as being some
50 km2. Like all Kapsiki settlements, the neighbourhoods and compounds are scattered over
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112 They estimate that some 50 cattle stay during the dry season when there is just enough fodder and water.
113 The Kubadje area is smaller than the Jiksa area because Jiksa also covers an area south of the official Kila-
Oudda border. The northern half of the Kubadje area was lost, a couple of years ago, to the Kila cultivators.
Surface (km2) Inhabitants People/km2 Number of
households
Oudda total 147 3863 26,3 651
Hlaka-Waza 56 833 14,9 139
Guiki (Fulbe) 10 210 21 42
Kubadje 2 300 150 17a
the hills. Because the numbers of inhabitants in the past, as described in the literature, were not
defined per village, it is impossible to estimate the increase in population density in Kila village
itself. Nevertheless, based on the total population increase of Mogodé sub-department114, one
can assume a population increase between 1945 and 1976 of more than 100 %. Although,
according to Mohammaddou (1984: 147) and Boulet (1984: 139) the death rates of the Kapsiki
are very high, their population increases quicker than that of the Bana because of their far high-
er birth rate115. Thus, in 2000, population numbers of the Kapsiki of Kila increased again and the
soil surface area has to be shared by roughly double the number of people than when the Fulbe
first settled in the remote neighbourhood of Kila.
So, the Fulbe in their pasture reserve are having to cope with increasing population pres-
sure not only from their own numbers, but also from the surrounding villages and especially
from the Kapsiki in their own village, Kila.
7.6.2 Human domain
Health
The Kubadje area is a very remote place. From the road that passes through Kila one has to
turn right into the bush, pass at least two deep riverbeds (filled to the brim with foaming water
during the rainy season) and several hill slopes with rocks and boulders. It is impossible to
reach the settlement by car, even in the most accessible period. Even for the other Kila inhab-
itants, health care and services are a long way away, but for the Fulbe of Kubadje assistance is
not available in acute cases. They have to look after themselves as if they were still bush
nomads. However, because they are living in a somewhat degraded environment, they cannot
dispose of all the necessary traditional (wild) medicines.
Drinking water is also a difficult issue. The nearest water well is on the way to Kila centre,
at least an hour’s walk away. People wash themselves and their cloths and pots in the pools of
the river Ndo during the dry season, while the sandy banks serve as a filter to tap drinking
water. Over the weeks the pools become dirty, soapy ponds that diminish in surface area until
they disappear and temporary water holes have to be dug in the sandy riverbed. Finally the
women have to undertake the walk to the Kila well every day in order to collect water. Until
that moment, drinking water quality is very poor and illnesses are rampant as a result. Almost
everybody suffers from amoeba-related complaints and several of the small children seem to
be stunted as regards growth. In addition, the number of polio-like disabled people is high
(more than 2 %)116. 
This latter problem is also due to the fact that mothers are not very motivated for the gov-
ernment organised vaccination programme. When asked, they express their willingness to
offer their babies for immunisation, but the information about the exact day and hour of arrival
of the vaccination team is not distributed properly (this in itself shows the inhabitants’ lack of
interest ) and those who know have more important things to do than to arrive in time. Because
114 Beauvillain (1989: 590 and 598). He equalises Mogodé with ‘Kapsiki’.
115 This may be due to the very early age at which people marry in the Kapsiki culture (girls at 15 and boys at
18) in comparison to that of the Bana, where several 25 year old men explained that it was not yet time to be
married. The same applies to girls aged 20 (interviews and observations during fieldwork, November 2000 –
January 2003).
116 One has to remember that the northern part of Nigeria, where the fundamental Islamic chiefs prohibit polio
vaccination, is close by and that the WHO has warned about the cross-border transfer of polio.
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of the remoteness of the neighbourhood, vaccinating nurses are not willing to wait for people
who are late. Thus, in January 2001, only three of the 25 children under 5 years of age received
their anti-polio drops117.
Education
Up to now the western type of education has not appealed to the Fulbe of Kubadje. Their lawan
Ngoura explains that when the French obliged parents to send some of their children to school,
they hid their offspring and sent the children of their slaves instead. They feared that the
colonisers might be tricking them and capturing or killing their children or, perhaps even
worse, changing them into non-believers. The Fulbe children are sent to the so-called Koran
school. That means that in the evening hours children gather around the hearth where, from a
very early age, they learn to recite and write Koran texts. The older ones with a bit more
knowledge help the others and they, in their turn, are educated by one of the adults with a full
Islamic education. The Kubadje settlement has a high percentage of ‘learned Muslims’, both
men and women.
These days, however, the value of the ‘western’ schools is recognised, especially by the
younger parents. Ngoura also admits that the Fulbe missed the track: “Those Kirdi now occu-
py all the higher government jobs because we are not well trained.” But, starting in education
is difficult. The nearest primary school is, again, in Kila which is too far to walk for the lit-
tle ones and inaccessible for the bigger children as well when the rains arrive because of the
swollen rivers that have to be crossed. The younger parents are now trying to organise a class
in Kubadje itself, although it is equally difficult for a teacher to reach the settlement 118.
7.6.3 Economic domain
The Fulbe do not cultivate for the market. The increasing amount of time they spend on agri-
culture is only for subsistence purposes. Their life revolves around cattle.
Like their ancestors, the Fulbe live from their cattle. Official numbers, based on vaccina-
tion, put the total number of cattle in Kubadje at 650 (Table 7.6.2). This means 2.2 cattle per
person. If all the milk from the cows and all the meat from the ‘normal off-take’ is con-
sumed119, each person gets 429,400 kcal per year. This is less than half of what is needed for
an adult (912,500 kcal). Based on interviews with family heads, it can be assumed that not all
cattle are kept in the Kubadje surroundings. How many each family owns in other areas of
Cameroon (or even Nigeria) cannot be established. However, economically (and thus also
regarding the energetic basis of the families) the picture is somewhat brighter than is
described here. 
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117 Own observation.
118 Since January 2002 the acting chief Hassana (second son of Ngoura) has arranged for a Kapsiki school
teacher to be present for half of the year (during the dry season), but in January 2004 the Fulbe women com-
plained that the children had learned nothing because this teacher is not conversant with Fulbe habits: “After
two years the children still do not speak a word of French”.
119 All calculations with regard to milk production per cow, calorific value of milk, consumable meat weight per
cattle, calorific value of meat etc. are based on Dietz et al (2001) in relation to East African pastoralism.
Although there is no reason to assume that West African data or data for the Mandara Mountains of
Cameroon are exactly the same (soils and vegetation are different), Dietz’s data are used because of a lack of
other data.
Table 7.6.2 Number and density of livestock of Fulbe in 2000
a = For Oudda, the data is based on the vaccination campaign of May 2000, as carried out by the local veterinary
officer in Guili. It is very likely that at the time of vaccination the largest number of cattle were on their dry
season trek to Nigeria and elsewhere.
b = For Kubadje the vaccination from which the numbers were taken, was performed in November 2000, a time
at which the herds had not yet left the area. Apart from some calves the whole herd seemed to be made avail-
able for vaccination.
c = This number is calculated on the basis that the Fulbe of Oudda graze their cattle solely in the neighbouring
Boubakary Nené reserve. In fact, density will be lower, because they also use other bush forest land in the
vicinity.
d = This number is based on the assumption that the Kubadje Fulbe graze their cattle solely in their own reserve.
In reality, this is not true because they not only use the harvest left-overs on Kila fields, but also use the more
extended pasture area of Modélé.
Women and small children are entitled to milk, although a certain quantity of milk is used for
the coffee and rice drink that is prepared for visitors. The women churn butter from the milk
and sell it separately. For one litre of fresh milk they receive approximately 150 Fcfa. One
litre of butter fetches 3,000 Fcfa at the Kila market. Yet, they do not earn much because the
herds are small, most of the cows are away during three to four months120 and, as they say, the
production per cow is low. During the dry season the sale of milk stops: during those harsh
times the cows produce even less and most of them are away with the rest of the herd any-
way. 
Some younger men left the area in their youth to try their luck elsewhere, as a trader or a
car driver, but when their fathers thought it time they returned to get married. Now they feel
trapped. Having been summoned home to become real cattle keepers, they find out that the
bush is declining and that cattle numbers are declining with it. They complain that, with so
many fields around, they cannot even graze the cattle at night, so these lose weight and do not
produce the number of calves they should do. Comparing the two Fulbe groups of Kila and
Oudda (see table 7.6.2), it is obvious that the Fulbe of Kubadje possess fewer cattle per per-
son than those of Oudda (a mean of 38 versus 95 per owner). The Kubadje Fulbe fear for their
future as cattle keepers.
One of the economically based wishes they have is a road into their neighbourhood to make
it easier for visitors to reach the area but also to increase the level of access to and from mar-
kets. They do not worry about whether or not this would disturb the pasture as such. 
120 Theoretically, 528 litre of milk is available per person per year. If the milk is divided between women and
children, each gets 660 litres. But, because of a lower than average production and three months of almost no
milk at all (from the few cows that are left at home to produce milk for the younger children), a woman or
child has access to less than 437 litres in the most ideal situation (market value: approximately 92,000 Fcfa).
Vaccinated Number of Mean cattle Cattle per km2 TLU
cattle owners of cattle per owner (non-cattle)
(+ range)
Oudda Fulbea 1047 11 95 (4 - 320) 42c n.av.
Kubadje Fulbeb 650 17 38 (8 - 90) 325d 40
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7.6.4 Social domain
Family and friends
The Fulbe are an ethnic group dispersed over Cameroon and West Africa in total121. They feel
they belong to one big group but, at the same time, they are very attached to their own clan
and (extended) family. Elderly men in particular travel a lot to visit their relatives. In cases of
celebration (the graduation of young people from the Koran school, babies’ name-giving cer-
emonies) or death, visitors arrive from far and near. For Kubadje this ‘far’ may mean from their
region of origin near Garoua in the south, or from Nigeria in the west where the Kubadje Fulbe
spent part of their lives. People may even come from further away: married daughters who live
with their husbands in Ngaoundéré or even Douala take the trouble to attend such events.
‘Near’ means from Kila (conversed Kapsiki) or Modélé, the first Fulbe settlement in the region
approximately fifty years ago, where the Kubadje Fulbe also spent some years, or other vil-
lages and towns in the vicinity such as Guili or Mogodé. In short, they have relatives and
friends everywhere. 
The acting chief, Hassana, and several of the neighbourhood elders, spend quite a lot of
time visiting their kinsmen in Modélé’. They want to have a perfect relationship with them
because they have authority over the bigger bush-pasture area there. Safeguarding access to
this pasture is important. These fellow Fulbe are also important in the regional struggle for the
definitive recognition by authorities of certain pasture reserves, of which Kubadje is one.
In the settlement itself there are two different sub-groups which are bonded separately. On
the one hand, there is the large compound of Ngoura and, on the other, the rest of the com-
pounds five minutes’ walk away. The inhabitants even give this second concentration a differ-
ent name (that of the founder), but this is contradicted by Ngoura, every time he hears some-
body using it. This separation may have some meaning in daily life, but to the outward world
Kubadje is one entity.
Political domain
Officially Kubadje is part of Kila and, thus, is subjected to the Kila village chief and the lami-
do of Mogodé. Although the Fulbe recognise the position of Takve, the Kila chief, when they
visit the Kila market or when minor quarrels break out between Kapsiki and Fulbe, they man-
age their settlement by themselves. For bigger problems they turn to the lamido in Mogodé. It
is to him that they pay their taxes which are collected by their own neighbourhood chief.
According to them it is not official politics that are important for ensuring that the area (and
their lives) is/are managed properly. Keeping the lamido on your side is the main point.
The Fulbe lawan122 Ngoura himself is out of the settlement for at least half of the year.
During that period he does not herd his cattle – that is the task of his sons - but instead invests
in contacts with all the different authorities, as well as other Fulbe from whom he also collects
information. He has a house in the departmental capital Mokolo, where he spends some time,
close to the official authorities, but also close to the religious and Fulbe authorities123. He
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121 See, e.g. De Bruijn and Van Dijk (1995).
122 According to his position in the village he is a djaoro (a neighbourhood chief), but both the Fulbe and the
Kapsiki, and even the higher authorities call him ‘lawan’.
123 It was in this house in Mokolo, after several months of illness and having been looked after by his third
daughter (a grown-up woman) that Elhadji Ngoura died in the early days of January 2003.
leaves the leadership of Kubadje to his second son. The first son is not as intelligent and polit-
ically capable, so Ngoura appointed this second son to watch over matters and the decision was
approved unanimously by the rest of the settlement. Contacts closer to home, such as those
with the lawan of Modélé, are maintained by this son. Together with the Modélé-Fulbe, the
Fulbe of Kubadje try to manoeuvre in such a way that the big pasture of Modélé is secured or
even extended124. 
Although the Kubadje-Fulbe seem to be far removed from State politics, indirectly they are
involved in them via their extended networks. For example, because they have uncles and
marabouts125 that are members of the ruling party, they have to back up that party too. This net-
work also gives them some (small) say in matters. In the past, the so-called Fulbe party UNDP
was an option to voice ideas and needs, but it lost power over time.
In short, although the Fulbe seem to be living in a very remote place, they keep in touch
with all kinds of issues that are going on in the Far North of Cameroon which are of impor-
tance to their community. 
Conflict mediation
Normally, internal conflicts in Fulbe society, such as disparities between spouses, quarrels
between youngsters, discussions over access to waterholes or animal damage etc.,   are solved
by the local chief (or herd master) and his wise men. If these cannot restore peace, the case is
brought before the lamido. In the case of external conflicts, that is conflicts between groups
(again over access to water or rights of trespassing), the groups’ lawans had to solve the dis-
pute or visit the lamido together to ask for his objective intervention. In the past, the lamido’s
subjects had to pay a symbolic amount of money for this arbitration (with every subject already
having given something as an expression of their esteem the moment they entered the region
with their cattle, just to make sure the lamido would defend their rights and do his utmost to
safeguard the general security of the area (see Moritz et al 2002)). Nowadays it is less clear.
Most of the time, people complain that they have to pay the lamido more and more, and the
word ‘corruption’ is heard time and again. On special occasions the lamido works together
with the official police and the sub-prefect, but the Fulbe prefer to keep discords between their
subjects to themselves.
Land rights
Within the Kubadje area the neighbourhood lawan Ngoura126 decides about the use of land. He
always consults the other elderly inhabitants, but the final decision is his. In this way, he can
loan out land to agriculturalists if he thinks it wise to give up a small part of the pasture to
engender loyalty to his group. He can forbid cultivation by the Fulbe on certain land sur-
rounding the settlement because he is the one that has to implement the lamido’s allocation of
Kubadje as a pasture area.
This shows that he is subordinate to more senior chiefs. Officially the village chief of Kila
is higher in line, but land allocation in the Kubadje area is not his responsibility. As explained
124 Indeed, in 2002-2003, while awaiting a solution for the Kubadje zone, MIDIMA extended the Hina-Modélé
reserve to the eastern Oudda pasture reserve of Boubakary Néné.
125 Religious leaders.
126 After his death his second son Hassana became the lawan. He already had considerable legitimacy before his
father’s death.
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above, the traditional chief of the region, the lamido of Mogodé, is the person to whom Ngoura
refers with regard to issues concerning the outer boundaries of the pasture reserve, or when the
intrusion of farmers disturbs the peace of the cattle and their owners. In such instances the
lamido and (or) his noblemen come down to look at the situation and take their decision.
Cultural domain
Although a grown-up Fulbe is expected not to give free reign to his emotions127, before they
reach that stage a lot of quarrelling will have gone on and will have even been encouraged. The
Fulbe of Kubadje raise their children to believe that they should not let anybody violate their
rights. Parents and other adults encourage their little ones to stand up for their interests, even
when these are only perceived interests. In order to achieve their goal, they are allowed to use
verbal and even physical aggression. As a result, adolescents often become involved in real
fights, some involving the use of knives. People have been seriously injured on two occasions
in the past two years128.
In the case of these and other quarrels the Fulbe regard themselves as totally autonomous.
They do not want to involve the police or other authorities, but settle disputes between the par-
ents of the children (or even grown-ups) involved on the basis of the arbiter role of the lawan or
other elders. An external but related mallum129 is only contacted occasionally in such situations.
Fulbe women have a full right to Koranic education. According to Islam they have the right
to inherit (mostly they add inherited cattle to their brothers’ herds) and they are not required to
perform heavy agricultural tasks. In Kubadje the women are mainly engaged in household tasks
such as cooking, washing and looking after the children. They do, however, cultivate small plots
with groundnuts and some vegetables around the house - all for household consumption.
Officially they are subordinate to their men, who decide about everything concerning the fam-
ily. The women are not (or pretend not to be) involved in men’s problems such as the dimin-
ishing of pasture surface and possible decisions about leaving or engaging in conflicts. They do,
of course, discuss those matters among themselves (and, I am sure, with their husbands in the
privacy of their huts). When talking more confidentially with one of them as an interpreter130,
several women expressed their concern: “What is going to happen? We cannot move to anoth-
er place with all these people. Where can we go to? Where can we build new houses?” They
wanted the authorities (and me) to take measures to stop agriculturalists invading the area.
In short, the Fulbe of Kubadje do not have many other options than to herd their cattle and earn
their living from cattle and milk. Although they want to be autonomous, they understand the
importance of having ‘outer’ authorities on their side to secure their grazing area. Therefore,
they try to persuade others to realise the necessity of a pasture reserve and to keep the cattle
tracks open from this small reserve to the larger ones nearby.
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127 See Van Santen (1993), De Bruijn and Van Dijk (1995), Vereecke (1999), Breedveld (1999) or Mortiz (2003)
about the concept of “Pullaako” that is indispensable to the Fulbe identity. 
128 On one occasion someone lost a number of fingers and once someone was stabbed in the stomach and was
rushed to Guili hospital. On both occasions a son of lawan Ngoura was involved.
129 The Fulbe word for a marabout, a Koran teacher.
130 Most of the time a Kapsiki interpreter was used in the Kubadje settlement, because none of the Fulbe there
could speak French (see Chapter Methodology), but if a Fulbe visitor was able to translate, especially if the
visitor was female, I took the opportunity to involve her in my work.
7.6.5 Discords and claims
The northern limit of the Kubadje reserve is demarcated along the northernmost of the two
east-west running rivers, just between the rest of Kila and Kubadje. The border was defined in
recent times131 when the sub-prefect and the lamido of Mogodé entered this southernmost
region of their territory, together with the sub-department’s line officers of the forest depart-
ment and of the agriculture department. They came to intervene in a quarrel between the Fulbe
inhabitants and Kila inhabitants of the region. According to the story, the former village chief,
Koye, had already stipulated the location of this boundary to his citizens, but he obviously
needed some back-up from higher authorities. The district authorities not only defined the
boundaries but also declared to their subjects that it was prohibited to cultivate in the reserve
and that possible crop damage caused by cattle within the reserve area would not be eligible
for reimbursement. 
The northern boundary is still discussed over and over again. It seems as if it has to be rede-
fined every couple of years and the sub-department and district authorities (sub-prefect, line-
officers and lamido) have to intervene regularly. A couple of years ago, for example, Zra
Pierre, the nearby neighbourhood chief on the western side, asked the district chief of Mogodé
to come and shift this boundary into the reserve slightly more, so as to make it possible for the
inhabitants of his neighbourhood, Djalingol, to use some of the fields that had, until then, been
situated within the boundaries of the reserve. Indeed, nowadays, the western part of the north-
ern boundary of the reserve follows the hilltop and not the river as used to be the case. As a
result, the Kila farmers are allowed to cultivate in the ‘re-established’ fields there and, in the
event of livestock-induced damage, can claim reimbursements from the animal’s owner.
The discord between the Fulbe of Kubadje and the cultivators of Oudda over the southern
border is more severe. As outlined in section 5, the Bana claim that this border has to be situ-
ated more to the north. The Fulbe refer with fervour to the official maps, because these are sup-
posed to be in their favour. Formally, the southern border between Kubadje and Oudda, which
is therefore located between the two districts, is stretched along a line running over the top of
the east-west mountain ridge just south of the Fulbe village quarter. This latter border is con-
firmed by the Kapsiki of Kila, especially by their village chief, Takva Koye, who claims to
have been present when the borders were established in his youth. Although the metal border
poles have gone, both the Kapsiki and the Fulbe say that the mountain tops themselves cannot
be removed and are proof in themselves. 
As explained above, the Fulbe say that the lamido of Mogodé is their ‘boss’. They pay taxes
to him and turn to him in cases of internal conflict. The official boundary delineated by the
(since removed) boundary marks shows that the territory belongs to the northern district.
According to an official government report written by the ‘Chef de Poste Forestier et de
Chasse de Mogodé’ (2000), it was Takva Koye, the village chief of Kila, who in response to a
demand made in 1958 by Elhadji Ngoura and his fellow Fulbe for a permanent pasture zone,
started to delineate such a zone together with the accompanying small tracks for animals. This
131 An exact year is not given, but it could be 1981 (when the case between the chief of Guili, Loumbi, and his
counter-part of Mogodé, Hama Djouda, escalated and was put before the committee in Mokolo, that decided
to deny access to all farmers), or it may have been later, when Elhadji Issa Tize had already taken over the
chiefdom in Mogodé (upon the death of Hama Djouda, 1984), and the authorities had to visit the area for a
second time (Chef de Poste Forestier et de Chasse de Mogodé (2000: 9-10)).
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suggests that the area indeed belonged to Kila and, therefore, the northern authorities.
However, this report is written by a line officer of Mogodé with interests and loyalties on the
northern side of the boundary. Moreover, it reflects a demand by Ngoura at the time that he
was indeed already paying his taxes to Mogodé.
7.7 Violence: Box 4
The last box of the VoE diagram: Box 4, Violence (see Fig. 7.1), will only be reached when (one
of) the parties choose(s) to use violent means. Otherwise the result will be the ‘non-box 4’ route.
7.7.1 The use of force
Contending: the use of threats
Contending means trying to get your own wishes implemented without any regard for the
wishes and needs of others. As far as the Bana are concerned this means that they want to chase
the Fulbe out of the Jiksa area, without being bothered by how these cattle keepers can earn
their living or where they have to live. As far as the Fulbe are concerned contending would
mean that the Bana stop cultivating in the Kubadje zone and that they leave open corridors to,
for example, the Modélé bush. In theory both can be reached by persuasion, threats or straight-
forward violence: beating or shooting the other into submission.
The route to violence starts with threats (see also chapter 5 and 6). Mostly the expression
of threats in the Kubadje–Jiksa area is triggered by crop damage caused by cattle. The threats
can be expressed by either the cattle owner or the cultivator or both. For example, a cultivator
tries, using reasonable arguments, to get the cattle owner to acknowledge his fault and to pay
back the crop losses. As a result, the Fulbe starts to threaten his adversary in the hope that he
will leave. In other cases the cultivator starts to verbally abuse and threaten (with the same
hope) the cattle owner who has not looked after his herd properly.
Just encounters between agriculturalists and cattle keepers in the Kubadje-Jiksa bush can
trigger an exchange of verbal abuse, especially when young Fulbe are involved (the elder
Fulbe keep quiet, or patiently try to explain their stance). Sometimes such verbal abuse does
not go any further than ‘calling people names’, but mostly it is mingled with threats. If the
Fulbe see a Bana busily clearing a new part of the bush in their area they will feel obliged to
warn the cultivator that his actions are illegal and that they will call on the police to arrest him.
The Bana then responds with even more menacing counter threats: “It is you who should not
be here. You are living on our soil and we will chase you away. We are in the majority!”
Contending: the use of violence
Several times the threats turn into actions. A woman who had the nerve to follow the cattle
tracks from her ruined field to the Fulbe settlement and complained to one of the young Fulbe
men present, was touched on her lips by him with a stick with the accompanying text that she
should be quiet, “otherwise….” The other party also put up a good show: some years ago the
refusal to pay for cattle damage had annoyed the Bana terribly. At that time a group of them
captured the Fulbe lawan Ngoura, took his clothes (and even his shoes) and, while setting him
free, warned him to change his behaviour and leave the area otherwise something worse would
happen to him or one of his subjects.
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Full blown violence has not (yet) occurred. The Fulbe indeed realise that they are in a
minority facing a large population from a whole village. Although some of the Kapsiki from
Kila have expressed their willingness to help ‘their’ Fulbe, it takes too much time to reach
Kubadje should the Bana launch an attack. On top of that, most Kapsiki are not even aware of
a Fulbe settlement in their neighbourhood and some who are aware live close by and would be
very happy if these Fulbe were to leave. It would provide them with a larger field surface area.
Nevertheless, there are Kapsiki who do talk about war when Bana aggression is mentioned: “If
those Bana start attacking ‘our’ Fulbe, I will pick up my gun (or spear) and help the Fulbe”. A
small band of young men (Fulbe and Kapsiki) has already devised strategies as to how to
attack the Bana and make them stop their cultivation activities in Kubadje.
Almost all Bana with fields in Jiksa, even those who do not use the fields themselves, have
expressed their willingness to help fellow villagers should they be attacked by the Fulbe. They
are resigned to living with that possibility. Women are given fields surrounded by others so as
not to be the first attacked. Several men from Waza and Hlaka are on the alert for calls from
cultivators in the north. Of those who do not have fields in the contested area, 15 % have
expressed their general loyalty in words or state that they are prepared to fight when necessary.
Some of them are even involved in the drawing up of plans for a first attack. They are not (yet)
organising their troops, but every time they come together (for example at the weekly market
or underneath the village tree at the end of the day) they discuss possibilities and exchange the
latest news about damage and threats from the other side.
In general, the State is perceived as an entity which is not involved very much, but which
will be there to suppress violence should it erupt. Inhabitants of both Kubadje and Oudda have
respect for the police, but they express their doubts as to whether this police will reach the
remote pasture reserve in time should fighting start. The lower level authorities are certainly
involved. These lamibe seem to be the triggering factors in the conflict. Riding on the waves
of the conflicting interests of their subjects, they try to make those subjects fight their own
fight, instead of helping find a solution. Their traditional role was one of conflict mediation but
now they seem only to incite their subjects to aggression.
In short, the Bana with Jiksa fields seem to embody enough reasons for people to fight for
their rights. Their cost-benefit calculations may turn out to result in the use of violence. As
far as the Fulbe are concerned the situation is more problematic, but they also have more at
stake. The younger (and thus more numerous) ones may tend to choose violence as their only
option.
7.7.2 Escapes: can violence be avoided?
There are two types of action that can lead to the avoidance of violence. The first involves one
of both parties giving in. This may be the result of pressure from the other party or higher
authorities or it may be due to the autonomous decision of one of the parties. The second is the
finding of a solution that serves both parties.
Contending: the use of persuasion
Theoretically it is possible to call the use of threats a method of persuading an adversary.
Because it is the most violent method of persuasion, it is described in a section above under
the heading ‘use of force’. Here we are focusing on the non-violent way of persuasion, name-
ly the use of arguments by which one of the parties puts pressure on the other party without
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(we are still talking about contending) listening to counter arguments or trying to understand
what needs and interests the other party has.
However, because the two groups involved here are not really on speaking terms, normal,
friendly persuasion is out of the question. Even persuasion of higher authorities, to make sure
those authorities back them in case of escalation of the conflict, is not one of the strategies used
by either Bana or Fulbe. Both parties leave that part of the contest to their lamido because he
is the strongest ally in that respect. He has access to other authorities and knows the routes. He
also wants the area to be his. As explained the Kubadje chief, Ngoura, does invest in linkage
building with his lamido. However, at the same time, he does not seem to do his utmost to
maintain a healthy relationship with this lamido. He does not collect the taxes on time, does
not respond to all the summons for meetings and, according to a complaint by the lamido him-
self, does not react to the plans and demands of this lamido for more development efforts (such
as in education and health issues).
Yielding
The story told so far in this chapter would suggest that withdrawal of one of the parties is a
past stage when the position of rights claiming is reached. Both agriculturalists and cattle keep-
ers firmly state that they want to stay and they have the right to stay. Nevertheless, these firm
statements really mask other views. Some of the Bana women refuse to cultivate in the Jiksa
region because “You cannot be there day and night, so you can’t protect your fields from crop
damage. The cattle owners from the settlement there will never pay for any damage. Why
should you waste your time and energy with the risk of achieving no yield at all?” They have
cultivated in the contested area - or their husband or friends have done that - and they contin-
ue to claim that the Fulbe have settled on their land, but they do not see any possibilities to
make this claim come true. They do not believe the authorities will help in this matter. Local
authorities do not have enough power themselves (like the lamido of Guili) or they do not want
to exercise their power out of fear, or because of corruption. Higher level authorities are just
not interested. Everybody acknowledges that the prefect is indeed needed but he is far away.
On the other hand, some of the cattle owners also reflect on their chances to win their case.
“Farmers just go on clearing the bush. Even if authorities state that reimbursement in the event
of crop damage by our cattle is not going to be paid for, where can we herd our cattle when
everything has been turned into fields?” They start considering a move, quietly looking for
other places to live. “Perhaps, with some luck, we can find a new place, although there are
nowhere such good pastures as here.”
This shows that, although ‘yielding’ is often regarded as giving in to other parties’ wishes,
it is of course also a strategy which focuses on one’s own interests. Taking account of reality,
and therefore, of other parties’ wishes means the costs of imposing one’s own wishes may
seem to become too high. A cost-benefit analysis results in giving in.
Problem solving
If the two parties were to find a way to divide the area between them, to make sure the cattle
can be fed, the cultivators can produce and the Fulbe can live in their compounds, then the
problem would be solved. Indeed, many Bana have proposed a solution. This extends the con-
tested area as such, but not their own territory. “Why shouldn’t we rotate the pasture areas?”
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they ask, “In the past this was common practice”132. Because the fertility of the fields in the
direct vicinity of the Oudda neighbourhoods has diminished, they are willing to delineate these
as a cattle reserve, to be given in use to the cattle keepers. The fertility in Jiksa is so good that
a rotation back to their former fields, now offered as pasture, is regarded as only being neces-
sary in more than 25 years time. During the interim period, trees may grow substantially and
the fodder production of the new pasture will increase tremendously.
The Fulbe are not totally against the plan but they hesitate because they do not trust the
other party or the authorities. “If we give up an official pasture reserve”, they say, “How can
we be certain about the new area. It should be made official as well.” 
Another major objection to the rotation of pastures is the fact that the Fulbe would have to
build new compounds every time. They have now invested in well-constructed houses and fur-
niture. It would be a major effort to move these belongings. Moreover, building new huts takes
time, effort and even money due to a lack of expertise.
The biggest hurdle to get over is the disagreement between the lamibe in the two districts.
Each of them is sticking to his idea about the border and, more precisely, the lamido of
Mogodé would never accept the loss of part of his territory without higher level interference
(and perhaps even not then either). For the moment no State organisation (for example MIDI-
MA) or NGO has taken on the task of settling disputes between the two parties as a cautious
start on the way to reaching a consensus or compromise. 
Even the presence of “our own Fulbe” in Oudda133 is not (yet) used in a kind of mediator
role to bring the Bana cultivators and the Fulbe of Kubadje together. They can feel (and have
experienced) the problems of the cattle keepers, they have the same culture but, at the same
time, they feel like inhabitants of Oudda and are loyal to their fellow villagers more than to the
Kila inhabitants.134
The position of the border between Kila and Oudda is taken up as an issue by the inhabi-
tants of Oudda themselves. However, they did not discuss it with the Fulbe that live in the area.
They only overruled opinions of the Kila-Kapsiki and imposed their vision of the past, after
which they decided that, from now on, they would not let anybody stop them from using ‘their’
land. If higher authorities accept this border shift, this ‘matter-of-fact’ approach may serve as
the starting point for mutual problem solving.
132 The older men, and especially some of the representatives of the lawan of Oudda I (the conglomerate of the
Oudda-quarters at the Guili side of the bend in the road), refer to this custom.
133 Many Bana refer to the Fulbe who live in the Oudda neighbourhood Guiki as “ours”, in contrast with the
Fulbe of Kubadje, who have chosen (as the Bana say) to be “theirs”, that is “from Kila”.
134 At the end of 2002 the area of the pasture reserve Boubakary Néné was officially extended by the State
(MIDIMA), because the Kubadje area, that they wanted to delineate officially in their quest of more forest-
pasture areas in the Mandara Mountains, aroused excessively complicated controversies. Agriculturalists who
own fields which were originally around the Boubakary Néné reserve but are now within the boundaries, are
angry. They not only express their wrath to the authorities, but also accuse their “own” Fulbe. Relationships
between the two groups within Oudda have deteriorated because of the MIDIMA action.
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Conclusions: Is there a pattern of scarcity to violence?
Bana, Kapsiki, Tupuri, Fulbe - everybody struggles with a growing competition for land. But
does it lead to violence? Does a causal link exist between environmental scarcity and violence?
If the answer is “yes”, what is the causal chain of events and  how do people avoid the out-
break of violence in the event of environmental scarcity? This chapter draws a conclusion with
regard to the research questions. At first sight all three cases seemed to consist of some (minor)
violence related to natural resources. People fought, wounded each other, threatened each
other gravely, damaged each other’s belongings, used witchcraft against each other and even
took a hostage once (albeit temporarily). Whether the cause was indeed environmental scarci-
ty has yet to be concluded. 
To explain causes, it is best to start from the event “that we want to explain and then to work
backward in time and outward in space so as to enable us to construct chains of causes and
effects leading to those events…” (Vayda and Walters 1999: 169). To answer the research
questions the violent outbreaks (small as they are) are the events to be explained. Thus, the
analysis will start at the last box of the Violence-or-Escape-diagram (Box 4: “Violence”,
Figure 8.1) and work its way ‘upwards’ along the causal chain.
It has to be said, that this last box of the VoE diagram and, thus, the last sub-section of each
case description (chapters 5, 6, and 7) is not the last step taken in real life. After the use of
small-scale violence - the type of violence noticed in the case studies - a situation can escalate
to become large-scale violence. But it is also possible that the status quo of minor violent out-
breaks will continue. Even the disappearance of the use of violence is possible1, when people
see that their strategy of aggression and force has resulted in what they wanted, or when they
perceive that violence does not get them any nearer to their goal while, on the contrary, their
non-violent group co-members have more success. Each violent event, after all, was accom-
panied by non-violent actions by other actors. 
In this chapter I will subsequently discuss the ‘event boxes’ of the VoE diagram with their
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1 And, indeed, always will be reached, whether or not after long periods of aggression and suffering.
possible causes. As has been stated, the exercise will start at Box 4. For each case I will briefly
say something about future possibilities of outbreaks of violence. In the second section I go
more or less backwards in time and discuss Box 3 of the VoE diagram, the assertion of rights,
its causes and escapes. In each section this pattern of backward movement is continued until
the left side of the original diagram (see chapter 2) is reached. For reasons of clarity, each sec-
tion will start with the enumeration of the ‘same’ four ‘questions’, although adjusted each time
to the section’s subject, namely that of the VoE Box in question.
The first of these ‘four questions’ is not really a question, but concerns the description of
the event Box involved. Then the questions about the causes to follow the cascade to violence
towards this special Box and about the reason why not everybody has followed the non-
Cascade get attention. These first three ‘questions’ focus on the separate cases and therefore
describe automatically the differences between the cases. The fourth questions, then, regards
the similarities between the cases, because the whole goal of the study was to find enough sim-
ilarities to make it possible to speak of a pattern. With that same aim I make short side expla-
nations and considerations when it is deemed necessary.
I end the chapter with a section on general conclusions regarding 1) whether or not a pat-
tern is found between scarcity and the outbreak of violence and, vice versa, the outbreak of
violence and the existence of scarcity; 2) critics on the theory of Homer-Dixon as one of the
most important ES-theories; and 3) the usefulness of the VoE diagram in this type of research.
Figure 8.1 Reverse VoE diagram
8.1 Why violence?
1 Description of the violent event
2 Is it caused by assertion of rights or is it caused by other factors?
340
Pop. growth
Access
P
A
T
Individual
Strategies
and
Institutions
Physical
Basis
Impact
on
Land
Co-causing
Factors
Access
and
Use
Escapes EscapesEscapesEscapes
End of
violence
Large scale
violence
side effects side effectsside effectsside effects
Co-causing
Factors
Violence
Continuation
of small
scale
violence
B 4OX B 1OXB 2OX
Co-causing
Factors
Assertion
of Rights
B 3OX
Diminish.
Environm.
Invasion
New
Niche
Escape
encouraging
factors
Escape
encouraging
factors
Escape
encouraging
factors
Escape
encouraging
factors
User
Space
Effects FactsEvent Box Steps Influence fact.
3 Why do not all actors use the escape route of non-violence?
4 What are the similarities between the three cases?
This section ends with a short theorisation that generalises the findings, with a view to
improved use of the VoE diagram (section 8.1.5). 
8.1.1 Description of events
Case 1: Baba Deli
In Dzambou the event consisted of the fist-fight at the Baba Deli meeting in which the
authorities indicated the trees to be marked as boundary signs for the official pasture-forest
reserve. It was a fight between two groups of Kapsiki agriculturalists. One of the groups con-
sisted of farmers that were against the establishment of a pasture-forest reserve and espe-
cially against the boundaries shown at the meeting. The other group consisted of farmers plus
two or three cattle keepers (who also cultivate) who approved both the establishment of the
reserve as well as the position of the boundaries. The representatives of the first group had
already given their formal approval of the reserve in a kind of participatory meeting with the
authorities, but the exact location of the boundaries was then decided differently2. The
changed position of the boundaries favoured the approving group by permitting them to stay
housed where they were, while the other boundaries would have obliged them to move.
These previously decided boundaries would have followed the location of boundaries as the
village inhabitants perceive them as having been drawn in the past in an agreement with a
former cattle keeper of Fulbe origin. Those farmers that were against the pasture-forest
reserve take the view that such an agreement had a temporary status: the fertility of agricul-
tural fields surrounding the pasture area would determine whether the grazing status would
end or not. The fight was started by people from this latter group. Apart from bruises, no
wounds or casualties were reported.
It is possible that, in Dzambou, some of those who refrained from violence at the meeting
will resort to it in the future, as deliberations of some groups of younger men have shown.
They are firmly dedicated to reaching their goal and are discussing several strategies of vary-
ing violent natures. Most of those who are considering the use of violence in the future have
already used it in the fist fight at the Baba Deli meeting. Obviously, this fight and the absence
of any sanctions motivate them more to use violence, although the success of the fight has been
nil up to now.3
Case 2: Kolara-Kobo
In the whole Diamaré several violent events have been reported, but no outright violence has
been recorded in the exact area under study. Nevertheless, the outspoken threats can be con-
sidered as (the beginning of) violence and can certainly be placed in Box 4. Thus, the (series
of) serious threats uttered directly against the threatened adversary can be considered as the
event that has to be discussed here. These threats are aimed at co-users and are, more often
than not, directly related to the new clearance of fields, especially on the camps of cattle
keepers or, on the other hand, to cattle damage to crops. In particular, verbal threats that are
2 Most probably the farmers’ representatives did not have any choice but to agree with the governmental plans.
3 The learning effect, mentioned by Sandole (1993) in his list of reasons for violence (see Chapter 2), is some-
what ambiguous here.
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underpinned by threatening gestures, such as the waving of fists or arms, may lead to physi-
cal confrontations.4
In the Kolara-Kobo bush, the violent part of the conflict is something solely between the
users in the field (agriculturalists and cattle keepers). The outbreak of violence between culti-
vators and herders in an adjacent part of the bush, reported by Van der Ploeg (2001)5, is even
hidden from the authorities6. Moreover, serious threats to use real violence are not aimed at
convincing the authorities to appoint the area to the threatener. The aim is to chase or frighten
the other user away.
Violent outbreaks in the broader Diamaré consist, just as often, of encounters between
herders as well as between herders and farmers. In the (smaller) area of the study, however,
threats by herders against other herders only occur sporadically. For example, some herders con-
sider the bush to be too crowded with cattle and try to prohibit other herds from coming too
close. In general, though, up till now cattle keepers have voiced the feeling that it is shameful
to chase co-herders (even those of another ethnic origin) away. You should be tolerant about oth-
ers using your campsite and you should be patient when others jump the queue at watering
points.
As has been mentioned earlier, in the study area as such most encounters occur between
herders and farmers. At the same time, the violence does not go beyond verbal threats, albeit
very outspoken and serious ones. This type of threats is regarded as minor violence. However,
all threats can be signs of future violence. Although a threat is something different from plans
about how to arrange an attack or an attack itself, the one can quickly develop into the other.
Minor threats raise the general level of tension towards the violence threshold.
Case 3: Kubadje-Jiksa
In the Oudda-Kila case, some users of fields or pasture in Kubadje-Jiksa resorted to violence
on a seemingly ad hoc basis. The event to be clarified is a series of such encounters. These
events include an attack by the cultivators on a sole and thus vulnerable herder who was near
their fields. He was attacked simply because he was there. On another occasion the people
reacted to crop damage by cattle by punching someone on the nose. They used the violence to
frighten their adversaries away, not to convince the authorities of their rights. The herders, in
turn waved their herding stick threateningly in the air or used it to hit a farmer on the head
when they discovered him clearing part of the bush. As soon as the farmer called for assistance
from his fellow cultivators nearby, the herders retreated. The herders’ threats have not (as yet)
resulted in the retreat of farmers that had already entered the area to cultivate. It did, however,
make certain farmers (especially the older ones and some women) choose not to start activities
in the area at all.
Future larger scale violence may be expected because of agitated young farmers who have
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4 Some of the threats are not voiced to adverse users of the bush, but to researchers or other visitors. These
threats can be regarded as belonging to Box 3 of the VOE diagram (see section 2).
5 See also Moritz (in press).
6 The direct cause of the attack by Fulbe youngsters on a Tupuri settlement in Mayo Kobo  in 1998 in which
several men died is reported to be the disappearance of some Fulbe donkeys, and the idea harboured by the
Fulbe that these Tupuri had stolen their animals. Possibly the whole event can be retraced to traditional habits
of initiation deeds in the form of livestock theft. These acts occur(ed) abundantly (and mutually) between
nomadic cattle keepers and Tupuri.
already discussed basic ‘military’ strategies. A large number of these young men do not have
direct (or future) interests in the disputed area. Also, the adult and adolescent sons in the
herders’ group are annoyed and regularly express their desire to stand up for what they per-
ceive as their rights.
Thus, in all three cases, minor violent events revealed a build-up of tension, without this having
(yet) erupted into full-blown violence.
8.1.2 Assertion of rights or other causing factors?  
Case 1: Baba Deli
The violence in Baba Deli was perpetrated by a number of farmers and was aimed at fellow
villagers who had supported the decision by the authorities and who stood to gain from the new
decision. However, the presence of these authorities underpinned the claim to the land by these
farmers vis-à-vis the authorities. Some of the people that participated in the fight did not have
any stake in the pasture fields. Partly it was an escalation of normal behaviour, such as bodily
contact, pushing, yelling threats, which are all part and parcel of the way in which Kapsiki
express themselves during disputes.
The most important reason for the outbreak of the fight at that moment, and why it escala-
ted, was the anger about the changing of the plans and the unequal treatment of the villagers.
Both triggers of anger were mingled with a general feeling of distrust towards the authorities,
but also towards fellow villagers. In the group of inhabitants without interests in the pasture
zone, the most obvious anger was triggered by the unfair decision by the authorities. Although
this may be a sign of fellow villagers’ loyalty and strong social ties, the fact that the social fa-
bric in Dzambou shows several cracks makes it more likely that the authorities’ behaviour
(implemented inequality) causes a strong feeling of insecurity among the rest of the popula-
tion. “You cannot trust the authorities and their rules.” Nevertheless, (some of) the accusations,
and especially the violence, focus on the favoured Fulbe settlement inhabitants instead of the
State. This may be due to a feeling that fellow villagers are an easier target than the State
(attacking a State representative is totally at odds with the respect people should pay to high-
er placed people, and it may turn out to be a dangerous activity). It is certainly partly due to
feelings of jealousy towards the inhabitants of the Fulbe corner because of their very high
yields (at least in the eyes of the other Dzambou-ers).
Indeed, most of the Dzambou farmers with fields in the pasture reserve do not consider their
problem as a problem with the State. Although they know that the State wants a forest reserve,
they go on blaming their fellow villagers who are proponents of the forest pasture reserve for
being the ones that instigated the whole conflict. Even the fact that they are favoured by the
State is not blamed on the State representatives, but on the Fulbe settlement inhabitants them-
selves through accusations of bribery.
The difference between the violence that has already occurred and future violence is the
extent of the organisation and the trigger. As has already been stated, the violence during the
meeting was not inspired by the wish to assert land per se. It was the feeling of unequal treat-
ment that triggered the anger and the use of force. The use of violence was not a deliberate
choice and it flared up due to people’s anger. Future violence may be more organised and have
the deliberate purpose of ascertaining the access to, use of and even ownership of the fields.
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How these farmers will defend their long-term interests in the pasture zone in reality is not yet
clear, but their plans are. Several people say they will not let go. “We just clear our fields and
continue using them, although those cattle keepers do not like it. If they damage our crops we
will kill them and their herds. The only way to stop us would be to send a large number of
armed police.” Although the focus would be on land security (and thus a tactic for ascertain-
ing of rights to land), the direct cause of a violent outbreak would still be people’s anger at
being treated unequally. “Why should they use fields in the pasture area while we are forbid-
den from doing so?”
For those who continue to use pasture fields, future violence can again be ad hoc and based
on direct anger, but then as a result of crop damage and, for example, an encounter with a
herdsman who has not checked his cattle (or the reverse, namely a herdsman or proponent of
the pasture who catches a farmer red-handed who is clearing a new field or cutting a tree for
fuel or construction wood). These ad hoc encounters risk leading to larger scale violence if the
above-mentioned dedicated young men devise plans to help each other in such cases.
In short, the violent event that took place during the Baba Deli meeting was for the most part
caused by ‘other factors’, although the ascertaining of rights to the land did play a role some-
where deep down in the reasoning and feelings of the actors. At first, pasture field owners gave
up their rights and claims. They did so during the Mogodé meeting and by way of a mandate
given to their representatives. However, the accord was not given wholeheartedly. Within the
power structures they felt they had no alternative but to give in. However, they did so reluctant-
ly and were still acutely aware of the loss of a large area offering (future) agricultural possibili-
ties. When they discovered that another option had been open to others and that these people had
used that option, that others had not given up their claims and, indeed, had been successful, their
frustration boiled over. The whole process made them reconsider their earlier agreement with the
pasture reserve as such, and the former reluctance now changed into total rejection. To underpin
this ‘sudden’ rejection, they sought (and found) several substantial arguments, namely the
inequality, the lack of justice in the democratic State of Cameroon, the bad governance shown
by the sudden alteration in the authorities’ decisions (which was also inexplicable given that
nothing had changed in the past two months) and the history of ownership and use of the area7.
Now, after the violent event (or after the complex of factors that led to the violence), some
of the pasture field owners reasserted the rights to their lands and did so more fiercely. Because
of the violent event and the factors that caused it, these people acquired a kind of ‘violent
mood’.
The pro-reserve inhabitants of Dzambou do not refer to the use of violence in the future.
They expect the State to defend the reserve. However, they did fight back when they were
attacked at the Baba Deli meeting and they strongly counter threatening remarks with the
warning that they will not flee. There is no reason to think these pasture reserve proponents
will refrain from resistance in the event of a direct attack in the future. Nevertheless, the plans
of the agitated young farmers are directed more at resisting the State than at assailing pro-pas-
ture fellow villagers.
The ambiguity towards the State in this case can be explained by the ambiguity of the
State’s roles and position. In theory, the State is indispensable as an institution to defend
344
7 Past violent events and the memories of violent behaviour of the current opponents did not seem to have any
influence.
(minority) rights and property. It sets the rules and, specifically, boundaries related to the
planned destination of a piece of land. Negotiations on such boundaries need to involve the
State. However, in the reality of Cameroon, the State is a puppet in the hands of the rich (that
is: those who pay the most) or those who are otherwise able to manipulate the State’s objec-
tives. This means that any time the State responds in a sudden and ‘strange’ way, one can only
conclude that bribes are involved. Such bribery can only be performed by the opposing party.
Then, this other party is the one that is blamed and is the focus of angry responses.
Case 2: Kobo-Kolara
The violence in the Diamaré (verbal abuse and threats) does not always have a rights-ascer-
taining origin. From time to time, at least, it is based on ethnic controversies (sometimes only
historical ones) or traditions like initiation rules and habits. In addition, since time imme-
morial, crop damage by cattle has led to (violent) quarrels between herders and farmers8.
Nevertheless, most of the threats expressed in the study area involve the perceived loss of, and
threats to, ‘territory’. Reviling opponents, verbal abuse and threats start at the moment that a
nomad arrives at his camp site and finds it occupied by new settlements or when he follows
his normal track through the bush towards a rich forage spot or watering place and this road is
blocked by fields in which a cultivator is busy working. If the farmer is not present, the herder
will not waste words on the matter but will just send his herd into the crops. Of course this will
lead to angry farmers. An encounter between the victim of the crop damage and the (or an)
owner of (the) cattle will at least start off a series of verbal confrontations. Often these are
accompanied by threats against the life or property of the other.
The fact that people do not feel backed by the State can also play a role in why they resort
to violence. Then it is the ever-continuing investment of effort and money in ascertaining
rights to the land that leads to frustration. In that situation the chicanery of the authorities
makes people choose the violent path in their endeavour to reach certainty over the land. In
such a case they may have learned that it is better to leave the authorities outside their con-
flicts. For the time being it seems as if in one family or in one group two strategies are used at
the same time (or at least alternating): the non-violent, aimed-at-the-State path is discussed in
the next sub-section.
The actual low scale violence of threats and verbal abuse can easily escalate into real phys-
ical encounters, as happened in the direct vicinity. As shown in socio-biological studies9,
younger males take and get (from the elders) the right to explore new paths in society, some
of which involve the use of force. If small-scale violence by some youngsters pays off, it will
be used more often and by a more extended group in the future. On the other hand, violence
can go too far and the result may be that those involved have to retreat even further than would
otherwise have been necessary10. 
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8 Moritz (2003) mentions that herders even consider themselves to be good cattle keepers when they delibe-
rately send their herds into fields, because then they give the animals the best food possible.
9 De Waal (1996, 1998) or Strum (1987).
10 As in the example of Van der Ploeg (2001): after the attack by Fulbe youngsters of the Tupuri settlement and
the resulting casualties, the nomad families involved retreated totally from the region and their ancestral
campsites.
Case 3: Kubadje-Jiksa
In the Jiksa-Kubadje zone the violent events came about after a build-up of frustrations over
crop damage and cattle-route blocking. At first, especially when the number of new users was
not very high and the herders could avoid the new fields, occasional incidents of cattle that
walked into fields led to peaceful attempts from both sides to persuade the adverse party that
the land was not his. That he should not develop fields in an area that belonged to herders or,
from the other perspective, that he should not herd his cattle in an area meant to be used for
agriculture. With an increase of new fields and no positive response to previous demands to
leave the area, together with no effective conflict resolution interventions of authorities, both
farmers and cattle keepers became annoyed. They started to underline the persuasion they
expressed with minor threats, then with bigger threats and then with minor expressions of vio-
lence. Thus, although triggered by the interference they encountered with actual (physical)
needs and influenced by absence of effective State (or other mediators) activities, the violence
is based on the wish to ascertain the rights to this piece of land. Specifically the future rights
to good land are the concern of the actors.
The talks and plans of several youngsters in Oudda may be seen as signs of loyalty towards
village members (especially when these youngsters do not have direct interests in the Jiksa area).
More than once, the expression of this loyalty has been driven by the perceived option to main-
tain or raise one’s standing in the village or village neighbourhood via the voicing of unrestrict-
ed group membership11. In addition to that, the memory of the heroic past, that is the fight against
the Kapsiki of Kila, made people think they would win again. Indeed, the story was told sever-
al times, especially to older boys and young men, with the result that they re-told it and referred
to it when talking about their plans. It had the effect of making any attack a defensive and not
an aggressive one, thereby giving it more legitimacy and therefore lowering the threshold 
Figure 8.2 Categories of actors at t = 0
a = for the difference between yielding (withdrawing in a later phase, when challenged) and avoiding (not enter-
ing the contested area at all): see Rubin et al (1994) in chapter 2.
Of course at t = 1, actors may have changed position and become a ‘member’ of another category. For exam-
ple, some actors start with the clearing of family fields in a pasture area and try to safeguard the right to that
piece of land, but later on they withdraw from the region. Then, they yield at t = 1.
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11 In some cases I even thought that their heroic words were intended to impress local girls, but any inquiries I
made concerning this (to the girls or the men) always provoked negative responses.
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8.1.3 Description of the non-violent path
Each of the cases studied included non-violent groups. Within these groups, three interesting
types of actors can be detected: 1) those actors who try to reach their goal, 2) those who not
only refrain from violence but also from their goal and 3) those actors whose direct interests
are not at stake in the conflict, but who nevertheless become involved. Figure 8.2 shows a list
of all categories of actors in this stage of the VoE diagram (see also Figure 8.1, t = 0).
Case 1: Baba Deli
In Dzambou the majority of the people that were present at the last village meeting in Baba
Deli (where the paint to mark the boundary trees was distributed) did not resort to violence.
For some of them the instalment of the pasture reserve did not affect their interests. They were
only present out of curiosity or because a village meeting is something villagers have to attend.
Others owned or used pasture fields, but refrained from violence because they did not consider
that to be a good strategy for safeguarding access to these fields (or because they are not that
strong and/or are afraid of getting hurt or even imprisoned, based on past experiences or
accounts, etc). Several of these people said that, in the presence of State authorities, one
“should be careful not to get a bad name”.
Indeed, some of this group gave up their goal – the defence of their fields – altogether.
Initially they stated a claim, but after the decision of the sub-prefect they even stopped using
the land in the pasture forest reserve. These people considered a good relationship with the
authorities to be more important than access to pasture fields. Their yielding served another,
more social-political security. They explain their behaviour by referring to their powerlessness
regarding the State. Partly this attitude springs from experiences of older people. When they
were younger, during the colonial period and directly after independence, the State was eager
to use force against those who did not obey its orders12. In addition, those elderly people are
mostly not very well educated and do not know the rights associated with (current)
Cameroonian citizenship.
Ideally, when it is clear that two different actor(group)s have claims to the same piece of
land, a mutual solution is sought. Some of the people involved, but also other villagers (for
example local chiefs) expressed compromises relating to both pasture land conservation and
continued farming. Solutions that combine these two with the State objective of the installa-
tion and maintenance of forests were not expressed13.  A search for a real solution has not (yet)
begun. Apart from the State decrees for meetings that are in fact only intended to inform vil-
lagers and not let them have any influence in decisions, there are no initiatives to bring the
three groups together. Thus, they cannot search collectively, on the basis of cooperation, for
mutually satisfying possibilities.
Case 2: Kobo-Kolara
In the Diamaré bush none of the actors belong to the categories without original stakes in the
resource. Most new cultivators just started their fields and settlements and kept quiet. In that
way they tried to avoid violent encounters. The cultivators say they do not intend to make the
herders disappear as long as they try to keep their cattle out of their fields:  “The bush is big
347
12 Here ‘event memory’ (learning) helps to make people refrain from violence.
13 This demonstrates more clearly the fact that the conflict is not considered to be a discord with the authorities.
enough”. This seems to be the wisest tactic because keeping the authorities out of the dispute
increases the possibilities for the farmers to carry on acquiring areas of the bush. 
Sometimes, cultivators that started fields in the bush later go back to the surrounding vil-
lages or migrate even further away. The reason for this retreat, though, is not that they have
yielded to the other party but rather to the difficulties of the Diamaré bush, such as the lack of
water or the presence of elephants during the agricultural season.
Most of the herders do not resort to violence either. Even when they find their rainy season
camp sites occupied, they just search for another place. They explain that it is shameful to
chase other herders away and sometimes this even applies to farmers. They (mostly) decide to
leave the area. They are the yielding group (as long as they indeed have other areas to go to14).
Sometimes they complain to the local lawan about the loss of their camp site, because he is
the chief of the land and it is his job to make intruders leave. But violence … “that is no option,
because the authorities would punish you badly. Haven’t you heard of the ardos15 of Mayo
Kobo who are imprisoned?”16
In this case again, only outsiders tried to think of problem-solving strategies. However, until
now, nothing has been implemented and this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future without outside help.
Case 3: Kubadje-Jiksa
In Oudda most of the farmers of the Jiksa zone did not want to use violence. They only want-
ed to use their ancestors’ fields. Most of them indeed just used their fields, cleared new ones
when they thought it necessary and guarded against intruding cattle. The herders on the other
hand talked a lot about the problem of losing their grazing land and corridors but choose (as yet)
to muddle on. They are trying to avoid damage in the ever-advancing fields and, in the back of
their heads, they are weighing up the different options, such as the option of moving away. 
There were no farmers of the Jiksa corner who proposed the installation of problem-solving
institutions and systems to search for methods whereby the interests of both user-groups can
be met. Only outside the group of users and/or owners of Jiksa fields, that is outside the group
of people directly involved, did certain Oudda inhabitants try to think about mutual solutions
like a rotation system of fields and pasture area. This involvement is due to feelings of gener-
al solidarity with both groups and a certain ‘village feeling’ of not wanting to encounter big
(and perhaps escalating) problems. However, a meeting to discuss options with both stake-
holding groups together has not (yet) been organised. Within the group of herders, a certain
hard-headedness has been expressed: “We cannot move. Our houses are here. It is too much of
an effort to rebuild them elsewhere.” But this may be just a tactic. It is not wise to tell your
adversaries about all the options open to you in advance.
Most of the Oudda inhabitants without an original stake in the Jiksa zone left the situation
as it was. They did not interfere. They did not even show up at discussions or at the demon-
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14 These other areas may quickly disappear: in the Adamaoua region for example the number of cattle is rising
quickly and the Benoue National Park authorities have become very strict in the defence of the park bound-
aries.
15 The word ardo is a Fulfulde word roughly meaning ‘the chief of a group of nomads’, comparable with the
‘djaoro’ of a neighbourhood.
16 This is the reverse of the kind of learning Sandole (1993) mentions: negative experiences inhibit the expres-
sion of people’s inherent violent proneness.
stration of the location of the boundary by the two outer neighbourhoods and some inhabitants
of Oudda Centre (see in section 8.2, the assertion section).
8.1.4 What are the similarities between the three cases?
The violence in our three cases does not seem to be driven by extended deliberations before-
hand aimed at long-term gains. Most of the time the direct cause was just anger: uncontrolled
anger at sudden, acute threats to subsistence (a fear of real deprivation, not based on scarcity
of resources but on damage to belongings without proper reimbursement), a disturbance of
habits and expectations or feelings of injustice and insecurity because of arbitrary State
actions17. For some people the anger was exacerbated because they suspected their adversaries
of bribery of the authorities. Bringing these accusations into the open and experiencing that
others had the same perception offered them some scapegoats that were easier to attack than
the State18. Thus, the violence in the three cases was a non-rational physiological reaction19 to
acute threats to basic needs, whether physical or meta-physical.
Part of the violence was instigated by solidarity feelings of farmers without a direct interest
in the natural resource itself. Social identity (perhaps deliberately formed in the rights ascer-
taining phase, but not aimed per se at making allies for the sake of violent outbreaks20) is com-
bined with personal identity feelings based on an expression of solidarity and autonomy. 
In theory, in new settlements, such as those in Kolara-Kobo, social capital and a collective
identity have to be built and that takes time. The fact that all settlers are in the same position
and have to rely on each other increases the rate of the process. Having the same enemy binds
people together, but also makes them resort to violence more quickly, especially when vio-
lence-curbing institutions are far away and when they think (and fear) that the other party will
react in the same way. The pre-emptive strike can seem to be indispensable. Then, even with-
out real social capital, same interests may quickly evolve in collective violent action.
Future violence may be used strategically. Several younger, more highly educated owners
of fields in the areas newly entered are discussing violent options to ascertain definitively their
position on the land. A rational calculation has been carried out as regards the monetary and
societal costs of the use of violence versus the benefits and the chances of reaching the goal.
Absence or unreliable conduct by the State or State representatives triggers the strategy of ta-
king one’s rights into one’s own hands. 
With their contribution to the aggressive plans and their (future) actual assistance in
attacks, the people without pasture field interests invest heavily in their social capital and that
of the existing village. This phenomenon can only be seen when the new area is entered by
members of an already (elsewhere) existing society. In the case of the Diamaré the new users
may have the same ethnicity, but geographically they are not from the same society.
Therefore, they cannot expect armed help from outside the settlement. Whether or not the
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17 In short, an unbearable growth of frustration fuelled by a (perceived) discrepancy between the actual level of
fulfilment of needs (whether physical of meta-physical) and somatic and mental well-being on the one hand
and the level that the actor thinks is reachable and right on the other.
18 Once again, this was not a deliberate strategy in search of scapegoats; the situation offered it and it was will-
ingly accepted.
19 See chapter 2: the list of causes, by Sandole (1993: 20-21).
20 Deliberate social identity formations can be invested in, for example, to acquire witnesses concerning owner-
ship status vis-à-vis the authorities.
members of a same society will indeed come to the aid of their fellow farmers (or herders21)
when armed allies are needed, remains to be seen. Sometimes the expressed loyalty is in fact
only an expression of own worries about interests that may be threatened in the future.
Involvement in an organised fight will be subject to a rational cost-benefit analysis. Future
abstract threats do not weigh heavily.
The difference between the first case and the other two is that the State is only party in the
first one. In the other two cases different authorities are involved, but not as representatives of
State interests. In such circumstances it is of no use to show off one’s own interests and strength
to the State but instead only towards other users and individual power-bearers. When the State
is party, threats to and even the use of violence against the State representatives may be con-
sidered22. In most cases the use of violence is thought to diminish the support of the State,
including when this State has no direct interests itself. Only some of the youngsters suggest that
violence aimed at the other users (thus not against the State itself) will help the State to step in
for them. “They will see that it is really our land, otherwise we would not risk our lives for it”.  
All the deliberate uses of violence are only implemented when the group involved can count
on some success. For example, violence is considered to be worthwhile when the State insti-
tutions with the task of maintaining order are too far away or are too weak, especially in com-
parison with the possible rate of ally formation. People are already making calculations about
an armed response and the possibility that their adversaries may involve allies in a short
enough time. As yet, in the three cases, the violence is small-scale and short in duration
because the actors (still) respect the State and its violence-suppressing institutions. This con-
tradicts all the remarks about a weak State in the North of Cameroon. At the same time it con-
firms deliberations that a weak State can cause conflicts and violence to escalate23.
It seems as if, in the case of actors that still want to reach their goal, the non-violent strategy
is backed up by the deliberations that “low profile behaviour” and “not attracting attention”
is the best way to succeed in the fulfilment of basic needs. When people come out into the
open, they do so collectively. The State is still considered as strong enough to frighten peo-
ple away from the use of violence or strong statements. Most actors involved do not trust
either the other party or outsiders enough to expect successful conflict resolution. Therefore,
they do not invest in lobbying or the establishment of consultancy platforms.
Many herders refrain from violence because they do not consider themselves strong
enough. They consist of small, dispersed groups that cannot mobilise allies quickly enough.
Thus, in all three cases safeguarding the (access to and use of) natural resources is not the only
reason to resort to violence. Not all people refrain from violence because from time to time
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21 In the cases studied no plans of herders were detected to come to the aid of another nomadic or cattle keep-
ing group. Within the nomadic family, solidarity and future assistance were expressed. Only in the Kubadje-
Jiksa case could the cattle keepers (theoretically) rely on their farming co-villagers of Kila, who (at least
those that knew of the discord with the Oudda farmers) promised to help “our” Fulbe in case of an attack by
southerners. Solidarity seemed to have been built on geographical identities, imposed by higher authorities.
22 To discredit or even hit the State, groups that should be protected by that State can be attacked (as was done
in Iraq to discredit the US after the war against Saddam Hussein in 2003) but in none of the three cases this
complex strategy is the reason behind the violence.
23 For the reasoning that a strong State may trigger conflicts: see Nguiffo (forthcoming).
they are overwhelmed by anger and act irrationally, being struck by overflowing frustrations.
On other occasions young, strong and educated men in particular consider violence as a good
option to underpin their claim vis-à-vis the authorities or to frighten away adversaries.
However, the plans to implement this strategy are still in the making. However, the absence of
sanctions against small-scale (ad hoc) violence may lead to new (and larger) violent outbreaks,
because of the learning aspect24.
8.1.5 Theorising Box 4
In the preceding sections, the start of the analysis at the events, as Vayda and Walters (1999)
advised, have led to the description of mixtures of calculated and eruptive violence. The cau-
ses thereof differed from rational to irrational. In short, looking back on the three cases, it
seems necessary to enrich the conceptualisation of Box 4 by making a more explicit distinc-
tion between the two types of violence. Untangling the “chains of causes and effects” (id: 169),
therefore demands different approaches. Rational action is open to rational explanation.
Irrational action requires a more hermeneutic, that is ‘intuitive’, method.  
In general, security scientists and politicians are more interested in calculated violence25
because that seems to risk resulting quicker in large-scale outbreaks26. Nevertheless, irrational
eruptions of violence are of interest because they are signs of a small distance between, what I
call here, the ‘tension line’ in a society and the ‘outbreak of violence threshold’ (see Figure 8.3).
Figure 8.3 Distance to Violence (DtV = Distance to Violence)
The tension line may be conceptualised as caused by more rational factors and have lower
dynamics than the eruption of frustration that we encountered in the case studies. Eruptions of
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24 See Chapter 2: Sandole (1993: 20-21).
25 However manipulated the calculation may be by ‘leaders’.
26 Premeditated, large-scale violence is not to be expected in the near future in any of the three cases. The num-
ber of groups involved in strategic ‘military’ planning (calculated violence) is too small and the build-up of
supporting ‘troops from outside’ has (yet) to be started. Nevertheless, such a process can gather momentum
quickly.
DtV
Outbreak of violence
threshold
Tension-
line
peace
war
time
frustration may be regarded as being superimposed on the tension line (Figure 8.4). The degree
of the eruption together with the Distance to Violence (DtV) determines whether or not such
an eruption crosses the Outbreak of Violence Threshold.
When tensions in society or between members of society are low or non-existent, the ‘ten-
sion line’ is near the base line (left side of Fig. 8.3 and 8.4). Rising tensions, for whatever rea-
son, cause the tension line to rise, until it might finally reach the Outbreak of Violence
Threshold line and violence will start. In other words if, as shown in Figure 8.5, the tension
line crosses the Outbreak of Violence Threshold, systematic and relatively calculated violence
begins, although violent eruptions also then take place. The distance between the level of the
tension line and the violence threshold line (called “Distance to Violence”= DtV) is indicative
for the risk of a society to end up in (large-scale) violence. When the DtV is large, a small frus-
tration eruption will not surpass the Violence Threshold (left side of Fig 8.4). With a small DtV
small frustrations can lead to eruptive violence (right side of Fig 8.4). Conversely,  if (series
of) violence eruptions can be found based on relatively small frustrations, the conclusion has
to be that such a society suffers from a small DtV and, therefore, has come within the reach of
larger scale violence. 
Figure 8.4 Frustration eruption in cases of a large or small ‘Distance to Violence’
Theoretically speaking, a large DtV can be bridged by one sufficiently large bout of  frustra-
tion. If this is a one-off event, it generally concerns just one person because otherwise the ten-
sion line would be higher. In other words, a low tension line means a peaceful situation. The
large gap in the direction of the violence threshold line can, for example, be bridged by some-
body who suddenly becomes totally mad about something. In most cases like this the situation
quickly returns to normal with the help of other society members27. On the other hand, as can
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27 A good example, and one that also stresses the influence of culture on the position of the societal tension line
and thus on the reactions of society members to such ‘mad’ outbreaks, is described by Kpomassie (1998) in
his anthropological report of a year on Greenland. The long dark winters at the high latitude and the transi-
tion to the totally different other season often causes depressions and madness of inhabitants that may lead to
homicide. Yet, to Kpomassie’s African astonishment, the Inuit society does not react with revenge, but with
understanding and placation of the victim’s family.
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be seen by reactions to crop damage in the past, sufficiently large frustrations do occur fre-
quently28. Thus, what is important is not the frequency of violent eruptions but the underlying
DtV width and the reasons for the place of the ‘tension line’.
In other words, eruptions of frustrations are inherent to life. In the case of violent eruptions
the frustration is the direct explanation but it does not provide any answer to the question of
why this type of frustration resulted in violence on this occasion. Nor does it give any indica-
tion about the direction of the ‘tension line’ in the near future. For a further analysis of the sit-
uation and in order to acquire a greater insight into the violent event, not the ‘why’ of the event
itself is of interest but the reason for the small DtV. Why and how did this small DtV come
into being? 
As can be infered from the deliberations about future violence in the preceding sections, anoth-
er, related question concerns the result, the effect of the transgression of the violence thresh-
old. Whether or not the cause of the transgression is itself interesting, the actors and the rest
of their society have learned from the violent eruption. Because of this, the DtV will change.
Once actors have learned that resorting to violence does not help, and they start to look for
other solutions, the tension line may lower29. It will rise when the actors have had (some) suc-
cess or when they have learned that more calculated violence is suitable. In the worst cases,
the tension line may even surpass the violence threshold as a result of which DtV is zero and
calculated violence begins30 (see Fig. 8.5).
For example in the case of Jiksa-Kubadje a series of frustrations (about bush clearances or,
on the other hand, crop damage) without violent expression because the general tension was
low (left side of Fig. 8.4), but also without solutions to the causes of the frustrations, made the
tension line gradually rise. At this moment, therefore, eruptions of frustration may easily sur-
pass the Outbreak of Violence Threshold (right side of Fig. 8.4). It is to be expected that, with-
out any measures, this process will continue and finally the tension line will surpass the
threshold line (Fig. 8.5).
In the Diamaré the tension line seems to rise with every encounter between pastoralists and
agriculturalists. Now that actors have learned of the treachery of the authorities, the line has
‘jumped’ to a higher level. From this point, threats may easily lead to the temporarily surpass-
ing of the Outbreak of Violence Threshold line (right side of Fig. 8.4). Such violent threats in
themselves cause the tension line to rise further, until it may surpass the Threshold line (right
side of Fig. 8.5).
At the moment of the clash in the Baba Deli case, the DtV was not very small, but the
amount of anger was so high that it surpassed this distance and, indeed, violence erupted.
However, the actors could see that the violence did not help. The State persisted and did not
change the boundaries again, let alone cancel the whole project. The learning effect made it
clear to the actors that they should not re-try the same ‘ad hoc’ violence aimed at pro-reserve
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28 For example, Breusers et al (1998) describes the already very frequent conflicts and even violent outbreaks at
the beginning of the last century between Fulbe herdsmen and Mossi farmers in Burkina Faso. 
29 This learning effect of a negative cost-benefit relationship for the use of violence can be a direct one, or can
traverse decennia. For example, the Kapsiki experience with violence during the colonial times heightens the
position of their violence threshold. The pride of the Tupuri of their resistance to the Fulbe could make their
violence threshold against those Fulbe lower (see chapter 5: this effect is not seen).
30 See Sandole (1999) about the causes of continuation of violent conflict.
villagers. Aroused by the whole event, their strategies are now more calculated. Although some
may now wish to work towards peace, others are more inclined to resort to premeditated vio-
lence. On the whole, the DtV seems to have decreased.
Figure 8.5 Distance to Violence reaches zero
In short, questions to be posed in Box 4 are:
- What is the violent event?
- What is the effect of this event? What have the actors learned?
- Is the event indicative for a small DtV?
- If yes, what are the origins and causes of this small DtV?
This last question leads us to Box 3 (section 2).
8.2 The assertion of rights
1 Description of assertion of rights. 
2 a. Is it caused by entry into a new niche? 
b. Is it caused by other factors? 
c. Why do not all actors use the escape route of non-assertion?
3 What are the similarities between the three cases? 
8.2.1 Description of assertion of rights
One of the causes of violent threats and the violent outbreaks is the wish to ascertain the right
to land. This is depicted in Box 3 of the VoE diagram. Assertion of rights is only necessary
when other people have claims on the same resource.
Case 1: Baba Deli
In the argumentation between the two groups of inhabitants of Dzambou the entering group
tries to assert its rights with claims of ancestors’ clearance activities. In the traditional tenure
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system, this means that these fields are the property of those ancestors’ offspring. The fact that
the land has been fallow for some decades does not play any role. Even people that borrow or
rent fields in the new area express their rights of access and use to be based on the rights of
the traditional owners. 
All owners and users, and even several of the inhabitants without direct land interests
strengthen their arguments with the calculation that a pasture reserve is unnecessary in this vil-
lage. There is only a small number of cattle combined with a large space of fallow fields
between the compounds, where these cattle can graze. Apart from the ancestral rights (that are
not acknowledged by State law), the reserve-opponents do not refer to reasons why they
should have more rights to cultivate than the State has to allow big trees to grow. 
The other party does not claim personal or primordial rights but refers to collective his-
torical agreements between the first clearers and cattle keepers. Their claim is that it has been
agreed that the pasture area is to be a pasture reserve and to remain so forever. These argu-
ments are, in turn, contradicted by the pasture field owners, in a kind of “yes-or-no” game.
The pro-pasture group refers to the State plans of a forest reserve and the conservation of big
trees because it benefits their interests to have the same arguments as the powerful State.
It is not only necessary to ascertain claims to the land towards other users, but also towards
the State because that is the entity that decides about the factual establishment of the pasture
forest reserve, the exact place and boundaries thereof, the right to graze cattle without fear of
crop damage (that is: without the obligation of reimbursements), and even possible permission
to continue agriculture after the instalment. One way of persuading State representatives is by
corruption. According to the anti-pasture farmers, the pro-pasture inhabitants bribed the sub-
prefect and lamido of Mogodé, and maybe also the police superintendent and the line-agencies
of animal husbandry and agriculture. If this is true, they did so to ascertain their rights to the
corner of the pasture where they have their compounds and fields31. 
In this special case an ownership claim towards the State could also be expressed via the
list of ‘owners’ (= actual users) of the sub-prefect. In reality this list does not comprise all own-
ers according to the traditions, because some did not come to the session and others were not
accepted by the authorities32. Moreover, neither were all users incorporated because several of
the lessees and borrowers did not register. They did not consider themselves as owners,
although according to State law they do have this status as ‘developers’33.
Case 2: Kolara-Kobo
In the Diamaré bush the newly arriving Tupuri also refer to the past and to primordial rights.
By doing so they claim collective rights. The Fulbe came later and used force to occupy the
region, they say. At the same time the farmers use arguments based on State law. But when
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31 If this is (again) true, it is a very opportunistic move by the regional authorities for personal profit. At first
they satisfied the majority of the farmers with a delineation of the pasture in a way that everybody, including
the Fulbe settlement farmers, would lose their fields (and the latter their compounds as well). Later, they had
themselves paid to change the boundaries again. Meanwhile, they deny any bribery by referring to the fact
that it is only natural for the Fulbe neighbourhood to remain (in the words of the lamido and the sub-prefect:
“where else should those people go?”), but why then did they decide differently in the first place?
32 Namely, those with ownership claims, but who did not use the fields at the moment of registration.
33 See chapter 4: the legal situation about land tenure.
others do the same (like the settled Fulbe of Gadjia34), they protest and explain that the law has
been wrongly interpreted. Individual farmers mostly claim rights to individual fields, but not
to whole areas. These claims are strengthened in the event of (the risk of) crop damage. Then,
the claim pertains to yields of sown crops. In almost all cases, the claim to the land is also
made on behalf of sons. Family fathers have moved to the bush to clear new fields for their
(future) offspring.
The herders in turn mention the fact that their ancestors already camped in this area long
ago on specific camp sites. They refer to neo-traditional authorities35 and arrangements,
although these are on the verge of disappearing36. A lot of them demand that the local lawan
protect their rights because he is the chief of the land. Sometimes this is done after the dis-
covery of settlers on their camp site, while on other occasions herders try to prevent such
entries. Apart from drawing the attention of the lawan to cattle keepers’ camps, magic is also
used to make it impossible for outsiders to use camp sites. Violation of the spell put on such a
camp can lead to the death of the intruder. In a way this is a violent way of ascertaining the
rights to that specific piece of land. However, it is difficult to be recognised as such by ‘ration-
al’ western researchers or by a ‘rational’ State. The entering Tupuri only bother when they
know of a spell and when the reputation of the ‘camp site owner’ with regard to witchcraft adds
weight to the threat.
Although certain explicit threats are indeed seen as ‘use of violence’37, other more vague
and general threats can be considered as only a description of a possible scenario, to underpin
the decidedness of the claim. Whether or not the event just surpasses the violence threshold or
not, does not make much difference for the analysis.
According to rumours, both groups try to buy allies among the elites. Indeed, they or their
representatives visit the regional headquarters to persuade the authorities to choose their side.
Whether or not this is accompanied by the (illegal) transfer of money or cattle remains a secret.
In the Cameroonian context it is not totally imaginary. 
In the widely reported conflict case over settlement in the Mayo Kobo bush on the village
territory of Daram (next to Kobo)38 different authors mention different amounts of money hav-
ing changed hands between the newly settled farmers and the Daram or Kobo lawan, between
the farmers and the sub-prefect of the region, and between the involved herders and the region-
al lamido and/or the administration authorities. Each year again, the herders sought the assis-
tance of authorities, after which the farmers had to counter these actions with their own claims,
all of which were underpinned with money, these authors claim. In this special case, therefore,
rights had to be asserted over and over again because the authorities had an interest in not solv-
ing the problem39.
Such a pattern cannot be discerned for the area studied in the current research. Newly sett-
ling farmers buy permission for, and the legal status of, the hamlet (via an official acknowl-
edgement of the djaoro) from the local lawan and the regional sub-prefect. Most of the respon-
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34 See chapter 5, section 6.
35 See chapter 4, section 1, for the concept of neo-traditional. 
36 See e.g. Moritz, Scholte and Kari (2002).
37 See the first section of this chapter.
38 Van der Ploeg (2001); Wassouni (pers. comment); Moritz (forthcoming).
39 Although the authorities gain by the continuation of the conflict, perhaps their actions are not caused by this
interest. Perhaps they do not have the capacity (legally, military etc.) to solve the problem.
dents do not see this as bribery, but as legal fees to be paid for administrative tasks40. Whether
the focus is on historical rights to the land, rights based on customary rules and rights based on
modern State law, each system always demanded a certain payment which is also paid for future
services, like contacts with organisations that will help them to construct a water-well. Once the
legal right to the area has been established, the new village has the right to such services. 
Herders that used to camp in the area do not claim their rights vis-à-vis the higher-than-local
authorities (perhaps they refrain from that after their experiences in the above mentioned Mayo
Kobo case). They try to persuade the local lawan of adjacent Kolara, whom they consider to
be the chief of the land and who himself is a big cattle-keeper with a certain amount of power
in the region, to come up for their rights. But they do not pay him more than they had already
paid for obtaining general permission to use the pasture lands. 
Trying to adapt the modern land laws in favour of herders by a kind of simple development
of the bush, has (as yet) only been done by a couple of sedentary Fulbe in Gadjia (see chapter
5). The possibility of pastoral use remained intact, but they were able to claim ownership
rights according to law. This tactic resembles the possibility put forward by certain Kolara-
Kobo bush herders of leaving the older people behind to occupy the camp sites while the
herds are away. This would be a clear-cut claim to the land, but it has not yet been imple-
mented in the research site41.
Case 3: Kubadje-Jiksa
In Oudda the same pattern of reference to the past is evident. The cultivators claim both vis-à-
vis opponents and outsiders that they have the right to use the fields in Jiksa because their
ancestors once cleared them. Several of them even state that their ancestors built houses in the
contested area and that they only moved because of a lack of water and too many robberies. 
Another way of ascertaining the rights to the region is via the route of belonging, that is
creating stories of collective identity42. Oudda inhabitants state historical claims to the territo-
ry via heroic stories of a past in which boundaries were determined. For this strategy the Jiksa
owners mobilise fellow villagers with and without direct land interests. Their first-comer rights
are implicitly underlined as they do not even address their opponents, but a third party that
‘ought to know’, because they were present before the opponent group was there. In January
2001, in the actual hamlet territory of the Fulbe in Kubadje, a discussion about the area’s
boundaries was held between two groups of inhabitants of  respectively the neighbouring vil-
lage Oudda and the rest of the own village Kila. The Fulbe, definitely an actor in the outcome
of the discussion, were not even addressed43. This strategy of disregarding the Fulbe meant that
the Oudda villagers wanted to stress that these Fulbe were mere ‘newcomers’ and have no
rights. To address counter arguments the Bana have collective explanations about the cheating
of (and by) former authorities.
357
40 It is very difficult for lower class, non-educated people to be sure of the real fee, fixed by law, for this kind
of transactions. 
41 In other areas this is already noticeable. For example in the region near Garoua some Mbororo women stay
all year round, while their men-folk go on transhumance (Van Santen, pers. comment, October 2002).
42 See also Chilver (1996): the invention and telling of stories to make up a collective past and build and claim
collective identity bounded to a certain region.
43 The situation was bizarre. The Fulbe were circling around the Kapsiki-Bana meeting that took place next to
their own compounds, but were not interlocutors. They were observers in their own life, so to say.
On the other hand, the adverse users, the Fulbe, claim that the region is theirs, that it was
given to them a generation ago by the village chief to live in and that it is meant to be used as
pasture. They were there as first users, having encountered an empty bush. Shortly after their
arrival their regional chief, the lamido, designated the area a pasture reserve, they say. Thus,
in this case the claim extends to a higher political level. The two lamibe became involved
because they both claim the area belonged to their territory. This is only of interest to the local
actors as long as the claim of their own lamido stresses their own point of view regarding the
ownership of the fields. The territory of a certain village or lamidat cannot at the same time be
the property of inhabitants of another administrative entity44. Thus, those Oudda habitants who
started to re-use Jiksa back up their lamido with the idea that it serves their own interests: if
the territory belongs to their lamido, the fields are theirs. In a likely, but converse, way the
lamibe use the farmers’ and herders’ arguments to underline their own case45. Yet, both groups
leave the addressing of higher authorities with land and boundary responsibilities to those
lamibe. Even in the case of crop damage, individual farmers do not seek the help and judge-
ment of higher authorities on the other side of the boundary, because they expect them to take
sides like the lamibe46.
The two lamibe do not act ambiguously, as reported in the case of other land conflicts in
Cameroon (see the Diamaré case above47). They have a clear-cut interest and act to defend
that. It has to be said that this interest is not based on a scarcity of the natural resource land.
Neither are the lamibe interested in direct income from the conflict between the users of the
land. For example, because all individual claims help a lamido in his own territorial struggle,
individual farmers who come to search the help of their lamido of Guili against the Fulbe
herders of Kubadje do not have to pay at all, or only the normal (= reasonable) price for arbi-
trage. Their complaints merely serve as arguments in the lamido’s struggle with higher
administrative levels.
Stating a claim to land without entering the area is also possible. A (small) group of yielding
cultivators did not think the whole exercise of starting new fields in Jiksa worthwhile. When you
have to guard your fields constantly, risk being attacked by herders or risk losing crops because
of cattle damage, why take the effort to clear those big trees at all. Some women especially con-
sidered it wiser to invest their time and money in other fields. Nevertheless, they fiercely backed
up the land claims of their husbands, sometimes encouraging them not to withdraw.
On the one hand, the threats of the herders pay off. On the other hand, it makes the yield-
ing party all the more dedicated to trying to win the case via others. However, this weak sort
of ascertaining from a distance cannot be successful without a factual entry by co-members of
the same demanding group. For the herders it may be a sign that threats have to be stepped up
in order to put off the rest of the group from entering as well. 
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44 This escape was suggested by the chief of Kila, when it emerged in the boundary discussion between him
and the Oudda inhabitants, that the historical boundary between the two villages did not fit the actual posi-
tion of the fields. All the other members of the meeting rejected this possibility: see chapter 7.
45 For the Guili lamido the reasoning is as follows: if the farmers succeed in ascertaining the rights to the Jiksa
fields, this area will be registered as a part of his territory.
46 And thus, going to higher authorities is seen as a waste of money.
47 In some areas of the Diamaré, authorities without a direct interest in land tend to prolong the conflicts
because of their lucrative mediator function.
8.2.2 Entry into new niches or other causing factors? Why not just no rights assertion?
The assertion of rights can also be based on causes other than the entry into a new niche. This
is depicted in ‘co-causing factors’ next to box 3. For the following description the enumeration
of diverse actors’ categories of Figure 8.2 can be helpful.
Case 1: Baba Deli
In Dzambou, most of the people that make claims to the pasture reserve land have started fields
on that new land. Now, these farmers want to be sure that they can continue using those fields.
Others, however, try to ascertain rights to pasture fields without having entered them. They
perceive future problems or try to use their claims for other gains. In general the outright ascer-
taining activities only started as a response to the decision of the authorities, which is per-
ceived as unjust.
One of the other reasons to ascertain rights vis-à-vis the authorities is that, if the reserve
were really to be established, the State would have to buy out registered owners48. For
Dzambou farmers, thus, it is important to be acknowledged as such. This is the reason that the
ownership claim was willingly expressed to the sub-prefect when he started to draw up a list
of owners. At that moment, the farmers only counted possible benefits of inscription. They did
not count on a continuation of ownership rights of pasture fields, but on direct (monetary)
gains. Nevertheless, some owners did not add their names and recoiled from this way of ascer-
taining rights, because they were afraid of misuse by the authorities49.
Some of those that started to use land in the pasture reserve did so secretly. They cleared a
proportion of the bush, sometimes in the middle of the contested area so that the area was more
out of sight. They surrounded it with prickle branches to keep out foraging livestock and wild
animals and did not make their presence known to anyone. Of course those who entered the pas-
ture reserve could see that trees and shrubs had disappeared and, later in the year, they could see
that crops were growing. However, the user of these fields tried to prevent disputes by guard-
ing his field against crop damage and, when such damage nevertheless occurred, by refraining
from complaints. Given the general distrust in the authorities, these farmers thought it a waste
of time and money to try to persuade others of their right of use or ownership. They did not reck-
on that any legal buy-out sum would ever reach any owner. On the contrary, they strongly
believed that their adversaries were bribing the State authorities, while they themselves did not
have enough cash or kind to do the same. In any case, that approach was too risky.
For the time being, the only strategy they are using is to complain about their hopeless sit-
uation (this shows that their goal is still somewhere in their mind), but in the near future they
will search for further possibilities to safeguard their basic interests. This will more or less
return them to Box 1 of the VoE diagram (see below: section 8.4). It is possible that they will
reach Box 3 or even Box 4 somewhere in the future, when their circumstances and the inter-
pretation of their situation have changed. At the moment they only count per year. Some of the
farmers who refrained from claims explained that each additional year that they could harvest
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48 Information with regard to this legal aspect was ‘rumoured’. Thus, it depended on social networks and educa-
tion levels as to whether farmers knew and understood. It was not officially announced by State representa-
tives during either of the village meetings.
49 Being known as someone with claims makes one vulnerable to accusations of rebellion, as the story of the
municipality representative, who stood up against the authorities and was subsequently accused of rebellion,
shows (see chapter 6.3.4., ‘conflict mediation’).
from the pasture fields was another good year with abundant yields and a period of rest for
their other fields. “Next year we will see…” Making a fuss would attract the attention of the
authorities and that would only lead to quicker expulsion, they reckon. 
The short-term goal of having just one year of harvest was met by the regional authorities
at the moment they rewarded political support given at the parliamentary and municipal elec-
tions of 2002. The promise of a vote for the sub-prefect’s party (the RDPC50) led to permission
being granted to continue pasture field use during that specific year. This could be done more
easily if the farmer involved refrained from claiming the fields as inalienable property.
Some of the borrowing or renting cultivators of pasture fields admitted that they did not
have real rights to the pasture zone at all. As long as they have the opportunity to use these
fields they are satisfied, but claims cannot be made. At best they can support the claim of the
owners. Some even refrain from that: “We cannot add any new arguments, and we do not want
to have problems.” 
Others, who stated a claim first, later changed their attitude because of a perceived power-
lessness vis-à-vis the State. To this was added the consideration that one should guard a good
relationship with this same State.
The pro-pasture villagers indeed managed to have a good relationship with the regional
authorities. Otherwise the location of the boundaries would not have been changed. Their claim
for a pasture reserve was not a personal claim. On the contrary, this claim brought with it a risk
for personal interests. If the Mogodé meeting plans had been implemented, the Fulbe hamlet
inhabitants would have lost their (fertile) fields. Only some of the farmers in the Fulbe corner
had such numbers of cattle that a nearby pasture, without the risk of crop damage, served their
interests. A smaller number still had so many livestock that they could live from them without
agriculture. For the others the reason for their claim is more obscure. They may have a long
term, whole-community vision. This means that this group is wise enough to see the necessity
of a pasture forest reserve for the whole region, for example to curb desertification. Such a
reserve would also serve to secure their future options. However, it is not possible to come up
with reasons why the Fulbe hamlet inhabitants have better insights in future risks, possibilities
and necessities than the rest of the (sometimes better educated) villagers, and why especially
they have a greater need for future cattle grazing land than others. I have to remind readers of
the fact that the name ‘Fulbe’ here is only given because of their Islamic religion and not
because of other original Fulbe related cultural aspects, such as cattle-keeping.
Nevertheless, the factor of cattle can play a major role in the strategies of the Fulbe corner
inhabitants. We can argue that most of the claims came forth from reasons in the social, rather
than in the natural capital sphere. Factors that may play a role are solidarity with surrounding
cattle owners as an investment in bonds with the rich, trying to establish a better relationship
with the regional lamido, because he is the most important traditional authority (and perhaps
even more powerful than the officially higher placed sub-prefect) and, thus, aiming to acquire
grazing land for his cattle, trying to increase the relationship with the authorities in general
because the ‘Fulbe’ already knew about the State plans for the official establishment of the
reserve, they knew they could not block it and they knew also that they had to safeguard their
compound corner. A reason that does refer to the natural resource land is the investment in
future group interests. Based on a feeling of a shared group identity springing from a mixture
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50 See Chapter 4: All State representatives are more or less forced to be members of the ruling party.
of the same religion, fulbeïsation (among other things this includes the keeping of cattle) and
geographical position, people invest in pastureland establishment to maintain the possibility
for their offspring to increase the size of their herds. 
All considerations have to take the described risk into account. That means that the Fulbe
corner inhabitants had considerable trust either in the lamido as such (as a brother in religion,
or based on other social bonding facts) or in their own possibilities to persuade the authorities
(whether or not with money).
Several cattle owners, who stumbled with their herd into crops within the pasture reserve
boundaries, tried to settle the raised dispute by just paying the compensation sum demanded.
In a way this contradicts their claim of ‘pasture for ever’; especially now that the sub-prefect
had authorised them to refuse to pay. However, they regarded a certain level of social bonding
with fellow villagers as more important than their claim. Indeed, this ambiguity is becoming
more and more evident51.
Case 2: Kobo-Kolara
In the Diamaré many entering farmers leave the assertion of the right to the land to those at
group level. On (or before) arrival they ask for permission from the local djaoro of the new
settlement to start fields and a compound but they do not explain, let alone claim, the why and
how of their rights there. In such cases the djaoros and interested co-settlers are the ones who
have to defend the rights of existence of the whole hamlet. 
If individual settlers do claim their rights versus cattle keepers, they do so because they
created fields in the bush and now encounter herds in their crops or angry cattle keepers who
deny them their right to settle where they are. In those cases the entry into the new niche is the
underlying cause of the ascertaining of the rights.
Some people do not stay in the new settlements. After one or two years of disappointing
yields, crop damage by wild animals (elephants, birds, etc.) and a troublesome water supply,
they withdraw to their former villages or to other new, more promising areas. 
Even more herders than cultivators leave. As has been said before, most of them yield and
try to find other rainy season camp sites or even other bushes to graze their cattle. Only when
explicitly asked during the interviews do they admit to having certain seniority rights in the
Kolara-Kobo bush. However, the newcomers cannot and do not claim such rights. Several of
the herders explain that they do not even complain to the authorities because they consider the
presence of farmers as a sign that the authorities (and especially the chief of the land) approve.
Many nomads think that the authorities do not like them and their way of life52.
Case 3: Kubadje-Jiksa
In Oudda no cultivators without ownership claims use fields in Jiksa. Only women who work on
the land of their husbands do not have ownership rights, but they have direct long-lasting53 inter-
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51 This feeling can help when real solutions to the conflict are sought.
52 Apart from the confirmation of this stance seen in the lack of State regulations and policy of favouring nomadic
herders or at least handling them equally with farmers, this thought may be true because the majority of State
representatives in the Far North are from southern provinces and from settled (farming or city-based) families.
53 The extent to which this is ‘long-lasting’ depends on them themselves. The longer they stay with their hus-
band, the longer these rights continue.
est in the claims of their husbands and therefore support these. In short, in Oudda the entry into
the new niche has always resulted in the assertion of rights. The expression of those claims, how-
ever, often only comes about after encounters with cattle keepers and their animals. For some
owners, notably those who have not (yet) started working on Jiksa fields, the asserting of rights
started even before the invasion. They underpin the claims of their fellow villagers who invaded
Jiksa as soon as these ask for witnesses and, in addition, on any occasion vis-à-vis outsiders.
Partly instigated by the lamido’s wish to increase (or maintain) his territory, the claim over
boundaries was added. For the farmers this was still an assertion of rights after or at the same
time of invasion and based on a desire for land. All those who own Jiksa lands but did not start
fields there participated in the visit to Kubadje to show and discuss the original boundary posi-
tion54. So for them it was not the entry into a new niche that led to an assertion. Certainly in
the case of both lamibe their claim has nothing to do with an entry into a new area or the per-
ception of land scarcity now or in the future.
The adverse party never thought of claiming their settlement region. They regarded it as
theirs, they paid taxes and let their herds graze there. This implicit ownership of the land had
to be made explicit the moment it was threatened by field-clearing farmers. Now they express
their rights towards entering farmers in (accidental) encounters, towards visitors and, via their
lawan, towards the authorities55. 
8.2.3 Similarities between the cases
Most of the time people choose to invade new land on which they (think they or want others to
believe they) have certain legitimate rights. In the three cases it only occurred very rarely that
new land without claims was entered. For example, some Tupuri from the Diamaré villages or
from the Tupuri heartland chose to search for fields further away. After the State-organised
movements to the Benoué area in earlier days, there are still Tupuri who go to the south to join
their ethnic brothers or start fields on their own. But even there they say they have some rights,
namely the rights of a general Cameroonian citizen to use the surface of his country.
People want to have more certainty about actual and future rights of access to and use of
land. They want others to acknowledge their rights, to make sure there is no need to go through
the whole process again and again, every time with the risk of losing the game. Of course, the
local actors know perfectly well that any rights may be challenged again in new circumstances,
but they at least want a certain basic security when basic circumstances remain the same. And,
although a process of modernisation is recognised by (at least) the younger generation and
although, at the same time, several actors acknowledge rising insecurities, for them the basic
circumstances have not changed. 
In none of the studied areas is the active asserting of rights to the land a continuing process,
which was already going on long before the actual threat to the ‘ownership’ of the land or the
other reason to assert rights to land became apparent. Most of the time people just use a certain
area or, while not using it, consider the right to use it as generally accepted. Only when this use
right is (or seems to be) violated by other users do they deem it necessary to state a claim.
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54 If they were not hindered in doing so by, for example, disability.
55 Most probably, the fact that this Fulbe hamlet fulfils a role in the territorial strategies of the lamido of
Mogodé makes it easier for the Fulbe lawan to maintain access to this lamido despite his uncooperative
behaviour with regard to taxes and modernisations that the lamido wants to be implemented.
Once the threat has been recognised (for example, some farmers in Dzambou have seen
the process of establishment of forest pasture reserves elsewhere in the Mandara mountains
and feared that their region would be the next target), the process of asserting the rights to
land can take years. These years are filled with moments of assertion interchanged with long
periods of doing nothing. Of course the ‘empty’ periods are not spent totally idle and some of
the activities will help the ascertaining process later. Once a (temporary) solution has been
found, the claiming negotiations can stop for the time being. They will flare up again when
deemed necessary, but that is not the same as continuous assertion56.
Access and use rights are not always connected to ownership. Nevertheless, it seems as if
the different users, to be sure of the contested areas, claim their rights in the ownership realm
- personal or group ownership - not over use or access only. At first the ascertaining of rights
is an ad hoc and personal enterprise, although mostly some deliberations of the collectiveness
of the rights are passed beforehand. Later, when the threat to the rights continues, more time
is spent on the mobilisation of social networks.
Mostly, both the new users and the present users only base their arguments on traditional
tenure rules and history. They claim their rights by addressing the other users, or the authori-
ties57 or both, or even addressing third parties, deciding whom to address in a rationally calcu-
lated process. It is then important whether or not the new niche is indeed entered, who is con-
sidered as ‘enemy’ or as potential ally and which arguments will be used. For example it is use-
less to express arguments concerning administrative boundaries only towards local opponents. 
In short, the assertion of rights is aimed at the (preferably personal) ownership of the area
(based on first comer or first clearer rights), often backed up by (perceived and as such
mobilised) claimed historical land allocations. All types of capitals can be invested to increase
the possibility of gaining the right to the land (for ever). In the natural capital domain this
means the use of low value land58 or natural resources other than land such as trees or water
resources59. If actors were to have the possibility to capitalise high value land, they would not
experience the necessity to ascertain rights to new land. 
On the other hand, it is possible to invest in natural capital to try to ascertain rights therein.
As has been said, entering a piece of land is a kind of claim. Subsequent maintenance and ame-
lioration of that piece of land would be strong reinforcements of this claim. Because in all cases
the new land is entered because of its high quality, investment in additional quality would have
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56 Although Berry’s statement (1993) is true, “that the negotiability of rules and relationships is one of the funda-
mental characteristics of African societies” (Juul and Lund 2002a: 5), that does not mean that these negotiations
are always and at all times being executed. Maintaining or increasing one’s social position in general does not
mean that that is always related to the assertion of property rights (to land, in an agricultural society), as is sug-
gested.
57 I deliberately use the term ‘authorities’ to denote one of the two entities that an actor can address. With this
term, I choose not to use the term ‘State’ as the single unit that may be thought of when using the term
‘authority’. Apart from the State that in itself is a bundle of institutions, all represented by different persons
(or groups of persons), non-State authorities also exist.
58 The idea of using low value land to invest and gain high value land can be seen in the proposals of several inha-
bitants to change the position of the pasture towards the infertile fields. However, this type of investment has to
be a collective one (non-pasture field owners also have to be involved to make the new pasture big enough and
continuous) and therefore can only work via investment in social capital. In reality an investment as such has
not (yet) be made. In addition, it is only feasible when the conflict does not involve the (State) goal of forestry.
59 In communities where access to water wells is not open to all (e.g. not for visiting cattle keepers), access to
land can theoretically be bartered for access to water. In the cases studied, this is not an issue.
been a sign of an ascertaining activity. However, apart from the necessary clearing of the fields,
in none of the three cases were any quality-improving measures implemented60. 
In the human capital sphere, education and information are good starting points on which
to make a stronger claim. One knows what to say and when, what one needs or what others’
rights are. Small groups of actors use those amongst them with special capacities of persua-
sion to act as their spokesmen. This kind of ‘intellectual’ capital does not run out when it is
used. Indeed, both in Oudda as well as in Dzambou these factors play a big role. In the
Diamaré as well, djaoros and other chiefs are sent out to assert claims. They are chosen not
only because of their high human capital, but more so because of their social position61 and
therefore their social capital.
In addition, even physical strength and health are factors which can be brought to bear.
These two qualities can, however, be lost if, for example, they are used in a fight and the actor
is wounded or when the user is arrested and put in prison. However, this did not occur in the
three cases62. Strength and health are used in the clearing of the new land, and in the building
of other capitals that may support the assertion of rights.
In the economic realm, investment of capital to assert rights would mean buying or renting
the desired new land, preferably with official ownership or long-term user right (from official-
ly registered owners) papers. This was not done in any of the cases. It was not possible because
of the excessively complex and expensive registration procedures63. The (probable) donations to
authorities can be seen as economic investments in the socio-political domain. These socio-
political investments in turn can (perhaps) be capitalised with a certain amount of pressure.
Plenty of other investments are made with socio-political capital. For example, previously
formed family and friendship bonds are used to persuade people to help in the lengthy argu-
mentation vis-à-vis other users or authorities, to bring about shared cultivation in the disputed
area, to try to involve politicians of one’s own party (although rarely), etc. Indeed, in all three
cases, group formation and the building of social identity (via a collective past, for example)
were used as important strategies towards assertion.
All types of arguments are used. These are based opportunistically on modern law, neo-tra-
ditional law64 or the customary law of the own ethnic group. In addition, the most powerful
allies possible are sought, sometimes through bribery, while other allies are mobilised who have
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60 I refer again to the Fulbe of Gadjia who did ‘improve’ their territory as a deliberate asserting activity (they
even used the approach to improvements that they themselves do not consider to be such, namely cutting trees,
clearing bushes and develop water wells, all this only to fit in the State rules). See note 34 and Chapter 5.
61 Given the more or less traditional composition of society, with its focus on wealth and lineage, social posi-
tion is not always (and perhaps almost never) the cause of substantial human capital, such as wisdom or
knowledge.
62 As described in Chapter 6, one of the village representatives in the Baba Deli case risked this treatment, after
he opposed the changing of the position of the pasture reserve boundaries. The sub-prefect of Mogodé
accused him of rebellion. 
63 In the uncontested Oudda territory the far side of the pasture in the north-east is the source of discords about
the exact location of the boundary. Recently settled farmers in Kordraweshi (see Fig. 7.3) can produce field
ownership papers signed by the lamido in parts of the bush, of which the cattle keepers say that it is within
the pasture zone. Offspring of former clearers have sold their family fields to those newcomers and managed
to get the lamido to sign (with the help of social capital, that is: good relationship with the lamido or his
noblemen; or with the help of ‘gifts’).
64 The law drawn up by the Fulbe was initially enforced by the colonial powers (albeit adjusted to their own
ideas) and just after independence.
the same interests and who therefore do not need to be bribed The arguments and allies are used
to deny or otherwise ignore adversaries’ arguments. A deliberate choice is made as regards
which actor is addressed in the rights asserting process. Sometimes not even the adverse user
(as in the Oudda boundary problem) is selected but rather a strategically more opportune party.
This can be seen as a social-political investment in witnesses, and perhaps even allies.
Sometimes the assertion of rights is not a reaction to the entry into the new fields, but
instead the invasion may be a way of asserting rights. “You see I need it now and they are, in
fact, my own fields.” A kind of circle reasoning is used based on the idea of “Otherwise I
would not start using them.” In the Diamaré bush, the Tupuri try to establish a matter-of-fact
situation in their relationship with the herders and the authorities who support them65. Although
authorities sometimes have an interest in continuing the conflict situation and do not react
unambiguously to claims to land, most land-users act rationally by not continuing (or even not
starting) to involve those authorities. “They only make you pay, and they never help you to
secure your land”, they say. In the context of the actors’ strategies it is more important to per-
suade the adverse users.
Sometimes, the assertion of rights is not preceded by an entry into a new niche. There are
actors who start their claims long before or totally separately from an invasion. In certain fami-
lies or neighbourhoods (especially in the Mandara Mountains Plateau with the long history of
ancestors who cleared bush areas) a certain socio-cultural pressure exists of not giving up the
ancestors’ fields66. Even without a perception of scarcity, even when you do not use those
fields, you cannot offend your ancestors and deny their efforts by forgoing their lands. 
In general, rights assertion is a long-term and weary exercise. Moreover, not all claims of
rights to the land are successful. In all three cases, the process has not ended. Ongoing ascer-
taining efforts, using different methods but still without definitive results, make the actors feel
more and more frustrated. 
When the State has direct interests in the land, the party with the same or corresponding
interests has more chance of winning its case. It can use the State’s arguments and will be
backed by the State (like the ‘Fulbe’ of Dzambou). State representatives do not adopt certain
positions nor do they act according to expressed positions when they have no direct stake in
(or via) the land and only try to continue the conflict to make it possible to gain more as con-
flict mediators (without really solving anything in the long term). Also as far as local inhabi-
tants are concerned, the financial motive - but then via legal regulations – may be the sole rea-
son for trying to assert land rights. Especially in the Dzambou case, certain actors try to assert
rights to land only to gain direct monetary benefits from the State indemnities. Once they have
succeeded they will quickly withdraw. If their approach does not work, another strategy and
another goal can be chosen.
No assertion of rights to (the use of) newly entered land means that the actor accepts that
his use is only temporary. He hopes to prolongate the period of use, but leaves it more or less
to the circumstances outside his control. Sometimes the lack of assertion is due to uncertainty
regarding the wish to prolong the period of residence. Rarer still is non-assertion because of a
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65 See also Lavigne Delville (2000: 103): “… presenting the authorities with a fait accompli tends to stand a
good chance of success”.
66 This can also be seen in the Tupuri heartland, although not all sons react like this. In contrast, in the densely
populated northern part of the Mandara Mountains (the Mafa region) high outward migration can be seen,
sometimes with the total abandoning of ancestors’ fields (see Van Andel (1998) and Zuiderwijk (1998)).
combination of a wish to stay and a kind of laziness or reluctance to stand up for this wish. In
almost all the non-asserting cases, fear and the perception of own weakness towards the other
party and towards the (unreliable) State play a role. The traditional or culturally embedded
ideas that authorities should always be respected can also influence decisions about (even low-
level) ‘revolt’. Acceptance of State legitimacy is often exacted on the basis of fear of force
(violence) by State institutions. On the other hand, misuse of power positions can lead to the
circumvention of authorities by actors and subsequently to a decrease in legitimacy, as the
Diamaré case shows67.
In short, in all three cases, the small DtV as indicated by the violent events (section 8.1) is
caused by the fact that the local legal system of ancestral and primordial rights does not give
clear-cut rights. The traditional system is vague and the vagueness increases where different
customary systems collide. Conflicts over land cannot be solved by means of the traditional
rules, especially not when tension rises. Customary law in the new settings therefore requires
case-to-case adjudication at a higher level. However, the motivations of adjudicators do not
lead them to find solutions. They earn a kind of salary for every case, they can gain extra by
outplaying the opponents, so these try to outpace each other in payoffs, and they are sometimes
even party in the case. 
In addition, the capacity of adjudicators is small. It is not clear to them which law system
should be applied: the statutory system or the customary system. In the case of the latter, an
additional decision needs to be taken as to which of the pertaining customary systems should
be applied. Next to that, the legitimacy of adjudicators is not clear. Should the lamido or the
sub-prefect have this role and in the case of additional boundary disputes, which lamido or
sub-prefect? The evident corruption does not help to increase the legitimacy of decisions of
adjudicators. Parties know that such an authority can be brided and that each decision can be
changed depending on the money offered.
Thus, the small DtV is caused by uncertainty about land rights and conflict resolution pat-
terns, even for those without direct stakes in land68. In all cases, more frequent land right asser-
tions, being as such a sign of land tenure insecurity, also increase the tension level. The con-
flict becomes more and more manifest without there being any obvious solutions.
8.3 Entry into a new niche
1. Description of entry into a new niche. 
2. a. Is it caused by land scarcity? 
b. Is it caused by other factors? 
c. Why do not all actors use the non-entry escape route?
3. What are the similarities between the three cases? 
8.3.1 Description of entry into a new niche
One of the causes of the wish to ascertain the right to the land is the fact that new land is
366
67 See also Lund (2002).
68 This is a very small group. In a rural society such as North Cameroon, the vast majority of actors has land
interests.
entered (see box 2 of the VoE diagram). The investment in the entry makes people try to hold
on to the new niche and not lose those lands again. 
Case 1: Baba Deli
After decades of using only nearby fields, Dzambou inhabitants sought the empty bush of the
unofficial Baba Deli pasture zone in order to cultivate. Neither they, nor their fathers and
sometimes not even their grandfathers, had ever used this area apart from when they cleared
the dense forest that existed there two generations ago, after which they delineated their ‘own’
territory with stone lines on the soil or stone markers on tree branches. 
At first only a very small proportion of the inhabitants started to use the fields of the ances-
tors in the pasture reserve. Some only use the fields of other traditional owners (via renting or
borrowing) that are not owned by their own (extended) family. A high proportion of those who
entered are young men. The number of new users increased slowly, but up until the time of the
research the surface of agricultural fields in the originally empty bush zone did not exceed a
third of the whole. 
Case 2: Kolara-Kobo
In the case of the Diamaré, the entry into a new area consisted of both field-clearing and settle-
ment. People came from the nearby region or from the Tupuri heartland further away. Most of
them started the new fields after they themselves, friends or family members had first visited
the area to consider the possibilities. Sometimes, in the first years of settlement, risks were
spread by sending a son or a wife while the rest of the family continued farming in the region
of origin. In other instances, a pattern emerged of moving closer every couple of years, from
far away to a surrounding village first and then to the actual bush. Most of the time it took
several years at least from the first time people had inspected the bush until the actual settle-
ment. The step itself was considered over and over again. Costs, benefits and risks were cal-
culated. All settlements were preceded by the clearing of areas for fields in the dry season
before the year of settlement. The average age of settlement household heads was significant-
ly lower than that of villages of origin.
Case 3: Kubadje-Jiksa
The villagers of Oudda only resorted to the Jiksa-Kubadje zone when they (or their husbands)
had ancestral claims there. Over the last 10 years, the use of Jiksa fields increased when a
growing number of farmers considered that they had used their other fields long enough.
Young men in particular started to clear the bush of Jiksa and began fields there.
Some of the inhabitants of Oudda started new fields in other areas of the village that (until
the end of the research) were not contested by others. For these new users these areas con-
tained the customary rights of:  “cleared by one’s ancestor”. Because Jiksa users consider the
Jiksa area to be cleared by ancestors too, they do not see any difference with the position of
fellow villagers who are able to start using old fallow fields without any interference69. It may
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69 As stated earlier, in Chapter 7, some farmers start to clear anew fields of ancestors in Oudda areas that have
been allocated as pasture by the former lamido. These actions are considered illegal by all parties involved.
The offspring of those ancestors do not have rights there and they do not claim rights either, apart from culti-
vating as long as nobody stops them. The moment somebody complains to the lamido, they leave and they
never try to get reimbursement for cattle damage to crops.
be the case that they clear another field, but the field as such is not new. In their view no change
of boundaries from their region of origin has taken place.
8.3.2 Land scarcity or other causing factors? Why do not all actors choose non-entry?
The (perception of) scarcity of fertile land or other causes leads to new land being entered. But
why do people not choose for strategies other than entering. Is the entry a Thünian action into
the outer ‘frontier’ zone, because the pressure on the inner zone increases due to the nearness
and growth of a market centre? Why do inhabitants not choose for the Boserupian intensifica-
tion trajectory? 
Case 1: Baba Deli
Some of those that entered Baba Deli pasture did so because they considered the time ripe to
start using the now fertile fields of their ancestors. All users said they did so because of a lack
of fertile fields elsewhere. However, the data in Table 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 (chapter 6) show that this
is only true for 65 % of them. Thirteen household heads out of twenty-three had indeed no
good fields and two households with good fields outside the pasture had a low total surface
area at their disposal. For the other 35 % of users, an anticipation of a future lack for the actor
himself or his offspring might be a reason to enter the pasture reserve.
Seeing the activities of the authorities to set up more and more pasture forest reserves on
the Mandara Mountain plateaux, some people started using fields in the pasture zone to show
to the State representatives that the land was somebody’s property. This was probably70 done
with the aim of persuading the State to choose another area and so not to become the victim
of a fait-accompli when in the future these fields appear to be necessary for the family, or with
the aim to become candidate for the law-based compensation fee. 
For several families, and especially their younger male members, the reason to invade the
new area was based on the idea that it was family property. They saw no reason why they
should not start using those fields. Especially when they could see a decline in the number of
fields per family member in the rest of the village together with the fertility of some of the
fields that had been used for a long time, they thought it normal to clear fields which had been
left fallow for a long time and which had once been created by their ancestors. The idea of
investing in other fields instead was ridiculous and would mean spending money on rent with-
out long-term gains regarding the field quality or tenure.
Although there are still plenty of fallow fields in the village, the land security picture in
Dzambou as a whole is not promising (see Table 6.3.5). For individual farmers the situation is
even worse because there are few options open to them to leave. Mostly, the younger, more
educated men with greater ambitions are aware of the grim future ahead of them. In response
to this, they not only try to invest in all sorts of capitals apart from the land of their ancestors,
but include those fields into their considerations and actions as well. They have learned of
other options, but also of the rising monetary value of land. In addition they, like the other
inhabitants, do not see any need to leave an area solely for pasture. They perceive a future lack
of arable land but no future lack of pasture.
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70 Some of the users who started after the State activities had begun mentioned this motive while sometimes it
was suggested by others (non-users).
Case 2: Kolara-Kobo
In the Diamaré, the entry of Tupuri is certainly based on a lack of (fertile) land in the regions
of origin and an insecure situation in general (see Table 5.3.11). There it is very difficult to
implement agricultural improvements. People try to search for other modes of existence but
that is not easy either. New users are poorer both in economic and social terms than the aver-
age people in their villages of origin. Investment with and in capital other than natural is
almost impossible. If they want to have a prosperous life and at least an equal number of pos-
sibilities for their offspring, they have to go to new areas, they say. This means an investment
in (the enlargement of) natural capital, but not in the area of origin and not in the quality of
natural capital already possessed. Although the Diamaré entails a risk in the sphere of precip-
itation shortages, the area is not totally new and it is a very extended one. In addition, those
new users who own ploughs wanted to use them and therefore had to quit their region of ori-
gin because there the available surface is far too small to make efficient use of ploughs. 
In the social realm, new users did not occupy very high positions in their villages of origin.
Ambitious young men may have chosen for relocation because in new settlements the hierar-
chy has to be rebuilt and they may end up at a higher position71. Sometimes, although not in
the exact area under study, Tupuri migrants have left their village of origin because of social
problems there72. In a new settlement, personal histories are not known or do not count.
In the Tupuri heartland, village chiefs complain about the out-flux of people, although the
majority still remain. Many of those who stay explain that a real Tupuri does not leave the area
of his ancestors alone. Some have direct obligations vis-à-vis an old father or uncle. Yet, more
negative attitudes also make people stay, such as a lack of the praised ‘Tupuri-braveness’ to go
out in the wild and perform heroic deeds. These people remain fatalistically in the over-crowded
heartland villages, waiting for bad things to happen73. Sometimes these household heads do not
even try to use all the options offered by the direct surroundings. Yet, of both remaining cate-
gories, but especially of those who stayed out of cultural and social motives, several people try
to make the best of it by investing in new social arrangements and mutual cash facilities74.
Case 3: Kubadje-Jiksa
The same applies to Oudda as in Dzambou. Here again the total land surface area available is
sufficient for all inhabitants, but the general livelihood security situation is not that positive
(see Table 7.3.7). Investment in long-term family property and thus security is the norm.
Hiring does not generate any long-term gain, other free areas still remain insecure and claim-
ing ancestral land means re-securing the old claim. In the African system of fluid property
rights (Berry 1993; Juul and Lund 2002) investing in a strong position for negotiations is a nec-
essary activity (Peters 2002). Especially strong (young and healthy) and future-oriented peo-
ple (the young and ambitious) will therefore choose the strategy of assertion with regard to
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71 Each new settlement has to have at least a djaoro and his first counsellor, sometimes also a djaksiri (see
chapter 5). First arrivals are important.
72 Van der Ploeg (2001).
73 Differences in personal characteristics regarding explorative and brave behaviour already existed in former
generations. Whether or not this indolent and/or cowardly behaviour has increased over the years is not clear.
Even when the percentage of persons with such a character remains the same, the increase of the population
means that the absolute number of them increases.
74 For details thereof: see chapter 5.
ancestral fields by using them. Even a short-term cost-benefit analysis can make people choose
to clear their ancestral fields. Why spend money on hiring other fields when your own are only
a couple of hours walk away? 
Although Oudda does not show specifically that the young, educated men are the ones that
enter the pasture area, like in Dzambou, the Jiksa users certainly have a more open mind than their
fellow villagers towards ‘modernities’. This is shown for example by their willingness to use
school for their offspring as an option to improve living conditions. Because of this more modern
world view, the economisation of society also plays a role in safeguarding ancestors’ fields.
In Oudda the opportunistic move towards buy-out prices from the State does not play a role.
Here the inciting position of the lamido of Guili is important, at least for the moment of entry.
Moreover, the collective claim to the area and thus the support of other inhabitants and the vil-
lage chief makes farmers start their new fields at this special moment.
Only a minority entered the pasture reserves both in Oudda and in Dzambou. Not even all
owners of land (according to customary rights) did so, although some of them did mention a
shortage of fertile land. Some of the wives of Jiksa field owners refrained from invasion out
of fear and a calculation of net loss. Some actors considered the pasture fields to be too far
away. In Oudda some people even mentioned their unwillingness (out of empathy and out of
fear) to disturb the settlement of Kubadje with all the negative impacts thereof.
Like those who asserted their rights, most other inhabitants had some resources in several
domains of capitals and tried to capitalise on them. Almost everyone invested in the (quality of)
natural capital. In general everybody tried to invest in ways of countering the decline in the fer-
tility of their fields other than just extending the quantity of natural capital. In addition, both new
users and non-invaders did not see the use of the new fields as a totally different method, but just
as a normal capitalisation of (dormant) natural capital they had already possessed for a long time.
8.3.3 Similarities between the three cases
Everywhere the majority of actors wanted to improve their economic position and their gen-
eral level of food security. Mostly they did not resort to the use of new land in such faraway,
unused areas. Not all of those who did changed their place of residence as well. In the Mandara
Mountain plateaux farmers did not change the location of the compounds and travelled back-
wards and forwards to the new fields. Although this was a long journey, it was possible to
reach the agricultural area within a short enough time to make cultivation possible. In the
Diamaré, distances were much greater75 so the decision also had to take into account the set-
backs of an actual move.
For all actors, the entry into the pasture area was a move to more outlying zones compared to
where they had been farming before. However, Von Thünen’s theory76 does not apply here77. They
were not driven from their former fields by richer actors who started to be interested because of
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75 Even when the in-between step of temporary settlement in a village adjacent to the bush was made, the dis-
tance to the new bush fields was considered to be too far, although it was theoretically possible to start off
very early every day to reach those fields for cultivating. However, in those temporary villages the migrant
had no or only weak social ties.
76 See chapter 2.
77 Also Njomaha (2004) concludes that Von Thünen’s theory is only applicable to two out of twenty research
sites in the Far North province of Cameroon.
the increasing value of land due to nearness (or better accessibility) of a (growing) market cen-
tre. Those who stayed behind were not motivated by the possibility to make more money out of
their land. On the contrary, land had not really been commoditised. Had the original zones had
better access to markets then that could have served as an escape route, giving possibilities for
intensification. Yet, the Boserupian route78 was not possible because of a lack of infrastructure for
both the supply of input and off-take of output. Moreover, individual investments did not offer a
way out since most actors did not even have enough money to hire fields.
Furthermore, the Boserup route is not applicable because that theory applies within a lim-
ited area79 in which one group has to feed its members. In the cases studied, the boundaries of
the areas of confined groups had not yet been reached. Like Boserup, they do not reckon with
the occupation of the same area by other groups, who also only focus on their own group inter-
ests. So, it seems as if in each case two groups consider the pressure on their territory not yet
so high that it will force them towards intensification. Additionally, Boserup’s agricultural
transition takes time80. For the case studies, the change into the high-pressure situation within
the bounded area will come about too abruptly.  “… external changes may sweep rapidly over
a group, giving them insufficient time to adjust their internal structures to avoid the sub-opti-
mal outcomes.” (Ostrom 1990:21; see chapter 2 of this thesis). Suddenly, when they start using
seemingly empty bush, farmers are confronted with other users and thus pressure. 
Although theory suggests that in times of increasing pressure on resources either transition
or involution are the possible answers, the dismissal of the Boserup route in the studied cases
did not lead inevitably to the downward spiral of Malthus. Because at least one of the parties
still had the opportunity to use new surface in the early phases, Malthus’ negative scenario
does not apply here. People are not desperately doing more and more of the same with declin-
ing results, instead they are doing the same in an expanding territory.
Indeed, those who made the new clearings defined the land as either theirs (Mandara plateaux) or
‘free’ (Diamaré81). “The area was empty”: ‘empty’ when the ancestors started clearing or ‘empty’
when the present settlers started to clear. To define this emptiness, the new users used arguments
based in their own (ethnic) customary rules and, when this seemed convenient, in State laws. The
(different) traditional rules of other users were ignored and others’ interests denied.
None of the studied new users chose the most fertile land as the spot to clear or settle. In
the two Mandara cases the choice was limited by the location of ancestors’ activities. If the
great-grandfather had cleared a strip of land on a steep hill, on a rocky place or where the basic
soil composition was worse than the general composition, the new user had to make do with
it. In the Kolara-Kobo bush settlers chose areas adjacent to vast areas of karal fields and
preferably on fertile vertisols, but not necessarily on former camp sites, where the year-long
accumulation of manure had made the soil very rich82. Tupuri villages extend over larger areas
than nomadic camps, so often such camp sites, lying next to a river, were not appropriate
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78 For a brief explanation of the theory of Boserup (1965): see chapter 2.
79 This is, between other things, implicated by measurement of percentages of “total area” (Boserup 1965: 30)
that can be used under a certain type of agriculture.
80 See, e.g., Tiffen et al (1994).
81 Although, even here a kind of historical communal ownership was voiced.
82 The cases of Van der Ploeg (2001), Wassouni (pers. comm) and Moritz (forthcoming), referred to in section
8.2.1, case 2, relate to settlement on camp sites and therefore on reducing camp possibilities for nomads.
because half of the village would risk being inundated during the rainy season. The first set-
tlers counted on future growth of their settlement and actively tried to persuade others to join
them. Also the other parties did not seek the most fertile lands per se. In all three cases, espe-
cially the access to cattle routes was problematic because the herders wanted to herd their cat-
tle without disturbances. Fields and settlements that blocked the road resulted in crop damage
and therefore conflicts. Only occasionally was a camp site involved. But then again the agita-
tion of the nomads did not concern the site’s extremely rich soil, but rather its strategic posi-
tion and the age-old habit of using it.
In all the three cases the actual new users are younger than the average age in their region
(of origin), because the heavy work of clearing requires extra health and strenght. Why these
young men do not use their extra capabilities to reach other goals is not totally clear. They cope
with the long distances to the fields, to the outside world and to water locations, quarrels with
cattle keepers, an increased risk of losing livestock, etc. Those who resettle also lose general
options in the health and education domain. The investment in a new area requires a special
mindset based partly on biological-psychological properties and partly on the interpretation of
reality together with that of own capacities. The interpretation of the actual and future situa-
tion of land scarcity is no different from that of other villagers who do not start new fields in
contested areas. However, the view of circumstances and influences, as well as which strate-
gy will lead to success, is different. Together, all these factors mean that their cost-benefit
analysis favours invasion. Especially for poorer people, short-term considerations only relate
to the combination of reasonably nearby ancestral fields, there being no other free areas avail-
able and those fields that are available being for hire. Hiring, however, will not generate any
returns in the longer term. Other free areas will remain unavailable. Thus, especially for future
oriented people (= the young and ambitious), who have an eye for the long term, it is time to
re-assert the ancestral fields. It helps a lot if those people are strong enough to clear large parts
of the bush and to walk long distances or even, perhaps, to resist others. That means that in
general they have to be young and healthy.
On the Mandara Mountains plateaux, those who choose to use the new fields also try to
invest in other options, such as the education of children. They may even combine the two
strategies because they see that on a yet longer time scale (a perspective generally only acces-
sible for the rich, the elite), the security of those ancestral fields cannot be guaranteed versus
the State, that claims more and more reserves.
Although, on the one hand, actors tried to use their new fields without disturbing others and
without arousing authorities, on the other hand they mostly had to secure support from the
authorities, at least to stress one’s case in contrast with that of the adverse users. Indeed, sev-
eral times, the invasion of the new niche was used as a (hopefully) “fait accompli” towards the
authorities (and the other users).
8.4 Land scarcity
1 Description of land scarcity. 
2 a. Is it caused by negative impacts on land, by access rules or by both? 
b. Is it caused by other factors? 
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c. What are the basic factors causing the negative impacts on the land?
3 What are the similarities between the three cases? 
8.4.1 Description of land scarcity
Going backwards in the VoE diagram, one of the goals related to using a new piece of land was
to counter the rising shortage of fertile land, with this safeguarding the long-term assertion of
food and livelihood security (for the family). The land shortage can be a real threat or only
‘real’ in the perception of the actors. 
Case 1, Baba Deli and Case 3, Kubadje-Jiksa
Unlike the situation in more densely populated parts of the Mandara Mountains, in the
Mandara Mountain Plateaux, neither Bana nor Kapsiki villages as a whole in the areas studied
suffer from land shortage. In terms of the VoE diagram (Box 1): they do not suffer from a low
personal Environmental Use Space with regard to agriculture (see the second sections of chap-
ter 6 and 7). Several individuals, however, complain about a lack of fields and some, indeed,
do not dispose of enough surface area with sufficiently fertile soils to make a living. In the case
of Oudda and Dzambou the percentages of people who entered the new zone without (access
to) enough proper fields elsewhere were 56 and 65 percent respectively (see chapter 7.4.1 and
6.4.1). At the same time, other subsistence possibilities were also absent.
Added to this is the fact that in the longer run, and given the increase in the population, the
number of fields outside the pasture area will not be sufficient to continue the tradition of long-
term fallows. To maintain this extensive way of agriculture a pasture area will also be neces-
sary. As has been stated, this situation of ‘not enough fertile fields’ has already been reached by
some actors.
Case 2: Kolara-Kobo
For the new users of the Diamaré the situation in the places of origin is even worse. In gener-
al the available surface for villages of origin is just sufficient for all inhabitants together.
Kolara seems a bit better situated with its mean field surface per person of 0.36 ha, but it is
still not very much. Here again the motives of the settlers were almost always expressed in
terms of  ‘searching for land’ and ‘curbing the hunger of the family’. Before the move, they
had access to less than a sufficient field surface area (0.16 ha per capita) and more than half of
them explained that their fields were not fertile enough.
As shown in chapter 2, the lack of Environmental Use Space for an actor is made up of a com-
bination of access (and use) possibilities with regard to land and negative impacts on the land
caused by population pressure, affluence of this population and available technology to count-
er (or that increases) the negative effects of the other two factors. The size and type of impact
of these last three factors is determined by the vulnerability of the physical basis of the land.
All factors can be and are influenced by institutional rules and regulations at various levels.
8.4.2 The factors causing personal (fertile) land shortage
Case 1: Baba Deli and Case 3: Kubadje-Jiksa
Both in Dzambou and in Oudda land is divided very unequally over the different households.
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For example, in Oudda, walking from the compound of one new user to that of another means
crossing vast stretches of fallow land. However, these fields cannot be used by the families of
Jiksa new users, as they are the property of others. It is also more and more the case that those
others ask for money if somebody else wants to use their land. 
Although the general fertility of the mountain plateau is not overwhelmingly good, and vul-
nerability for erosion and drought is high, at the moment the situation is satisfactory, especial-
ly when the fields get the chance of recovery after several years of use. Looking at the whole
area, the total population density is not high with the average field surface area per person
being more than that which is considered sufficient in this climate zone83. Technology is not a
factor of great importance here. Ploughing may disturb the soil but, on the other hand, it can
improve productivity. The cultivation of groundnuts as a cash crop may improve soil quality
because it is nitrogen binding. 
Thus, it is not the scarcity of land in general that matters, but the scarcity thereof for cer-
tain actors and specifically for those individuals that entered new areas. It is the unequal dis-
tribution that obliges farmers to resort to the bush area of Jiksa or Baba Deli. Re-partition
among the families is unthinkable. Some Dzambou inhabitants suggest that they would accept
the exclusion of the Fulbe quarter from the pasture reserve if the richer field owners there were
to give away some of their other fields (those in the direction of Sir, for example84) or some of
their yields. 
Case 2: Kolara-Kobo
Unequal distribution of land plays a role in the Diamaré case as well. Moreover, the heartland
is suffering from a general land shortage which is affecting (almost) everybody. In some areas
this is less pressing because the inhabitants have already chosen to change their way of life
more thoroughly. For example in Sirlawé the pressure is less because of a higher out-migra-
tion of highly educated young men to non-agricultural jobs. However, this is not always pos-
sible and, according to interviews, it is taking place less frequently at the moment than in the
past. According to the Tupuri custom, not all sons inherit land. So, in some families, individ-
uals do not have access to any fields because they have too many brothers. Nevertheless, the
inheritance is mostly divided among a number of sons and the total surface area per owning
son diminishes over the generations.
Thus, some families have less land surface area than others. In addition, some families consist
of more (male) individuals than others. These two negative factors can also exist within one
family at the same time. In such cases the individual scarcity can reach high levels. The insti-
tutions that regulate the property rules are based in custom and history, but change over time.
Although, in the past, the Kapsiki did not live in a system of private property as far as land was
concerned (Van Beek 1978, 1987), it appears that they registered anyhow the activities of their
(great-)grandfathers and the resulting cleared areas. In this way they ascertained their family
rights to land. In the event of conflicts over land this information was indispensable. Even a
generation ago, this was leading more and more to the active claiming of title deeds. The use
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83 See Dietz et al (2001) and the two chapters of the cases (chapters 6 and 7).
84 This would not help all families in need of fields, because only a minority of inhabitants of the Fulbe neigh-
bourhood had access to other fields. The fact that most do not, is one of the reasons why they cannot move.
of another family’s land became more difficult. All the inhabitants of a certain neighbourhood,
and sometimes inhabitants outside that neighbourhood, knew where the fields of their own
family and that of others were situated. Whether or not the family rights led to more individ-
ual private property rights depended on the rules within the extended family. No village
authority was able to interfere in the process. Expropriation of these rights could only take
place by way of allocation by the legitimate local (regional) authorities and only for commu-
nal benefit. If the legitimacy of that authority is accepted, its decisions become law.
The traditional rule of first-comer and first-clearer also applies to the Tupuri. The ancestor
who cleared the most also provided his offspring with the most extended arable surface area.
The very first arrival had some special rights to allocate certain areas as ‘not to be cleared’
(holy bushes, etc.), but normally first-comers rushed on competitively in order to clear as much
as possible85. In several settlements in the Diamaré the djaoros (who were the very first to
arrive) decided to put a limit on the maximum clearing of certain soils. For example, recog-
nising the limitations of transplant-sorghum fields in the bush, new families could only clear
a certain surface thereof, so as to guarantee future settlers some hectares as well.
Apart from the more biological and chance-based86 factor of the number of offspring of such
first-clearers, the dedication and bravery of the ancestor as regards entry into possibly danger-
ous areas, as well as the hard clearing work as such, determined the actual property of (indi-
viduals within) families. In principle, thus, the unequal distribution of fields is not due to orig-
inal power disparities or the appropriation of land by elites87. First-comers became the elite and
(mostly) big land owners at the same time. Until recently, in the areas studied the State did not
have anything to do with the allocation of lands to different individuals of the actor groups cur-
rently involved. In the Diamaré areas formerly situated in the Pilot Project zone (most of the
study area) both the groups studied were excluded during the project period. Only local cattle
herders had permission to use the area and neither agriculturalists nor nomadic pastoralists had
rights to the land. Now, after the opening up of the Pilot project area, local cattle herders do
not have any more access rights than other cattle keepers.
As has been stated, on the mountain plateaux the population density is not yet a cause for
concern. However, certain families have so many members that this has limited the access pos-
sibilities for several individuals. There are no effective institutions for diminishing the high
population growth. The State Family Planning policies have not resulted in any decrease of
births in the studied regions88. 
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85 Interviews May-June 2001 and January 2004 with Tupuri respondents in the Heartland and in Kolara-Kobo.
86 This refers to factors in the physiology of the parent couple and the risk and factual occurance of diseases
and death. In fact the social position and wealth of a house father also plays a role. For example, greater
wealth means the possibility of more wives, and therefore more children as well.
87 The family of the village chief (the one who now governs the agglomerate of the three most eastern neigh-
bourhoods) in Oudda is the owner of extended areas of fields, because their forefather was already chief here
and in the past village inhabitants were obliged to help for several days (or weeks) per year with agricultural
work on the chief’s fields. Part of this work consisted of the clearing of new areas. Actually this family loans
out fields to everybody who wants to use them. These are mostly villagers without any fields of their own.
The chief himself acquires most of his income from trade in cloth.
88 Successful measures for birth control which are accepted worldwide, like more education for girls, have not
reached the mountain plateau. In the Tupuri areas this has been implemented slightly more effectively. Lots
of young Tupuri women explain they want fewer children (that is no more than 5 or 6 rather than an infinite
amount).
Although people may wish for a more affluent life, reality makes them only try to maintain
their usual level. In years of abundant rain, some people indeed dare to dream about a better
life but often such dreams are dispelled a year later when the rainfall is again insufficient.
Except for a technology-related wish for more surface area, based on the use of ploughs, the
desire to maintain or increase one’s wealth does not cause the personal lack of Environmental
Use Space. 
The use of ploughs is an ambiguous factor. On the one hand it is the reason why people want
more surface area in order to make effective use of the equipment. On the other hand, it makes
it possible to work more efficiently and effectively on the fields and, thus, generate a higher
yield. Looking at it from yet another angle, ploughs may raise yields at first but in the longer
run they may cause a more rapid exhaustion of the soils (if no measures are taken). Other new
technology, either with positive or negative effects, is mostly not at the disposal of the actors.
8.4.3 Similarities between the three cases
In all three cases several individual actors suffer from a lack of fertile land because of the divi-
sion of fields over the families and the number of farming people per family. Some families,
even when they initially had access to extended areas, have since become very large and are
having to share the area between too many individuals. Land inequality was not caused by elite
land capturing (see Homer-Dixon 1999). However, in the Diamaré, the pressure on the land is
also increasing because of an increase in use by rich urban-based cattle owners.
The higher pressure on the land for certain families, caused by the access rules of the dif-
ferent ethnic groups in all three areas, may be combined with the vulnerability of the physical
basis for both erosion and quick fertility loss, especially in times of drought. This enhances the
diminishing actual access of individuals to enough and sufficiently fertile fields.
General (modern) technology designed to increase the fertility of these small surfaces is not
accessible for most of the inhabitants of the villages studied, let alone for those that resorted
to entry into new niches. 
In some of the neighbourhoods, some (groups of) actors try to counter food-insecurities by
way of social, collective initiatives. When broadened to include not only stocking systems of
money and food, and when implemented in whole villages and in the most effective way pos-
sible, these initiatives may, on the one hand, lead to better and more equal access rules, and
therefore more equal security in relation to food. On the other hand, it may result in improved
management of the land in general89. Such new institutions can be seen as a feedback-loop
from Box 1 of the VoE diagram to the ‘Box 0’ zone before it.
The use of other options to counter the lack of Environmental Use Space and a subsequent
lack of food are mostly blocked for all those that choose to enter a new niche.
Yet, in all three cases, the overall scarcity of land was at an intermediate level. Nevertheless,
fallow land could be found and options to start using ‘new’ land (although partly in use by oth-
ers) were available. None of the three cases suffered from a total occupation of the land, as is
the case in other parts of Far North Province90.
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89 For example, initiatives to set up or participate in rural information circles on how to improve agricultural
practices.
90 For example, the area of the Mafa in the northern Mandara Mountains (see Zuiderwijk (1998) or Van Andel
(1998)).
8.5 General conclusions
8.5.1 A pattern or only complexities?
If the different steps in the VoE diagram are examined, it is clear that different actors use dif-
ferent tactics each time to safeguard the goals formulated in an ‘event’ box. On each occasion,
only a minority follow the horizontal arrow towards the next box (see Fig. 8.6). Moreover, the
motivations for using an action that is expressed in a box turn out each time to have other
sources (as well) - at least for some of the actors - than the goal formulated in the former box.
For example, the assertion of rights to land is not always an effect of the entry into a new niche,
let alone of a diminishing of Environmental Use Space. The assertion of rights to land is direct-
ly related to a more general complex of insecurities, that is a lack of other options. Sometimes
people who stay where they are nevertheless try to assert their rights to new lands. Often, the
perception of land scarcity leads to actions other than the invasion of new lands and the asser-
tion of the rights involved.
Nonetheless, as can be seen in the three cases, a causal link between violent outbreaks and
environmental scarcity does exist. However, this link is not always apparent and does not
apply to everybody. In the areas studied it is a minority pathway. For those choosing violence,
the scarcity is sometimes seen as an actual threat. Sometimes it is seen as only a potential
threat. Then, actors want to be sure that such a threat will not become real for them and their
families.  
Figure 8.6 Participation in Violence Profile (PiV)
(the percentages are arbitrarily, but reasonably, chosen to illustrate that the 
Cascade to Violence is a minority route for each Box) 
Local history has had a major influence on the perception of the legitimacy of each step of the
VoE diagram and the activities necessary in order to respond to the perceived tendencies. At
the same time, the actual situations and cultural ways of viewing the world (together with
manipulation of perceptions) also influence people’s perception of history. Whether or not an
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actor will take a step also depends on the backing of ‘his’ narrative by the rest of the commu-
nity (and how big or how influential that group is). This can also be manipulated or, more pos-
itively, managed.
When earlier steps in the Cascade are deemed legitimate, and are indeed taken, the step to
violence may be engendered by a feeling of hopelessness and ‘standing alone’ with one’s own
interests or those of the small group to which one belongs, in opposition to the other party. In
that case the DtV described in section 8.1.5. is small. Here again, legitimacy perception and
the justification of violence are important parameters. Except in pure one-off emotional out-
bursts, resorting to violence can only be done when the actors feel they are supported some-
what by co-members of the same group or village. These may be, or perhaps preferably are,
people without direct interests in the cause itself. This moral support is, among other things,
what is sought in the earlier phases of the conflict. What people need is not so much others
to fight with them but people who will support their conflict (this is, for example, one of the
important roles that women have in wars). Within each society the percentage of people
actively involved is always (at least slightly) lower than of those who consider the action
legitimate. Within a society, those members of the same group that support the action are con-
sidered - by the performers of that action - to be of the same sub-group, distinguishing them-
selves from the rest of society. While manipulating such considerations, clever leaders may
organise the back-up by others on the waves of a small DtV, especially when the culture
involved already values the use of violence and when it contains devices (methods) to imply
and incite others91.
Figure 8.7 PiV under the influence of emotions or norms
However, a converse effect of culture may also be seen. Not all factors are aggravating. Two
different phenomena, for example, inhibit the actual use of violence. One is based on morality
and the other based on fear. Both are culture and character dependent, interplaying between the
autonomy and the interpretative frames categories of De Groot and Kamminga (1995)92 and
strongly influenced by the manipulations of leaders. Moral notions set the threshold for ‘vio-
lence is justified’, ‘we want violence’, and thus for actual violence (see Fig. 8.7b). Moral
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91 Examples are songs with provocative texts, stories about heroes whose examples have to be followed
(although, again, these may be invented or made up by leaders, even over longer time spans (see Chilver
1996)), or stirring drums.
92 See chapter 2.
a: Ratio-emotionally blocked in case of fear b: normatively blocked in case of changing norms
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notions regarding violence can also change quickly when people are confronted with actual vio-
lence and the shock of casualties and losses, as can be seen by the Kapsiki who baulk from vio-
lence since the violent days of their ancestors. In such an event it is possible that the justifica-
tion of the violence is lower than the percentage of people who actually use it (Fig. 8.7b, line
U). In general, justification by a big enough group is important to start or continue violence. Of
course the feeling of ‘it is justified’ is influenced by the strength of frustration and vice versa.
On the other hand, a general feeling of ‘violence is legitimate’ can still result in non-violence
when participants do not dare to fight (see Fig. 8.7a). Although not explicitly evident, in all three
cases this seems to play a role with regard to intervention from the State and, as far as some
actors are concerned, with regard to the strength and mobilisation speed of the adverse party.
In general, it is possible to say that a lack of legitimate conflict resolution mechanisms and the
feeling of actors that there is too much arbitrariness93 and unfairness in a context of over-all
rising insecurities94, may engender a small DtV. This then, can combine with personal insuffi-
ciencies regarding livelihood95 to make individuals resort to violence. Such a shortage of con-
flict resolution mechanisms also causes a rising neglect of other people’s interests96, which
makes the step to contending and violence smaller. The legal insecurity is partly due to the
combination of an unclear and outdated customary law system, sometimes even opposed by
another hostile customary law system (as in the Diamaré-case), and an evenly unclear and
ambiguous formal law system97. This mix changes the much praised African fluidity98 into a
system of manipulation by the powerful and leaves the poorer endowed with less or almost no
other options than the one of despair. 
In the cases studied women are not opposed to their own spouses or other men of their own
group, nor are only they opposed to other user groups, as reported for example in North-West
Province by Chilver (1989)99. They and ‘their’ men suffer equally from the growing competi-
tion over land. In addition, with the production of sorghum by man and wife together, subsis-
tence production is not solely the women’s responsibility. As is the case almost everywhere in
Cameroon, women do not have an official say in ‘political’ matters. All this, together with a
lack of organisation100, causes women in all three cases to wait for action of the men. They do,
however, have influence on the general tension level of their societies by way of speaking
93 The much noticed ambiguity of tenure systems in Africa (Berry 1993, Bruce 1988), and the fact that all
arrangements are always negotiable (Juul and Lund 2002) regularly leads to situations of excessive uncer-
tainty. Especially the weak are frequently the victim of the fact that powerful actors set the conditions and
outcome of such negotiations.
94 Not only in the natural resource domain.
95 In the rural areas of Cameroon (and in lots of other places) this is directly related to access to land.
96 See, e.g., Broome (1993).
97 Blaming the pluralistic legal system as such ignores the fact that with clear definitions and with clearly
defined boundaries and competences (all deemed legitimate by the actors involved) different legal systems
may be exercised perfectly well on top of and next to each other.
98 In situations of power equality or where power holders can be checked by the rest of the group (because the
system may be fluid, but not totally unclear), fluidity may lead to lots of small skirmishes, but these are easily
manageable.
99 Chilver (1989) describes several women’s uprisings in NW Province from the end of the 1950s onwards
(violent and non-violent) when their possibilities to use land and produce food crops were hampered.
100 In NW Province women were organised into ‘action groups’ both based on Bamenda customs and on the
help of elite women from the women’s wing of the ruling political party (Chilver 1989).
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together and with their husbands, brothers and fathers about experienced problems101, and by
enticing their men folk into forceful action.
The use of violence can be a strategic act to gain access to important resources (being mate-
rial or immaterial) or it can be an emotional outburst of frustration. As Moore (1978: 50)
already said, “… people arrange their immediate situations by means of processes of situa-
tional adjustment”. This means that not all actions are aimed at the regularisation of social real-
ity. Many times actors “act in irregular ways” (Leach et al 1997: 50).  
The violent events in the cases studied are all highly triggered by an emotional response to
an acute threat. At the same time they give rise to future-oriented rational deliberations about
whether or not to use the violence again. Repeated incidents thereby gain in rationality and
strategic content. The learning effect increases. The actors have learned that violence, other
tactics, or even a combination of the two may or may not be successful and they have also
established which type of violence pays off or not. A series of incidents, together with the in-
between periods of other types of actions, can in and by itself cause peace or war. In such cases
of longer-enduring conflicts structures of justification (narratives) and structures of strategy in
a more material sense (e.g. allies) develop. In the terms of section 8.1.4: such deliberate strate-
gies influence the position of the tension line and thus the width of the DtV. Of course, the
arguments used in the narratives are also part of the strategies102.
Not all the actors present choose either the route towards violence or that towards the peace-
ful assertion of rights. There are differences between actors because their perceptions of the
problem are different, their positions in the social fabric are different and they choose to invest
in other capitals - again with the help of other capitals - partly because the endowments with
capitals is different per person and partly because they regard different capitals important than
their co-actors do. It is worth mentioning the example of the (interpretation of the) relationship
with the State and the way the State-role is perceived to have an effect on both the land tenure
issue as well as the general position of the actor103. Of course the factual activities of the State
(or its representatives) play an important role in those perceptions. If the relative strength of
‘fuelling’ factors for an actor (or for a group of actors) reaches a certain threshold, acute threats
can trigger violence.
In addition, there are innumerable factors that inhibit the unwinding of the cascade of the
VoE diagram. It seems as if actors prefer the non-violent route and that only the ‘circum-
stances’ make them choose to follow the cascade of violence. Although they have to take
account of the ever-present risk of counteractions by jealous fellow villagers who are envious
of success (an ever-returning issue in discussions with farmers in all three case studies)104, most
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101 For example, the woman of Oudda who was threatened with a stick by one of the Fulbe cattle keepers after
crop damage by the cattle of Elhadji Ngoura told her story to anybody who would listen and this gave rise to
highly indignant reactions in all the ‘outer’ neighbourhoods of Oudda (see Chapter 7).
102 The more powerful people are, the easier they can manipulate the narratives, and the easier they can use the
ambiguities in the land rights system to their own benefit (see, e.g., Peters 2002). 
103 Both the relationship with and the role of the State can deliberately be invested in long before the actual
fight(s), dependent (again) on possibilities, long-term views and position of the actor. This is what the inhabi-
tants of the Fulbe hamlet in Baba Deli seem to be doing.
104 Platteau (1996: 62-63) also mentions the lack of agricultural investment possibilities in Sub-Saharan Africa
due to, first and foremost, the shortage of economic and technological infrastructure and, second, even if all
these necessities are present, “people are discouraged from improving their lands because of jealousy on the
part of the chief and other villagers.”
of the time, and if enough other economic possibilities are available, people do not try to start
fields in new niches. A rational calculation then tells them that the effort of bush clearing and
the risks of expulsion by current users or the State, together with some other setbacks (that are
always present), make the costs of entry too high compared to the benefits.
However, social and cultural rationality may lead actors away from strict economic delib-
erations. More ethical considerations, like the obligation vis-à-vis ancestors (and their fields)
and the principle that “land ought to belong to the sons of the village” (Platteau 1996: 46),
often play a role in the claiming of land. In the three cases this motivation - that is also con-
nected to the role of land as a device of meaning and a source of identity formation - certain-
ly mixes with the economic drives to ascertain land. Nevertheless, although the struggle for
land is indeed connected to feelings of belonging both to the land itself and to the group that
is thought to have the right to use it, the cases show that those feelings do not per se connect
to ethnicity. For example, geographical positioning or the basic way of life may be a more
important factor.
Yet, even after the entry into a new niche, the assertion of rights to that land appeared not
to be the standard route. Sometimes new areas were only used for a short time and sometimes
new information or new perceptions on old information made people assess their costs and
benefits differently. This, then, leads them to refrain from claims; sometimes they even did so
after a former decision to stick to the assertion of the rights to the land.
It has to be added, though, that the three cases are situated at a specific position in the hier-
archy of ‘pressure because of land scarcity’. Because the advice of ES critics not to study
‘evident’ cases (see chapter 2 and 3) has been followed, the scarcity level is ‘only’ interme-
diate. Whether the conclusions given will hold when the land pressure is really high remains
to be seen. Nevertheless, a preliminary reaction may be that, then too, the level of other inse-
curities, the role of the State and cultural or individual attitudes towards violence are very
important. 
In short, apart from the support of general wisdom regarding the tackling of a broad range
of insecurities of individual actors and groups to prevent violence, the study can not and does
not result in one concise causal theory that works for the three cases or (even less so) for (all)
other cases. Indeed, security specialists can still not rely on quick fixes to prophesy situations
hoping to prevent outright violence. Because mono-causal linkages could not be found, it can
only be deduced that, to improve the grip on conflict situations, partly intuitive notions and
insights should be built on the basis of a variety of theories and concepts, fed by case-studies
and, thus, an increase of experience. Specific conflicts have a chance to be resolved only by
on-the-spot mediators, who, on the one hand, base their actions on full-grown experience and
a wide range of knowledge and (not too strict) theory, and, on the other hand, are open-mind-
ed enough to keep the specificities of the conflict under study into focus.
8.5.2 Revisiting mainstream Environmental Security notions
In contrast to Environmental Security’s straightforward, one-way connection between envi-
ronmental scarcity and social effects, such as migration, constrained economic productivity
and elite rent-seeking (Homer-Dixon 1999: 134) which can only be mitigated by “second-
stage interventions” (id), or else will automatically lead to “social segmentation and weakened
institutions” (id), the present study shows a more complex, forward and backward moving,
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mutually influencing pattern in the diagram. It is never the former action or situation alone that
causes the unwinding of the rest of the Violence Cascade. Thus, in the cases studied, it is never
land scarcity on its own that gives rise to violence. Indeed, just as the violent encounters influ-
ence subsequent strategies, each action described in an ‘event’ box of the VoE diagram does
influence subsequent actions, but more often than not the event boxes are not decisive.
It is the whole complex of insecurity resulting from all the domains that plays a role in the
decision-making of actors. The societal circumstances that may trigger violence already exist
and are not the result but rather the cause of environmental scarcity105. 
Homer-Dixon’s ‘lack of ingenuity’, for example, may inhibit a proper development of agri-
culture because of the absence of necessary infrastructure and technology. This then leads to
the scarcity of Environmental Use Space. In the same vein, low economic productivity means
that land scarcity is felt sooner and more acutely. The cause of the local lack of ingenuity, how-
ever, is not the environmental scarcity but (mostly) another societal failure. Perhaps the cap-
ture of the State by elites to use its strength for their own benefits (and not the capture of nat-
ural resources106) and the subsequent neglect of weaker people’s interests lies at the basis of
this local ingenuity shortage and subsequent violence. Even without ‘capture’ by elites, “state
intervention is indeed a major source of farmers’ insecurities” (Platteau 1996: 74), as we have
seen in at least two of the case studies. Instead of causing violence, the breakdown of the
power of the State may then lead to better arrangements if it is accompanied by an empower-
ment of civil society.
Another important influencing factor is the performance of conflict resolution from very
early conflict phases up to the violent phase. Improper institutions are not only a product of
growing scarcity. Again contrary to ES notions107, the reverse also applies. For example, a lack
of management of land tenure issues may lead to resource scarcity for several actors. The
breakdown of community rules and regulations in the wake of the rising influence of statuto-
ry law (and the connected tendencies towards privatisation108) has increased the insecurities
with regard to resource access for the weaker members of society, such as women109. The lack
of conflict resolution has an additional impact when these actors claim what they consider to
be ‘their’ part. In the three cases it is especially the local-level shortage of equal sharing and
justice that engenders the environmental scarcity. With the lack of conflict resolution mecha-
nisms, resorting to violence seems more effective when it comes to safeguarding one’s share.
Both faulty State involvement and a deficient justice system make people seek other means
of safeguarding livelihoods in cases of general insecurities and scarcities. Indeed, in all three
cases, the lack of ingenuity (this is the means of improving ‘Bebbington’s capitals’ for indi-
viduals and societies), as Homer-Dixon depicted, hinders the necessary agricultural transition
according to Boserup’s model. Nor has such a transition come about via the nearness of a mar-
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105 The fight over access to locally abundant resources (such as minerals and diamonds, for example) causes
local farmers and herders to suffer from increasing shortage of access to (their) land (see, for example,
Moyroud and Katunga (2002) over the struggle for coltan in East Congo).
106 Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994 and 1999) speaks of “elite rent seeking” with regard to scarce natural resources.
107 For example in Homer-Dixon’s model (1999: 134).
108 Even if agricultural transition had been successful: Boserup (1965: 92) already warned that it would lead to a
loss of land tenure security and a resulting “vast amount of litigation [with] each step on the road to private
property in land”. 
109 As can be seen in all three cases: free access is denied more and more (see also Goheen 1989a: 375).
ket that engenders the build-up of, for example, infrastructure and intensification (Von
Thünen’s theory). According to Homer-Dixon in such cases the Malthus-road will inevitably
come into existence. However, the cases studied have shown that motivation is higher for a
non-Boserupian route that cannot be called Malthusian either. Migration, entering a new niche
and doing more of the same at another place, is what happened. 
The pressure (experienced) made people use their inventiveness to search for the right argu-
ments, allies and moments for the assertion of rights to these new lands. Even the right meth-
ods were invented, via experiments by young men with, among other things, politics, out-
migration to job options further away, but also with violent defence of ancestors’ fields.
Normally, explorative behaviour by youngsters helps societies to realise the necessary inno-
vations. The curiosity and experimental mood of young men and women has a long-term func-
tion at collective level. Ideally, the establishment of a society decides what will be imple-
mented of all those experiments. Increased insecurities and rising scarcity means community
elders do not now prohibit the explorative actions of younger members of the group with
regard to violence. The use of violence is therefore not a sign of societal breakdown but a
deliberate choice for a constructive strategy that even enhances (or is brought about by) stricter
community cohesion.
Of course negative societal circumstances may be aggravated or felt more heavily by actors
if environmental scarcity adds to the general insecurity. However, which action will be prac-
tised next depends on all the factors that have an influence on individual actors. This is shown
by the fact that all the actors behave differently. They all perceive and experience the influ-
encing factors differently. Contrary to the inevitable pathways in Homer-Dixon’s model, that
suggest majority actions, in all three cases only a minority of scarcity-experiencing (or per-
ceiving) village inhabitants chose to invade a new niche, after which a smaller group tried to
assert the rights to the area entered and only a very small group resorted to violence (which
did not even have much to do with the scarcity felt). Because the path to violence is only taken
by a small proportion of those who are affected by scarcity, it is very difficult to predict which
factors will cause big enough groups to use violence. 
The societal differentiation that took place in each step of the VoE diagram in the cases stud-
ied (see Figure 8.6) finally resulted in very small-scale, quickly suppressed violence because
only minorities followed the cascade. If ‘society as a whole’ had followed the steps of the VoE
Cascade to violence and had supported those actions (thus, in the case of less societal differ-
entiation) then the violence in Box 4 would have reached a higher level. 
Therefore, contrary to the notion of Homer-Dixon that societal segmentation leads to vio-
lence, the phenomenon observed seems to point towards the necessity of strong community
feelings and displays of loyalty, without which actors refrain from violence. As stated in chap-
ter 2.4, niche differentiation makes it possible for people to live peacefully alongside each
other. The role of social divisions is much more complex in violence causation than is con-
ceptualised in ES so far. Indeed, as Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 23) noticed: neither a very
much fragmented society nor a totally undivided society risks real civil war.
Segmentation that is situated somewhere between total homogeneity and maximal fraction-
alisation, with “ethnic dominance”, generates the greatest risks. In such situations the position
of the tension line may rise quickly for several reasons.
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The focus of ES on frustrations and grievances as a cause of violence caused other basic
factors that may influence the position of the tension line and, thus, the choice of violence
to be neglected. In section 8.5.1., the importance of culturally and personally based factors,
such as moral notions and fears are discussed. ES has not yet studied the aggravating effect
of a ‘culture of violence’, nor the inhibiting effect on violence of a non-violent leader stand-
ing up in the wake of a conflict, who is able to shift the general moral code (e.g. Mahatma
Gandhi).
Indeed also fear is not (yet) discussed in the Environmental Security domain. It certainly
relates to the basic biological-physiological mechanism that Sandole (1993)110 mentions in his
list of causes of violence. Yet, Sandole declares that these mechanisms have a triggering role
while I have shown here that they can also have an appeasing role. Indeed, in the enrolment of
the VoE pathway, fear is a paradoxical factor. Worried people who quickly fear a loss of pos-
sibilities and who are distrustful vis-à-vis others and the authorities may be prone to quick
actions and the rapid invasion of other niches. However, fear will withhold people from vio-
lence in the later phases of the VoE diagram. However, as is depicted in Figure 8.7a, such peo-
ple may support the narratives of those who (want to) use violence. With that they raise the
tension line and ensure a small DtV.
Last but not least, the position of the tension line may be high wherever people feel their
metaphysical needs, their psychic needs, are being threatened. So far in ES the focus seems to
be on economic causes of the outbreak of violence. But, as is said before, this is only part of
the whole explanation. Especially in struggles over land, the role of that land as a bearer of
meaning can make actors fiercely defend their rights to it. People can bargain or even beg
when it comes to physical needs, but identity is indispensable to human beings.
8.5.3 General conclusion regarding the VoE diagram 
The use of the Violence-or-Escape model in the exploration of three different cases has shown
that, next to striking similarities, there are considerable differences between the cases. At the
same time, the general patterns that emerge, especially when analysing at the detailed level of
the diagram, show the usefulness of a descriptive model. A certain level of generalisation about
a cascade of causing factors and definitive outcomes is possible. Sufficient proof has been pro-
vided that the steps in the VoE diagram are not only helpful, but also provide a framework by
which a general pattern can be discerned.
The model designed for this study can be used to guide investigations: for prevention (early
warning or discerning moments of effective intervention and the direction thereof) and/or for
a posteriori insight. It is advisable to note detailed descriptions of each case studied, while fol-
lowing the steps of the VoE diagram, as was done for the three cases of the present study.
Subsequently, the analyses of the events described have to be guided by the explanatory mod-
els, like the “A versus Non-A” models described in chapter 2. As has been shown, this means
that, while combining the different theoretical notions within one research-diagram, it is
almost impossible to ‘forget’ influencing factors. With this it is more encompassing than the
well-known Homer-Dixon model (1991, 1999).
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110 See Chapter 2.
At the same time, it is possible to compare different cases because the format used by way
of the VoE diagram is very strict. Yet, as is recommended by George (1979), it is not so rigid
that it does not permit case-specific observations.
In general, the VoE diagram has stood the test of an encompassing model that is designed to
describe completely a chosen part of reality, to help understand that reality. The completeness
is aimed at by incorporating both the violence cascade and all non-violent pathways, and the
general pattern of influencing factors on all levels. Notions, such as those developed in sections
8.1.4 and 8.5.2, have to be born in mind, like other theories of the A-non-A type that have been
used. However, the study makes clear that some enhancements to the VoE diagram have to be
made to increase the completeness, without losing clearness. For example, especially the Baba
Deli case has shown that an extension after Box 4 is relevant. After a violent event, stronger
assertion may take place involving more violent means, and therefore with more chance of esca-
lation (see Figure 8.1). The feedback loop to the beginning of the diagram is not enough.
Another observation concerns the difference in value of the arrows depicting the route from
event box to event box and those depicting the influencing and ‘other’ factors. Superficially,
they reflect the same: actions noted in the event boxes and the ‘other factors’ can both be caus-
es of the event focused on. However, other and influencing factors are a conglomerate of dif-
ferent perceptions, institutions and secondary (or tertiary) actors’ activities, while the ‘event’
boxes depict actions by the primary actors.
Although claiming rights without entering the new niche was mentioned while discussing
the structure of the model in chapter 2, the general possibility of relationships between boxes
that do not follow directly in line of the VoE diagram, which circumvent the boxes in-between
as it were, is not visible either in the VoE diagram. For example, Box 1 can lead directly to
Box 4, without the interim steps of entry into and assertion of rights of new lands. All escape
boxes can still lead to subsequent event boxes in the direct Violence Cascade. Actors that per-
ceived a diminishing Environmental Use Space and chose to invest in other economic possi-
bilities were later able, via an increase of knowledge about State law and citizen rights (e.g.),
to reconsider their decision not to claim land. It is even possible that they fuel identity claims
and fund violence.
Thus, to keep the diagram ‘simpler than reality’ and therefore make it a useful model, both
the fact that steps between boxes can (and mostly are) split up into smaller steps, and the fact
that in some circumstances and by some actors some steps are not taken at all (the ‘jumping
over’ boxes), are not visually depicted in the VoE diagram. When analysing influencing fac-
tors, however, such details will come to the fore. 
In short, the diagram has been shown to be useful for both individual case studies and for com-
parative exercises designed to result in an enhancement of the theory. As a result, the research
has produced a general, rough pattern that becomes visible when searching for linkages between
resource scarcity and violence. In addition, the research has shown that the “easy cascades’, like
the one modelled by Homer-Dixon (1999), are faulty most of the time. Several connections
show a reverse pattern to the one depicted in the Homer-Dixon model. Each step is in reality
influenced by many more factors than are shown in those diagrams and many elements referred
to in the diagrams have their influence in many more situations than just the one depicted.
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Appendix
Precipitation data of several pluviometric centres in the Far North of Cameroon
and some other climatic data (n.av. = not available)
Table 1 Rainfall per month, last five years of last century; in Bourah (10° 15’ N; 13° 31’ E; 775m) 
Source: Pluviometric station, Agricultural Service of Bourah
Table 2 Rainfall per month, in Sir (10° 34’ N; 13° 40’ E; 920m)
Source: Collection of Precipitation Data of Mission Catholic de SiR
Table 3 Rainfall 1995-2002 in Mogodé (±10° 37’ N; 13° 34’ E;1008 m)
Source: Pluviometric station, Agricultural Service Mogodé.
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March April May June July August Sept. Oct. Nov. Total
96 trace 22.5 170.3 138.3 112.5 240.3 183.8 58.8 0 926.4
97 0 65.5 102.5 147.8 202.3 246.6 349.3 78.9 0 1192.8
98 0 52.1 105.6 107.7 321.2 305.5 162.9 115.6 0 1170.6
99 0 0 43 212.4 110.4 307.7 182.2 180.1 0 1035.7
00 0 84.2 67.8 195.8 216.5 336 110.5 65 0 1075.8
Years 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mm rain 9990.8 829.86 1181.8 1068.2 735.1 819.8 1048.7 1038.8
Number of days 92 87 94 84 90 59 68 81
Nr. of months 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
March April May June July August Sept. Oct. Nov. total
92 0 26 102 107 143 332 140 26 0 875
93 0 43 61 161 208 222 160 10 0 976
94 0 127 31 191 343 550 0 0 0 1242
95 0 65 64 77 155 315 177 47 0 896
96 0 20 55 106 160 192 241 20 0 794
97 110 0 161 105 302 320 239 49 2 1287
98 0 24 63 195 223 379 172 78 0 1133
99 0 Trace 94 78 203 332 192 167 0 1066
00 0 27 62 158 335 581 85 34 0 1282
01 0 74 165 167 329 300 216 4 0 1286
02 0 71 0 241 131 152 211 105 7 935
Table 4 Monthly mean temperatures in Mogodé
Source: Pluviometric station, Agricultural Service Mogodé
Table 5 Precipitation over the months and years in Doukoula (10° 07’ N; 14° 58’ E; 340m)
a = In the year report for 1998 as well as in the SODECOTON archives and computer files for that year, precip-
itation data of the Doukoula region has disappeared. The same applies to 2001-2003 (last visit to archives of
SODECOTON Tchatibali: January 2004)
Source: SODECOTON Pluviometric station Doukoula (year reports SODECOTON and archives)
Table 6 Precipitation over the months and years in Tchatibali (10° 04’ N; 14° 55’ E; 340m)
Source: SODECOTON Pluviometric station Tchatibali (year reports and archives SODECOTON).
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April May June July Aug Sept Oct Year total
1995 n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. 960
1996 94 101 286 136 284 251 46 1198
1997 45 112 78 162 339 67 54 857
1998a n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av.
1999 0 56 70 109 281 189 106 811
2000 17 27 82 276 190 98 8 691
April May June July Aug Sept Oct Year total
1995 n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. 1040
1996 49 146 220 120 381 225 21 1162
1997 102 101 134 118 327 76 25 883
1998 11 62 111 126 452 238 49 1049
1999 8 47 41 214 397 204 49 960
2000 21 39 80 172 243 62 44 661
2001 12 129 18 250 302 275 3 989
2002 18 43 71 142 231 142 40 687
2003 22 13 202 270 286 289 14 1096
Months Jan. Febr. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Minima 2001 n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. 22 21.2 20.8 23.3 22.8 19.5
Maxima 2001 n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. n.av. 27.8 26.2 29.4 33.8 34.6 33.6
Minima 2002 16.4 20 25.6 27.4 27.9 24.4 22.8 21.5 21.6 22.9 22.9 n.av.
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